Rommel - A great general?

[BriteLite]

ORIGINAL: Shawkhan

...Have you read the book by Peter Tsouras,'Disaster at D-Day'? It shows what might have happened if Rommel hadn't left his post at the critical hour and the use of reserves had worked out just a little better.

No I have not. But it is now on my buy list. Thanks!

[LAntorcha]

ORIGINAL: ColinWright

A fairly good example of Rommel's style --

Now, the career of ninety nine generals out of a hundred would have come to an end right there.

I've read it. That was brilliant!!! (that and how Mr.Bean apologizes at the disco [&o] Never have seen nothing like those examples of master improvisation) Gold Medal, Kudos, Smoke and Mirrors...

Isn't true that once ordered a engineer the "construction" of several Panzers out from recon cars an some textile materials on surplus?

Hitler exploited 100% the figure of a mediatical crack like E.Rommel (a product of her beloved Reich). To the point that when matters in N.Africa went bad, he suddenly felt "ill" and had to be moved away.

Rommel seems to stick with A.H. at the begining but with the passing of the months I think Rommel realized her Führer's nature which would lead to disaster sooner or later.

Should it be from the esprit de corps achieved or from natural genius, he deserves recognition. Although his successes must been owed to a high level of proficiency from the men under his command, at least to some grade.

One could make the analogy of Rommel being a excellent soccer captain (and a really good striker) but incapable of being the team manager, nor viewing the match from the coach's place. Knowing that nothing can be done with a dommed score by mid-time.

I think surely was under knowledge of the plot (in fact it seems din't resist to being captured) but not being involved at all.

On ULTRA: recently readed that beside the real project, there where some other side projects of direct counter-intelligence involving people deceased a decade ago. Material concerning that was not revealed until recent times in order to protect the life of those agents (no way of being sure if it is real or Reader's Digest stuff).

About Auftragstaktik in modern days:
Do not forget of the epic of the Leading forward concept confronted to the musicality of a .338 Lapua Magnum through your best commander's zygomatic bone.

Unless him being a Titan like GW so it isn't a total waste of ammo.

[ColinWright]

ORIGINAL: LAntorcha

ORIGINAL: ColinWright

A fairly good example of Rommel's style --

Now, the career of ninety nine generals out of a hundred would have come to an end right there.

I've read it. That was brilliant!!! (that and how Mr.Bean apologizes at the disco [&o] Never have seen nothing like those examples of master improvisation) Gold Medal, Kudos, Smoke and Mirrors...

Isn't true that once ordered a engineer the "construction" of several Panzers out from recon cars an some textile materials on surplus?

That sounds like a reference to the deception measures Rommel practiced when the Afrika Korps was landing at Tripoli in February 1941. Not having much to actually stop the British with if they chose to advance, he faked it as best he could until he did have a substantial force ashore.

Rommel seems to stick with A.H. at the begining but with the passing of the months I think Rommel realized her Führer's nature which would lead to disaster sooner or later.

Rommel seems to have been a bit of a political naif. I think it was in late 1943 that he suggested to Hitler that Germany should appoint a Jewish gauleiter so as to deflect criticism. Probably a real shortage of suitable material by that point...

...One could make the analogy of Rommel being a excellent soccer captain (and a really good striker) but incapable of being the team manager, nor viewing the match from the coach's place. Knowing that nothing can be done with a dommed score by mid-time.

Now that's a criticism I find unconvincing. That Rommel was never chief of the General Staff can be seen as an argument against assuming that he would have done well. It does nothing to prove he wouldn't have. Why wouldn't Rommel have made an excellent 'team manager?' Beyond the fact that he never had the job in the first place, I don't see any evidence at all.

[IronDuke_slith]

Great thread, which is not all that common. These sorts of threads (IMHO about the net) can quickly get a bit mythical. My compliments all round.

My only intervention would be to caution against overuse of the term Aufstragstaktik. As a term, I think this was largely the invention of the American military in the 70s. The Germans certainly never used it as enthusiastically during the war as all and sundry have used it after.

In its most basic guise, it was dead by 1942, and only a handful of examples really exist before that. It tends to exist these days as a catch all term for German military techniques but never meant what most people tend to think it does.

As for Rommel. Morally suspect, he was an operational genius in the traditional German mould. The leap forward after Mersa Matruh is evidence at its most basic. Perhaps no other army in the world would have gone forward with the logistics he had at that point. German doctrine saw no other way. That it all fell apart is beside the point.

As others have suggested, I think he was right about the defence of Normandy, although I'd agree with the poster who suggested his performance was on a par with any one of fifty other Germans who could have been appointed. The operational conditions at that point were such that there wasn't anyone who could have held Normandy for much longer than they did.

