So what if the Japs want to stick around Pearl Harbor?
Moderators: wdolson, MOD_War-in-the-Pacific-Admirals-Edition
RE: So what if the Japs want to stick around Pearl Harbor?
The results of the actual PH attack seem to be at the lower end of the bell curve of possible results. I've seen 2 x BBs sunk twice in about 20 tries. Every attack seems to damage nearly twice as many ships as historically. Plus the airbase(s) is always knocked out and the repair yard is sometimes damaged. Toning down the torpedo carrying Kates to something akin to their real historical performance (50% hits on the unmoving surprised ships at PH and around 10% on ships underway at sea) would go a long way to fixing things.
RE: So what if the Japs want to stick around Pearl Harbor?
The amount of angst expended over the "extra days" at Pearl and the "enforced" sortie of Force Z is all out of proportion to the game impact. Does it hurt in 1941? Absolutely. Does it matter in 1943? Absolutely not.
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RE: So what if the Japs want to stick around Pearl Harbor?
ORIGINAL: Kull
The amount of angst expended over the "extra days" at Pearl and the "enforced" sortie of Force Z is all out of proportion to the game impact. Does it hurt in 1941? Absolutely. Does it matter in 1943? Absolutely not.
Not trying to offend, Kull (your point has some validity). But it's also the equivalent of saying "Why were you all so upset when Allied Players sent in 150 B-17's at 1000 feet against your naval TF's? Will it matter in 1945?"
From what I've seen in play and the forum, most players tend to get excited about what's happening to them NOW. Especially if they feel they are being abused by their opponent or the scenario or the rules.
- NightFlyer
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RE: So what if the Japs want to stick around Pearl Harbor?
The risk KB took or did not take at PH was Nagumo's decision. Yamamoto expected to lose 2 carriers and Yamaguchi would have scuttled two carriers if they ran out of fuel (ref. Shattered Sword). So when you say it was too risky to hang around PH, you really mean, "Nagumo was too cautious (I would use the word useless - he knew little of naval aviation tactics) to hang around PH". KB never had the same opportunity again and they should have launched more strikes at the fuel depots, drydocks, sub pens and searched for the US carriers. This would make it "ahistorical" but I enjoy playing these games for the "what-if" factor as long as it doesn't become too unrealistic. In the end though the result would have been the same, Japan could never match the US in industrial output of carriers and aircraft. Japan stupidly thought the US would sign a peace treaty after the attack, mostly because of the "America First" movement in the US at that time.
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RE: So what if the Japs want to stick around Pearl Harbor?
I don't see anything wrong with the Japanese staying longer at Pearl Harbour. The major problem are the full campaign scenarios are not designed for a longer operation at Pearl Harbour. More resources would have been used for the operation. It is a whatif scenario.
In WitP AE and WitP the allied player will not give in. In RL the Japanese hope for a short war.
This is a game not RL. For pbem players playing the full campaign the limiting factor is the time taken to play a scenario.
In WitP AE and WitP the allied player will not give in. In RL the Japanese hope for a short war.
This is a game not RL. For pbem players playing the full campaign the limiting factor is the time taken to play a scenario.
RE: So what if the Japs want to stick around Pearl Harbor?
The Japs made two serious strategic errors at PH, the first being to launch the attack in the first place! The second being that the over-cautious Nagumo cancelled the 3rd strike, which was to hit the shore installations, fuel dumps, repair shops and dry dock faciluties. If they'd been knocked out then the remains fo the Pacific fleet would have been in serious trouble.
