Scenario Design Questions Regarding Divisional Summaries

[vahauser]

ORIGINAL: Curtis Lemay

ORIGINAL: vahauser

Curtis,

I guess this is just going to be one of those subjective judgments.  I think that 36 and 12 is a better TOAW depiction than 40 and 8.  Also, some people would argue that Niehorster is a better source than the Handbook (whatever version).  Niehorster gives 36 and 12 for the 1941 divisions.  I'm sticking with 36 and 12 unless I see absolutely definitive and conclusive evidence otherwise for the 1941 divisions.  

Until then, it won't be the first time that my conclusion/interpretation differs from yours.  Oh well.

I don’t know which one is correct either. Note that there is another difference in that the AT guns are shown as 75mm, not 37mm. The Handbook was directed at a 1945 audience, so it may have been describing the last version of the “Old Type” division. But the issue is that, if you use multiple sources (and you should), then there will be conflicts between them that you will have to resolve. (Another issue, of course, is to use caution with web sources – clearly, they had edited that figure.)

Plus, since this was a 17,000-man unit, only a fraction of which was assigned to the front lines, there will naturally be multiple philosophies on how to model its manpower. The whole premise of this thread – that there should be one “correct” version of the 1941 division – was absurd. There are too many subjective factors.

The "75x 75mm AT Guns" is a serious error. I suspect it is a typo. The Handbook has a number of typos.

Regarding your assertion that I was/am seeking a single "perfect" version of an 'early-wave' division in 1941 is not entirely correct. What I was/am more interested in was/is to generate discussion regarding what those "differing philosophies" and what some of those "subjective factors" are.

In general, my philosophy is:
1) Specialized manpower is specialized for a reason--namely, to make the division function better. If you strip the specialists away from their specialities and force them to use their rifles, then this is never a good thing. Never ever. Never. It is always a bad thing. Always. Therefore, double-representing specialists in a divisional TOE is giving the division a bonus that it should never get.
2) Don't get hung up on minutiae. Since it is clear that there is no such thing as a "perfect" TOAW divisional TOE (due to a variety of subjective reasons that this thread is illustrating), then do the best job of correctly interpreting the information at hand to the best of your ability. I use highly-complicated spreadsheets to evaluate and rate equipments. So, I am not afraid to be detailed and meticulous. But I don't let all those high-powered calculations get in the way of the fact that creating a divisional TOE is more like making a painting that it is simply "counting rifles". Yes, you need good information and a good way to count rifles, but in the end those are just the paint brushes and paints and the TOAW framework is the canvas. You still have to be a good painter to create a good TOAW scenario.

[Curtis Lemay]

ORIGINAL: vahauser

The "75x 75mm AT Guns" is a serious error. I suspect it is a typo. The Handbook has a number of typos.

?? How could you know that if you don't even have a copy of it? As I said, it could be based upon a later ('42 or '43) version of the "Old Type" division.[/quote]

Regarding your assertion that I was/am seeking a single "perfect" version of an 'early-wave' division in 1941 is not entirely correct. What I was/am more interested in was/is to generate discussion regarding what those "differing philosophies" and what some of those "subjective factors" are.

That was not the impression I got. I'll leave it at that.

In general, my philosophy is:
1) Specialized manpower is specialized for a reason--namely, to make the division function better. If you strip the specialists away from their specialities and force them to use their rifles, then this is never a good thing. Never ever. Never. It is always a bad thing. Always. Therefore, double-representing specialists in a divisional TOE is giving the division a bonus that it should never get.

But they will be forced to use their rifles if the enemy penetrates into the division's rear-areas. At that point, it is a bonus the division should get. Here I'll just repeat the conundrum I detailed in a previous thread:

"Let's just consider two different situations:

First, a division is ordered to assault the enemy front lines. It does so for some time, until its entire frontline combat elements have been destroyed. At that point it is withdrawn from the frontline to the rear for re-fitting. It's lost about 4,000 combat troopers.