Regards,
IronDuke

[quikstrike]

Rommel got promoted above his level of competency. As a Divisional or even Corps commander he was good. As a Field Marshal, he lost sight of operational imperatives, most critically logistics. Anyone who has studied the N. African campaign, or wargamed it, knows how critical the logistics issue was for both sides in the campaign. Rommel treated it as a pesky side issue. Compounding this was his insistence at pursuing the British rather than accepting an operational pause in order to execute HERCULES, the invasion of Malta. Neutralizing Malta had the potential to significantly ease Rommel's logistics burden, both Hitler and Mussolini had signed off on plans for HERCULES, and Rommel convinced them to cancel the operation. Bad idea.

[ColinWright]

ORIGINAL: quikstrike

Rommel got promoted above his level of competency. As a Divisional or even Corps commander he was good. As a Field Marshal, he lost sight of operational imperatives, most critically logistics. Anyone who has studied the N. African campaign, or wargamed it, knows how critical the logistics issue was for both sides in the campaign. Rommel treated it as a pesky side issue. Compounding this was his insistence at pursuing the British rather than accepting an operational pause in order to execute HERCULES, the invasion of Malta. Neutralizing Malta had the potential to significantly ease Rommel's logistics burden, both Hitler and Mussolini had signed off on plans for HERCULES, and Rommel convinced them to cancel the operation. Bad idea.

Hitler was also queasy about Hercules -- and if you look at what the British garrison consisted of, it becomes clear that it would have been a disaster.

As to Rommel's competence as an army commander, compare and contrast: the troops and equipment at his disposal and the troops and equipment available to his opponent. Then look up the relative flow of supplies.

With four German divisions (one of them a distinctly improvised formation) and some Italians, Rommel stood off the main military effort of the entire British empire -- and even threatened to defeat it entirely.

I think it was a pretty impressive performance.

Put it this way. You question his competence as an army commander: I think the British would have thought it worth their while to pay almost any sum to have had him relieved from that position. My guess is they weren't as glad to have him commanding Panzerarmee Afrika as your evaluation implies they should have been.

[Curtis Lemay]

ORIGINAL: ColinWright
Hitler was also queasy about Hercules -- and if you look at what the British garrison consisted of, it becomes clear that it would have been a disaster.

As to Rommel's competence as an army commander, compare and contrast: the troops and equipment at his disposal and the troops and equipment available to his opponent. Then look up the relative flow of supplies.

With four German divisions (one of them a distinctly improvised formation) and some Italians, Rommel stood off the main military effort of the entire British empire -- and even threatened to defeat it entirely.

I think it was a pretty impressive performance.

Put it this way. You question his competence as an army commander: I think the British would have thought it worth their while to pay almost any sum to have had him relieved from that position. My guess is they weren't as glad to have him commanding Panzerarmee Afrika as your evaluation implies they should have been.

I agree with Colin here. The assessment of his advance after Tobruk relies entirely on 20:20 hindsight, and ignores the huge influx of material the CW received after it - something he couldn't have known about. As I've pointed out earlier in this thread, there was some level of force below which the CW couldn't hold El Alamein, regardless of the logistical situation. And they had just been decimated at Tobruk. Capture of Alexandria would have solved all logistical issues far better than capture of Malta. And that nearly happened.

Just consider that Rommel owns something very few Generals (or pundits) possess: Victories over superior forces.

[ColinWright]

ORIGINAL: Curtis Lemay


I agree with Colin here. The assessment of his advance after Tobruk relies entirely on 20:20 hindsight, and ignores the huge influx of material the CW received after it - something he couldn't have known about. As I've pointed out earlier in this thread, there was some level of force below which the CW couldn't hold El Alamein, regardless of the logistical situation. And they had just been decimated at Tobruk. Capture of Alexandria would have solved all logistical issues far better than capture of Malta. And that nearly happened.

Just consider that Rommel owns something very few Generals (or pundits) possess: Victories over superior forces.

I'll also reiterate my point about Hercules. Look up the size of Malta, consider its terrain, and look up the British garrison in 1942. Then look up the intended attacking force. It would have made Crete look like a cake-walk -- and it wouldn't have worked.

Now, the Germans may have been well on their way to starving Malta into submission -- the British aren't Russians, and they couldn't have stuck a hundred thousand civilian fatalities from lack of food. Not to mention that the Maltese themselves might have objected. It wasn't, after all, really their war.

However, prolonging the siege isn't what was proposed, and in any case, as you say, it only looks like the better course in hindsight. Given the situation at the time, Rommel and the Germans put their money on the right horse. Try to hustle the British right out of North Africa. In principle, the thing to do with a beaten foe is not to let him withdraw unmolested and regroup.

