Germans were good Strategists - Devil's Advocate

[miral]

As a gesture of reconciliation for some bad feelings I inadvertently caused with a post on this I would like to play Devil's advocate and argue the opposite position. I readily admit that my writing style can come across as abrasive and arrogant, but this arises from an enthusiasm for this historical matter rather than any desire to offend, and I certainly don't claim vast expertise or that those with contrary opinions may not well be right and I wrong.

The counter arguement. The best book that I am aware of that argues, albeit this is infered from the main point of the book, is R.H. Stolfi's Hitlers Panzers East. His thesis, very simplied, as any book review must of necessity be, is that if Hitler had listened to his generals and pushed on to Moscow with full emphasis there and no where else, especially if he had not turned Guderian south into the Ukraine, Moscow would have been taken, probably well before the worst weather hit and, though this would not have led to the immediate surrender of the Soviets, it would have been a victory so huge in consequences that he calls Hitler's decision to turn south the single most important decision made by a political leader in the 20th century.

Were Moscow taken the prestige and psychological effects, on both Germans and Allies, would have been vast. In additon, a good chunk of the Soviet industrial plant would have been destroyed or captured. Also, even if the Soviets burned or otherwise wasted large parts of the city whatever was left would surely have offered better protection from the winter than the open country and small villages that the Germans ended up trying to shelter in, with many fewer casualties from frostbite ect.

Finally, when spring came the Germans would have been in very good position to push on further east of Moscow into another considerable chunk of Soviet industry.

There are several interesting things about the Hitler vs Generals argument here. First, this is a clear case, unlike the original decision to invade Russia, of Hitler forcing his views on a most unwilling General corps. Second, it is an excellent example of what Clauswitz thought was among the most important questions for a stateman and his people to decide at the beginning of a war. First, recognize the war for what it is and don't try to make something else you might prefer it to be out of it. Second, determine the enemies center of gravity, that is, the thing whose capture or destruction is most likely to bring the enemy to collapse, or at least, the bargaining table. While Clauswitz thought that the enemies armed forces were more often than not the appropriate target, he allowed that sometimes other targets, such as the enemy's capital city, were more important. Thus we see Hitler and his generals in a classic argument over the center of gravity of the war.

And it is interesting that the generals were so united; the field commanders such as Guderian and the General Staff officers like Halder, who often disagreed and did not get along very well, were pretty much unanimous on this.

Given how close the Germans came to Moscow anyhow, starting their offensive later, with more worn out troops, the odds are that they could have taken the city in 1941, with enormous consequences for that war and world history.

This is certainly a reasonably position, which Stolfi argues with verve and detail

I would like to hear of other titles that support his position.

Thanks

[IronDuke_slith]

I wasn't that impressed with it to be honest. The Russian Forces opposite AGC attrited themselves in a series of bloody offensives whilst Guderian was excircling Kiev, and thus they were weaker when he finally got going than they were initially. Guderian was having a hell of a job defending his Yelna bridgehead in the face of heavy resistance at the time of the swing south and further forward momentum would not have been easy.

Secondly, I don't see how you can create a long right flank with 600 000 Soviet troops sitting to the south of it in a mass. Those men at Kiev threatened any advance on Moscow with a front level counter offensive.

Thirdly, German doctrine was decidedly Clauswitzian in that it always emphasised destruction of the enemy's field forces. It was Hitler who twisted it with economic or political objectives.

Fourthly, Napoleon.

fifthly, Much of russian industry had relocated eastwards. I don't know why Muscovite industry wouldn't have gone the same way if the fall was likely. Certainly all Government and Beaurocratic functions left the city when the Germans got near.

Finally, the reasons for the failure of Barbarossa are far deeper than any one operational decision.

Respect and regards,
IronDuke

[sapper_astro]

You are forgetting that Moscow was the central communications hub. Railway lines from North to South, telegraph lines, etc all ran through it. Chances are, with the fall of Moscow, the fall of Leningrad would have been a much higher chance as well.

Armies, communications, et al in Napoleonic times were an entirely different beast to WW2.

In Zhukov's memoirs, he states that after he was given the Moscow front, he found nothing except a few isolated battalions and NKVD troops between Smolensk and Moscow - before the Panzers turned South. Unless he is flat out telling lies, this would tell me that had they continued on to Moscow, there would not have been much to stop them at all. Not to mention that the Siberians were no where near the capital at that time...

Basically, I believe the decision to turn south was a gigantic blunder. One far larger than Goering's/Hitler's decision to turn from attacking the RAF airfields to the revenge attacks on the towns.

[06 Maestro]

Interesting approach Miral. I can go with this.

