I recall there was a thread discussing the starting date for this game. Upon reflection it seems to me that the best starting date is 9th December 1941.
Firstly, the Japanese put in 2 attacks simultaneously (except for a couple of hours difference). One attack was at Pearl Harbour and the other against Malaysia.
But because Malaysia is on the other side of the date line the attack there officially occurred on 8th December.
My problem is that if the game begins on 7th December, then the US ships destroyed at Pearl Harbour becomes dependant upon luck. And if the Japanese player has poor luck he will be very unhappy.
Of course the Japanese must continue to fight in China otherwise, with zero opposition, could threaten the Japanese home islands.
On 9th December the Japanese carriers are safely steaming away from Hawaii and already have a foothold in Malaysia.
Let the game begin.
9th December 1941
Moderators: Joel Billings, wdolson, Don Bowen, mogami
The "US CVs in Port" is a wonderful "what if" but seems unlikely. By then they were tied up in duties elsewhere. If there is a "US CVs in Port" option selectable for the 7 December scenario, then the probability should be small that they'd be there. Moreover, there should be an equal probability that they're 100 miles southwest of Kido Butai, undetected, and launch a coordinated 3-CV strike that arrives at 8:00 AM local time.
Show me a fellow who rejects statistical analysis a priori and I'll show you a fellow who has no knowledge of statistics.
Didn't we have this conversation already?
Didn't we have this conversation already?
why not have the game start say a month before pearl harbor so you can actually choose when and where the battles start. you will be choosing the rest of the battles anyway so why can you not choose the first one as well? this is more fun to me because you can actually plan and allocate your forces ahead of time for your own battle plan not how the game is set up at the beginning. what if i wanted to attack manila first and draw the american fleet to me to be destroyed. it would just be more fun to me to try out other options that Japan never tried.
True not very likely for the Yorktown, but the Enterprise was due in at PH on the 6th. It arrived on the 7th only because bad weather delayed refuleing the TFs DDs. So I guess its probable that you could have the Big at PH tied to a weather variable. To be fair you could also have a weather variable determine IJN abiltiy to launch a strike on the 7th.Originally posted by mdiehl
The "US CVs in Port" is a wonderful "what if" but seems unlikely. By then they were tied up in duties elsewhere. If there is a "US CVs in Port" option selectable for the 7 December scenario, then the probability should be small that they'd be there. Moreover, there should be an equal probability that they're 100 miles southwest of Kido Butai, undetected, and launch a coordinated 3-CV strike that arrives at 8:00 AM local time.
A 3 CV ambush however is not plausible because the Yorktown is busy and Saratoga is in SanDeigo.
In counterfactual history, many improbable things are plausible. I'm just of the opine that a game with greater counterfactual rewards should come with plausible counterfactual risks. It's not like we need to imagine highly unrealistic reasons for Saratoga to not be in SF.
If we can imagine these CVs to be in port then it's fair to imagine that the Wake supply mission occurred on some other date, that Saratoga went with, and that all 3 ships were at sea in some sort of alert status on 7 December... something like, for example, an IJN submarine detected in close proximity to PH on 6 December, and someone connecting the dots between the various "imminent" war warnings popping out of Washington with the strong curiosity of why an IJN warship is hanging around Hawaii without bothering with the usual port call, diplomatic niceties, and so forth.
If we can imagine these CVs to be in port then it's fair to imagine that the Wake supply mission occurred on some other date, that Saratoga went with, and that all 3 ships were at sea in some sort of alert status on 7 December... something like, for example, an IJN submarine detected in close proximity to PH on 6 December, and someone connecting the dots between the various "imminent" war warnings popping out of Washington with the strong curiosity of why an IJN warship is hanging around Hawaii without bothering with the usual port call, diplomatic niceties, and so forth.
Show me a fellow who rejects statistical analysis a priori and I'll show you a fellow who has no knowledge of statistics.
Didn't we have this conversation already?
Didn't we have this conversation already?
