Shibasaki - Tenacious Defender Of Tarawa
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Shibasaki - Tenacious Defender Of Tarawa
Rear Admiral Keiji Shibasaki's defense of Tarawa cost the allies dearly. With a force of about 5K he inflicted major casualties and delayed Nimitz's advance through the central pacific. Another of Japan's great military men- Shibasaki.
virtute omne regatur
I think he is a fan of the Imperial Japanese Army
Hi
So how many more "great" Japanese military leaders do you have on your list?:)
Dan
So how many more "great" Japanese military leaders do you have on your list?:)
Dan
He'll keep naming them until he finds one who was a great leader.
Shibasaki. The man who said that Tarawa could not be taken by a million men in a thousand years: if the defenders had been USMC, he'd have been correct.
I'll nominate an Allied one. Cunningham. Heroic defender of Wake Island. Commander of a scratch force of civilians, USMC artillerists, a couple of machine guns and a handful of F4F3s. Together they sank two Japanese ships, repulsed an invasion, personally broke wind in the face of Admiral Yamamoto, and delayed the Japanese advance through the Pacific, ultimately requiring the Japanese to use two fleet carriers worth of planes and an entire infantry division.
Cunningham: You the Man.
Shibasaki. The man who said that Tarawa could not be taken by a million men in a thousand years: if the defenders had been USMC, he'd have been correct.
I'll nominate an Allied one. Cunningham. Heroic defender of Wake Island. Commander of a scratch force of civilians, USMC artillerists, a couple of machine guns and a handful of F4F3s. Together they sank two Japanese ships, repulsed an invasion, personally broke wind in the face of Admiral Yamamoto, and delayed the Japanese advance through the Pacific, ultimately requiring the Japanese to use two fleet carriers worth of planes and an entire infantry division.
Cunningham: You the Man.
Show me a fellow who rejects statistical analysis a priori and I'll show you a fellow who has no knowledge of statistics.
Didn't we have this conversation already?
Didn't we have this conversation already?
Re: I think he is a fan of the Imperial Japanese Army
Am reading War in the Pacific by Harry Gailey. He is much better about listing Japanese commanders and troop names/dispositions. I am playing IJN/IJA in UV so am trying to stay psyched up. In reality Japan was thorougly beaten with horrendous casualties in almost every confrontation.Originally posted by U2
Hi
So how many more "great" Japanese military leaders do you have on your list?:)
Dan
virtute omne regatur
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Jeremy Pritchard
- Posts: 575
- Joined: Thu Sep 27, 2001 8:00 am
- Location: Ontario Canada
Since when did Tojo get all of this Hitler power?Originally posted by Dawy
Their horrendous casualties were caused by their belief in their "bushido code" of honor.
The bushido code revised by Tojo was nothing more than a big propoganda scam in order to boost the morale fibre of the Japanese army.
Tojo was not Hitler, he never had close to the same power that Hitler had. Churchill and Roosevelt were more dictators then Tojo, since no matter how bad things got, they would be in power until the end. Tojo was effectively ousted from power in 1943 and officially removed in 1944. Japan was run by a military government that gradually assumed power in the 1930's. You give Tojo too much credit, in reality he was not as imaginative or charismatic as Hitler. Tojo didn't do anything that was not devised by the military government as a whole, he was just their voice, not their brain.
Now if you really want to talk about Japanese commanders, how about Yamashita, Yamaguchi, Ozawa and Tanaka? These were truely great commanders who were defeated more by circumstance then their ineptitude.
[QUOTE]Originally posted by Jeremy Pritchard
Since when did Tojo get all of this Hitler power?
Tojo was not Hitler, he never had close to the same power that Hitler had. Churchill and Roosevelt were more dictators then Tojo, since no matter how bad things got, they would be in power until the end. Tojo was effectively ousted from power in 1943 and officially removed in 1944. Japan was run by a military government that gradually assumed power in the 1930's. You give Tojo too much credit, in reality he was not as imaginative or charismatic as Hitler. Tojo didn't do anything that was not devised by the military government as a whole, he was just their voice, not their brain.
