*** Hitler's Secret Weapons ***

[Randomizer]

@ Goodguy
It would seem that we have used the same reference materials to arrive at different (but not extremely different) conclusions.  This is not unusual in lively historical discussions.  So be it, good debate, Sir.
 
@ Warfare 1
If offence was taken I need to apologize for none was intended.  The Internet and particularly wargaming forums are haunted by Nazi fanboys for whom victory was just an ME-262, Type XXI or King Tiger away.  It gets tiresome after a while particularly when the Allies had a few tricks up their sleeves but these inevitably get discounted or ignored.  The Uber Nazi lobby is strong and sometimes the innocent get caught in the crossfire.  Sorry if my at times vitriolic target indication caused a blue on blue incident.
 
Cheers

[junk2drive]

Glad it has stayed civil. Don't want the big padlock.

[06 Maestro]

Regarding ME 262 production; the total figure that I had seen was 1285. Most of these were built in 1945. It is likely most of those never even flew.

There were something like 600 262's found intact in some forested areas at the end of the war. These aircraft were complete-except for the nose cones. It seems there was some sort of transportation problem and/or the concerned nose cone factory was damaged some how.[;)]

I wonder if those aircraft are included in the total of completed 262's? With all info known to me, production of the 262 did not exceed 200 per month until January of '45. This would have left an additional 500 or so a/c to be completed during February and March. A additional 600 a/c 99% complete by late April would take the total produced to nearly 2000-this is quite impossible. The most produced plane in '45 was still the 109-and there was only a total of all types of about 5000. There were certainly not 1500 262's built in '45.

So, the point is, if production was 1285 to 1400 it seems very likely that you can subtract 600 from that figure. This would leave a balance of 700 to 800 a/c that were actually fully produced. This would have been an inadequate amount to maintain even one fighter group during the last 6 months of the war.

Another point about the fan blaade problems. It was an issue of not having the correct material to build tham out of-thus it was prone to break apart after intense use. It seems that by the summer of '44 the only place where the required material could be had was on the east bank of the Dneniper River. This was one of the main reasons Hitler forbade the withdrawal of the mobile formations of Army Group Center to a more rational reserve status behind the main lines on the west bank. The mines located in the area just west of Smolensk were of great importance-apparently greated than the survival of AGC. Economic based military decision making at its best.

[06 Maestro]

ORIGINAL: junk2drive

Glad it has stayed civil. Don't want the big padlock.

Ditto. This perhaps the most interesting thread I've seen in the General Forums. There is a wealth of information (or incorrect/outdated) to be covered. We don't need to aim the Japanese death ray (even the 1945 model[:D]) at each other.

[GoodGuy]

ORIGINAL: Warfare1

I am not a Nazi fan-boy,....

[]... I simply wanted to use it as starting point; not because I believed everything it contains.

[]... I also wanted to show just how advanced Nazi/German research was (the Sanger; the Me P.1101, etc...) even though these weapons never reached any useful stage.

Understood, fair enough. I noticed that you presented both opinions regarding the Amerika bomber, but I wasn't sure about your opinion regarding the collection of myths on the first webby you presented.

ORIGINAL: 06 Maestro

There was another rather advanced concept-heat seeking AA missals. According to A Speer, the developement of this surface to air missal was nearing completion in '42 (IIRC).

If he really emitted that statement, I don't buy it. First indications of the "the fighter-crisis" began to show as early as 1942. This term was used in design offices, and it referred to the critical situation where new piston-engines weren't available. During the crisis later on, most, if not all, recent fighters' piston-engines were tuned/"pimped" versions of the standard designs, which offered at most averages performances - compared to the fast turbo-charged Allied fighters, while (reliably) running for 50 hours, only.

The idea was to create a less expensive way to fight Allied bombers. In order to damage or even destroy several bombers Flak units had to fire several thousand flak rounds (one source indicates 4000 rounds for a similar example). Such an amount of ammo cost several hundred thousand Reichsmarks. In contrast, one rocket cost up to 14,000 Reichsmark.