Second, a division is cutoff and surrounded behind enemy lines by enemy maneuvers. Trapped, every man must fight. But it's hopeless, and eventually the entire division is destroyed. All 18,000 men in the division are lost - including vast numbers of specialized, highly-trained officers, etc.

Now, consider that only the frontline elements were modeled in a TOAW scenario for this. In game terms, both results are exactly the same! In both cases, the division has been entirely destroyed. In both cases, the amount of equipment that had to be eliminated was the same. In both cases, the loss penalties awarded the enemy player are the same. In both cases, the replacement equipment needed to rebuild the division is the same.

But in the real world, those two situations are vastly different. In the first case, the division only needs some grunt replacements and it's ready to rejoin the fight. The really valuable parts of the division weren't damaged at all. Whereas, in the second case, the division must be rebuilt from scratch, with lots of very expensive equipment and personnel needed to be able to do so.

That's why I continue to believe that, if the situation is going to get wild or desperate, you've got to model the rear-areas."

Now, there's just no perfect solution to this issue in TOAW. But how can you simply ignore it and dogmatically declare that those rear-area elements should "never ever" be modeled? The rear-area elements form both an additional defensive buffer any attackers must fight through and a "prize" that the attackers will receive for bagging them. Therefore, the consequences of only modeling the frontline elements impact the strategy & tactics of the players:

1. The rationale for pincer movements is artificially reduced.
2. Defense-in-depth is artificially weakened.
3. Opportunities for counteroffensives are artificially increased.

Now, there are topics where the rear areas never saw combat (WWI, for example, maybe some modern topics). But WWII in general (and Barbarossa in particular) was not one of them.

[golden delicious]

ORIGINAL: Curtis Lemay
But they will be forced to use their rifles if the enemy penetrates into the division's rear-areas. At that point, it is a bonus the division should get.

...and not before.

What you want is a simulation which allows extra equipment to take part in combat if and only if the unit in question is under particular strain. That's not available right now in TOAW III but putting that equipment in for every situation isn't a satisfactory solution.

As to your point about encirclements, if you cut off and destroy a unit, it loses all its artillery and so on- which are plenty valuable in TOAW. What's more, all lost equipment is gone. Not so if it's destroyed in frontal combat.

One could add some functionality to TOAW which prevents reconstitution (or allows reconstitution only at a lower proficiency and after a longer period) for units which were not in supply when they evaporated. This would of course be a yes/no option to a designer, and the feature would be off by default to avoid breaking old scenarios.

[golden delicious]

ORIGINAL: vahauser
20/20 75mm Inf Howitzers (does not exist in standard TOAW--this is a new equipment in my ww2.eqp file)
6/6 150mm Inf Howitzers (does not exist in standard TOAW--this is a new equipment in my ww2.eqp file)

Aren't these items the same as the "Light Guns" in the existing database?

[vahauser]

ORIGINAL: Curtis Lemay

ORIGINAL: vahauser

The "75x 75mm AT Guns" is a serious error. I suspect it is a typo. The Handbook has a number of typos.

?? How could you know that if you don't even have a copy of it? As I said, it could be based upon a later ('42 or '43) version of the "Old Type" division.

Regarding your assertion that I was/am seeking a single "perfect" version of an 'early-wave' division in 1941 is not entirely correct. What I was/am more interested in was/is to generate discussion regarding what those "differing philosophies" and what some of those "subjective factors" are.

That was not the impression I got. I'll leave it at that.

In general, my philosophy is:
1) Specialized manpower is specialized for a reason--namely, to make the division function better. If you strip the specialists away from their specialities and force them to use their rifles, then this is never a good thing. Never ever. Never. It is always a bad thing. Always. Therefore, double-representing specialists in a divisional TOE is giving the division a bonus that it should never get.

ORIGINAL: Curtis Lemay
But they will be forced to use their rifles if the enemy penetrates into the division's rear-areas. At that point, it is a bonus the division should get. Here I'll just repeat the conundrum I detailed in a previous thread:

"Let's just consider two different situations:

First, a division is ordered to assault the enemy front lines. It does so for some time, until its entire frontline combat elements have been destroyed. At that point it is withdrawn from the frontline to the rear for re-fitting. It's lost about 4,000 combat troopers.