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My mistake. You were right. Tojo was only a figurehead for the Japanese army.
Here's a better explanation for the horrendous casualties of the Japanese army...
The Japanese army was created and bred in a cultural environment which, while emphasising the spiritual martial values of a warrior ethos, also promoted fanatacism and a non-intellectual outlook. This was to outweigh the warrior virtues and eventually lead to disaster.
The special relationship of the Japanese race to the divinity of the Emperor imbued in the Japanese serviceman a feeling of moral or spiritual superiority over opponents which led to the discounting of the importance of the more intellectual, technological and logistical aspects of war. Keep in mind the Japanese serviceman of the Pacific War was less than 100 years removed from the feudal traditions of the Samurai, the class from which the Army and Navy were drawn after the commencement of modernisation. The military life of the medieval Samurai with its simple weapons and campaigning in the small area of Japan required little in the way of logistics, intelligence or planning; an uncomplicated warrior ethos prevailed. In the 20th century these values were reflected in the Japanese command structure. Although all staff bureaus were theoretically equal, in fact the operations bureau held the real power, even the Chief of Army Staff being little more than a robot. ‘High spirited’ and ‘glamorous’ combat officers disliked the ‘plodders’ and ‘worriers’ who worked in intelligence and logistics. Logistics were regarded as ‘boring’.
The Japanese commanders had traditional samurai values imbued into their mind through strict indoctrination during training. Generally speaking these were young men from a conservative and traditional rural background. They were recruited at the age of twelve to thirteen and were from that time isolated from normal society. Their education imbued them with a contempt for Western values which led to an ignorance of, and lack of interest in, enemy fighting potential and a total underestimation of it. Many officers who visited the West, like Tojo, simply confirmed their prejudices of Western decadence.
Since when did Tojo get all of this Hitler power?
Tojo was not Hitler, he never had close to the same power that Hitler had. Churchill and Roosevelt were more dictators then Tojo, since no matter how bad things got, they would be in power until the end. Tojo was effectively ousted from power in 1943 and officially removed in 1944. Japan was run by a military government that gradually assumed power in the 1930's. You give Tojo too much credit, in reality he was not as imaginative or charismatic as Hitler. Tojo didn't do anything that was not devised by the military government as a whole, he was just their voice, not their brain.
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My mistake. You were right. Tojo was only a figurehead for the Japanese army.
Here's a better explanation for the horrendous casualties of the Japanese army...
The Japanese army was created and bred in a cultural environment which, while emphasising the spiritual martial values of a warrior ethos, also promoted fanatacism and a non-intellectual outlook. This was to outweigh the warrior virtues and eventually lead to disaster.
The special relationship of the Japanese race to the divinity of the Emperor imbued in the Japanese serviceman a feeling of moral or spiritual superiority over opponents which led to the discounting of the importance of the more intellectual, technological and logistical aspects of war. Keep in mind the Japanese serviceman of the Pacific War was less than 100 years removed from the feudal traditions of the Samurai, the class from which the Army and Navy were drawn after the commencement of modernisation. The military life of the medieval Samurai with its simple weapons and campaigning in the small area of Japan required little in the way of logistics, intelligence or planning; an uncomplicated warrior ethos prevailed. In the 20th century these values were reflected in the Japanese command structure. Although all staff bureaus were theoretically equal, in fact the operations bureau held the real power, even the Chief of Army Staff being little more than a robot. ‘High spirited’ and ‘glamorous’ combat officers disliked the ‘plodders’ and ‘worriers’ who worked in intelligence and logistics. Logistics were regarded as ‘boring’.
The Japanese commanders had traditional samurai values imbued into their mind through strict indoctrination during training. Generally speaking these were young men from a conservative and traditional rural background. They were recruited at the age of twelve to thirteen and were from that time isolated from normal society. Their education imbued them with a contempt for Western values which led to an ignorance of, and lack of interest in, enemy fighting potential and a total underestimation of it. Many officers who visited the West, like Tojo, simply confirmed their prejudices of Western decadence.