I seem to recall that the US had two carriers in the area at the time, Lexington & Enterprise (Saratoga was on the west coast, not sure where Yorktown was) and could possibly have interfered in the 8th. However given the poor state of the US forces coupled with the fact that both were going used for ferry missions and had a bare reduced complement of planes, could they have damaged or destroyed the KB? Probably not considering that each Jap carrier held back 9 planes as constant CAP over the KB during the entire 12.07.41 just in case the US carriers showed. Total of 54 planes, assuming (say) 50% effectiveness at any one time is 27 Zero's flown by pilots at the peak of their efficiency, morale, skill & training against incoming and almost certainly unescorted fragmented attacks by SBD's and TBD's and their unprepared and bewildered pilots, assuming the US carrier fleets could even find the KB in the first place (bearing in mind PH would be of no help whatsoever and at that time all the US 'Orange' plans revolved around battleships still as the primary weapon... know who I would I be putting money on...
I seem to recall that the US had two carriers in the area at the time, Lexington & Enterprise (Saratoga was on the west coast, not sure where Yorktown was) and could possibly have interfered in the 8th. However given the poor state of the US forces coupled with the fact that both were going used for ferry missions and had a bare reduced complement of planes, could they have damaged or destroyed the KB? Probably not considering that each Jap carrier held back 9 planes as constant CAP over the KB during the entire 12.07.41 just in case the US carriers showed. Total of 54 planes, assuming (say) 50% effectiveness at any one time is 27 Zero's flown by pilots at the peak of their efficiency, morale, skill & training against incoming and almost certainly unescorted fragmented attacks by SBD's and TBD's and their unprepared and bewildered pilots, assuming the US carrier fleets could even find the KB in the first place (bearing in mind PH would be of no help whatsoever and at that time all the US 'Orange' plans revolved around battleships still as the primary weapon... know who I would I be putting money on...
RE: So what if the Japs want to stick around Pearl Harbor?
ORIGINAL: NightFlyer
This would make it "ahistorical" but I enjoy playing these games for the "what-if" factor as long as it doesn't become too unrealistic.
I do believe that Dec 7, 1941 should be scripted and follow the actual events (although with slightly different results) for historical accuracy. But, from Dec 8, 1941 it is the supreme commander's (i.e., player's or AI's) decision. I don't think that anyone intends that all events until 1945 to be scripted -- they will follow the supreme commander's will, although they must be bound by what was historically possible. That is, everything from Dec 8 onwards is really an "what-if".
So, given the actual resources on Dec 7 and the actual events on Dec 7... it would be non-historical if the KB camped PH for a month, but was it historically possible for a commander other than Nagumo to stick around PH for 2 or 3 days more to do more damage?
If it was historically possible, without giving 20 oilers to KB, then both the AI and the player should be allowed to do that -- and bear the consequences of a bad decision (the player, I mean, not the AI.. the AI won't mind if all its carriers are sunk by Catalinas).
Thanks,
fbs
RE: So what if the Japs want to stick around Pearl Harbor?
By the way, there is only an AM attack on PH on Dec 7, with all my games. Can't carriers send a PM attack too with the current engine? Any limitation with that?
Thanks,
fbs
Thanks,
fbs
RE: So what if the Japs want to stick around Pearl Harbor?
ORIGINAL: Kadrin
I honestly don't know why you would bother sticking around, every run of the PH Strike I've seen results in a minimum of 6 battleships sunk along with a number of other ships. Far more than the Japanese actually accomplished with fewer losses to boot.
In fairness in my current GC pbem I didn't lose a single BB at Pearl.
However every single BB there was left on heavy damage, none of them will be sailing before 1943.
RE: So what if the Japs want to stick around Pearl Harbor?
ORIGINAL: fbs
Quite a bit of criticism about Nagumo camping Pearl Harbor for a week.
But... is that such an outrageous option for the Japs to stay around? Say that Nagumo took the gamble and preyed around PH for a few more days - either by attacking PH again, or by keeping distance from PH and looking for incoming/fleeing ships. How much of that was actually possible? ...
Possible, but didn't Nagumo and his KB have other errands to run in the Pacific?
The only reason PH was attacked was so that Japan would have a free hand to expand into her neighbor's seas w/o any US interference.
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RE: So what if the Japs want to stick around Pearl Harbor?
