Ineffective PH attack?

[witpqs]

Let me pose this question to set a baseline of what people mean:

What (approximate) result in the game do you consider historical?

The question is necessary because the game has different mechanisms than were present IRL. For example, IRL only 2 BB's remained sunk in game terms. Whereas in the game, once sunk is always sunk. Less obvious game-play impacts might apply to other results of the battle (leaving that open ended for your answers).

[Mike Scholl]

ORIGINAL: witpqs

Let me pose this question to set a baseline of what people mean:

What (approximate) result in the game do you consider historical?

The question is necessary because the game has different mechanisms than were present IRL. For example, IRL only 2 BB's remained sunk in game terms. Whereas in the game, once sunk is always sunk. Less obvious game-play impacts might apply to other results of the battle (leaving that open ended for your answers).

As you point out. "sunk" in the game means "remains sunk", so two BB's "sunk" at PH in the 12/07/41 turn would be "Historical". So for "approximate", I'd say one to three "sunk" is about right.

[Q-Ball]

What was "sunk" historically? Isn't this tough to pin down?

Only Arizona was too damaged to ever return to service. Oklahoma could have been, but it was decided that it wasn't a good use of resources, and she was scrapped instead. California, West Va, and Tennessee all had major damage that took until 1943 or 1944 to repair,and had major rebuilds; if the USN had decided not to invest those resources in rebuilding those three ships (and there was some debate about that), would they have also been "sunk"?

[witpqs]

ORIGINAL: Q-Ball

What was "sunk" historically? Isn't this tough to pin down?

Only Arizona was too damaged to ever return to service. Oklahoma could have been, but it was decided that it wasn't a good use of resources, and she was scrapped instead. California, West Va, and Tennessee all had major damage that took until 1943 or 1944 to repair,and had major rebuilds; if the USN had decided not to invest those resources in rebuilding those three ships (and there was some debate about that), would they have also been "sunk"?

That's the point of the question. When one person in this thread says 'historical results' they might be meaning something very different from when another person writes the same words. I ask your view to get it on the table and perhaps at least get people - if not on the same page - seeing what pages folks are on.

[John Lansford]

Actually, Tennessee was ready for combat in '42.  She had her PH damage repaired by mid-year but then had extensive refits, removing superstructure and secondary guns and adding a SoDak type superstructure, 5" DP gun mounts and smaller AA guns.  She helped bombard Tarawa in 43 but would have been available a lot earlier if needed.
 
Nevada, California and WV, now, all three of them had heavy damage that kept them out of the war until 1944.

[JWE]

ORIGINAL: John Lansford
Nevada, California and WV, now, all three of them had heavy damage that kept them out of the war until 1944.

Well ... not really; not really, really. They had pretty much the same damage as some others. So why couldn't they be just cut down, like so many others and sent back out? And who decided on the 'modernization' program, and who whould get the first shot at it? And why didn't the remaining operational ships get the first taste? And what would have happened to California, if she didn't get whacked as hard as she did? And Nevada was pretty choice, so wtf on breakin her bones till late war? And so it goes.

[Mynok]

I've always wondered why the #1 definition under history isn't simply

1. SNAFU

[Ketza]

If you want to sink more BBs dont bomb the airfields. Adjust all of your targets accordingly.

[bklooste]

Perhaps in the next version (AE 2 WitP 2, etc) it might be possible for the Japan side to have greater choice of what ships start where. Yamamoto knew if the CV's were not in PH the attack was a basic washout. His line "I fear all we have done is wake a sleeping giant and fill it with a great rage". sort of says it all.
What I am getting at is being able to put some TF's in a totally different place. Why do we have to bomb PH all the time?
What happens if the KB is in the PI or DI areas. Starting the war our own way would be fun.

He said no such thing , that was from the movie "Tora Tora Tora" , the "we always knew CVs were important" brigade is also a post war creation this was not accepted till 43. The Pacific fleet was the main target and the carriers were a bonus both sides still believed BB were far more important than CV at that point otherwise they would not have build / designed the Yamotos , Iowas and Montana's. Also note the Lexingtons were convert to carriers only because no more battleships were allowed under the Washington treaty if not for the treaty it is likely the US would have 1-2 fleet carriers less and at least 2-4 battleships more and most counties carrier doctrines and capabilities would have been far less developed .

[bklooste]

ORIGINAL: Ketza

If you want to sink more BBs dont bomb the airfields. Adjust all of your targets accordingly.

If you want to sink more BBs dont bomb the airfields. Adjust all of your targets accordingly.

Vals cant penetrate BBs so why bother trying ? Thats half your aircraft.