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Jeremy Pritchard
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Exactly.Originally posted by mdiehl
In counterfactual history, many improbable things are plausible. I'm just of the opine that a game with greater counterfactual rewards should come with plausible counterfactual risks. It's not like we need to imagine highly unrealistic reasons for Saratoga to not be in SF.
If we can imagine these CVs to be in port then it's fair to imagine that the Wake supply mission occurred on some other date, that Saratoga went with, and that all 3 ships were at sea in some sort of alert status on 7 December... something like, for example, an IJN submarine detected in close proximity to PH on 6 December, and someone connecting the dots between the various "imminent" war warnings popping out of Washington with the strong curiosity of why an IJN warship is hanging around Hawaii without bothering with the usual port call, diplomatic niceties, and so forth.
Getting into alternate history does not mean that you do only one thing that is plausible, but possibly a series of things, that can help or hurt either team.
It's true - CV5 Yorktown would not have been available for a counterstrike against Kido Butai off Oahu on 7 Dec 1941. She spent that day docked in Norfolk, VA.
The Enterprise TF, at least, was at a high alert status. Halsey's orders to his TF upon departure for Wake were to engage and destroy any Japanese forces encountered. This order was given in late November 1941. I'm not certain what orders were given to the Lexington TF, but she left later than the Enterprise TF, and Halsey was ComAirBatFor and so might have had something to say about the matter...
The Enterprise TF, at least, was at a high alert status. Halsey's orders to his TF upon departure for Wake were to engage and destroy any Japanese forces encountered. This order was given in late November 1941. I'm not certain what orders were given to the Lexington TF, but she left later than the Enterprise TF, and Halsey was ComAirBatFor and so might have had something to say about the matter...
Some days you're the windshield.
Some days you're the bug.
Some days you're the bug.
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Jeremy Pritchard
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Well, what alternate history is, is that some things are different then historically what happened. If there is a chance for CVs to be in port, then there might have been a chance that the Yorktown was not in the Atlantic, the Saratoga was out on operations as well.
The wargame "Carrier Strike" and "Carrier Strike II" was one of my favorites (until my disks died on me). What it offered for each of its scenarios was a series of options. For example, there was a 1930's war scenario where the IJN pit itself against the USN. There was the most plausible scenario, then there were others with options of extra ships, different deployment and such. This was with all other scenarios, probably done to increase the playability of the game. Each option gave you something but at the expense of something else. One scenario might give you a chance for something extra with the chance of something else going wrong.
What would be best is to have an option about Pearl Harbour that has a 50% chance that US CV's will be in port AND another 50% chance that they are ready to strike the IJN Carrier Task Force, or an option to have a historical battle (carriers are not caught in port, but you don't have to worry about a possible attack on you). Maybe this extra option should be extended to the following.
25% Carrier in Harbour
25% Carriers counterattack while raid going on
50% Historical ship positioning
The wargame "Carrier Strike" and "Carrier Strike II" was one of my favorites (until my disks died on me). What it offered for each of its scenarios was a series of options. For example, there was a 1930's war scenario where the IJN pit itself against the USN. There was the most plausible scenario, then there were others with options of extra ships, different deployment and such. This was with all other scenarios, probably done to increase the playability of the game. Each option gave you something but at the expense of something else. One scenario might give you a chance for something extra with the chance of something else going wrong.
What would be best is to have an option about Pearl Harbour that has a 50% chance that US CV's will be in port AND another 50% chance that they are ready to strike the IJN Carrier Task Force, or an option to have a historical battle (carriers are not caught in port, but you don't have to worry about a possible attack on you). Maybe this extra option should be extended to the following.
25% Carrier in Harbour
25% Carriers counterattack while raid going on
50% Historical ship positioning
I don't mind not having a December 9 start date. In PacWar, the opening strike on Pearl was just the first of thousands of battles in the game that was based on luck. But, if Matrix wants to have a grand campaign that starts on December 9 and assumes the historical damage at Pearl - fine.