Second, a division is cutoff and surrounded behind enemy lines by enemy maneuvers. Trapped, every man must fight. But it's hopeless, and eventually the entire division is destroyed. All 18,000 men in the division are lost - including vast numbers of specialized, highly-trained officers, etc.

Now, consider that only the frontline elements were modeled in a TOAW scenario for this. In game terms, both results are exactly the same! In both cases, the division has been entirely destroyed. In both cases, the amount of equipment that had to be eliminated was the same. In both cases, the loss penalties awarded the enemy player are the same. In both cases, the replacement equipment needed to rebuild the division is the same.

But in the real world, those two situations are vastly different. In the first case, the division only needs some grunt replacements and it's ready to rejoin the fight. The really valuable parts of the division weren't damaged at all. Whereas, in the second case, the division must be rebuilt from scratch, with lots of very expensive equipment and personnel needed to be able to do so.

That's why I continue to believe that, if the situation is going to get wild or desperate, you've got to model the rear-areas."

Now, there's just no perfect solution to this issue in TOAW. But how can you simply ignore it and dogmatically declare that those rear-area elements should "never ever" be modeled? The rear-area elements form both an additional defensive buffer any attackers must fight through and a "prize" that the attackers will receive for bagging them. Therefore, the consequences of only modeling the frontline elements impact the strategy & tactics of the players:

1. The rationale for pincer movements is artificially reduced.
2. Defense-in-depth is artificially weakened.
3. Opportunities for counteroffensives are artificially increased.

Now, there are topics where the rear areas never saw combat (WWI, for example, maybe some modern topics). But WWII in general (and Barbarossa in particular) was not one of them.

No German infantry division ever had 75x 75mm AT guns. When the 37mm AT gun was phased out, the larger AT guns were reorganized. Instead of 9x 37mm AT guns per regiment, this was reorganized into 3x (or at most 4x) 50mm/75mm AT guns per regiment.

Further, the divisional AT battalion was reorganized into two companies of AT and one company of AA instead of the earlier three companies of AT. Also, even the two companies of AT was reorganized into one company of 12 towed 50mm/75mm AT guns and one company of StuGs (14 StuGs).

So, by 1942-43, the total divisional component of AT guns was 52 at most, and more likely 36, 50mm/75mm AT guns.

Oh, and by the way, I did indeed at one time (back in the 1970s during my PanzerBlitz and Panzer Leader days) physically own a hardcopy version of the Handbook. So, I have actually seen it and handled it and read it and noted the typos contained within it (during that same period I also physically owned a copy of the Soviet Handbook, too).

Situation A: You have trained specialists performing their specialties which allows the division to function at the Proficiency you've assigned it. Result? Your division gets to operate as an integrated division at that Proficiency.

Situation B: You strip the trained specialists away from their specialties and force them to use their rifles in an emergency. Result? You have an armed mob instead of a division, which is not operating as an integrated division because it no longer has the specialists it needs to integrate the division. Also, by definition, this armed mob cannot be operating at the divisional Proficiency originally assigned.

Situation A is the only rational and justifiable way to depict a division in TOAW III.

[Curtis Lemay]

ORIGINAL: golden delicious

ORIGINAL: Curtis Lemay
But they will be forced to use their rifles if the enemy penetrates into the division's rear-areas. At that point, it is a bonus the division should get.

...and not before.

What you want is a simulation which allows extra equipment to take part in combat if and only if the unit in question is under particular strain. That's not available right now in TOAW III but putting that equipment in for every situation isn't a satisfactory solution.

As I pointed out in post #26, there are ways to hamstring the rear-area elements for offensive purposes while having them on hand for defensive purposes. For example, in "Germany 1945" the Allied rear-area elements have movment allowances of 1. This renders them unusable for offense, while allowing them to remain available to blunt any German counteroffensive. "Soviet Union 1941" is similar in that the German rear-area elements have very limited transport - so if used in heavy combat will tend to be reduced to a movement allowance of 1.

