Could Germany have defeated the USSR?

[GaryChildress]

This is an offshoot of a discussion in the War in the East forum. Basically the question is, could the Germans have defeated the Soviet Union in WW2? I'm inclined to believe the answer is "no". Well...with a possible exception. If the Germans had taken Moscow in '41 with Stalin in it maybe the Soviet Union would have collapsed and sued for peace. Otherwise it seems to me that Germany lacked the resources in manpower and material to fight a war with the USSR all the way through.

I'm no expert on the subject so what do others think?

[Sarge]

I know it’s simplistic but I honestly think Hitler’s total distrust and lack of confidencein in his staff would have just found another opportunity to lose the war.

[sol_invictus]

Of course anything is possible when dabbling in hypotheticals but I agree with Sarge in that Hitler being Hitler went a long way toward assuring that the Germans were doomed to lose. Of course Hitler could have always have had a change of heart and decided to listen to Guderian or Manstein. Also Stalin could have always gotten a bullet in the head in that fateful meeting and the Soviet leadership could have experienced a complete collapse and panic.

[sullafelix]

I believe quite easily except for his mad racial policies. The Germans were greeted as deliverers from soviet oppression in the beginning. Had they decided to outline a plan of of small states, Ukraine etc.. where they would have been dependents of Germany much like what they proposed in WWI. The Germans would have had tons of willing partners to crush soviet Russia. There would have been no need to worry about partisans and they would have had plenty of recruits. He could even had lied  ( what a stretch ) and first conquered and then followed through with the racial policies.
 
Of course to be honest without the sicko racial policies many scientists would not have left Germany and we might all be singing edelweiss.
 
But even with the same policies intact if Germany had been put on a war footing in 39 or 40 instead of 43 and Speer had that much more time to build the economy before bombing became an issue they could have won. Instead of 5000 panthers and 1400 tigers how about 25000 and 10000. With one German tank worth 5 allied even the vasts amounts we built might not have been enough. Also with the eastern campaign remember that the panzer divisions tank strength was cut in half right before the invasion. What if because of the ability to build more tanks they weren't.
 
I could go on and on about the various strategical and operational errors that were made.

[Monkeys Brain]

ORIGINAL: Gary Childress

This is an offshoot of a discussion in the War in the East forum. Basically the question is, could the Germans have defeated the Soviet Union in WW2? I'm inclined to believe the answer is "no". Well...with a possible exception. If the Germans had taken Moscow in '41 with Stalin in it maybe the Soviet Union would have collapsed and sued for peace. Otherwise it seems to me that Germany lacked the resources in manpower and material to fight a war with the USSR all the way through.

I'm no expert on the subject so what do others think?

OK, history teacher called Monkyes Brain needs to step in...

First Germany would have to take Murmanks (lol, yes that), but not nececarily.
Most important would have be to take Leningrad in 1941. Or At least to tighten the grip on Leningrad. They only had one division helpin Finns on Svir river (understrength I think because that division missed one regiment I think). As Von Arnim raced to capture Tikhvin with ONE panzer corps and as Finns DID ABSOLUTELY NOTHING to help them out, Soviets quicky attacked his flanks and liberated Tikhvin in November 1941.
So inedaquate forces....
Also Hitler and others did judge wrongly ability of Soviets to make up those losses of 1941. See figure of tanks and planes production for 1942. for example.
Weapon production was also mentioned. Of course in 1941. Germans should have stripped other fronts most rigidly (France, Norrway, etc...) and leave only enough for defense. UK was not prepared to attack in 1941. or 1942. (Dieppe...)

But, if Leninigrad was taken in 1941. or prepared to be taken by spring 1942. And IF Moscow has been taken in 1941. or latest spring/summer 1942. then they would have some chance.

Moscow was very important because mostly it was biggest railroad hube with 200000 railroad cars as well there. If you take Moscow then you inhibit most important North South transfer of Russian reserves - if Moscow is taken then northern Russia is gone as well.

You, of course need one major victory in the south of course then Russian are gone to Gorky and then to Urals. I doubt that rest of USSR would make too much problems they could be saved only some time because of great distances.

Voila.

[06 Maestro]

I would say that; yes, Russia could have been beaten-with three little changes to the real situation.