Personally, I feel the most important of the options would be (i) a historical start at December 7 with the outcome of the Pearl attack being resolved by the compauter ala PacWar and (ii) an alternative December 7 start with the carriers possibly being present.
With regards to the latter, the argument that the Saratoga can't be in Pearl at the game start because it was historically in San Diego and the Enterprise couldn't because blah blah . . . doesn't make a difference. The Japanese could just as easily have attacked on December 1st or December 10th. The date of the Japanese attack - other than being a Sunday - was pretty much a random date as were the dates that any particular carrier was in Pearl. They were certainly independent of each other. Seems to me that, under this option, the percentage chance of catching a carrier in Pearl should be the same as the percentage of time the carrier spent in Pearl for, say, the previous month. Thus, if the a carrier spent about 20% of the previous month in Pearl, you would have a 20% chance of catching it there. This would apply mostly to Enterprise and Lexington with a very, very small chance of catching Saratoga. The same analysis would be made for the chances of having the U.S. carriers catch the IJN fleet: what percentage of the time were they within 100 miles of the IJN launch point? Probably not much if any. Even if you don't want to do that analysis, you have to admit that the chance that a carrier is in Pearl has to be less than within a 100 mile radius of the IJN. If the carrier is not in Pearl, it could be anywhere: Wake, Midway, Johnston, San Diego, or cruising in the eastern Pacific. The chances of its being within 100 miles of the magic spot are pretty remote. So I would opt for a fairly historical percentage chance that one or more carriers were in Pearl with a very small chance of having one or more carriers within striking distance of the IJN.
Personally, I feel the most important of the options would be (i) a historical start at December 7 with the outcome of the Pearl attack being resolved by the compauter ala PacWar and (ii) an alternative December 7 start with the carriers possibly being present.
With regards to the latter, the argument that the Saratoga can't be in Pearl at the game start because it was historically in San Diego and the Enterprise couldn't because blah blah . . . doesn't make a difference. The Japanese could just as easily have attacked on December 1st or December 10th. The date of the Japanese attack - other than being a Sunday - was pretty much a random date as were the dates that any particular carrier was in Pearl. They were certainly independent of each other. Seems to me that, under this option, the percentage chance of catching a carrier in Pearl should be the same as the percentage of time the carrier spent in Pearl for, say, the previous month. Thus, if the a carrier spent about 20% of the previous month in Pearl, you would have a 20% chance of catching it there. This would apply mostly to Enterprise and Lexington with a very, very small chance of catching Saratoga. The same analysis would be made for the chances of having the U.S. carriers catch the IJN fleet: what percentage of the time were they within 100 miles of the IJN launch point? Probably not much if any. Even if you don't want to do that analysis, you have to admit that the chance that a carrier is in Pearl has to be less than within a 100 mile radius of the IJN. If the carrier is not in Pearl, it could be anywhere: Wake, Midway, Johnston, San Diego, or cruising in the eastern Pacific. The chances of its being within 100 miles of the magic spot are pretty remote. So I would opt for a fairly historical percentage chance that one or more carriers were in Pearl with a very small chance of having one or more carriers within striking distance of the IJN.
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Jeremy Pritchard
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I do beleive that the above option would really just serve to favour the Japanese. I beleive either have the historic option run its course (with as many or as few of the ships at Pearl Harbour on Dec 7 sunk or damaged by running the attack through), or have the game have equal chances of the USN Carrier positions both favoring and unfavoring each side. Otherwize the Japanese player would be a fool not to choose the very good chance that the US will have a carrier at Pearl using the above set of random chance.
We don't want an option that serves generally just to favour one side over another.
Who is to say that the US didnt really know that the IJN was attacking Pearl on December 7th and kept the carriers out of there on purpose? Why not assume that the carriers were not out of port by accident? WHy not have the carriers attack the known attackers instead of avoiding them to fight another day?