ORIGINAL: xj900uk
The Japs made two serious strategic errors at PH, the first being to launch the attack in the first place! The second being that the over-cautious Nagumo cancelled the 3rd strike, which was to hit the shore installations, fuel dumps, repair shops and dry dock facilities. If they'd been knocked out then the remains fo the Pacific fleet would have been in serious trouble.
With the benefit of "hindsight", you are certainly correct. But with the benefit of "hindsight" wasn't MacArthur equally wrong not to move his air assets out of range and send all his subs to sea during the many hours he had between receiving the "PH War Warning" and the actual Japanese attack? Or given "hindsight", why would "Tom Thumb" Phillips sail Force Z north from Singapore?
"Hindsight" is always going to be on the side of the game player when compared to his real-life counterpart. It's up to the game designers to keep it's exploitation to a workable minimum if they can. After that it's ""house rules" and "gentlemens agreements".
RE: So what if the Japs want to stick around Pearl Harbor?
Simple solution. Give the Japanese carriers enough sorties for "two strikes only"
My experience as the Allied player in two pbemails is that the Japanese player usually comes away with slightly better than historical with the first strike, and pretty much prostrates the American fighter force killing many and leaving them with an average morale in the low 30 range on average. A second strike faces ineffective fighter opposition and result in very few losses and just about sinks or severly damages all BBs. Sucessive strikes are the same as the Allied fighters are used up by then. If I were an IJN player, barring a house rule, I would stick around and pummel Pearl at least three and maybe four days in a row. As the game is now, it can be done, and the American player can do little to fight back except risk his carriers.
However, limiting the Japanese to enough sorties for two strikes and no more acutally puts a little excitment into the game and creates an element of risk for the Japanese player. The second strike can be lucrative for Japan but there is always the risk that the Allied player is a "crazy assed sumbitch" and will send his carriers after you. And, Japan will have no sorties left-only CAP. Seems like a fair deal to me. This simple solution will force a tough decison on the IJN player just like the decisions Nagumo had to face.
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My experience as the Allied player in two pbemails is that the Japanese player usually comes away with slightly better than historical with the first strike, and pretty much prostrates the American fighter force killing many and leaving them with an average morale in the low 30 range on average. A second strike faces ineffective fighter opposition and result in very few losses and just about sinks or severly damages all BBs. Sucessive strikes are the same as the Allied fighters are used up by then. If I were an IJN player, barring a house rule, I would stick around and pummel Pearl at least three and maybe four days in a row. As the game is now, it can be done, and the American player can do little to fight back except risk his carriers.
However, limiting the Japanese to enough sorties for two strikes and no more acutally puts a little excitment into the game and creates an element of risk for the Japanese player. The second strike can be lucrative for Japan but there is always the risk that the Allied player is a "crazy assed sumbitch" and will send his carriers after you. And, Japan will have no sorties left-only CAP. Seems like a fair deal to me. This simple solution will force a tough decison on the IJN player just like the decisions Nagumo had to face.
"There is no off position on the genius switch."
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RE: So what if the Japs want to stick around Pearl Harbor?
ORIGINAL: Mike Scholl
ORIGINAL: Kull
The amount of angst expended over the "extra days" at Pearl and the "enforced" sortie of Force Z is all out of proportion to the game impact. Does it hurt in 1941? Absolutely. Does it matter in 1943? Absolutely not.
Not trying to offend, Kull (your point has some validity). But it's also the equivalent of saying "Why were you all so upset when Allied Players sent in 150 B-17's at 1000 feet against your naval TF's? Will it matter in 1945?"
From what I've seen in play and the forum, most players tend to get excited about what's happening to them NOW. Especially if they feel they are being abused by their opponent or the scenario or the rules.