1. Technology- The Mk3 could have been equipped with the high velocity 50 gun from the very beginning of the production. For reasons of standardization, (equipping infantry and AFV's with the 37mm) it was decided to design the turret so it could be easily upgraded to the 50mm from the 37 latter on. The order for that change came just after the French campaign-ordered by Hitler himself. For some reason, there was a misunderstanding, and the tanks were rearmed with the low velocity 50mm gun. This huge mistake was not corrected until 1942, but which time the small tank was approaching the end of its usefulness. Of course, to develop a AT type gun for the Mk4 pre Barbarossa would have been a good idea too, but not essential.

2. Production- Germany was the only major country that could have drastically increased its production during the early war that did not. The 72 hour work week was not instituted in Germany until 1943. At a stroke of a pen, Germany could have experience a 20% increase in production-starting in '39.

3. Operational- The focus of the invasion of Russia should have been the capture of Moscow-and then the final elimination of the Red Army. This plan (which was actually put forward, but not used) would have had to have been agreed upon well before the actual invasion began. The actual plan that was utilized for Barbarossa did not have this focus and leaves some serious doubt that Moscow could have been taken.

With these three little points adhered to, Germany could have "won" in the east. This still would not have guaranteed winning the war-that would call for an additional 3 points-at least.

[Charles2222]

As far as I'm concerned it depends on a lot of things, and still, with all we may talk about it, we will be no closer to knowing the truth.

1. The main question, just which germany are we talking about? Something of the real world germany, or a fictitious one where germany is really only against the USSR (no France to occupy, and no NAfrica, and no interference from either the USA or GB). It's my opinion that germany was the greatest single military might in the world, such that it "could" beat any one nation by itself, but the problem is the real world germany never had it so easy.

2. Real world germany - A lot of things could had been done differently to turn the tide, and several of them approach the artificial germany I spoke of, such as depleting France (or Norway) of more occupational troops, or not having a NAfrican campaign. Whether letting Italy wither on the vine in NAfrica, could bring more problems than was historical for germany I cannot say. It would seem Italy would be invaded sooner, but then trying to get rid of the USSR sooner would had been easier and less supply would had been lost for DAK if they were supplied in the USSR instead.

3. Would the german drive for Kiev had ended up better actually trying to take Leningrad, or more importantly Moscow?

4. Of course, as mentioned earlier, what does an earlier gearing up for Total War accomplish?

[06 Maestro]

ORIGINAL: Charles_22

As far as I'm concerned it depends on a lot of things, and still, with all we may talk about it, we will be no closer to knowing the truth.

The truth? Perhaps not, but we can certainly make reasonable assumptions. In multiple models of the campaign, Germany has been able to triumph with the right plan and a player that can stick to it. Of course, we all have the benefit of inside knowledge today that the Germans did not have. I recall a sentence from Hitler (too bad I don't recall the time period) which he stated that; "I went into Russia like a madman breaking down a door, and not knowing what was on the other side". What could Germany have accomplished if they even had a fraction of our current knowledge of Russian capabilities? Perhaps if we can find a couple of very intense gamers who hate military history and know nothing of the war and give them the best game for an Operation Barbarossa (and some 1940's operational theory)-then we will know the "truth".[:D]

Russia would be tough to defeat under any circumstances. The extent of Russian power is not fully realized by many. Russian armaments production during the 1930's exceeded the entire rest of the world combined (excluding naval forces). The Red Air Force was actually so large that even with the astounding losses it suffered, there was never a shortage of pilots. Russia was a monster of a power.

1. The main question, just which germany are we talking about? Something of the real world germany, or a fictitious one where germany is really only against the USSR (no France to occupy, and no NAfrica, and no interference from either the USA or GB). It's my opinion that germany was the greatest single military might in the world, such that it "could" beat any one nation by itself, but the problem is the real world germany never had it so easy.

Good point. From the Germans POV at the time, they were taking great risks in the west to be able to conduct Barbarossa-there really was not much more they could have thrown into it that was actually available.

3. Would the german drive for Kiev had ended up better actually trying to take Leningrad, or more importantly Moscow?

I think so, but again, with the initial plan that was used, this is iffy. It is clear though that the commanders that wanted to capture the heart of Russian power before Russia was able to reorganize were quite correct in their thinking. If its the only chance to win, you've got to go for it. The problem was that there was no consensus as to what it would actually take to win.