The list with requirements/specs had been issued by the RLM in September 1942, and included the requirement that the missile should have an extended blast radius, using a fragmentation bomb that could deliver a sufficient amount of shrapnels, in order to damage as many enemy planes as possible.
Another requirement was to design the rocket in a way that several sections could be produced without the factories/workers knowing what purpose the particular parts had, to counter espionage. The sections were then supposed to be assembled in a secret plant.
Also, the rocket was supposed to withstand rough weather conditions so that it could be placed right on the ramp (camouflaged) until it was used, even if that would take weeks or months.
The final specs issued in Nov. 1942 required a missile with a top speed of Mach 2, able to hit or damage targets flying at 900 km/h, up to 20,000 meters altitude and a radius of 50 kilometers.

The radius was somewhat optimistic, IMHO, to say the least, as the mechanical navigation (a gyrostat) and the simple targeting computer did not provide a high accuracy, so nearby bomber groups would have been targeted until more accurate navigation- or homing-solutions would have been available - that's my guess.

The first successful start was accomplished in late February 1944, the very first start in January had been rated as failure by some sources - as the missile did not reach sonic speed and just reached an altitude of 7000 km, but there are references that the developers foresaw this behaviour, giving them the opportunity to apply changes and new ideas prior to the next start.
The developers decided to use the same principle/engine used in the V2 rocket, the Waterfall was just smaller.
The "Wasserfall" missile reached a max speed of around 2700 kilometers/hour, the missile ran out of fuel at around 20,000 meters.

The US Hermes-A1 rocket was a reproduction of the Waterfall rocket.

No doubt the guidance system would have been primitive, but just how much so? If it had worked at all it would have been much more deadly that standard AA.

The guidance system was a simple mechanical computer, which required that the crew knew location, direction and speed of the targeted bomber group. As it was only intended to use it to attack nearby bombers, the approach would have been almost completely vertical.
The main idea regarding the detonator was a remote (radio? wire?) controlled solution, and an automatic backup detonator that would destroy the missile in case it had missed (to protect civilians).

Other tests incorporated a magnetic detonator, an infrared homing solution for use at night, and an acoustic homing warhead (with the mechanism from the acoustic torpedos).
The tests with the acoustic system were actually carried out, but i am not sure about the infrared version. There is no way that a working system was available in 1942.

I could imagine that the blast would have been bigger than the one of a regular flak round, since the rounds couldn't carry more than a few kilogramm of explosives.

The V2-project, being totally independent from the Wasserfall project (and with a different dev team and different approach regarding controls/targeting device), competed with the Wasserfall rocket regarding the use of scarce resources and manpower. Hitler favoured the V2 due to its propaganda and terror effect (he over-estimated its accuracy and its effect on Allied war efforts, too, I guess), so the really useful Waterfall project got the short end of the stick.

Looking at the effectiveness of SAM sites in Vietnam and other conflicts (Israel/Syria), the waterfall could have made a difference. Good call Maestro, we found another contender for the "useful/superior German weapon technology" badge within our whatif-quest. [;)]

The waterfall production had been canceled in February '45, in order to focus on V2 production. Btw, the leading dev Dr. Thiel was killed in March 1943, during an Allied bomber raid targeting the installations in Peenemünde, home of the V2 and Waterfall development, which may have delayed the development process. Most sources indicate that ~50 prototypes had been built, some sources say that a number of 40 flights was documented.

[GoodGuy]

ORIGINAL: 06 Maestro

The most produced plane in '45 was still the 109-and there was only a total of all types of about 5000. There were certainly not 1500 262's built in '45.

Sources I read indicate a number of 2.969 Me 109s in 1945.

Rechecked sources:
Until the end of 1944, 586 Me 262s had been built, with most of them being configured as Blitzbomber instead as fighter.
From January to April 1945, 865 Me 262s left the assembly lines.
Total = 1451.