Coming second is nothing more than being the first loser...
What is the dope with Yamaguchi, or Ozawa? The names are familiar but I cant place themOriginally posted by Jeremy Pritchard
Now if you really want to talk about Japanese commanders, how about Yamashita, Yamaguchi, Ozawa and Tanaka? These were truely great commanders who were defeated more by circumstance then their ineptitude.
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Jeremy Pritchard
- Posts: 575
- Joined: Thu Sep 27, 2001 8:00 am
- Location: Ontario Canada
I had a good and detailed post but the forum messed up and lost it... Here is a condensed version...
Ozawa:
- Led successful Indian Ocean Crusier raid in May-April 1942, most successful raid of surface warships during war.
- Led Carriers at Leyte Gulf, was the only commander who actually stuck to plan, he also realized when enough was enough and retreated at the soonest possible moment, saving his battleships, cruisers and most of his destroyers.
Yamaguchi:
- Was the carrier commander during the 1st 6 Months of the war.
- Commanded the Pearl Harbour strike, but was countermanded by Nagumo for further strikes to attack facilities.
- Commanded the Carrier Strike Force during the Java campaign, focussed on supply and transport which were more critical targets then warships in securing Java.
- Commanded the Indian Ocean strike, sank everything he could find.
- Commanded the Midway Operation, continually had Nagumo interfering with strikes and operational plans. Did not want to change aircraft armament multiple times but contermanded. After the loss of 3 carriers on the 1st Day he managed to send out a pinpoint strike from the Hiryu that crippled and started the course of events that sank the Yorktown. Elected to stay on the Hiryu when it went down. Would have been better if he switched places with Nagumo.
Basically, Yamaguchi was Japan's preimenent Carrier mind. Nagumo still lived in the world of battleships, and Yamamoto only realized the potential of the carrier, he really did not know how to use them tactically as Yamaguchi did. Unfortunately, Yamaguchi was never really allowed to have the freedom of command, as all of his missions were high profile, and required more then a Rear Admiral for command.
Ozawa:
- Led successful Indian Ocean Crusier raid in May-April 1942, most successful raid of surface warships during war.
- Led Carriers at Leyte Gulf, was the only commander who actually stuck to plan, he also realized when enough was enough and retreated at the soonest possible moment, saving his battleships, cruisers and most of his destroyers.
Yamaguchi:
- Was the carrier commander during the 1st 6 Months of the war.
- Commanded the Pearl Harbour strike, but was countermanded by Nagumo for further strikes to attack facilities.
- Commanded the Carrier Strike Force during the Java campaign, focussed on supply and transport which were more critical targets then warships in securing Java.
- Commanded the Indian Ocean strike, sank everything he could find.
- Commanded the Midway Operation, continually had Nagumo interfering with strikes and operational plans. Did not want to change aircraft armament multiple times but contermanded. After the loss of 3 carriers on the 1st Day he managed to send out a pinpoint strike from the Hiryu that crippled and started the course of events that sank the Yorktown. Elected to stay on the Hiryu when it went down. Would have been better if he switched places with Nagumo.
Basically, Yamaguchi was Japan's preimenent Carrier mind. Nagumo still lived in the world of battleships, and Yamamoto only realized the potential of the carrier, he really did not know how to use them tactically as Yamaguchi did. Unfortunately, Yamaguchi was never really allowed to have the freedom of command, as all of his missions were high profile, and required more then a Rear Admiral for command.
Clarification
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"The carrier commander during the 1st 6 Months of the war" was Nagumo Chuichi, whose background was in destroyers rather than battleships. Yamaguchi Tamon commanded Carrier Division Two, comprising Hiryu and Soryu; Nagumo commanded the Japanese carrier force from Pearl Harbor through Santa Cruz and was therefore Yamaguchi's CO. And though Nagumo could be overcautious, Yamaguchi could also be overbold. Case in point: Pearl Harbor, where Nagumo made the smart call.