4. Of course, as mentioned earlier, what does an earlier gearing up for Total War accomplish?

Well, for Germany by the end of 1941, well over 5000 aircraft of all (Luftwaffe had less than 3000 a/c in Dec '41) types for starters, hundreds of thousands of tons of critical munitions types, about 20,000 trucks and thousands of armored fighting vehicles. It may have had a positive impact on research also. Of all the things that could have had a big impact on the war, this is number one IMO. The British geared up from day one-and they won.

[sol_invictus]

The bane of all historic wargaming; hindsight.[;)]

[IronDuke_slith]

ORIGINAL: 06 Maestro

I would say that; yes, Russia could have been beaten-with three little changes to the real situation.

1. Technology- The Mk3 could have been equipped with the high velocity 50 gun from the very beginning of the production. For reasons of standardization, (equipping infantry and AFV's with the 37mm) it was decided to design the turret so it could be easily upgraded to the 50mm from the 37 latter on. The order for that change came just after the French campaign-ordered by Hitler himself. For some reason, there was a misunderstanding, and the tanks were rearmed with the low velocity 50mm gun. This huge mistake was not corrected until 1942, but which time the small tank was approaching the end of its usefulness. Of course, to develop a AT type gun for the Mk4 pre Barbarossa would have been a good idea too, but not essential.

I would suggest this didn't really matter, Maestro, in the grand scheme. Given the success the Germans had during the initial campaign, how much better could things have gotten? the German Panzerwaffe was technically outclassed in France but got the job done. No doubt this error cost lives, but given the numbers of Soviet Tanks destroyed or captured, it's hard to believe this would have made much of a difference.

2. Production- Germany was the only major country that could have drastically increased its production during the early war that did not. The 72 hour work week was not instituted in Germany until 1943. At a stroke of a pen, Germany could have experience a 20% increase in production-starting in '39.

I don't think it was that simple. Part of Germany's production issues stemmed from attitudes within the wehrmacht to weaponry and outdated production processes at home. These took time to rectify. Changing to a three shift system and rationalising design choices certainly improved production, but the German economy simply wasn't equipped to deliver what the Wehrmacht needed however long they worked.

For example, given Germany's campaign-long lack of POL, exactly what use would another ten thousand tanks have been? Germany would never have been able to fuel them, and would have struggled to provision them. Germany certainly wouldn't have been able to provide the trucks for move the accompanying infantry had another 10 or even 20 Panzer Divisions been raised.

3. Operational- The focus of the invasion of Russia should have been the capture of Moscow-and then the final elimination of the Red Army. This plan (which was actually put forward, but not used) would have had to have been agreed upon well before the actual invasion began. The actual plan that was utilized for Barbarossa did not have this focus and leaves some serious doubt that Moscow could have been taken.

The real point was that Moscow was irrelevant given the general German doctrinal intent to destroy the opposing field force. For example, the usual bug bear in this sort of thread was the diversion to Kiev. However, this bagged 665000 prisoners and gave the AXIS numerical superiority (albeit briefly) for the only time in the entire war. Moscow was only essentially useful because in defending it, the Russians would mass and give the Germans a chance to achieve larger than normal victories, as they did at Vyazma and Bryansk. However, given most organs of government and production was out before Typhoon got going, I don't see it would have made that much difference.

The essential German issue was that there were not enough AXIs troops, there was not enough motorised equipment and supporting logistics, they were numerically outnumbered and every mile they advanced drew their spearheads further apart in a country that got wider the further east you went.

Regards,
IronDuke

[IronDuke_slith]

ORIGINAL: 06 Maestro

Well, for Germany by the end of 1941, well over 5000 aircraft of all (Luftwaffe had less than 3000 a/c in Dec '41) types for starters, hundreds of thousands of tons of critical munitions types, about 20,000 trucks and thousands of armored fighting vehicles. It may have had a positive impact on research also. Of all the things that could have had a big impact on the war, this is number one IMO. The British geared up from day one-and they won.

Again here, (I'm not picking on you, sorry if it appears that way). All extra aircraft and tanks do is stretch the available POL further. Instead of getting to the outskirts of Moscow, the extra tanks and aircraft only really ensure that the Wehrmacht and Luftwaffe are stopped after Kiev.

Also, with regards munitions. Given the German logistical situation, extra munitions didn't help because the Germans couldn't lift them to the front anyway.