For some reason I just thought it was a number between 1100 to 1200.

The majority of the 1945 fighter production did not see combat, due to lack of fuel, and had been "parked" and camouflaged on auxiliary airfields, some even in tunnels or underground installations.

@Randomizer: Btw, I rechecked sources, General Spaatz had sent a message to Washington (on 1st of September 1944), stating that the German jet fighters could make the bomber losses unbearable in the immediate future.
This, of course, if the Germans would have been able to keep up the number of sorties. Rumania turned sides around September, and its oil fields, which enabled the Germans to produce more fuel than the monthly consumption (at least motor engine fuel), were contested by the Russians. The loss of the Rumanian oil fields let the German fuel production fall below the monthly consumption rate, and this showed even more for aviation fuel.

The German fuel distribution didn't collapse altogether for one reason: The tremendous amount of vehicle losses during the retreat from France allowed the Germans to take a breather, as this had pushed the monthly consumption rate way below the monthly fuel production. The consumption peaked again and even exceeded the production level around 18th-20th of December, a few days after the Ardennes offensive had begun.
Losing the oil fields in Hungary (January 1945?) then appeared to be the nail in the coffin, mobility-wise, as that left the Germans with a tiny oil field in North Germany, which could not provide enough fuel (i think it delivered around a bit more then a tenth of the monthly consumption). At that point German forces had to eat up the POL reserve.

Since around 1942 the German Luftwaffe had partially lived off the stocked reserves, while the production focus had been on petrol (for tanks and vehicles). I can lookup the exact amounts some time, if there's interest.

[Jeffrey H.]

ORIGINAL: GoodGuy

...The final specs issued in Nov. 1942 required a missile with a top speed of Mach 2, able to hit or damage targets flying at 900 km/h, up to 20,000 meters altitude and a radius of 50 kilometers.

The radius was somewhat optimistic, IMHO, to say the least, ...

Sorry to pick at nits but I don't think the numbers are correct. 50m yes, 50kilometers I don't think so. At 20 kilometers elevation, the ground would be in the blast radius, by 30 kilometers.

[paullus99]

I believe he meant "operational radius" not blast radius. Of course, I believe those numbers are more than just a tad bit optimistic, given that there are only a few modern SAMs that have those operational ratings or better even at this point.

[Mike Parker]

yes it has to mean  50km engagement envelope.  Those specs are very impressive, and I have to believe they are not realistic, I have no doubt they were theoretical project specs, I just think an operational system would not have been near those figures.

[EUBanana]

ORIGINAL: Warfare1
While this is true, Germany flew the first operational jet plane almost 21-22 months (27 August, 1939) before the British did (in May 1941), putting them well ahead in this field.

Yet it was only introduced into the field a couple of months before the Meteor, so a bit moot really.

Frank Whittle was largely ignored by the RAF in much the same way the Me262 was largely ignored by Hitler. You could choose to say 'What if Hitler appreciated the jet engine more' but you could also say 'What if Frank Whittle rather than Reginald Mitchell enjoyed the full support of the MoD in the 1930s'?

[Warfare1]

ORIGINAL: Randomizer
@ Warfare 1
If offence was taken I need to apologize for none was intended. The Internet and particularly wargaming forums are haunted by Nazi fanboys for whom victory was just an ME-262, Type XXI or King Tiger away. It gets tiresome after a while particularly when the Allies had a few tricks up their sleeves but these inevitably get discounted or ignored. The Uber Nazi lobby is strong and sometimes the innocent get caught in the crossfire. Sorry if my at times vitriolic target indication caused a blue on blue incident.
Cheers

Thanks Randomizer

I appreciate your words.

I think I should have made my position clearer in my initial post in this thread. I can see how this could have been misunderstood.

Great discussion.