There are other ways as well: in CFNA, rear-area elements don't have the recon enhancements that frontline elements have - this makes hex conversion much more costly to them, preventing them from keeping up with the frontline spearheads. So they make poor offensive elements while still functioning just fine defensively.

[Curtis Lemay]

ORIGINAL: vahauser

Situation B: You strip the trained specialists away from their specialties and force them to use their rifles in an emergency. Result? You have an armed mob instead of a division, which is not operating as an integrated division because it no longer has the specialists it needs to integrate the division. Also, by definition, this armed mob cannot be operating at the divisional Proficiency originally assigned.

Nonsense. Not every single human in the rear is being modeled as manning a rifle. Only a fraction of them are. Plenty left to keep it from turning into a mob. Furthermore, by the time the rear gets engaged, much of the frontline elements have usually been destroyed - so there's less division to manage, requiring less rear-element manpower to do so.

Situation A fails to simulate the three factors I listed. They're pretty significant.

[vahauser]

ORIGINAL: golden delicious

ORIGINAL: vahauser
20/20 75mm Inf Howitzers (does not exist in standard TOAW--this is a new equipment in my ww2.eqp file)
6/6 150mm Inf Howitzers (does not exist in standard TOAW--this is a new equipment in my ww2.eqp file)

Aren't these items the same as the "Light Guns" in the existing database?

In general, yes. One notable difference, however, is that both the 75mm and 150mm infantry howitzers carried HEAT rounds as part of their standard ammo load (the standard ammo load of a 75mm infantry howitzer was 30 rounds HE and 10 rounds HEAT; the standard ammo load of a 150mm infantry howitzer was 20 rounds HE and 5 rounds HEAT). Thus, the AT capability of the direct-fire infantry howitzers is different in my WW2.eqp file. [As an aside, the primary purpose of these HEAT rounds was for use against bunkers, but they worked very well against AFVs, too.]

[vahauser]

ORIGINAL: Curtis Lemay

ORIGINAL: vahauser

Situation B: You strip the trained specialists away from their specialties and force them to use their rifles in an emergency. Result? You have an armed mob instead of a division, which is not operating as an integrated division because it no longer has the specialists it needs to integrate the division. Also, by definition, this armed mob cannot be operating at the divisional Proficiency originally assigned.

Nonsense. Not every single human in the rear is being modeled as manning a rifle. Only a fraction of them are. Plenty left to keep it from turning into a mob. Furthermore, by the time the rear gets engaged, much of the frontline elements have usually been destroyed - so there's less division to manage, requiring less rear-element manpower to do so.

Situation A fails to simulate the three factors I listed. They're pretty significant.

Look, if you want to double-count your specialists, it's okay with me...

[Curtis Lemay]

ORIGINAL: vahauser


In general, yes. One notable difference, however, is that both the 75mm and 150mm infantry howitzers carried HEAT rounds as part of their standard ammo load (the standard ammo load of a 75mm infantry howitzer was 30 rounds HE and 10 rounds HEAT; the standard ammo load of a 150mm infantry howitzer was 20 rounds HE and 5 rounds HEAT). Thus, the AT capability of the direct-fire infantry howitzers is different in my WW2.eqp file. [As an aside, the primary purpose of these HEAT rounds was for use against bunkers, but they worked very well against AFVs, too.]

One quarter of artillery equipment's AP value is automatically applied as AT strength in TOAW.

[Curtis Lemay]

ORIGINAL: vahauser

ORIGINAL: Curtis Lemay

Nonsense. Not every single human in the rear is being modeled as manning a rifle. Only a fraction of them are. Plenty left to keep it from turning into a mob. Furthermore, by the time the rear gets engaged, much of the frontline elements have usually been destroyed - so there's less division to manage, requiring less rear-element manpower to do so.

Situation A fails to simulate the three factors I listed. They're pretty significant.

Look, if you want to double-count your specialists, it's okay with me...

More nonsense. Do you have any sort of rational response to the points in my last post?