Iron Duke made some very good points-all of them valid.

It is still possible that the continued thrust on Moscow could have succeeded. There have been multiple "experts" say that it could have been accomplished by late October. Success was far from guaranteed though.

To expand on Iron Duke's 1st point; during the Soviet attacks against the infantry of AG C there was a claim, largely corroborated, that some 6000 Russian tanks were knock out by AT gunners. It seems a reasonable assumption that a very large part of that Russian force was already between Moscow and PZ Group 2 by late July. In view of the difficulties German armor was having with Russian armor it is entirely possible that the German thrust on Moscow in August would have ended in a bad way.

There are a couple more factors (at least) that should be mentioned. The turn south did result in the single greatest victory ever-a very efficient move. The move also was in line with the concept of the grand operational plan as issued to the senior commanders; that the Soviet Army was not to be allowed to withdraw into the interior. This clearly meant that the German Army was somewhat guided by the original order to conduct the Kiev encirclement. The capture of the industrial areas was also a high priority, and the way things were progressing in the south, it didn't look like that was going to happen. In view of these considerations, Hitler’s' operational genius overshadowed that of his commanders. The various commander's, unable to admit they were wrong in nagging Hitler about keeping the focus on Moscow continued to press for that operation to the detriment of operations in the north and the south-both of which held great promise of success if properly supported. Well before the last stage of Typhoon was implemented, the generals knew it could not succeed before winter-but none dared to back off from their earlier demands, thus putting the German Army on a very bad footing just before General Winter showed up.

At least one commander had the guts to take realistic action by assuming a defensive stance on some very good ground a few weeks before the Red Army launched the full scale counter attack. This cost Guderian his command and kept him out of action for nearly a year and a half-gotta give credit where credit is due. Although I do not recall specific names, if I ever did see them, but something had been claimed about German Generals being shot at this time for doing what Guderian did-he had just a little too much "juice" for that kind of treatment-if it actually happened-you know how those Generals are prone to exagerate.[;)]

This could be a good lesson as to how history is written.

As for the overall reason for failure of Barbarossa I think it is clear that the German Army had made a gross underestimate of the Soviet Union. Although intelligence on production was reasonably good, they did not anticipate the massive movement of factories to the interior. Likewise, they did not anticipate the huge amount of reserves that the Soviets could commit within a few months. These failures can be traced to one branch of the German General Staff-it was their responsibility to come up with the numbers, and they apparently failed at those particular tasks.

On a brighter spot of the GGS's abilities, they figured on destroying a certain number of Soviet Divisions by the end of the summer. I do not recall the exact number, but something like 160-they missed that amount by a few percentage points. It must have been dumb luck.

[06 Maestro]

ORIGINAL: miral
As a gesture of reconciliation for some bad feelings I inadvertently caused .....
Thanks

I don't think you caused any bad feelings here. You were simply relating some info that was made available by, what most would call, a good source (does not mean they are right[;)]). As long as we can discuss military history w/o shooting the messenger or flaming-all is good. Sometimes its hard to keep politics out of such discussions, but we must.

Your writing style seems rather mellow too-so, carry on..

[SS Hauptsturmfuhrer]

ORIGINAL: 06 Maestro

In view of these considerations, Hitler’s' operational genius overshadowed that of his commanders. The various commander's, unable to admit they were wrong in nagging Hitler about keeping the focus on Moscow continued to press for that operation to the detriment of operations in the north and the south-both of which held great promise of success if properly supported.

Not sure Hitler was a genius at anything other than politics, but he may have occasionally been correct while his generals were wrong and this was one of those rare times. In a nutshell, Hitler wanted to destroy Soviet armies first, then walk over and grab the oil in the Caucasus. The German generals all wanted Moscow. So Hitler seems right to protest doing Typhoon but, amazingly, he bent under pressure and agreed to it.

Typhoon was possibly the biggest German attack on the Eastern front. It started great and they easily overrun the Russian defenses despite having to cross rivers into forestland held by entrenched defenders. The emphasis on having a big army over a well supported one (spare tank engines and parts etc.) was a problem. Winter jackets were stuck back in Poland cause the logistical network of trains was prioritizing fuel and ammo.

Guderian was not himself during Typhoon. He was stressed-out and very unhappy. Of course he didn't perform well during the battle being out of harmony like that. He sent his tanks way ahead of the army trying to grab bridges before the Russians blew them instead of helping to close and reduce the Vyazma pocket. I guess it still shows he was a creative tactician.