[paullus99]

Actually, I would love to see a simulation of an all-jet Battle of Britain. Definitely on the cusp of "what-if" if both sides had realized the potential of the jet engine back in the 30's.

[GoodGuy]

ORIGINAL: Mike Parker

yes it has to mean  50km engagement envelope.  Those specs are very impressive, and I have to believe they are not realistic, I have no doubt they were theoretical project specs, I just think an operational system would not have been near those figures.

I meant a range of 50 km. In German the word "radius" also refers to the max range. I have no data about deviation (per kilometer), but in case of the V1s and even V2s it's well known that they were quite off target at times.
In turn, the targeting computer operated by the Waterfall ground personnel called for exact data (speed, current location, direction, altitude) entry in order to be effective against incoming bombers. If accurate data was available, I believe these rockets were pretty accurate and able to hit or damage the bombers.
But the number of (early) warning radars decreased constantly, due to the Allied progress on the ground, in 1944. So this data was often inclomplete or simply not available in late '44.

Regarding max ceiling: During the test-flights, the V2 actually performed the first space flight in history, and since the Waterfall had basically the same engine (it was just smaller and lighter), an absolute ceiling of way over 15,000 meters sounds absolutly reasonable, if looking at length and payload of the Waterfall. Some sources say the absolute ceiling was 18,000 meters, other sources claim 24,000 meters.
I found one source stating it had a "Querreichweite" of 26,000 meters, which might translate to horizontal flight range. This value sounds reasonable too, as some of the smaller rockets listed below had a max ceiling of up to 15,000 meters, already. The Waterfall also had an adaptive steering system, correcting the flight path (entered by the ground crew) if necessary.

There were other AA-rockets:

• The "Taifun" :
  - liquid propellant (either Kerosene or hydrogen)
  - the rocket was supposed to be fired by a multiple rocket launcher system (in salvos, the launcher could be equipped with up to 48 rockets)
  - several hundred rockets had been built
  - testing could not be finished
  - successful launch of 11 Taifun "F" (serial production versions) in late January 1945, a following test failed completely, 20 rockets exploded for unknown reason.
  - 2500 units were supposed to be produced until late March 1945, as part of the "Führernotprogramm" (may translate to Führer emergency program - a desperate attempt to build a massive number of cheap planes and ground-to-air rockets.
  - the detonator was controlled by a timer/clockwerk, which ignited the warhead after a certain time frame (defined by the ground crew)
  - the liquid fuel engines delivered terrible inaccuracies regarding flight path, so solid fuel engines had been tested too, with quite satisfactory results (smooth flight paths) in late January or February.
  
  - Vmax : 2730 km/hour
  - max range : 12 kilometers
  - absolute ceiling : 15,000 meters
  - armed weight : 19.7 kg
  - weight of explosives: 0.5 kg (500 gramm)
  - engine burning time : 2.5 seconds
  - thrust : 800 kp
  - length : 1.93 meters.
• The "Feuerlilie" ("fire-lily")
  - developed since 1940 by Rheinmetall-Borsig
  - 2 versions built and tested:
  F 25 (with a diameter of 25 cm), length: 1.9 meters
  F 55 (55 cm), length: 4.80 meters
  
  - Vmax F 25: 840 km/h
  - Vmax F 55: 1260 km/h
  
  - max ceiling F 25 : unknown
  - max ceiling F 55 : 10,000 meters
  - weight F 55 : 600 kg with a payload of 100 kg
  
  - first launch F 55 A1: 12th of May 1944 (it traveled 7,500 meters in 69 seconds)
  - last documented flight 19th October 1944
  - The RLM had reduced the amount of operational prototypes to 20.
  - Plans to replace the engine with the engine from the Henschel Hs 293 glide bomb in mid-January, but the project had been canceled in late January
• The "Rheintochter" ("Rhinedaughter")
  