[vahauser]

ORIGINAL: Curtis Lemay

ORIGINAL: vahauser

ORIGINAL: Curtis Lemay

Nonsense. Not every single human in the rear is being modeled as manning a rifle. Only a fraction of them are. Plenty left to keep it from turning into a mob. Furthermore, by the time the rear gets engaged, much of the frontline elements have usually been destroyed - so there's less division to manage, requiring less rear-element manpower to do so.

Situation A fails to simulate the three factors I listed. They're pretty significant.

Look, if you want to double-count your specialists, it's okay with me...

More nonsense. Do you have any sort of rational response to the points in my last post?

Re-read what you wrote that I have put in bold font in your quote. Absolutely there is "less division". So why do you persist in adding more?

As I said before, if you want to turn non-combat specialists into combat troops (and operating at the same Proficiency) then that's your choice as a scenario designer. Personally, I disagree.

[ColinWright]

ORIGINAL: Curtis Lemay


More nonsense. Do you have any sort of rational response to the points in my last post?

A Kurtis Klassic.

[Curtis Lemay]

ORIGINAL: vahauser

ORIGINAL: Curtis Lemay

ORIGINAL: vahauser



Look, if you want to double-count your specialists, it's okay with me...

More nonsense. Do you have any sort of rational response to the points in my last post?

Re-read what you wrote that I have put in bold font in your quote. Absolutely there is "less division". So why do you persist in adding more?

That statement is a ridiculous non-sequitur. There is "less division" only after much of the frontline elements have been eliminated in combat. That would be during the playing of the game - not during the design process. They're completely unrelated.

As I said before, if you want to turn non-combat specialists into combat troops (and operating at the same Proficiency) then that's your choice as a scenario designer.

Had you read my post #26 you might have understood that they are not at the same proficiency - they are de-leveraged because I'm only modeling a fraction of them. And their "specialties" would be AAA units, Engineer units, delivering supplies (or escorting those deliveries), etc. Not the commanding general or his immediate subordinates. The division won't "turn into a mob" while those elements are fighting. Nor did they, historically, when rear-areas routinely came under attack in WWII. They were far more resilient than that.

You're saying to pretend the rear can never come under attack. And your reasons are pretty trivial (supposed effects on unit proficiencies).

By the way, do you include HQs in your designs? Most designers do. But that's where those commanders are.

[Curtis Lemay]

ORIGINAL: ColinWright

ORIGINAL: Curtis Lemay


More nonsense. Do you have any sort of rational response to the points in my last post?

A Kurtis Klassic.

He starts right out with an ad hominem attack. Typical.

[vahauser]

ORIGINAL: Curtis Lemay

ORIGINAL: vahauser

ORIGINAL: Curtis Lemay



More nonsense. Do you have any sort of rational response to the points in my last post?

Re-read what you wrote that I have put in bold font in your quote. Absolutely there is "less division". So why do you persist in adding more?

That statement is a ridiculous non-sequitur. There is "less division" only after much of the frontline elements have been eliminated in combat. That would be during the playing of the game - not during the design process. They're completely unrelated.

As I said before, if you want to turn non-combat specialists into combat troops (and operating at the same Proficiency) then that's your choice as a scenario designer.

Had you read my post #26 you might have understood that they are not at the same proficiency - they are de-leveraged because I'm only modeling a fraction of them. And their "specialties" would be AAA units, Engineer units, delivering supplies (or escorting those deliveries), etc. Not the commanding general or his immediate subordinates. The division won't "turn into a mob" while those elements are fighting. Nor did they, historically, when rear-areas routinely came under attack in WWII. They were far more resilient than that.

You're saying to pretend the rear can never come under attack. And your reasons are pretty trivial (supposed effects on unit proficiencies).

By the way, do you include HQs in your designs? Most designers do. But that's where those commanders are.

No. You are double-counting all those specialists. Why? Because you build them into the division as extra troops from the very beginning. Those specialists are available as combat troops from the moment you create the reinforced TOE for that division containing them. They are double-counted (both as specialists and as combat troops). And all those hundreds of extra squads fight as combat troops right from the start. At the same divisional Proficiency. They are double-counted.