[Dr. Duh]

ORIGINAL: bklooste

...

He said no such thing , that was from the movie "Tora Tora Tora" , the "we always knew CVs were important" brigade is also a post war creation this was not accepted till 43. The Pacific fleet was the main target and the carriers were a bonus both sides still believed BB were far more important than CV at that point otherwise they would not have build / designed the Yamotos , Iowas and Montana's. Also note the Lexingtons were convert to carriers only because no more battleships were allowed under the Washington treaty if not for the treaty it is likely the US would have 1-2 fleet carriers less and at least 2-4 battleships more and most counties carrier doctrines and capabilities would have been far less developed .

That both sides believed BBs were far more important than CVs wasn't exactly a completely settled matter - clearly there were progressives in both navies that saw air power as the future, so I think at best one could only argue that traditional proponents of the decisive battle between big-gun surface fleets still held sway in both camps.

While Yamamoto is credited with initiating the idea, as I recall, Genda was more responsible for the detailed planning. Did these two leave documentation that purported to give an in-depth explanation of all the reasoning that went into their choices? Off the top of my head, I think there were two principal objectives commonly ascribed to them: one was military, the other was more political. The military objective was to cripple the US Pacific fleet so that it would be out of the picture during their conquest of the Southern Resource Area, and during the subsequent consolidation of their planned defensive perimeter.

The political objective was to dishearten and demoralize the American military and political leadership by destroying America's most prestigious naval forces, and that by starting out so badly we would be more likely to eventually accept their conquests as a fait accompli. That the Japanese leadership would think this has a lot to do with them projecting their own cultural bias onto us, and for that same reason they couldn't conceive that the actual result of such an attack might be exactly the opposite of what they intended. The idea that it would motivate our "peasantry" to allow the government to fight on no matter how long it took was too alien a concept.

Anyway, thinking you're going to take out the enemy's most important forces by targeting his battleships and planning to do it with a carrier strike force would seem to call for - a certain degree of cognitive dissonance. [X(]

[treespider]

ORIGINAL: Dr. Duh

Anyway, thinking you're going to take out the enemy's most important forces by targeting his battleships and planning to do it with a carrier strike force would seem to call for - a certain degree of cognitive dissonance. [X(]

Except the Japanese used the British attack on Taranto as the model...and IIRC a capital ship was not sunk at sea by carrier aircraft prior to the Coral Sea (although carrier aircraft did play a part in the disappearance of the Bismarck (it was scunked, right))...whereas a carrier had been sunk by battlecruisers at sea in 1940.

[bklooste]

ORIGINAL: witpqs

ORIGINAL: Q-Ball

What was "sunk" historically? Isn't this tough to pin down?

Only Arizona was too damaged to ever return to service. Oklahoma could have been, but it was decided that it wasn't a good use of resources, and she was scrapped instead. California, West Va, and Tennessee all had major damage that took until 1943 or 1944 to repair,and had major rebuilds; if the USN had decided not to invest those resources in rebuilding those three ships (and there was some debate about that), would they have also been "sunk"?

The Japanese also refloated ships in port later in the war this is also not modeled unless refloating is modeled you could argue the number of ships sunk is 4-5. They went to the bottom after all.

50 bombers with 800kg AP
40 with torps

Arizona Sunk , placed in the reserve fleet. 1 torpedo , 2 800kg AP , 1 critical hit , 1 bounced of turret
Oklahoma Capsized/ Sunk , re-floated and scrapped , 5 torps hits
Nevada Sinking and beached ,1 torp , (6-10 other bombs)
California Sunk , 2 torps , (2 250 kg bombs)
Utah Capsized , 2 torps
West Virginia Sunk , 7 torps , 2 800kg AP ( 1 dud)
Tennessee damaged back in 26th Feb 42 , 2 800kg AP ( 1 was damaged failed to explode after )
Maryland damaged back 26th Feb 42. 2 800kg AP ( both low order)
Pennsylvania minor damage in dry dock , torps fired at dry dick caisson

Other
Helena 1 torp
Raleigh 1 torp



Comments :