  - early model's burning life : 2 seconds
  - later on a two phase engine was used
  - project canceled in favour of the "fighter emergency-program"
  - remote controlled (radio), where the aluminium facing of the rocket served as Antenna
  - diameter : 54 cm, length : 2.86 meters
  - warhead : 25 - 150 kg of explosives
  - detonator : ignition by either magnetic proximity fuse or by ground crew (pushing the button [:D])
  - 4 wings on the middle section (cross-wise), 2 wings on the tail, "duck"-wing on the rocket's tip
  - liquid fuel engine (a mix of salpeter and vinyl ether)
  
  - 51 starts of versions R2 (possibly R1 included)
  - Version R3 -> engine burning life: 53 seconds
  - additional jump-start rockets at the sides (burning life around 1 second)
  - the modified base of a Flak 88 could be used as ramp (which somewhat reminds me of the mounts used for modern SAM sites)
  - absolute ceiling : unknown
  - Vmax : ~400 meters/second, thus above sonic speed (~343 meters per second = 1235 km/h)
  
  The rocket shown on the picture below is either a reproduction or even an original Rheintochter "R1", the early version with less than 4 seconds burn time :
  
  

[Warfare1]

ORIGINAL: EUBanana

ORIGINAL: Warfare1
While this is true, Germany flew the first operational jet plane almost 21-22 months (27 August, 1939) before the British did (in May 1941), putting them well ahead in this field.

Yet it was only introduced into the field a couple of months before the Meteor, so a bit moot really.

Frank Whittle was largely ignored by the RAF in much the same way the Me262 was largely ignored by Hitler. You could choose to say 'What if Hitler appreciated the jet engine more' but you could also say 'What if Frank Whittle rather than Reginald Mitchell enjoyed the full support of the MoD in the 1930s'?

I think the reason why we focus on German research is because the Nazis started the war; not the British. Any casual reading of WWII will reveal that the first two years were touch and go for the Allies.

So I think any research that may have led to weapons that could have given the Nazis an even greater edge is worth exploring.

Earlier in this thread I discussed the Me 262 and I think it worth re-posting here. Basically due to several delays, German High Command indifference, and Hitler's meddling, the fighter version of the Me 262 came too late.

The Me 262

1) Most of my sources indicate that a little over 1400 Me 262s were built during WWII [Wolfgang Wagner, "The First Jet Aircraft," Schiffer Publishing Ltd. 1998].

2) On 17 August, 1943 production of the Me 262 was just getting into full swing when the USAAF bombed the Messerschmitt factory at Regensberg, destroying important tooling.

3) The Messerschmitt development programs were transferred from Augsburg to Oberammergau which caused even further delays.

4) Adding to the mix of delays was Hitler's insistence that the Me 262 be built NOT as a FIGHTER but that the Me 262 be built as a BOMBER.

5) It wasn't until May, 1944 that Hitler allowed some Me 262s to be produced as fighters, at the astonishing rate of only ONE FIGHTER for EVERY TWENTY BOMBERS.

6) Finally, it wasn't until 4 November, 1944 that Hitler allowed the Me 262 to go into unlimited FIGHTER production.

Despite problems with the Me 262, by the time 1945 rolled around it became a formidable jet plane. However, at this point it was a case of too little, too late. Even so, in 1945 the Me 262 was still able to down significant numbers of bombers even with massive fighter escort.

If not for the constant delays in production including that of Hitler's meddling, the Me 262 could have been produced in numbers by late 1943. This was long before D-Day. The Me 262 could have caused high losses among the Allied bomber formations (something the Allied leadership greatly feared). The reduction in bombing would have meant less loss to German production.

While the Me 262 would not have been a war winner all by itself, most historians agree that it would have presented a significant threat if introduced in 1943.

[Warfare1]

ORIGINAL: 06 Maestro

Another point about the [Me 262] fan blade problems. It was an issue of not having the correct material to build tham out of-thus it was prone to break apart after intense use. It seems that by the summer of '44 the only place where the required material could be had was on the east bank of the Dneniper River. This was one of the main reasons Hitler forbade the withdrawal of the mobile formations of Army Group Center to a more rational reserve status behind the main lines on the west bank. The mines located in the area just west of Smolensk were of great importance-apparently greated than the survival of AGC. Economic based military decision making at its best.