[Obsolete]

Not sure Hitler was a genius at anything other than politics,

I believe one of the smartest military genius decisions of his was to accept Kietel's decision to use Guderian's new  blitz theories.  The facts though, are that #1, it was not HIS plan, and #2,, Kietel had to numerous times try and get the high-command to look at it and ACCEPT IT.  He knew damn well if they did not, they'd run into the exact same stale-mate as in the first world war, and they'd get starved out with the worlds most powerful army (France) victorious once again.  And yes, that's right... France was the worlds most powerful army (yet again). 

So it is not too unlikely that after running circles around that army within reccord time, that many high-up officers could have become a little too over-confident.  Wouldn't you be?  Naturally many thought they would succeed where Napoleon got butchered, but it is intersing how history still repeats, even when there are some smart and cautious individuals around who try to do everything to avoid it.

[SS Hauptsturmfuhrer]

ORIGINAL: Obsolete

Not sure Hitler was a genius at anything other than politics,

I believe one of the smartest military genius decisions of his was to accept Kietel's decision to use Guderian's new  blitz theories.  The facts though, are that #1, it was not HIS plan, and #2,, Kietel had to numerous times try and get the high-command to look at it and ACCEPT IT.  He knew damn well if they did not, they'd run into the exact same stale-mate as in the first world war, and they'd get starved out with the worlds most powerful army (France) victorious once again.  And yes, that's right... France was the worlds most powerful army (yet again). 

So it is not too unlikely that after running circles around that army within reccord time, that many high-up officers could have become a little too over-confident.  Wouldn't you be?  Naturally many thought they would succeed where Napoleon got butchered, but it is intersing how history still repeats, even when there are some smart and cautious individuals around who try to do everything to avoid it.

Yup, agree with this. Hitler had his moments. Another was the victory at Kharkov when Bock wanted to use his army to save the defenders in the west instead of attacking north and encircling the Russians. Hitler actually made the winning decision. Can you believe it? This is the same guy who ordered Army Group Center to send all their tanks north and stand in place until they were all dead.

[06 Maestro]

ORIGINAL: SS Hauptsturmfuhrer
Not sure Hitler was a genius at anything other than politics, but he may have occasionally been correct while his generals were wrong and this was one of those rare times.

We need toungue in cheek "smilies".
Although Hitler may have been right in this case, it is only because he chose the wrong Barbarossa. There were other plans put forward which made AG C the grand force (more so than it actually was) with the primary objective of Moscow over all others from the first day. Had that plan been chosen, it is much more likely that the offense could have been pressed non stop to that objective. As it was, there would have been a thin line of reserve divsions with a relatively small reserve covering a 350 k southern flank-a little risky.

Guderian was not himself during Typhoon. He was stressed-out and very unhappy. Of course he didn't perform well during the battle being out of harmony like that. He sent his tanks way ahead of the army trying to grab bridges before the Russians blew them instead of helping to close and reduce the Vyazma pocket. I guess it still shows he was a creative tactician.

I think he knew what was coming and did not want to expose his main force. The Russians did attack in his sector well before they struck the main German line. Its interesting that the positions he chose to hold ( in variance to direct orders to continue the attack) was the scene of the greatest defensive victory of the war (for the Germans). In Feb of '43 the Russians suffered a massive defeat north west of Orel. I think this had something to do with Hitler calling him back to duty as the IG of the PZ Troops.

In this thread I will attempt to show the German Generals as the baffoons they were-however, hard as I may try, I may not be able to do that with a few of them Nazis.

[Helpless]

In Zhukov's memoirs, he states that after he was given the Moscow front, he found nothing except a few isolated battalions and NKVD troops between Smolensk and Moscow - before the Panzers turned South. Unless he is flat out telling lies, this would tell me that had they continued on to Moscow, there would not have been much to stop them at all. Not to mention that the Siberians were no where near the capital at that time...

There is a mixture of a wrong statements.

Mentioned Zhukov's statement was when he took over what is left of Reserve and Western Fronts (there was no Moscow Front) in October 1941 after both huge pockets in Kiev (Sep) and Vyazma (Oct) and not "before the Panzers turned South". So your assumption that there was nothing between AGC and Moscow in August 1941 is wrong.

There was no such thing as pure Siberian divisions. The divisions which appeared near Moscow in November were from many places from Moscow to Vladivostok - fruits of permanent mobilization.

IronDuke made very short and right statements.

[Culiacan Mexico]

ORIGINAL: miral
Given how close the Germans came to Moscow anyhow, starting their offensive later, with more worn out troops, the odds are that they could have taken the city in 1941, with enormous consequences for that war and world history...

The Germans were never that close to taking Moscow, and actually probably benefited from the delay:

1. South West Front was destroyed securing the southern flank for the advance and eliminating any possibility of those troop being redeployed to face Army Group Center.