• 5 Battleships sunk ,1 capsized , 2 with significant damage
• With the same damage in blue waters only 2 would have survived ( note not same battle same damage)
• Serious damage seems to be repaired quickly eg the Tennessee had 2 16" shells explode inside her , 1 went through the turret the other knocked out the guns.
• The game doesn't model any special abilities in terms of shallow water and re-floating so why shouldn't the average be 5 sunk ? Why cant you refloat sunk ships in port like the US is in Pearl and the Japanese in 44-45 ?
• Did the Japanese get lucky or did they aim for the Turrets and Magazine if so thats some pretty accurate bombing ?
• the 800kg AP 16" rounds had a high dud rate but the explosions were pretty nasty.
• Hit rates ( assuming Japan used 5 torpedoes on the caisson ) torps 20/ 35 57% , 800kg AP 8/50 16%.
• No torps or 800 kg bombs were used on the 2nd ( or possible 3rd ) wave as all the ships were sinking or on the bottom. The Kates used 2 * 250 kg bombs and target the installations and air fields , The Vals attacked smaller ships .
• Note only about 7 torps per CV were used there would have been plenty in stores. If the first wave did not sink all those ships they would have been used on the 2nd wave.

Excluding major loss of surprise at worst we should see 4-5 BB sunk every time if the first strike doesn't do it the 2nd one will. Ships Sunk in a major port to take 90%/90% damage instead provided damage is < 150%.

[Dr. Duh]

ORIGINAL: treespider

ORIGINAL: Dr. Duh

Anyway, thinking you're going to take out the enemy's most important forces by targeting his battleships and planning to do it with a carrier strike force would seem to call for - a certain degree of cognitive dissonance. [X(]

Except the Japanese used the British attack on Taranto as the model...and IIRC a capital ship was not sunk at sea by carrier aircraft prior to the Coral Sea (although carrier aircraft did play a part in the disappearance of the Bismarck (it was scunked, right))...whereas a carrier had been sunk by battlecruisers at sea in 1940.

Um, the point I was trying to make was, how can you hold to both of these ideas at the same time:

1. Classic battleship doctrine - which was that the only reliable plan to take on a force of battleships was with another force of battleships - if you manage to sink one some other way, you just got lucky.

2. Plan to cripple an entire fleet of battleships - using only airpower from carriers.

[bklooste]

That both sides believed BBs were far more important than CVs wasn't exactly a completely settled matter - clearly there were progressives in both navies that saw air power as the future, so I think at best one could only argue that traditional proponents of the decisive battle between big-gun surface fleets still held sway in both camps.

Most of the US CVs were built because of the Washington treaty ( they had no choice) , after the treaties were abandoned the main budgets went to the South Dakotas , Iowas and Montanas $$$ show what the decision makers were thinking. The only reason more Montanas /Iowas were not layed down was they wouldn't be ready for the war , due to necessity a finished CV or CVE is better than an unfinished BB and hence the US built CVs NOT because they thought they were better. Would have been interesting what would have happened if Japan didn't strike Pearl and the necessity for capital ships was not as great so yes the powers in charge were decisive battle supporters.

As mentioned it was just a copy of the strike on the Italian fleet ,for which the key was logistics. Even the progressives had no idea on the use of carriers versus capital ships at sea which are under CAP. Personally i dont think they are that effective unless you have a massive advantage. However the growing air power and the ability to project it onto land ( not just the shore) along with less investment in resources is compelling and is the reason the IJN build the Soryus and the US the Enterprise . Though in Sea to Sea most proponents would not have backed carriers vs battle cruisers with some Cap from a CVE.

[bklooste]

Um, the point I was trying to make was, how can you hold to both of these ideas at the same time:

1. Classic battleship doctrine - which was that the only reliable plan to take on a force of battleships was with another force of battleships - if you manage to sink one some other way, you just got lucky.

2. Plan to cripple an entire fleet of battleships - using only airpower from carriers.

Not as simple as that

1. Classic battleship doctrine - which was that the only reliable plan to take on a force of battleships was with another force of battleships - if you manage to sink one some other way, you just got lucky. With battleships protected by a Cap from a CVE and increased AA and carriers to project force onto land and for port strikes/ASW. ( Note the Japanese used CVEs to provide Cap for their BBs)

vs

2. Plan to cripple an entire fleet of battleships - using only airpower from carriers.

Pretty sure all powers and most carrier advocates were clearly in Camp 1 .2 Has an economical advantage which is why Japan were probably closest to 2.

[bklooste]

Except the Japanese used the British attack on Taranto as the model...and IIRC a capital ship was not sunk at sea by carrier aircraft prior to the Coral Sea (although carrier aircraft did play a part in the disappearance of the Bismarck (it was scunked, right))...whereas a carrier had been sunk by battlecruisers at sea in 1940.