As I've said three times in this thread, if you want to double-count your specialists, then that's your decision as a scenario designer. But I disagree completely with your decision.

[ColinWright]

...

[Curtis Lemay]

ORIGINAL: vahauser

No. You are double-counting all those specialists. Why? Because you build them into the division as extra troops from the very beginning. Those specialists are available as combat troops from the moment you create the reinforced TOE for that division containing them. They are double-counted (both as specialists and as combat troops). And all those hundreds of extra squads fight as combat troops right from the start. At the same divisional Proficiency. They are double-counted.

I can only assume you didn't read my post #26 (and now can't be bothered to go back and read it, either). So I'll repeat it here:

"As I've pointed out elsewhere, the rear-area squads that are represented are already de-leveraged by the fact that only a fraction of them are modeled. In other words, of the 17,000 odd troops in the division, perhaps 5,000 were front-line combat troops, the rest in the rear - that leaves 12,000 or so. But I'm only modeling about 3,000 of them - effectively rating them at 1/4 proficiency or there abouts.

Also note that only a handful of divisions are independently modeled in the scenario. The bulk of the forces are in Corps. And those Corps are modeled in two parts - a frontline part and a rear-area part. That separates them so that they function independently. Also, in the case of the Germans, their rear-area parts are debilitated as combat elements. This was done by slashing their transport quantities. So if they are used in frontline combat they will tend to drop to 1 movement point."

So, no, those extra squads are not available as offensive combat troops from the start - they are hamstrung such that they will only be available defensively (a role they should perform). And, no, they are not rated at the same proficiency as the frontline elements - far lower in fact.

And it's possible to hamstring them even more - see "Germany 1945". There, the Allied rear-area elements spend the game with movement allowances of 1. So the philosophy itself can be adjusted to the designer's preference.

[vahauser]

ORIGINAL: Curtis Lemay

ORIGINAL: vahauser

No. You are double-counting all those specialists. Why? Because you build them into the division as extra troops from the very beginning. Those specialists are available as combat troops from the moment you create the reinforced TOE for that division containing them. They are double-counted (both as specialists and as combat troops). And all those hundreds of extra squads fight as combat troops right from the start. At the same divisional Proficiency. They are double-counted.

I can only assume you didn't read my post #26 (and now can't be bothered to go back and read it, either). So I'll repeat it here:

"As I've pointed out elsewhere, the rear-area squads that are represented are already de-leveraged by the fact that only a fraction of them are modeled. In other words, of the 17,000 odd troops in the division, perhaps 5,000 were front-line combat troops, the rest in the rear - that leaves 12,000 or so. But I'm only modeling about 3,000 of them - effectively rating them at 1/4 proficiency or there abouts.

Also note that only a handful of divisions are independently modeled in the scenario. The bulk of the forces are in Corps. And those Corps are modeled in two parts - a frontline part and a rear-area part. That separates them so that they function independently. Also, in the case of the Germans, their rear-area parts are debilitated as combat elements. This was done by slashing their transport quantities. So if they are used in frontline combat they will tend to drop to 1 movement point."

So, no, those extra squads are not available as offensive combat troops from the start - they are hamstrung such that they will only be available defensively (a role they should perform). And, no, they are not rated at the same proficiency as the frontline elements - far lower in fact.

And it's possible to hamstring them even more - see "Germany 1945". There, the Allied rear-area elements spend the game with movement allowances of 1. So the philosophy itself can be adjusted to the designer's preference.

Um. Okay, Curtis...

I've bolded the relevant phrase. My preference is to not double-count the divisional specialists or include them as combat troops at all. That is the adjustment I make to that philosophy.

[Curtis Lemay]

ORIGINAL: vahauser

Um. Okay, Curtis...

I've bolded the relevant phrase. My preference is to not double-count the divisional specialists or include them as combat troops at all. That is the adjustment I make to that philosophy.

Since they aren't being double-counted and aren't available for offensive combat, do you actually have a reason for that? Sorry, but I'm not going to just sit by silently while you scurrilously disparage my methods with falsehoods. Defend your claims - if you can.