The same applies to the trucks. Germany lacked the raw materials to make rubber. They simply would not have been able to produce enough tyres to equip 20000 or 50000 new trucks even if they had had the fuel to fill them up. 20000 was also not enough. The Wehrmacht marched into Russia with thousands of French Civilian vehicles that were simply not up to the job. Any serious programme should have concentrated on upgrading the truck fleet, not necessarily augmenting it.

Regards,
IronDuke

[06 Maestro]

ORIGINAL: IronDuke

Again here, (I'm not picking on you, sorry if it appears that way).

No, not at all. Its a big subject and there is lots of room for differing views-and reasons for those (most of the time).

All extra aircraft and tanks do is stretch the available POL further. Instead of getting to the outskirts of Moscow, the extra tanks and aircraft only really ensure that the Wehrmacht and Luftwaffe are stopped after Kiev.

True-to a certain extent. However, one needs to analyze the cost of an entire divisions that requires supply and support while it is missing (or critically short of) its primary weapon system which makes it mission capable. An armored divsion which still had 14,000 men, 1,500 trucks, but 25 tanks is a huge and wasteful drain on the supply system. With 100 more tanks and 500 more men, the added costs to keep that division supplied would be minimal-especially when you consider its added capabilities-which would be several times more than the depleted division. The same rational holds true for air units. To maintain a base that is meant to sup[port a hundred a/c, but there are only 20 to keep going is not the most productive way to do things.

Also, with regards munitions. Given the German logistical situation, extra munitions didn't help because the Germans couldn't lift them to the front anyway.

This is largely true from the late summer of '41 well into '42. By the spring of '42 the rail system had been repaired well enough so that operational shortages should not have occurred (until jumping forward again another few hundred miles). (side note, this raises the grand strategy for the '42 campaign-many though that by standing on the defensive-(except for Leningrad and Sevastopol)- for a year would pay off better than attempting another big push when things were just starting to go right-supply wise-no small consideration).

The same applies to the trucks. Germany lacked the raw materials to make rubber. They simply would not have been able to produce enough tyres to equip 20000 or 50000 new trucks even if they had had the fuel to fill them up. 20000 was also not enough. The Wehrmacht marched into Russia with thousands of French Civilian vehicles that were simply not up to the job. Any serious programme should have concentrated on upgrading the truck fleet, not necessarily augmenting it.
Regards,
IronDuke

There were very good stocks of strategic materials at the start of the war-Goering was actually a very sharp chap in that regards. It is true that rubber was a looming problem, but one that was eventually overcome with synthetic rubber. The supplies could have handled the added production for a few years-of course, they did not know how successful the synthetic plants were going to be-so it becomes a question of more now, or more later. In any event, some areas of the armaments industry could have been exempted from the 72 hour work week. There were area, such as a/c production that were held back by some very poor planning. Germany was rich in aluminum for instance, but the a/c factories were fearful of shortages, thus resulting in hording and additional waste. I don't recall the figures with clarity right now, but something like only 50% of aluminum production was reserved for the Luftwaffe, whereas the RAF received almost 100% of GB's production. Shift work and the 72 hour work week could not have bee that difficult to implement-after all, the Brits did it immediately, Speer was able to get it rolling quite quickly after the demise of Todt. (in fairness, Todt did start the program for non Luftwaffe factories a few months before his accident).

As for the fuel situation; there was no strategic shortage which would effect primary operations. I have seen statements that there were fuel shortages in France during the 1940 campaign-these were due to poor staff work rather than any strategic shortage of fuel. It was not until late in '42 before fuel was becoming critically short for primary operations. This is not to say that Germany was not acutely short in a strategic sense, but they had more than enough in 1941 for Barbarossa-even if there were another several thousand more tanks and a/c.

Hitler had told Todt that he wanted a thousand tanks a month after the French campaign-he was told it was impossible. It clearly was not.

The Luftwaffe would have had to start looking into better ways to train much larger numbers of pilots, as they did later in the war. Fuel was certainly a big consideration in training the force. Had the cutbacks begun earlier, and accelerated the improvements in ground training, a much larger (and high standard) German Air Force would have been available by 1942.

Again, I think that a simple stroke of a pen ordering the 72 hour work week would have given enough material to make a significant difference in Barbarossa. By 1942, the differences would have been rather huge-especially in the air.