2. Most of the Soviet Armies facing Army Group Center during this period burnt themselves out in costly attacks leaving them very vulnerable to Operation Typhoon when it was launched.

[Culiacan Mexico]

ORIGINAL: sapper_astro

You are forgetting that Moscow was the central communications hub. Railway lines from North to South, telegraph lines, etc all ran through it. Chances are, with the fall of Moscow, the fall of Leningrad would have been a much higher chance as well.

Most the Armor in Army Group North was transferred to Operation Typhon... they lacked the strength to take Lennigrad, regardless of what happened to Moscow.

ORIGINAL: sapper_astro

In Zhukov's memoirs, he states that after he was given the Moscow front, he found nothing except a few isolated battalions and NKVD troops between Smolensk and Moscow - before the Panzers turned South. Unless he is flat out telling lies...

Zhukov commanded Reserve Front (August 1941-September 1941), while the effectiveness of these unit might be in question... they were somewhat more than a few "isolated battalions and NKVD troops".

-------------------------

"The first version was created on July 30, 1941 in a reorganization of the earlier Front of Reserve Armies. STAVKA Order No.003334, of 14 July, directed that the Front of Reserve Armies include:

* 29th Army, with five divisions, five regiments of artillery, and two regiments and one squadron of aviation;

* 30th Army, with five divisions, one corps artillery regiment, and two AA artillery regiments;

* 24th Army, with ten divisions, three gun, one howitzer, and three corps artillery regiments, and four anti-tank artillery regiments;

* 28th Army, with nine divisions, one gun, one howitzer, and four corps artillery regiments, and four anti-tank artillery regiments;

* 31st Army, with six divisions, one corps artillery regiment, and two anti-tank artillery regiments; and

* 32nd Army, with seven divisions and one anti-tank artillery regiment.

ORIGINAL: sapper_astro


Basically, I believe the decision to turn south was a gigantic blunder. One far larger than Goering's/Hitler's decision to turn from attacking the RAF airfields to the revenge attacks on the towns.

Maybe, but I would note the Germans always indicated in Barbarossa planning that the path to victory was through the destruction of the Soviet military... not in the acquisition of territory. Two weeks into the war and General Halder is writing of victory in his diary, not because of territorial gains, but because of the large scale destruction of the Soviet military... both in the air and on the ground.

[madgamer2]

at least someone mentioned a small but major point. The Germans had winter clothing and it was again Hitler who did not allow it to be sent to the front in the end of the summer because he thought it would not look good to the German people after he promised to take Moscow in 41. Taking the capitol would have no more effect than when the French did in 1812 as far as ending the war..
The swing to the south and the large Russian troop losses along with a Winter ready German army would have allowed the Germans to not attack the capitol at all. They could have stayed in place and with winter clothing and supplies turned back any Russian counter attacks. One can only wonder what the spring of 42 would have been like with a well rested winter ready German army sitting where they were and started Typhoon when the weather was better and the Army rested and reinforced and supplied, but then what the heck do I know anyway.
The capture of one city even the capitol would not have ended the war. The Germans still had control of the air and could have made the winter of 41 very uncomfortable for the Russian troops in front of the city.
One must also remember that hindsight is far easier than foresight. Its easy for us to judge, write,and point out various moves from our position here in the 21 century than being there during the war. I am just an old fart so what do I know any way. I5t is fun to listen to the various ideas put forth about this or any military period and always be so.

Perhaps like religion and politics one might add war strategy to subjects it is useless to disscuss but always will be.

Madgamer

[madgamer2]

Good points made Obsolete

Madgamer

[SS Hauptsturmfuhrer]

ORIGINAL: madgamer

at least someone mentioned a small but major point. The Germans had winter clothing and it was again Hitler who did not allow it to be sent to the front in the end of the summer because he thought it would not look good to the German people after he promised to take Moscow in 41.

Madgamer

Totally not true. Winter clothing was on it's way to the eastern front before winter in 1941 but got stuck in the logistical bottleneck in Poland because the trains were prioritizing war material for the offensive over non-combat supplies.

[Perturabo]

ORIGINAL: madgamer

at least someone mentioned a small but major point. The Germans had winter clothing and it was again Hitler who did not allow it to be sent to the front in the end of the summer because he thought it would not look good to the German people after he promised to take Moscow in 41.

From what I've read it's not true. It's because there wasn't a way to ship the clothing. German logistics were very poor and they already weren't able to ship enough ammo and fuel, which had greater priority than clothing.