[Curtis Lemay]

ORIGINAL: ColinWright
I'll also reiterate my point about Hercules. Look up the size of Malta, consider its terrain, and look up the British garrison in 1942. Then look up the intended attacking force. It would have made Crete look like a cake-walk -- and it wouldn't have worked.

And that's if it actually went off as planned. Since it was a joint operation between the Italians and the Germans, there was real fear that the Italian Navy would balk after the German paratroops had been dropped. (I think you may be my source on this?)

However, prolonging the siege isn't what was proposed, and in any case, as you say, it only looks like the better course in hindsight. Given the situation at the time, Rommel and the Germans put their money on the right horse. Try to hustle the British right out of North Africa. In principle, the thing to do with a beaten foe is not to let him withdraw unmolested and regroup.

Exactly. Just because an operation failed doesn't mean it wasn't the percentage play. The Germans were trying to win the war - not hold out till 1946.

[ColinWright]

ORIGINAL: Curtis Lemay

ORIGINAL: ColinWright
I'll also reiterate my point about Hercules. Look up the size of Malta, consider its terrain, and look up the British garrison in 1942. Then look up the intended attacking force. It would have made Crete look like a cake-walk -- and it wouldn't have worked.

And that's if it actually went off as planned. Since it was a joint operation between the Italians and the Germans, there was real fear that the Italian Navy would balk after the German paratroops had been dropped. (I think you may be my source on this?)

Could well be. Hitler (with good reason) was very uneasy about placing much faith in the ability of the Italians to execute. It's worth pointing out that if the Italians had successfully executed their amphibious landing, it would have gone down as their only successful offensive operation of World War Two other than managing to overrun British Somaliland.

However, prolonging the siege isn't what was proposed, and in any case, as you say, it only looks like the better course in hindsight. Given the situation at the time, Rommel and the Germans put their money on the right horse. Try to hustle the British right out of North Africa. In principle, the thing to do with a beaten foe is not to let him withdraw unmolested and regroup.

Exactly. Just because an operation failed doesn't mean it wasn't the percentage play. The Germans were trying to win the war - not hold out till 1946.

Plus, what was the downside? It's not like the British would have agreed to leave Rommel alone if he promised to leave them alone. There would have been an overwhelming British offensive at the end of 1942 -- wherever the front was.

[Shawkhan]

...Interestingly enough, I think both sides in this thread are correct, given historical hindsight. Only one major relevant fact from the Malta situation has not been discussed. Logistics was the ONLY thing keeping Rommel from taking Cairo in 1942. The fact that the British had broken the Axis codes I believe was the deciding factor in Rommel's defeat. Supply was so critical to him that he insisted on knowing the exact dates Italian tankers and freighters would sail for Tripoli. As the British had access to the same information, it was a simple matter to arrange a fatal rendezvous for the unfortunate Italians. If Rommel had not unwittingly provided this information to the Allies, I maintain that the Suez Canal would have been taken by the Axis.
...Of course, the whole North African campaign would have been different if Hitler had had any strategic ability at all, since the whole Med would have been closed if he had seized the opportunity to take Gibraltar before the end of 1940. 

[ColinWright]

ORIGINAL: Shawkhan

...
...Of course, the whole North African campaign would have been different if Hitler had had any strategic ability at all, since the whole Med would have been closed if he had seized the opportunity to take Gibraltar before the end of 1940. 

How? Supplies only rarely came via Gibraltar.

The route was far too dangerous. The normal route was around Africa.

Then too, the Malta question tends to be misstated. There wasn't a choice between successfully attacking it and supporting Rommel. It's not like the Germans could have taken it by assault in any case. Seriously: the British really had made it impregnable.

Now, the Germans could have kept up their bombardment, which (a) might have eventually forced Malta to surrender, and (b) certainly would have prevented it reviving as a base for interdicting Rommel's supply lines. However, I doubt if Malta would have actually surrendered in time to do Rommel any good.

In any case, continuing the bombardment strips Rommel of what air support he had for his plunge into Egypt. Does his plunge still happen in this case?

Secondly, I don't see anything improving in time to affect Rommel's July attempt to hustle the British out of El Alamein. In fact, a continuing effort against Malta only weakens that effort.

After that point, Rommel wasn't going to break through. It's possible that with improved supplies, he might have fared better against Montgomery's offensive -- but if that air force is still plastering Malta, then the Allies have even greater air superiority over the desert.

So maybe those supplies make it to North Africa -- but can't be brought up to the front. They're blown up in trucks in the desert instead of sunk in ships on the sea.

