The General's abilities

[CSO_Talorgan]

Is it possible to simulate the difference between a Percival and a Patton?

Would varying the proficiency of HQ units do the trick?

[ColinWright]

ORIGINAL: CSO_Talorgan

Is it possible to simulate the difference between a Percival and a Patton?

Would varying the proficiency of HQ units do the trick?

Varying the proficiency of the HQ unit itself will only affect the behavior of that particular unit.

Assuming Percival and Patton are commanding different formations on the same side in the same scenario*, you can vary formation proficiency. Lower proficiency formations will be more likely to go into reorganization.

You can also vary the supply proficiencies of the concerned formations. See that scene in 'Patton' with him clearing the traffic jam at the road junction. Higher supply proficiency for his formation.

*if bored, work out the hypothetical where this happens!

[golden delicious]

ORIGINAL: ColinWright


*if bored, work out the hypothetical where this happens!

A company level scenario covering the 1918 Allied offensive.

Anyway, Percival is a bit of a scapegoat. He seems to have been fairly respected for his wartime record, and performed very well in Russia in 1919- and he certainly had no idea of the condition of the Japanese forces to which he surrendered.

[ColinWright]

ORIGINAL: golden delicious

ORIGINAL: ColinWright


*if bored, work out the hypothetical where this happens!

A company level scenario covering the 1918 Allied offensive.

Anyway, Percival is a bit of a scapegoat. He seems to have been fairly respected for his wartime record, and performed very well in Russia in 1919- and he certainly had no idea of the condition of the Japanese forces to which he surrendered.

...

These sort of rationalizations are often offered in defense of incompetent commanders -- however, that Percival was able to command a battalion or a brigade well in 1918 doesn't justify his conduct of the Malaysian campaign.

One wonders what would have happened if the Commonwealth forces had been commanded by Slim, or O'Conner, or Montgomery, or Auchinleck, or Alexander, or Gort, or Brooke -- there were quite a few British generals who convincingly demonstrated their competence in other campaigns. In the case of Auchinleck and Gort, this included staving off disaster with often disorganized forces in the face of an apparently unstoppable foe -- essentially what Percival failed to do.

I'd say that Percival delivered the most miserable performance of any Commonwealth field commander in World War Two. Wilson and Freyberg would run close seconds, and Mountbatten managed to bring about at least one egregious disaster -- but Percival delivered the Oscar-winning performance.

It's true that the forces Percival commanded had many weaknesses and shortcomings -- but the Japanese position wasn't so hot either. Had Matsushita (?) failed to win the campaign, few historians would have blamed him. Had that been the outcome, his forces would have been seen as 'obviously' inadequate.

A commander really is there to get a grip on the situation and stop the rot. Percival did not do that.

[golden delicious]

ORIGINAL: ColinWright

One wonders what would have happened if the Commonwealth forces had been commanded by Slim, or O'Conner, or Montgomery, or Auchinleck, or Alexander, or Gort, or Brooke -- there were quite a few British generals who convincingly demonstrated their competence in other campaigns.

I suppose Percival stands out amongst Allied commanders as having failed not for the usual blunders, but from apparently doing very little at all. I've looked at several articles and can't find any indication of what his actual response was to the Japanese beyond replacing a divisional commander at a critical juncture and the eventual surrender.

[ColinWright]

ORIGINAL: golden delicious

ORIGINAL: ColinWright

One wonders what would have happened if the Commonwealth forces had been commanded by Slim, or O'Conner, or Montgomery, or Auchinleck, or Alexander, or Gort, or Brooke -- there were quite a few British generals who convincingly demonstrated their competence in other campaigns.

I suppose Percival stands out amongst Allied commanders as having failed not for the usual blunders, but from apparently doing very little at all. I've looked at several articles and can't find any indication of what his actual response was to the Japanese beyond replacing a divisional commander at a critical juncture and the eventual surrender.

There you go. He was obviously up to managing an army -- just so long as fighting didn't break out.

[Curtis Lemay]

The thing is, though, I wonder what our assessment of MacAurthur would have been if all we had to base it on was Bataan.

[ColinWright]

ORIGINAL: Curtis Lemay

The thing is, though, I wonder what our assessment of MacAurthur would have been if all we had to base it on was Bataan.

For some of us, it might not affect our judgement all that much.

MacArthur certainly was talented -- but if anything, he probably took what are the common faults of gifted generals, and so exaggerated them that they became liabilities. He insisted on resources for his sector even when it made no sense at all, and he would always go for the showiest, most impressive route to success. After all, what made Bataan such a disaster was MacArthur conceiving the idea that he could keep the Japanese out of Luzon entirely. Inchon worked -- but in context, was the risk really necessary?

To some extent, I think that by World War Two, he was past it. His prime really had been World War One -- where he was a brilliant brigade commander. By 1942, he was just too old -- and the sycophants he surrounded himself with only served to confirm his faith in his continuing genius.

He was not so much a great general as a wildly uneven one. If it was a matter of a forlorn hope, he would have been an excellent choice. After all, it was always entirely possible he'd come up with something. On the other hand, if I had a sure thing, I would never trust him with it. He might come up with something in that case as well.

[ColinWright]

ORIGINAL: Curtis Lemay

The thing is, though, I wonder what our assessment of MacAurthur would have been if all we had to base it on was Bataan.

To actually address your point, one does have to go with what one has -- and Malaya was a prolonged campaign. Percival had plenty of chances to mend his ways. Not that I know enough to actually call the judgment authoritative, but he reminds me of nothing so much as a junior clerk suddenly put in charge of a major corporation in serious financial trouble -- completely overwhelmed and not capable of much beyond sitting there watching disaster unfold.