On a related point; Goering wanted the new Volkswagen factory to be put under the Luftwaffe sphere right at the beginning of the war. This was Germany's biggest factory. Had he received control of that plant, resource consumption by the Luftwaffe would have expanded drastically. Goering had no qualms about that-and he was the guy who should have knon better than anyone in Germany. Luckily for the allies, Hitler decided to give it over to Army orders-but it sat idle for a very long time.

Compared to British prewar planning, the Germans were far behind the curve. The Brits (even under Chamberlain) had made real plans for turning all automotive plants into a/c factories. The appropriate executives were all informed so that the plan could commence as soon as required. They planned to double production in the first year, and double iot again in the second year-quite ambitious-and nearly completed.

[Charles2222]

06 Maestro: The USSR superiority in numbers is often fake. There's no way the quality of the USSR soldier equaled, on average, the german soldier, and comrade Stalin made sure of that with the 30's -and- 40's purges. The air force was a total joke, as it was almost completely eliminated within the first week. Only after the germans as a whole started having troubles on other fronts, could any sense of numbers be used positively for their air force (through the factories building new ones). Part of the luxury the USSR had, remember, was they never faced the whole of anything german, but then that's the artificial germany I spoke of. After the Siberian divisions were let loose germany had to face more or less the entire USSR force, whereas germany occupying other lands and fearing invasions there, never really got to show the USSR the total capabilities. Only if the USSR invaded germany from the start would that had been possible. Only in matters of armor (and the navy for either side played such a minor part) was the USSR the superior in the first years. Almost always superior in numbers I would presume, and at times in individual tank capabilities as well (KV1 and T34 period in particular), but a lot of that advantage was squandered away in just plain bad tactics and disorganization.

Total War can look like a possible solution for them, but part of the problem was having that fascist pig directing them. What I mean by that, is that Hitler feared his own people and assasination attempts, even before Barbarossa began. It looks like a mistake not to gear up for war earlier, but part of the problem is that he already had a number of people wanting to bump him off, so that last thing he needed was to give more people more reasons to do so.

[06 Maestro]

ORIGINAL: Charles_22

Total War can look like a possible solution for them, but part of the problem was having that fascist pig directing them. What I mean by that, is that Hitler feared his own people and assasination attempts, even before Barbarossa began. It looks like a mistake not to gear up for war earlier, but part of the problem is that he already had a number of people wanting to bump him off, so that last thing he needed was to give more people more reasons to do so.

Political considerations were, oddly enough, the prime reason for Germany failing to gear up for total war before it was too late.
There was a desire by Hitler to keep the general population happy to avoid any moral problems-but what moral problems would occur from a lack of air protection? They knew they were in a battle to the death-their early approach to war production leaves one wondering what they were thinking.

Soviet equipment was not bad stuff. It is true that many of their tanks were nothing more that expensive pill boxes in '41, but there was a lot of them. As you say, the training was a major factor, unit and individual. Experience was lacking, but if they could survive, then the experience would come-and it did.

[Charles2222]

ORIGINAL: 06 Maestro

ORIGINAL: Charles_22

Total War can look like a possible solution for them, but part of the problem was having that fascist pig directing them. What I mean by that, is that Hitler feared his own people and assasination attempts, even before Barbarossa began. It looks like a mistake not to gear up for war earlier, but part of the problem is that he already had a number of people wanting to bump him off, so that last thing he needed was to give more people more reasons to do so.

Political considerations were, oddly enough, the prime reason for Germany failing to gear up for total war before it was too late.
There was a desire by Hitler to keep the general population happy to avoid any moral problems-but what moral problems would occur from a lack of air protection? They knew they were in a battle to the death-their early approach to war production leaves one wondering what they were thinking.

Soviet equipment was not bad stuff. It is true that many of their tanks were nothing more that expensive pill boxes in '41, but there was a lot of them. As you say, the training was a major factor, unit and individual. Experience was lacking, but if they could survive, then the experience would come-and it did.