[madgamer2]

And who was responsible for what got shipped when? The quartermaster knew the bottle neck would slow things down but it was Hitler who at first considered shipping or having the winter supplies closer to the trops before the invasion even started but changed his mind then by the time they were shipped they did get held up in the Polish crunch.
What is your opinion of not making the attack in the first place? Would a fresh German Army in 42 have been better. Just having them in front of the city was a threat. I suppose the chances looked good at that point to get the capitol but we can see from our time that it was not that good of a move especially without proper winter preparations. I think you have a bit more knowledge of the situation than I. Do you agree with what actually happened or would you have done it differently.

Old guy want to know
Madgamer

[06 Maestro]

The winter uniform debacle is something quite difficult for the German Generals to hide from. The initial planning envisioned the infantry divisions to continue to advance throughout the winter months against little or no opposition from the destroyed Russian Army. Therefore, the issue of the proper equipment was planned for, but not implemented. In view of the importance of such equipment in that AO, it clearly should have been the number one priority-unless one had some inside information that there was going to be a miracle-like balmy winter weather.

After the Vyazma battles (another stunning victory) it was clear that the Soviet military was not going to collapse as envisioned. The Germans had a good idea of how many divisions they were still facing and were aware of how quickly the Soviets were able to rebuild destroyed divisions and whole armies. Many Russian divisions were captured more than once withing a few months. It was crystal clear that the the German Army was not going to be able to eliminate military opposition before the onset of winter. In fact, before summer was over Halder told Hitler that it was necessary to capture the Russian oil fields to brake their effective resistance.

A rational decision would have been to call a halt to all offensive action after the first week of November '41. The German Army's losses by that point were quite tolerable while making the Russians look like fools. A fantastic job had been accomplished, but they (including many of the Generals) could not bring themselves to stop-thus admitting that it could not be done in one swift campaign-thus admitting they were wrong. Of course, had they had a crystal ball, I think even Hitler would have demanded a stop.

The result of their irrational decision to go forward with Typhoon after Vyazma was the depletion of the infantry divisions to such a degree that those could never be brought back up to strength. This also had an impact on later operational decisions and the TO&E of the Army. The losses due to the big freeze are hard to imagine. Even though huge battles rage all along AGC, the losses from the cold were far more that battle losses. This continued for two months. The cold was severe enough that the Russians also had considerable losses from it even though they had arctic gear.

Whether this situation could have been entirely avoided is debatable, but certainly could have been drastically reduce. Even with the issue of the winter clothing there still would have been losses. What was actually needed was arctic gear of which Germany had very little-thus the program of asking German civilians to donate their personal winter clothing. It seems reasonable that if the winter gear was given high priority from the 1st week of November that it would have been reaching the front by 6 December in large amounts. Also, very importantly, the German Army could have easily have built a well fortified line to let the expected Russian attack fall upon.

Had the German High Command opted for the rational choice of stopping and preparing for the winter, Germany would have been in a much better position in '42. That the correct choice was not made points to a German General Staff that had lost its ability to perform its defined mission. They may have tried to convinced their CnC, but clearly, not hard enough.

[Perturabo]

ORIGINAL: madgamer

And who was responsible for what got shipped when? The quartermaster knew the bottle neck would slow things down but it was Hitler who at first considered shipping or having the winter supplies closer to the trops before the invasion even started but changed his mind then by the time they were shipped they did get held up in the Polish crunch.

That's shipping things that are needed to survive and fight now vs. shipping things that will be needed later.

For example Guderians group already had minimal reserves of fuel and ammo at the start of the operation. Would getting winter clothes instead of fuel and ammo help them? I don't think so.

ORIGINAL: madgamer

What is your opinion of not making the attack in the first place? Would a fresh German Army in 42 have been better. Just having them in front of the city was a threat. I suppose the chances looked good at that point to get the capitol but we can see from our time that it was not that good of a move especially without proper winter preparations. I think you have a bit more knowledge of the situation than I. Do you agree with what actually happened or would you have done it differently.

Old guy want to know
Madgamer

I think they should have stopped at certain point and bring in ammo, fuel, winter supplies and reinforcements. The decision to go for the Moscow was based purely on wishful thinking.

[SS Hauptsturmfuhrer]

Hindsight is easy, but with it, it is easy to see that wiping out the Vyazma pocket and then fortifying for the winter would have been optimal for maxing enemy damage and minimizing German losses.  Without hindsight, astonishingly Hitler was likely correct in not attacking Moscow, and instead, it would have been best to restock over the winter and then go for the oilfields in the south while Stalin turtles in Moscow so the Soviet hordes are in the perfectly wrong place.  Hitler was most probably also correct in prioritizing the destruction of commie armies over taking objectives, and as for objectives, the Caucasus was the main one for him.