Good counter, and I left myself open to it with an insufficient comment. The Pearl opening and Force Z sortie are really one time events that are driven by the nature of the start position. If KB could show up in January or February and have the same success, THAT would be a major problem. Surprise-driven "First Day" oddities - so long as they aren't repeatable - are not destabilizing over the length of the entire game, so I don't view them as serious issues. There's plenty of other things which are truly problematic (such as the Japanese LCU dominance of China), and I'd prefer the devs focus on those issues as opposed to the annoyances. On the other hand, some of the ideas having to do with opening day limitations on KB sorties - if easy to implement - wouldn't be a bad idea. But be careful here. If KB could only fly two sorties, as has been recommended, the Allied player would KNOW that (which in RL they didn't), and could thus race his carriers in for risk-free assaults on KB. Is 4 days of camping excessive? Absolutely. Is running out of ammo after two strikes excessive? Also true.
Just beware the "law of unintended consequences".
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RE: So what if the Japs want to stick around Pearl Harbor?
ORIGINAL: Kull
ORIGINAL: Mike Scholl
ORIGINAL: Kull
The amount of angst expended over the "extra days" at Pearl and the "enforced" sortie of Force Z is all out of proportion to the game impact. Does it hurt in 1941? Absolutely. Does it matter in 1943? Absolutely not.
Not trying to offend, Kull (your point has some validity). But it's also the equivalent of saying "Why were you all so upset when Allied Players sent in 150 B-17's at 1000 feet against your naval TF's? Will it matter in 1945?"
From what I've seen in play and the forum, most players tend to get excited about what's happening to them NOW. Especially if they feel they are being abused by their opponent or the scenario or the rules.
Good counter, and I left myself open to it with an insufficient comment. The Pearl opening and Force Z sortie are really one time events that are driven by the nature of the start position. If KB could show up in January or February and have the same success, THAT would be a major problem. Surprise-driven "First Day" oddities - so long as they aren't repeatable - are not destabilizing over the length of the entire game, so I don't view them as serious issues. There's plenty of other things which are truly problematic (such as the Japanese LCU dominance of China), and I'd prefer the devs focus on those issues as opposed to the annoyances. On the other hand, some of the ideas having to do with opening day limitations on KB sorties - if easy to implement - wouldn't be a bad idea. But be careful here. If KB could only fly two sorties, as has been recommended, the Allied player would KNOW that (which in RL they didn't), and could thus race his carriers in for risk-free assaults on KB. Is 4 days of camping excessive? Absolutely. Is running out of ammo after two strikes excessive? Also true.
Just beware the "law of unintended consequences". Hey..., that's my line! [8D]
I agree. I'd like to see "control" of this problem in the form of tighter fuel supply for KB and it's support Tankers. Right now they seem to have far too much (KB can sail all the way back to Japan without refueling at all).
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RE: So what if the Japs want to stick around Pearl Harbor?
ORIGINAL: Kull
ORIGINAL: Mike Scholl
ORIGINAL: Kull
The amount of angst expended over the "extra days" at Pearl and the "enforced" sortie of Force Z is all out of proportion to the game impact. Does it hurt in 1941? Absolutely. Does it matter in 1943? Absolutely not.
Not trying to offend, Kull (your point has some validity). But it's also the equivalent of saying "Why were you all so upset when Allied Players sent in 150 B-17's at 1000 feet against your naval TF's? Will it matter in 1945?"
From what I've seen in play and the forum, most players tend to get excited about what's happening to them NOW. Especially if they feel they are being abused by their opponent or the scenario or the rules.
Good counter, and I left myself open to it with an insufficient comment. The Pearl opening and Force Z sortie are really one time events that are driven by the nature of the start position. If KB could show up in January or February and have the same success, THAT would be a major problem. Surprise-driven "First Day" oddities - so long as they aren't repeatable - are not destabilizing over the length of the entire game, so I don't view them as serious issues. There's plenty of other things which are truly problematic (such as the Japanese LCU dominance of China), and I'd prefer the devs focus on those issues as opposed to the annoyances. On the other hand, some of the ideas having to do with opening day limitations on KB sorties - if easy to implement - wouldn't be a bad idea. But be careful here. If KB could only fly two sorties, as has been recommended, the Allied player would KNOW that (which in RL they didn't), and could thus race his carriers in for risk-free assaults on KB. Is 4 days of camping excessive? Absolutely. Is running out of ammo after two strikes excessive? Also true.