That's one dilemma that plagues me as well, that military reverses might be just as harrowing to the public as having to work too hard. Come to think of it though if what you were referring to was the USAAF and RAF bombing campaigns, by the time they went to total war, there really wasn't that much reason to believe they couldn't handle the strategic bombers. The USA couldn't have started earlier than 1/42 and somewhere around 1/43, after Stalingrad, came the Total War speech. I don't think there was enough evidence before the speech to suggest they couldn't handle anything that was aerially thrown against them. The most easy solution, which did end up happening, was to put more emphasis on fighter production, but I suspect that the Total War speech came even before that. Another thing I wonder about, just how quickly after the speech did the turnabout start? Was it just a lot of hot air for several months, or did they really get serious right then? At least with the military reverse of Stalingrad, they then had the excuse that the population had to work harder in order to hope to win, or as they probably put it, to make up for what was lost there.

[06 Maestro]

ORIGINAL: Charles_22
Another thing I wonder about, just how quickly after the speech did the turnabout start? Was it just a lot of hot air for several months, or did they really get serious right then?

As best as I can recall (from A. Speers book) is that Todt initiated the 72 hour work week for German armaments factories in January of '43. German production did start to climb immediately from that point. The Luftwaffe plants had there own supervision. Although their output began to rise rapidly also, they did not go onto the 72 hour week until April of '43. The differences in production were amazing. If we did not start smashing factories that summer, things were going to get real ugly.

Regarding German Intel on our bomber forces; from what I understand, Goering was well informed of U.S. bomber production and production forecasts as of mid '42. Some simply did not believe it was possible, other Luftwaffe Generals wanted to stop bomber production so that everything could be concentrated on fighters. IIRC, the extreme response to the plausible threat from the U.S. was not taken in that the war in the east was suppose to be largely over so the Luftwaffe could return to the west in numbers.

On a related thought; the U.S. high command was not worried about the Germans capturing the Caucasian oil centers. Apparently the Brits were. It had bee reasoned out that even with a huge increase in fuel supplies for the Luftwaffe, they were a spent force. The reduction of quality trainers for the Luftwaffe was an ever ongoing event with one "emergency" after another. Even with higher production and an increase in fuel, the problems would become insurmountable. The time that was required to train new units and aircrew was just no longer available to the Luftwaffe before the hammer would fall. That was the US view in late '42 anyway.

The critical years for the Luftwaffe expansion was '40-'41. This is another reason why the higher production in the early years of the war were critical. They needed training a/c by the thousands. Losses of first line a/c due to training accidents were very high-something like 1 plane for 5 pilots. These were problems the RAF anticipated-and somewhat avoided. Although the RAF actually lost more a/c from accident than from combat for a long time-they kept churning out the aviators and planes until they were on top of the situation.

This conversation reminds me of a great book I have on the air war. Its not about the battles per se, but the overall organization of the various air forces, training, research control and industrial policies-complete with numbers. I will find that sometime in the next day and post its title/author. It was fascinating stuff.

[Qwixt]

ORIGINAL: Sarge

I know it’s simplistic but I honestly think Hitler’s total distrust and lack of confidencein in his staff would have just found another opportunity to lose the war.

I agree with you. The man was crazy.

[06 Maestro]

ORIGINAL: Qwixt

ORIGINAL: Sarge

I know it’s simplistic but I honestly think Hitler’s total distrust and lack of confidencein in his staff would have just found another opportunity to lose the war.

I agree with you. The man was crazy.

That is somewhat simplistic, but is also probably true. There were just too many little mistakes-mistakes that could be traced back to a somewhat flawed leader.

Regarding mistrust; the mishap on upgrading the Mark 3 to the high velocity 50mm was blamed on the Quartermaster General. Hitler gave the order for the change (about July 1940) in a large staff meeting. When the error was discovered (early '41?) the General stated he followed his instructions. Hitler said no-I said high velocity. So, an effort was made to get to the bottom of this almost treasonous action to determine just who said what. It turned out that they could not find out for sure-because it was found that no stenographer was present at the meeting. There was no record of what was said at all. I don't know what happened to the good General-his career certainly had a big hurt on it.

Two things came of this situation to make things better. All meetings were to be recorded-and-[;)]that there would no longer be a Quartermaster General present in any of the OKW briefings. This would have been initiated right in the middle of detailed planning for Barbarossa. Knocking your top supply expert out of the top loop of information on the eve of the greatest military operation ever is not really all that bright-regardless if he made a mistake or not. I'm not sure if this ban lasted throughout the war, but if it did there is small wonder that the Army ran into some supply problems here and there.