First, there's the timing to consider. A third wave would have had to wait for the survivors of the first wave to return, repair, refuel, and rearm; consequently a renewed strike could not have begun launching until well after noon. Thus a third wave would have faced the prospect of a long overwater flight and carrier landing in the dark. Physically and mentally exhausted after nearly twelve hours of flying (including ~2 hours of combat flying) that day. Rusty after not being able to practice even daylight carrier ops since leaving home waters, due to the need for operational security. Operational losses would have wrecked Nagumo's air groups, even disregarding the much stiffer resistance (especially flak) another strike would have faced without the element of surprise.
Second, sticking around would have unnecessarily exposed Nagumo's carriers. Returning fliers reported that Oahu airfields remained operational with an unknown number of heavy bombers - in hindsight we know that high-altitude level bombing posed no threat to maneuvering ships at sea, but in December 1941 this was less clear. Nagumo also knew that the US had at least two CVs somewhere in the vicinity, but their exact locations were unknown - all he knew was that he hadn't caught them at Pearl. Had Nagumo remained in the area, he risked having ~100 SBDs and TBDs show up over his formation from an unexpected direction while his own aircraft were stuck belowdecks preparing for another strike at Oahu. Again, we know that at most only one US CV was in position to even attempt an intercept, but Nagumo could not know that.
Third, he had to keep to a fairly rigid refueling timetable. His destroyer screen didn't have enough fuel to stick around Oahu very long, so Nagumo had to get back or else risk being forced to abandon them, out of fuel, adrift, and helpless on the open ocean. Nagumo's screen represented a significant chunk of Japan's total destroyer force, and almost all were of the most modern and capable types - losing them would have cost the IJN dearly.
Fourth, Nagumo's orders were to hurt the Pacific Fleet badly enough that it would not be able to interfere with Japanese operations in what they considered the crucial first six months, while Japan established a defensive perimeter. He'd accomplished that mission - had in fact succeeded beyond his wildest dreams - so there was really no reason to stick around, risking Japan's precious carriers and invaluable air groups. Certainly nothing that outweighed the very good reasons to get out of Dodge. Small wonder that Nagumo's staff advised him to quit while he was ahead (despite Fuchida's claims to the contrary).
"The carrier commander during the 1st 6 Months of the war" was Nagumo Chuichi, whose background was in destroyers rather than battleships. Yamaguchi Tamon commanded Carrier Division Two, comprising Hiryu and Soryu; Nagumo commanded the Japanese carrier force from Pearl Harbor through Santa Cruz and was therefore Yamaguchi's CO. And though Nagumo could be overcautious, Yamaguchi could also be overbold. Case in point: Pearl Harbor, where Nagumo made the smart call.
First, there's the timing to consider. A third wave would have had to wait for the survivors of the first wave to return, repair, refuel, and rearm; consequently a renewed strike could not have begun launching until well after noon. Thus a third wave would have faced the prospect of a long overwater flight and carrier landing in the dark. Physically and mentally exhausted after nearly twelve hours of flying (including ~2 hours of combat flying) that day. Rusty after not being able to practice even daylight carrier ops since leaving home waters, due to the need for operational security. Operational losses would have wrecked Nagumo's air groups, even disregarding the much stiffer resistance (especially flak) another strike would have faced without the element of surprise.
Second, sticking around would have unnecessarily exposed Nagumo's carriers. Returning fliers reported that Oahu airfields remained operational with an unknown number of heavy bombers - in hindsight we know that high-altitude level bombing posed no threat to maneuvering ships at sea, but in December 1941 this was less clear. Nagumo also knew that the US had at least two CVs somewhere in the vicinity, but their exact locations were unknown - all he knew was that he hadn't caught them at Pearl. Had Nagumo remained in the area, he risked having ~100 SBDs and TBDs show up over his formation from an unexpected direction while his own aircraft were stuck belowdecks preparing for another strike at Oahu. Again, we know that at most only one US CV was in position to even attempt an intercept, but Nagumo could not know that.