Just beware the "law of unintended consequences".
Why should KB run out of ammo after two days? Torps yes, 800kg AP bombs yes (both would run out after the first strike). But there would be plenty of bombs left that more than represent a threat to the facilities on Hawai and every ship except a BB (but those are knocked out at Pearl anyway). Or am I completely wrong here? Bomb loads for only two strikes seems very few.
RE: So what if the Japs want to stick around Pearl Harbor?
From what I've seen in play and the forum, most players tend to get excited about what's happening to them NOW. Especially if they feel they are being abused by their opponent or the scenario or the rules.
Considering 7 of the BBs were SUNK historically and the game doesnt model raising ships ( like the ships Japan raised later in Japan) players should consider themselves very lucky to get away with the light damage they suffer. The game does not distinguish port sizes so the same BB sunk in port at Midway and could not be raised nor does it model side by side ships.
Underdog Fanboy
RE: So what if the Japs want to stick around Pearl Harbor?
In my game, Force 'Z' escaped with out a scratch beneath bad weather (and a patrol of NZ Buffallo's got several Nells & Beattys into the bargain whilst htey were milling around)
Hindsight was a truly wonderful thing, but this is the opportunity to look at 'what if' alternatives, and the game gives us a wonderful opportunity to look at the prospect of a more agressive Nagumo not cancelling the 3rd wave on PH, and continuing to ride his luck and trying to hunt down & sink the US carriers.
After all, Japanese intelligence had reported the absence of the US carriers the night before, this news was passed on to both Yamamoto and also Nagumo, who was given the option to abort the attack if they were not present (he pressed on, despite his caution and reserve). however his original no.1 priority was to attack the US carrier fleet and batttleships 2nd, so what if he decided to follow this through and hunt them down? He could certainly have done it until his fuel ran out (which is what Yamagushi was pressing for)
Hindsight was a truly wonderful thing, but this is the opportunity to look at 'what if' alternatives, and the game gives us a wonderful opportunity to look at the prospect of a more agressive Nagumo not cancelling the 3rd wave on PH, and continuing to ride his luck and trying to hunt down & sink the US carriers.
After all, Japanese intelligence had reported the absence of the US carriers the night before, this news was passed on to both Yamamoto and also Nagumo, who was given the option to abort the attack if they were not present (he pressed on, despite his caution and reserve). however his original no.1 priority was to attack the US carrier fleet and batttleships 2nd, so what if he decided to follow this through and hunt them down? He could certainly have done it until his fuel ran out (which is what Yamagushi was pressing for)
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RE: So what if the Japs want to stick around Pearl Harbor?
ORIGINAL: bklooste
From what I've seen in play and the forum, most players tend to get excited about what's happening to them NOW. Especially if they feel they are being abused by their opponent or the scenario or the rules.
Considering 7 of the BBs were SUNK historically and the game doesnt model raising ships ( like the ships Japan raised later in Japan) players should consider themselves very lucky to get away with the light damage they suffer. The game does not distinguish port sizes so the same BB sunk in port at Midway and could not be raised nor does it model side by side ships.
I guess its semantics, but I think of sunk as 'disappeared below the waves and not recoverable'. Stretching that I'd say AZ, OK, WV and CA were 'sunk' at PH in that they were either never repaired to a combat worthy condition or physically sank to the harbor floor.
Although I never kept stats in about 20 first turns my impression is that ship damage at PH is higher in AE than rl. The opposite of the how it was in WitP. Not a big deal, but I do love using those old bbs in amphib task forces.
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RE: shall we go for 15 pages?
Sorry for boring you, just green button me.