We don't want an option that serves generally just to favour one side over another.
Who is to say that the US didnt really know that the IJN was attacking Pearl on December 7th and kept the carriers out of there on purpose? Why not assume that the carriers were not out of port by accident? WHy not have the carriers attack the known attackers instead of avoiding them to fight another day?
Oops, sorry my bad. I ment to say Lexington.Originally posted by CynicAl
It's true - CV5 Yorktown would not have been available for a counterstrike against Kido Butai off Oahu on 7 Dec 1941. She spent that day docked in Norfolk, VA.
The Enterprise TF, at least, was at a high alert status. Halsey's orders to his TF upon departure for Wake were to engage and destroy any Japanese forces encountered. This order was given in late November 1941. I'm not certain what orders were given to the Lexington TF, but she left later than the Enterprise TF, and Halsey was ComAirBatFor and so might have had something to say about the matter...
Yet another variant
Another possibility, at least as likely as Yorktown returning from Neutrality Patrol duty in the Atlantic, is that Kimmel could have sortied Pacific Fleet on 6 December for exercises 200nm south of Oahu. The next morning, the Japanese strikes arrive over Pearl and see... very little. A handful of DDs and various support types, plus an old BB and a few DDs in drydock. Damage to facilities is slightly greater and damage to the Fleet much lighter than IRL. Call this the "Empty Bag" scenario.
Or: Kimmel decides to go ahead and search as much area as he can with the aircraft he's got, instead of sitting on his hands and whining to DC to send him more aircraft. A wide-ranging PBY spots Kido Butai on 5 December, leading to a head-to-head contest between Kido Butai and the main force of Pacific Fleet. Call this the "Busted Strike" scenario.
I think that the big "US advantage" options should be less likely than the "Japanese advantage" options. Call it ~60% likelihood of the raid coming off as IRL. Then a ~24% chance of finding one or more US CVs in port (a subcheck under this would give 1CV ~55%, 2 CV ~33%, 3 CV ~11%). Then the US advantage scenarios come in with "Empty Bag" at ~ 8%, "Busted Strike" at ~4%, or a US counterambush at ~4% (with a similar subcheck to the one above formultiple CVs). We don't have to (or want to) make the negative outcomes for both sides equally probable because the negatives for the IJN player (who will not be getting large numbers of new CVs in the course of the war) are so potentially devastating in the long run compared to those for the US player (who can count on eventually getting plenty of reinforcements of all types, though it will make the early going tougher).
Or: Kimmel decides to go ahead and search as much area as he can with the aircraft he's got, instead of sitting on his hands and whining to DC to send him more aircraft. A wide-ranging PBY spots Kido Butai on 5 December, leading to a head-to-head contest between Kido Butai and the main force of Pacific Fleet. Call this the "Busted Strike" scenario.
I think that the big "US advantage" options should be less likely than the "Japanese advantage" options. Call it ~60% likelihood of the raid coming off as IRL. Then a ~24% chance of finding one or more US CVs in port (a subcheck under this would give 1CV ~55%, 2 CV ~33%, 3 CV ~11%). Then the US advantage scenarios come in with "Empty Bag" at ~ 8%, "Busted Strike" at ~4%, or a US counterambush at ~4% (with a similar subcheck to the one above formultiple CVs). We don't have to (or want to) make the negative outcomes for both sides equally probable because the negatives for the IJN player (who will not be getting large numbers of new CVs in the course of the war) are so potentially devastating in the long run compared to those for the US player (who can count on eventually getting plenty of reinforcements of all types, though it will make the early going tougher).
Some days you're the windshield.
Some days you're the bug.
Some days you're the bug.
Why the CV's are at sea
Greetings. The US knew war was coming. The CV's were capable of actually patrolling and responding to a threat and they had a mission (moving air assets to forward bases)
The BB's were in port because they burn large amounts of fuel, are slow and without a target there was no way to pre-place them to be of any use.