This is one of those nuggets of gold that I like to find.

If this is true then it explains a lot about why Hitler forbade AGC's withdrawal, and adds another dimension to the battles fought here.

Thanks

[GoodGuy]

ORIGINAL: Warfare1

4) Adding to the mix of delays was Hitler's insistence that the Me 262 be built NOT as a FIGHTER but that the Me 262 be built as a BOMBER.

According to newer studies, it seems like Messerschmitt himself did his share to get to this "tragedy of German air armament" (like some historians say), as he may have placed or initiated that idea in Hitler's head. The Nazi government showed less interest in the Me 262 as they did not believe it could make a difference (my personal guess), some may even have regarded it as a high-tech toy with potential to eat up scarce resources.
It seems like Messerschmitt tried to convince Hitler to place an order from June to September 1943, so he came up with a theoretical config as high-speed fighter bomber (although it was projected as interceptor), which finally got picked up by Hitler enthusiastically.
Given, Hitler & Co. did not see the advantages and potential of the Me 262.

[Warfare1]

ORIGINAL: GoodGuy

ORIGINAL: Warfare1

4) Adding to the mix of delays was Hitler's insistence that the Me 262 be built NOT as a FIGHTER but that the Me 262 be built as a BOMBER.

According to newer studies, it seems like Messerschmitt himself did his share to get to this "tragedy of German air armament" (like some historians say), as he may have placed or initiated that idea in Hitler's head. The Nazi government showed less interest in the Me 262 as they did not believe it could make a difference (my personal guess), some may even have regarded it as a high-tech toy with potential to eat up scarce resources.
It seems like Messerschmitt tried to convince Hitler to place an order from June to September 1943, so he came up with a theoretical config as high-speed fighter bomber, which finally got picked up by Hitler enthusiastically.

Very odd situation.

I think Hitler had an aversion to anything that seemed to be "defensive" in nature.

Hence his insistence on V1s and V2s striking England; the Me 262 as an "offensive" bomber vs being a "defensive" fighter; constantly ordering units to attack (even when this was prohibitive); and let's not forget what happened to 6th Army at Stalingrad...

Hitler squandered away many assets and opportunities.... (lucky for us).

Makes you wonder what might have happened if things had turned out differently.

[Warfare1]

dp

[GoodGuy]

ORIGINAL: Warfare1

ORIGINAL: 06 Maestro

Another point about the [Me 262] fan blade problems. It was an issue of not having the correct material to build tham out of-thus it was prone to break apart after intense use. It seems that by the summer of '44 the only place where the required material could be had was on the east bank of the Dneniper River. This was one of the main reasons Hitler forbade the withdrawal of the mobile formations of Army Group Center to a more rational reserve status behind the main lines on the west bank. The mines located in the area just west of Smolensk were of great importance-apparently greated than the survival of AGC. Economic based military decision making at its best.

This is one of those nuggets of gold that I like to find.

If this is true then it explains a lot about why Hitler forbade AGC's withdrawal, and adds another dimension to the battles fought here.

Thanks

Actually, the 4th Army retreated westwards, while Hitler ordered to defend the City of Mahiljou to slow down the Russian push. The 12th Infantry Division was assigned with that task, and in fact sacrificed, as Hitler declared the city to be a fortress, a "last man standing"-order. The Russian push towards Mahiljou was in fact a way less aggressive attack at first, initially serving as distraction from the pincer movement up north, in particular around Wizebsk. Hitler denied to see/accept the overwhelming Russian superiority in manpower and planes.
German recon planes were not available in sufficient numbers to deliver a realistic picture regarding the Russian build-up and about the location of the Russian tank units.