Exactly both are VERY important development in ideas. What was the first BB sunk by a carrier ? Hiei was finished by aircraft but the cruisers did the damage . Musashi in 44 and that was over welming air power. Most Japanese Battleships were lost vs other battleships ( if you exclude the B29 port strikes)

[treespider]

ORIGINAL: Dr. Duh

ORIGINAL: treespider

ORIGINAL: Dr. Duh

Anyway, thinking you're going to take out the enemy's most important forces by targeting his battleships and planning to do it with a carrier strike force would seem to call for - a certain degree of cognitive dissonance. [X(]

Except the Japanese used the British attack on Taranto as the model...and IIRC a capital ship was not sunk at sea by carrier aircraft prior to the Coral Sea (although carrier aircraft did play a part in the disappearance of the Bismarck (it was scunked, right))...whereas a carrier had been sunk by battlecruisers at sea in 1940.

Um, the point I was trying to make was, how can you hold to both of these ideas at the same time:

1. Classic battleship doctrine - which was that the only reliable plan to take on a force of battleships was with another force of battleships - if you manage to sink one some other way, you just got lucky.

2. Plan to cripple an entire fleet of battleships - using only airpower from carriers.

There is a slight disconnect between your two ideas...

The PLAN was a gamble to find and sink the BB's in port when they were completely stationary with complete surprise , the plan was not to engage the US Pacific Fleet in a game of maneuver warfare with the carriers.

[Dr. Duh]

ORIGINAL: treespider

ORIGINAL: Dr. Duh

ORIGINAL: treespider





Except the Japanese used the British attack on Taranto as the model...and IIRC a capital ship was not sunk at sea by carrier aircraft prior to the Coral Sea (although carrier aircraft did play a part in the disappearance of the Bismarck (it was scunked, right))...whereas a carrier had been sunk by battlecruisers at sea in 1940.

Um, the point I was trying to make was, how can you hold to both of these ideas at the same time:

1. Classic battleship doctrine - which was that the only reliable plan to take on a force of battleships was with another force of battleships - if you manage to sink one some other way, you just got lucky.

2. Plan to cripple an entire fleet of battleships - using only airpower from carriers.

There is a slight disconnect between your two ideas...

The PLAN was a gamble to find and sink the BB's in port when they were completely stationary with complete surprise , the plan was not to engage the US Pacific Fleet in a game of maneuver warfare with the carriers.

True enough. Although this wasn't exactly the same as sneaking into Scapa Flow either. Here's where we get into stuff I don't remember ever reading about though - what were their contingencies if the battleships hadn't been in port that morning? Was the plan to slink home with their puny carriers and just send another cable to Washington ("oops - my bad") while they put together a proper battlefleet to find and engage the Pacific fleet in a decisive battle? Or did the plan say that if they weren't in port, KB would look for them and try to sink them wherever they were?

[treespider]

ORIGINAL: Dr. Duh


True enough. Although this wasn't exactly the same as sneaking into Scapa Flow either. Here's where we get into stuff I don't remember ever reading about though - what were their contingencies if the battleships hadn't been in port that morning? Was the plan to slink home with their puny carriers and just send another cable to Washington ("oops - my bad") while they put together a proper battlefleet to find and engage the Pacific fleet in a decisive battle? Or did the plan say that if they weren't in port, KB would look for them and try to sink them wherever they were?

From the USSBS volume campaigns of the Pacific war -

In accordance with instructions from CinC Combined Fleet, the Task Force sortied from Hitokappu bay at 0600, 26 November and proceeded along the track shown in Appendix 2. On 2 December instructions were received to the effect that negotiations had failed and that 8 December was designated as "X"-day. The refueling was successfully completed on 3 December without mishap. (In the event of failure of the fueling operation it had planned to continue without the destroyers.) After refueling, the Task Force proceeded along the track without incident. No shipping was encountered and the force successfully escaped detection. During the approach, the following instructions were in effect:

1. If discovered prior to "X"-minus-2-day, the Task Force was to return to Japan without executing the attack.

2. If discovered prior to "X"-1-day, the decision as to what action to take was the responsibility of the Task Force Commander.

3. If discovered on "X"-minus-1-day or the morning of "S"-day the Task Force was to continue with the attack.

4. If at any time during the approach to Pearl Harbor the negotiations with the United States had been successful the attack would have been cancelled.

5. If, at any time during the approach to Pearl Harbor the American Fleet attempted to intercept the Japanese Task Force, the Japanese planned to counterattack. If the American Fleet advanced into Japanese home waters in pursuit of the Task Force it was planned to commit the Main Body of the Japanese Fleet as a support force.

6. If, after arriving in Hawaiian waters, it was found that the American Fleet was at sea and not in Pearl Harbor, the Japanese planned to scout a 300-miles radius around Oahu and attack if contact was made; otherwise they were to withdraw..