Given the aggressive nature of the CV TF commander one interesting option might be to have them react to the Pearl Strike. If they achive suprise the war could be won on Dec 7th.
If the Japanese TF commander is alert and finds them first......
The BB's were in port because they burn large amounts of fuel, are slow and without a target there was no way to pre-place them to be of any use.
Given the aggressive nature of the CV TF commander one interesting option might be to have them react to the Pearl Strike. If they achive suprise the war could be won on Dec 7th.
If the Japanese TF commander is alert and finds them first......
I'm not retreating, I'm attacking in a different direction!
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John Carney
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I have no problem with options in any game.
I note that WITP- SAJ will last approx 1,000 days.
And the hard-core players will set the turn length to 1 day – which means paying 1,000 turns.
If players can play 2 turns per day each (unlikely) it will take 500 days to play the game.
And considering there might be 10 options (for example) then it would take 5,000 days to complete 10 campaigns or 13 years.
My favourite way to play any game is to play a short scenario against the AI and then another short scenario H2H.
Afterwards I like to play the Long Campaign 4 times. By which I mean H2H and to play twice from each side. The first 2 times are a kind of practice and the final 2 times should be very close and filled with tension.
Afterward I like to apply the options and then once again play 4 Long Campaigns H2H.
To do so would take 4,000 days. If there were 10 options it would take 40,000 days or 110 years. If only I could live that long.
So it is clear to me that whilst I will enjoy this game, there is no way that I can complete even one Long Campaign H2H. Which is unfortunate – unless I set the turn length to 10 days.
I note that WITP- SAJ will last approx 1,000 days.
And the hard-core players will set the turn length to 1 day – which means paying 1,000 turns.
If players can play 2 turns per day each (unlikely) it will take 500 days to play the game.
And considering there might be 10 options (for example) then it would take 5,000 days to complete 10 campaigns or 13 years.
My favourite way to play any game is to play a short scenario against the AI and then another short scenario H2H.
Afterwards I like to play the Long Campaign 4 times. By which I mean H2H and to play twice from each side. The first 2 times are a kind of practice and the final 2 times should be very close and filled with tension.
Afterward I like to apply the options and then once again play 4 Long Campaigns H2H.
To do so would take 4,000 days. If there were 10 options it would take 40,000 days or 110 years. If only I could live that long.
So it is clear to me that whilst I will enjoy this game, there is no way that I can complete even one Long Campaign H2H. Which is unfortunate – unless I set the turn length to 10 days.
At the very least, the alt-start situation with the possibility of USN CVs in port ought to be optional, so that we can ignore it if we wish.
The principle flaw with the Pacific Theater *boardgames* (and from what I've seen of the AARs, UV) is the tendency to make USN CVs useless until numerical superiority is obtained by the Allies. (A problem shared with WW2:PTO, that a couple friends and I solved by some substantial rules tweaking. You can find those as a "rules variant" on grognards.) A3R/ERS is IMO the *worst* WW2/Pacific strategic tabletop wargame made. It has some laudible elements in the way VF/IJN a/c are handled, but it is largely a horridly researched, arbitrary set of crude naval warfare rules and strategic cliches tacked on to a land based combat engine designed for the ETO.
The principle flaw with the Pacific Theater *boardgames* (and from what I've seen of the AARs, UV) is the tendency to make USN CVs useless until numerical superiority is obtained by the Allies. (A problem shared with WW2:PTO, that a couple friends and I solved by some substantial rules tweaking. You can find those as a "rules variant" on grognards.) A3R/ERS is IMO the *worst* WW2/Pacific strategic tabletop wargame made. It has some laudible elements in the way VF/IJN a/c are handled, but it is largely a horridly researched, arbitrary set of crude naval warfare rules and strategic cliches tacked on to a land based combat engine designed for the ETO.
Show me a fellow who rejects statistical analysis a priori and I'll show you a fellow who has no knowledge of statistics.
Didn't we have this conversation already?
Didn't we have this conversation already?