[Curtis Lemay]

ORIGINAL: ColinWright
He was not so much a great general as a wildly uneven one.

Which is why he is so controversial. Experts disagree about him just as wildly. But if all we had to go on was Bataan, he wouldn't be controversial at all. There would be uniform consensus that he was a failure. Poor ole Percival never got a second chance.

[CSO_Talorgan]

ORIGINAL: ColinWright
Assuming Percival and Patton are commanding different formations on the same side in the same scenario*, you can vary formation proficiency. Lower proficiency formations will be more likely to go into reorganization.

You can also vary the supply proficiencies of the concerned formations.

Thank you for this.

ORIGINAL: ColinWright
*if bored, work out the hypothetical where this happens!

How about Monty goes to Malaya and Percival ends up a corps commander in Sicily?

[ColinWright]

ORIGINAL: Curtis Lemay

ORIGINAL: ColinWright
He was not so much a great general as a wildly uneven one.

Which is why he is so controversial. Experts disagree about him just as wildly. But if all we had to go on was Bataan, he wouldn't be controversial at all. There would be uniform consensus that he was a failure. Poor ole Percival never got a second chance.

...and rightly so. As I said, I lack sufficient familiarity to be sure of my ground here, but over the three months of the Malaya campaign, Percival seems to have clearly demonstrated that he was incapable of exercising command at the army level. You're right that if all we had to go on was Macarthur's 1942 campaign, he'd be regarded as an imbecile of the first order -- but no one ever doubted he was in charge.

[ColinWright]

How about Monty goes to Malaya and Percival ends up a corps commander in Sicily?

Interesting thought. Leaving aside Percival's ability to command a corps, Montgomery in Malaya would be an unknown. He never held any command higher than that of a division when facing a superior enemy in the field. No telling how he would have done -- but I have the impression he was able to sack incompetent or disobedient subordinates, motivate troops, change plans when things weren't working out, etc. It's entirely possible he would have done very well.

[CSO_Talorgan]

ORIGINAL: ColinWright
Montgomery in Malaya would be an unknown. He never held any command higher than that of a division when facing a superior enemy in the field. No telling how he would have done -- but I have the impression he was able to sack incompetent or disobedient subordinates, motivate troops, change plans when things weren't working out, etc. It's entirely possible he would have done very well.

From what I know of Montgomery I'm inclined to believe that he would have been better on the defense than the offense.

[golden delicious]

ORIGINAL: CSO_Talorgan

From what I know of Montgomery I'm inclined to believe that he would have been better on the defense than the offense.

Well Montgomery was good at set-peice battles. This doesn't bode well for the Malaya campaign as a whole but he may have been able to conduct a more respectable defence of Singapore.

[CSO_Talorgan]

ORIGINAL: golden delicious
Well Montgomery was good at set-peice battles.

Was he?

I thought his strength was in restoring discipline to chaotic situations.

[ColinWright]

ORIGINAL: CSO_Talorgan

ORIGINAL: golden delicious
Well Montgomery was good at set-peice battles.

Was he?

I thought his strength was in restoring discipline to chaotic situations.

I think Auchinleck actually did the hard bit as far as that goes.

[ColinWright]

ORIGINAL: golden delicious

ORIGINAL: CSO_Talorgan

From what I know of Montgomery I'm inclined to believe that he would have been better on the defense than the offense.

Well Montgomery was good at set-peice battles. This doesn't bode well for the Malaya campaign as a whole but he may have been able to conduct a more respectable defence of Singapore.

To be fair to Montgomery, he was always noticeably leaden in the pursuit. However, that doesn't necessarily mean he would be incapable of conducting a mobile defense. After all, he needn't screw up his courage to go after the enemy under those circumstances -- they'll come to him.

I dislike discussing things I don't know enough about (particularly when people who do know may be in the vicinity), however, if I recall correctly, Percival did little about relieving certain obviously inadequate Indian Army division commanders, and equally little about reining in a very headstrong Australian division commander.

I see Montgomery as proving far more effective in both these roles. Add that if he does delay the Japanese much beyond the historical, then 18th Division shows up in time to be thrown into the line.

So now things bidding fair to last well into 1942.

Now. Imagine the Americans counterattacking in Bataan. (At one point the Japanese were absurdly weak there.).

It's February 1942. The British are holding firm somewhere along the Malay peninsula. The Fil-Americans have just liberated Manila to wildly cheering crowds.

Interestingly, it all forces a premature Anglo-American counter-offensive and a diversion of resources to fight Hitler. Not really good for the Allied cause at all.

[CSO_Talorgan]

ORIGINAL: ColinWright
I think Auchinleck actually did the hard bit as far as that goes.

Come to think on it, you are probably right.

Returning though to the original question, would a difference in general's abilities be brought out by giving subordinate units different colours, thereby reducing cohesion?

[Erik2]

ORIGINAL: CSO_Talorgan

ORIGINAL: ColinWright
I think Auchinleck actually did the hard bit as far as that goes.

Come to think on it, you are probably right.

Returning though to the original question, would a difference in general's abilities be brought out by giving subordinate units different colours, thereby reducing cohesion?

I usually give formations different icon colours to establish their ability to coordinate combat. I use this together with the formation cooperation levels, ie army, free support etc. Using these may also restrict supprt assets, like bn artillery vs corps artillery. A general's abilities could be reflected in overall supply and force/HQ proficiency.