[bigbaba]

ORIGINAL: Gary Childress

This is an offshoot of a discussion in the War in the East forum. Basically the question is, could the Germans have defeated the Soviet Union in WW2? I'm inclined to believe the answer is "no". Well...with a possible exception. If the Germans had taken Moscow in '41 with Stalin in it maybe the Soviet Union would have collapsed and sued for peace. Otherwise it seems to me that Germany lacked the resources in manpower and material to fight a war with the USSR all the way through.

I'm no expert on the subject so what do others think?

a famous quote about fighting against russia is:

"you can only defeat russia from inside."

as the german troops advanced into russia, they were welcomed as liberators by the population of the baltic states, ukraine, belaruss...but hitlers "lebensraum ost" ideology saw no room for this russian people who hated stalins regime. and when the people noticed that hitler isnt better then stalin, they joined the partisan movement which was realy huge in 1943-1944.

with a human policy in russia, the germans would surely beat stalin, but not with their nazi ideology.

[Charles2222]

ORIGINAL: 06 Maestro

ORIGINAL: Charles_22
Another thing I wonder about, just how quickly after the speech did the turnabout start? Was it just a lot of hot air for several months, or did they really get serious right then?

As best as I can recall (from A. Speers book) is that Todt initiated the 72 hour work week for German armaments factories in January of '43. German production did start to climb immediately from that point. The Luftwaffe plants had there own supervision. Although their output began to rise rapidly also, they did not go onto the 72 hour week until April of '43. The differences in production were amazing. If we did not start smashing factories that summer, things were going to get real ugly.

Regarding German Intel on our bomber forces; from what I understand, Goering was well informed of U.S. bomber production and production forecasts as of mid '42. Some simply did not believe it was possible, other Luftwaffe Generals wanted to stop bomber production so that everything could be concentrated on fighters. IIRC, the extreme response to the plausible threat from the U.S. was not taken in that the war in the east was suppose to be largely over so the Luftwaffe could return to the west in numbers.

On a related thought; the U.S. high command was not worried about the Germans capturing the Caucasian oil centers. Apparently the Brits were. It had bee reasoned out that even with a huge increase in fuel supplies for the Luftwaffe, they were a spent force. The reduction of quality trainers for the Luftwaffe was an ever ongoing event with one "emergency" after another. Even with higher production and an increase in fuel, the problems would become insurmountable. The time that was required to train new units and aircrew was just no longer available to the Luftwaffe before the hammer would fall. That was the US view in late '42 anyway.

The critical years for the Luftwaffe expansion was '40-'41. This is another reason why the higher production in the early years of the war were critical. They needed training a/c by the thousands. Losses of first line a/c due to training accidents were very high-something like 1 plane for 5 pilots. These were problems the RAF anticipated-and somewhat avoided. Although the RAF actually lost more a/c from accident than from combat for a long time-they kept churning out the aviators and planes until they were on top of the situation.

This conversation reminds me of a great book I have on the air war. Its not about the battles per se, but the overall organization of the various air forces, training, research control and industrial policies-complete with numbers. I will find that sometime in the next day and post its title/author. It was fascinating stuff.

Pretty interesting, but as far as ready pilots and number of capable planes, do recall the match here. We're talking about guys, who as late as the Poltava Incident, were parking their planes willy nilly, often in plain view, off the runways, and often didn't bother to flatten out the ground very much (so their takeoffs weren't very smooth). This of course would describe the USSR aircrews. If generalizations can be trusted, while the Luftwaffe may have had more complicated, or even more delicate planes, "may", the Red Air Force treated their machines like garbage, so I wouldn't exactly expect their service ratio to be too terribly high in comparison. There was a period of complete domination by the Luftwaffe against the RAF (Red Air Force), and then at some point, in operational machines anyway, there was parity, but even then the Luftwaffe had a considerable edge. Then came the period of the drain, where more and more was being sent to battle the strategic offensives, and as a result the USSR RAF got something approaching dominance. It wasn't that the Luftwaffe did so poorly with what they had as to why they would lose the edge somewhere, but because they were often having to split their forces, even more so than the armies usually, to fight nations that were putting almost all of their aerial power against them.

Artificial germany, again, never would have had the slightest problem with the USSR RAF, especially after that romp of a start, but unlike the USSR for the most part, they had other battles to fight, so there were as in all cases with the germans, periods of superiority, periods of parity, and then periods of inferiority.