Re: Why the CV's are at sea
I'm sorry, Mogami, but I don't see there being much chance of a successful counterstrike by the U.S. To the extent we knew war was coming, we weren't expecting it that soon nor were we expecting it at Pearl Harbor. Ammunition for the AA weapons were locked up in ammunition lockers, planes were not dispersed on airfields, there were no anti-torpedo nets for the BBs, there was no CAP flying at dawn, a submarine was attacked and sunk at the harbor entrance with no general alert sounded, and the attacking force was picked up on radar with no one being concerned. Let's face it - the U.S. was caught with its pants down and was completely and totally surprised. Why would the status of the carriers be any different? Absolutely no one else was ready to fight on Sunday morning; why would the Enterprise be the sole shining light of preparedness?Originally posted by Mogami
Greetings. The US knew war was coming. The CV's were capable of actually patrolling and responding to a threat and they had a mission (moving air assets to forward bases)
The BB's were in port because they burn large amounts of fuel, are slow and without a target there was no way to pre-place them to be of any use.
Given the aggressive nature of the CV TF commander one interesting option might be to have them react to the Pearl Strike. If they achive suprise the war could be won on Dec 7th.
If the Japanese TF commander is alert and finds them first......
With respect to a counterstrike by U.S. carriers, there are three possibilities. If there is a carrier in Pearl, you cannot convince me that it would not be in the same peace time status as the rest of the fleet with the crew hungover and sleeping in and with half of the pilots on shore leave. Another possibility is that it is at sea but not within range to counterstrike - as was the actual case. Given the range of missions the carriers were given, the short range of aircraft, and the vastness of the ocean, this is very likely.
Your third possibility is that the carrier is at sea and within counterstrike range. There is virtually no chance that you would have more than one carrier in this situation. First of all there is going to be initial confusion. It will take awhile to confirm that this is an actual strike on Pearl, a while longer to determine that they're carrier aircraft, and even longer to assess their own situation. Having zero intel, the skipper may well determine that running is smarter than trying to find and fight an unknown force. No military transitions quickly or well from peace to war when it is surprised. If the carrier has anywhere near a full complement of planes on it, many are not going to be immediately flightworthy. Some will be undergoing repairs. I don't know this, but many may be stored with little or no gas to reduce fire hazard (though maybe they kept them topped off to reduce fuel vapor - don't know). I see no reason to believe that the munitions would not be stowed in peace time mode and take awhile to get them to the hangar decks. I would guess that few if any of the fighters would have any .50 loaded, which would take a long time to load. The skipper is likely to send up to half of his bomber force out unarmed on search patterns. If the enemy is found, it will take quite awhile to recall and rearm this force.
There is a chance a carrier could have reacted, but it is small. The most likely outcome different from history would be to have an unprepared carrier sitting at Pearl.
I do agree absolutely that there should be a historical option. Heck, this would be the default and would have to be included in the game. Whether it is a December 9 option or the option to refight the battle given historical orders of battle - whatever.
I also agree with an earlier post that if you're going to provide the option to change history by having the possibility of having a carrier in port, there should also be the possibility that not all of the battlewagons are at home.
I think the answer is to simply look at deployments of the various ships in the two months leading up to December 7. I have no idea what that would look like, but it should be simple information to find. If the battlewagons were in port for that whole period, then they should be at Pearl. If a ship spent 50% of its time at sea, then there is a 50% chance it will not be in port on D-Day.
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Supervisor
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Counterstrike was possible, but how effective?
I'm going to side with Mogami on this one. The Enterprise was ready to go to war as of November, 1941. This mimeographed sheet was passed out to the pilots and announced to the crew:
As far as realities are, it would have been the Enterprise in port that Sunday. If the weather had just been less rough, they wouldn't have had to slow down for the destroyers, and therefore would have been caught like the rest of the fleet in port. And they were ready to strike if the Japanese were located. Unfortunately, the entire Scouting Six had been launched ahead of the Enterprise to search forward and land at Pearl 2 hours ahead of the carrier. They arrived during the attack. Therefore, the Enterprise was effectively blind (since they weren't about the utilize Bombing Six SBDs for search, they needed them for attack). 9 of the survivors of Scouting Six were able to get back in the air (about noon) and searched to the north but they were too late, as the Japanese had retired a bit to the north after recovering planes and while deciding on whether to try a third strike.