In any case, my understanding is that once Rommel was up at El Alamein a surprising volume of his supplies was brought over from Greece and Crete rather than via Tripoli -- which was rather far in the rear by that point. Neutralizing Malta might not be quite as decisive as you assume. That is to say, there's some portion of Rommel's supply stream that is simply unaffected by what happens to Malta.

[Shawkhan]

...Tiger convoy ring a bell? W/o emergency convoys run into Malta via Gibraltar I do believe starvation would have occurred before the Fall of Tobruk. Of course we only conjecture for argument's sake. Naturally Malta would have been taken by 1941 if some one in Berlin had been thinking.
...Greece and Crete do not have a land connection to North Africa. Are you talking just air transport? 

[ColinWright]

ORIGINAL: Shawkhan

...Tiger convoy ring a bell? W/o emergency convoys run into Malta via Gibraltar I do believe starvation would have occurred before the Fall of Tobruk. Of course we only conjecture for argument's sake. Naturally Malta would have been taken by 1941 if some one in Berlin had been thinking.

The Tiger convoy would be the exception that proves the rule -- and that was before the Luftwaffe showed up. Thereafter, any convoy into the Mediterranean Basin was an extravagantly expensive and risky proposition, usually requiring several escorts for every merchant vessel, and often ending in complete failure, with most ships sunk or forced to turn back. See the attempts to succor Malta. In fact, after Tiger, I don't think any convoy ran the gauntlet all the way from Gibraltar to Egypt until 1943.

As to Malta herself, the reliefs were usually mounted from Egypt -- since air cover could be furnished from Cyrenician airfields. While fighters were flown in from carriers staging out of Gibraltar, I don't believe most civilians supplies were brought in that way. Had the need been there, the fighters could have been brought in via Egypt as well. Again, Gibraltar wasn't critical. Nice, but not a sin qua non.

At the end of the day, while Gibraltar was important, it was not pivotal to the situation in the Mediterranean. Had it fallen, the manner in which it fell, what this implied about Spain entering the war, and the various knock-on effects from that would have far outshadowed any actual change in the situation from the Rock changing hands.

...Greece and Crete do not have a land connection to North Africa. Are you talking just air transport? 

Tripoli does have a land connection? Man, are my atlases out of whack...

Anyway, it's just something I recall reading. By the time he was up at El Alamein, an awful lot of what Rommel was getting was being brought over from Greece/Crete. I'm not saying it eliminates Malta as an important factor in the equation, but it does qualify it.

I don't want to assert Gibraltar was valueless. However, it wasn't a ten. I'd give it about a six. Others might argue for eight. Had it fallen, though, I don't see the situation in North Africa changing except through such indirect effects as Spain entering the war, French North Africa becoming available to the Axis, etc. The base -- in and of itself -- wasn't a war winner or a war loser.

[hank]

by wmorris
snippet
"...
Erhard Raus' memoir Panzer Operations and his many contributions to the postwar papers published by the US Army show him to have been both a remarkable tactician and an innovator. He, along with Gotthard Heinrici seem to be the originators of "zone defense" tactics, that gave greater success with less force than prior German practice. He too came to be a nuisance due to truth-telling and got the sack after several remarkable operational performances."
 
Very interesting thread. 
 
I was wondering when/if anyone would mention these two guys.  Raus and Heinrici were great tacticians.  I have Raus' book.  I find few significant sections in any of the books I have that were written with details on Heinrici's accomplishments and from the little I've read his were mostly limited to the ending months of the war (are there any?).  IMHO the best strategists were Manstein and Guderian and the great divisional/corp generals who made the German army so effective, i.e. Rommel, Balck, Raus, Hausser, and others whose names escapes me.  It takes a different mindset to command entire armies as opposed to corps or divisions.  I prefer reading about division commanders and their up close and personal accounts like von Luck's adventures at Cagney July 18 during Operation Goodwood; Raus' actions near the Aksay River, etc. ... and all the way down to the individual soldiers ... like tank commanders Wittmann, Bolter, Dr. Bakke and their gunners Kurt Knisple, Bobbi Wohl, and dozens of others.  (my Tiger Aces books are so worn out I need to buy new ones)  ... my 2 pennies for its worth

[ColinWright]

Reading Irving's The Trail of the Fox here.  Okay, it has to be admitted Rommel was...exuberant.

From a Memorandum written by the Wehrmacht chief of Army personnel:

"...It is remarkable that in the case of one officer, a battalion commander in the Fifth Panzer Regiment, a recommendation for the Knight's Cross, a cowardice charge, and his dismissal followed one another in the briefest interval..."