Third, he had to keep to a fairly rigid refueling timetable. His destroyer screen didn't have enough fuel to stick around Oahu very long, so Nagumo had to get back or else risk being forced to abandon them, out of fuel, adrift, and helpless on the open ocean. Nagumo's screen represented a significant chunk of Japan's total destroyer force, and almost all were of the most modern and capable types - losing them would have cost the IJN dearly.
Fourth, Nagumo's orders were to hurt the Pacific Fleet badly enough that it would not be able to interfere with Japanese operations in what they considered the crucial first six months, while Japan established a defensive perimeter. He'd accomplished that mission - had in fact succeeded beyond his wildest dreams - so there was really no reason to stick around, risking Japan's precious carriers and invaluable air groups. Certainly nothing that outweighed the very good reasons to get out of Dodge. Small wonder that Nagumo's staff advised him to quit while he was ahead (despite Fuchida's claims to the contrary).
Some days you're the windshield.
Some days you're the bug.
Some days you're the bug.
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Culiacan Mexico
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Can I add MAJ James P.S. Devereux (USMC).Originally posted by mdiehl
I'll nominate an Allied one. Cunningham. Heroic defender of Wake Island. Cunningham: You the Man.
"If you love wealth greater than liberty, the tranquility of servitude greater than the animating contest of freedom, go home from us in peace. We seek not your counsel, nor your arms. Crouch down and lick the hand that feeds you. May your chains set lig
You may add Devereux. Cunningham was the Sr. officer in command. Devereaux handled the basic tactics of the battles when engaged. IIRC, Cunningham and Devereaux placed most of the semi-permanent installations in consultation with each other.
Show me a fellow who rejects statistical analysis a priori and I'll show you a fellow who has no knowledge of statistics.
Didn't we have this conversation already?
Didn't we have this conversation already?
mdiehl, cynical and cuilacan hit most of the points.
Zed, you really need to get read up on the war. Thwe Japanese were always looking towards the next (really) "decisive battle" The fact that they just got trounced meant that that the prior battle was not really the "decisive battle" Yamamoto was caught up in this as was the high command.
To add to Jeremy's excellent descriptions, Yamashita, conquered Malaya while outnumbered and at thenend almost out ammunition. Never popular with the high command, he ended up in the Phillipines where his good advice was ignored by his superior.
Nagumo was promoted "over his level of incompetence", and Yamaguchi would have made a formidable 1st Air Fleet commander.
Ozawa actually outsmarted Hasley in Leyte, correctly judging that "Bull" would storm north with everything he had - which he did. He should have been combined fleet cdr earlier.
The US Marine repulse of the first Wake invasion attempt was the LAST time a ground force repulsed an amphibous invasion attempt. Also the US Marines were NEVER kicked off a beach in their history.
Zed, you really need to get read up on the war. Thwe Japanese were always looking towards the next (really) "decisive battle" The fact that they just got trounced meant that that the prior battle was not really the "decisive battle" Yamamoto was caught up in this as was the high command.
To add to Jeremy's excellent descriptions, Yamashita, conquered Malaya while outnumbered and at thenend almost out ammunition. Never popular with the high command, he ended up in the Phillipines where his good advice was ignored by his superior.
Nagumo was promoted "over his level of incompetence", and Yamaguchi would have made a formidable 1st Air Fleet commander.
Ozawa actually outsmarted Hasley in Leyte, correctly judging that "Bull" would storm north with everything he had - which he did. He should have been combined fleet cdr earlier.
The US Marine repulse of the first Wake invasion attempt was the LAST time a ground force repulsed an amphibous invasion attempt. Also the US Marines were NEVER kicked off a beach in their history.
Still playing PacWar (but no so much anymore)...