Now the variations to the historical model could be (and these involve only slight changes from actuality):
1) The weather didn't slow down the Enterprise TF and they are in Pearl on December 7th.
2) As it happened.
3) The attack is reported before Scouting Six is sent on in to Pearl. Then there might be a chance of detection of the Japanese fleet. The position of the Enterprise would have to be determined (somewhere 3-5 hours out of Pearl at "normal" speed for the TF is what I've estimated from the reports - depends on how far out the scouts were launched for Pearl). As far as I know, the Lexington was too far out, but maybe it was in position to intercept (if they wanted to) a located Japanese fleet. I don't know on that.
4) The Japanese decide to do a 3rd (and 4th?) strike to destroy the infrastructure at Pearl. This would keep the fleet in the area long enough that they might (would?) be detected by the US and thus up the chance of a strike from the Enterprise (unless, of course, it was in Pearl that morning
).
From what I have gathered on Halsey, he would have launched on the Japanese carriers if he had located them. He did send off a full strike in the afternoon towards an identified Japanese TF -- but that turned out to be an error (in the exact reciprocal of the actual radio intercepts). Now, 1 carrier strike against the Japanese wouldn't exactly win the war (not without massive, and I do mean massive, Midway-type luck on their side), but it might hit a couple of carriers (or other ships). Maybe nothing more than a morale booster, but you never know. They might have been able to get a carrier.
Now if the Enterprise is in Pearl, everything that you stated about pilots & sailors on leave is very true. They might be a little more alert than most of the fleet, but with cold boilers, there isn't a lot that they could do other than have better AA because all guns and ammo had been prepared for use while at sea. Being the sole carrier in harbor though would not have had led to a very long life.
Now as to the rest of the fleet in port for the weekend, that was more usual than not (it's why the Japanese hit us on a Sunday morning, after all).
As a side note, a discovery of the Japanese fleet by the Enterprise prior to December 7th would have been interesting.
As Halsey had given orders to the TF to attack first and ask questions later and Nagumo had orders to abort and return if sighted anytime before the 7th. (Only if sighted on the 7th was he still supposed to continue with the attack.)
So, it makes for an interesting "what might have happened". The US to attack the Japanese fleet first (and start the war).
Now, I couldn't say whether the Lexington was also on war status, but the Enterprise was. All planes were armed and the dummy warheads on the torpedoes had been replaced by live ones.1. The Enterprise is now operating under war conditions.
2. At any time, day or night, we must be ready for instant action.
3. Hostile submarines may be encountered.
Signed: Captain George D. Murray
Approved: November 28, 1941
W.F. Halsey
Vice Admiral, U.S. Navy
Commander Aircraft, Battle Force
As far as realities are, it would have been the Enterprise in port that Sunday. If the weather had just been less rough, they wouldn't have had to slow down for the destroyers, and therefore would have been caught like the rest of the fleet in port. And they were ready to strike if the Japanese were located. Unfortunately, the entire Scouting Six had been launched ahead of the Enterprise to search forward and land at Pearl 2 hours ahead of the carrier. They arrived during the attack. Therefore, the Enterprise was effectively blind (since they weren't about the utilize Bombing Six SBDs for search, they needed them for attack). 9 of the survivors of Scouting Six were able to get back in the air (about noon) and searched to the north but they were too late, as the Japanese had retired a bit to the north after recovering planes and while deciding on whether to try a third strike.
Now the variations to the historical model could be (and these involve only slight changes from actuality):
1) The weather didn't slow down the Enterprise TF and they are in Pearl on December 7th.