One of the early stage goals of the Russian summer offensive "Bagration", which consisted of a series of 11 operations, was to reach the town Orsha (Orscha) in order to get access to the only tank/vehicle friendly road. The road wasn't exactly paved like today's high- or freeways, it was like the typical Russian or French roads that allowed for heavy transports. This road led to Minsk in the West and it was the German backbone for all the supplies that were directed to Army Group Center.
If the Germans wanted to deny the Russians the fast access to Minsk and Vilnius, the idea to hold the bulge wasn't totally irrational.

Thing is, the OKH, the Army Group Center's HQ and even Jodl advised to rectify the frontline to gain a higher concentration of German troops in each sector, as they were scared that the upcoming summer offensive could deeply penetrate the frontline in a number of sectors, which could cause Group center's defense to collapse. Hitler denied any correction/withdrawal.

The sector occupied by the Germans formed a bulge eastwards, from Wizebsk in the North to a point way south Mahiljou. Holding the Northern part of the East bank, from the point where the Dnepr swings South, from North East of Orsha to a point south of Mahiljou was ignorant (if looking at the Russian superiority), but understandable in a way, as loosing Orsha and the vital main road would have rendered any future operation/defense in the area impossible. The area was packed with swamps and woods widely unaccessable by heavy equipment. I don't think that the mines played any role in Hitlers thought-process at that point.

I'd love to see the source that put up that claim !

He hated to be on the defensive and he hated to give up territory. His decisions often resulted in encirclements of units ranging from single divisions to entire Armies, in cases where he ordered particular forces to "stand and fight".
While he had some interesting offensive ideas for the French campaign (1940), his leadership on the defensive was terrible. Also, even his ideas for offensive operations were quite risky; he was either a gambler or a psychopath. I tend to vote for the latter. [:D]

[06 Maestro]

Goodguy-thanks for the wealth of info on the AA rockets. I had never read such detailed info about those projects. Regarding Speer; I'm certain that I read that info from one of his books-no way to recall which. As I recall his position was that in '42 the AA rocket development was more advanced (closer to completion) than the V2 (which still had some big problems). He did not say that was ready, but could be in less time and would be much easier to put into large scale production. There were some that took the reports of growing US bomber production seriously-some of them very high ranking individuals. They just could not prevail with the one guy that mattered most until it was too late.

"Sources I read indicate a number of 2.969 Me 109s in 1945. "

Just to be clear; I meant 5000 of all types of aircraft-not just 109's. I'm sure your figure is very close to the actual number. If we add in FW's/TA's of all types, the Salamander's, Arado 234's and the various twin engine night fighter's that were still in production, that does not leave a very large balance from the 5000 or so total. My primary point in this is that the actual number of 262's totally completed is much smaller than the normal given figure's-assuming there were actually 600 found along forested roadway's missing the nose cones.

"I could imagine that the blast would have been bigger than the one of a regular flak round, since the rounds couldn't carry more than a few kilogramm of explosives. "

Yes-I do not recall the exact amount, but the charge in the primary rocket system was something like 50 times greater than an 88 or 105 round. Each rocket that could detonate in or near a bomber formation would have had frightening effects.

Some other advantages of a rocket defense system that were pointed included ending wasted fuel in failed interception missions, warm up time on the runway's, the need for excessive fighter pilot training and a a force that could not overwhelmed/exhausted in one big offense.

"Looking at the effectiveness of SAM sites in Vietnam and other conflicts (Israel/Syria), the waterfall could have made a difference. Good call Maestro, we found another contender for the "useful/superior German weapon technology" badge within our whatif-quest".

Thanks-and thank you for the rocket info.

Rocket technologies was one area where I think we can all agree on in which Germany had a clear (actually a huge) advantage. Luckily, the wrong choices were made by Hitler-or whoever. We need to keep in mind that any anti AA missile defense system would have amounted to fighter low level attacks. This would have been quite costly for the Allies.