2) As it happened.
3) The attack is reported before Scouting Six is sent on in to Pearl. Then there might be a chance of detection of the Japanese fleet. The position of the Enterprise would have to be determined (somewhere 3-5 hours out of Pearl at "normal" speed for the TF is what I've estimated from the reports - depends on how far out the scouts were launched for Pearl). As far as I know, the Lexington was too far out, but maybe it was in position to intercept (if they wanted to) a located Japanese fleet. I don't know on that.
4) The Japanese decide to do a 3rd (and 4th?) strike to destroy the infrastructure at Pearl. This would keep the fleet in the area long enough that they might (would?) be detected by the US and thus up the chance of a strike from the Enterprise (unless, of course, it was in Pearl that morning
).From what I have gathered on Halsey, he would have launched on the Japanese carriers if he had located them. He did send off a full strike in the afternoon towards an identified Japanese TF -- but that turned out to be an error (in the exact reciprocal of the actual radio intercepts). Now, 1 carrier strike against the Japanese wouldn't exactly win the war (not without massive, and I do mean massive, Midway-type luck on their side), but it might hit a couple of carriers (or other ships). Maybe nothing more than a morale booster, but you never know. They might have been able to get a carrier.
Now if the Enterprise is in Pearl, everything that you stated about pilots & sailors on leave is very true. They might be a little more alert than most of the fleet, but with cold boilers, there isn't a lot that they could do other than have better AA because all guns and ammo had been prepared for use while at sea. Being the sole carrier in harbor though would not have had led to a very long life.
Now as to the rest of the fleet in port for the weekend, that was more usual than not (it's why the Japanese hit us on a Sunday morning, after all
).As a side note, a discovery of the Japanese fleet by the Enterprise prior to December 7th would have been interesting.
As Halsey had given orders to the TF to attack first and ask questions later and Nagumo had orders to abort and return if sighted anytime before the 7th. (Only if sighted on the 7th was he still supposed to continue with the attack.)
So, it makes for an interesting "what might have happened". The US to attack the Japanese fleet first (and start the war).
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Jeremy Pritchard
- Posts: 575
- Joined: Thu Sep 27, 2001 8:00 am
- Location: Ontario Canada
Being "Alternate History" one can assume that it was not just pure luck that the USN carriers would intercept the Japanese Carrier TF, but possibly an advance in code breaking and/or a major spy coup managed to give the US knowledge of the raid before it happened. Since the USN carrier were already out of port, it would not arouse much suspicion with the Japanese spys at Hawaii should they be organized into a strike group (leaving the Battleships as 'targets' but ready to sail at a moments notice).
This being "alternate history" allows certain leeway in actions that preceeded exact actions of the event. It is not as extreme as magically changing a nation's doctrine or way they will wage the war, but mainly gaining and using a piece of knowledge in a way that they normally would (the US used Midway as bait, so why not Pearl Harbour?).
Using the same actions of what happened would mean that a US CV strike would be virtually impossible, since without adequate recon from Pearl, they would not know where to strike (plus the Japanese did not stick around long). In order to make this strike work, the US must attack either before, or right after their strikes have been sent out (as this is when the IJN would be stationary). In order for this to happen, a prewar plan (albiet maybe even just a few hours old) had to be in existence.
This being "alternate history" allows certain leeway in actions that preceeded exact actions of the event. It is not as extreme as magically changing a nation's doctrine or way they will wage the war, but mainly gaining and using a piece of knowledge in a way that they normally would (the US used Midway as bait, so why not Pearl Harbour?).
Using the same actions of what happened would mean that a US CV strike would be virtually impossible, since without adequate recon from Pearl, they would not know where to strike (plus the Japanese did not stick around long). In order to make this strike work, the US must attack either before, or right after their strikes have been sent out (as this is when the IJN would be stationary). In order for this to happen, a prewar plan (albiet maybe even just a few hours old) had to be in existence.