Why is holding Burma so hard for Japan?
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- Wirraway_Ace
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Why is holding Burma so hard for Japan?
Many AARs show tremendous pressure being put on Burma by the British in the fall of 1942, 2 years ahead of the historical pace. Some Japanese players cry foul and point to issues of restricted units marching across borders and the ease of supply movement through jungle hexes. While these may be issues in game play and mechanics, I think players also overlook the obvious difference between actual British Commonwealth performance and capabilities during the first year of the war and what often happens in the game.
Historically, British forces lost over 166,000 men and large amounts of equipment in Hong Kong and the Malaya. This included not just the 9th and 11th Indian Divisions along with the bulk of the 8th Australian Division, but the entire 18th British Division, 2 brigades (originally of the 17th Ind Div) and 9,000 British, Indian and Australian replacements that arrived in Singapore just before the fall. Add to this having 2 more divisions and a veteran armour bde (the 7th Armour Bde walked out of Burma, having either lost or had to abandon all its tanks and transport) wrecked in Burma, the historical British force structure lost 6 divisions plus a huge number of replacements in the first 4 months of the war. It took two years for the British Army to recover, and it can be argued, it never fully recovered.
Most Allied players will not lose anything like this. By March 42, British Commonwealth forces throughout the theater will be at 100 prep points and begin training to their national max of 55. The rate of experience improvement will vary through chance and the admin skill of the leader, but even the worst Indian units (starting at 20 experience) will be 50ish by the fall of 42. No wonder many Japanese players are finding tremendous pressure on the Burma front by the fall of 42.
I feel that dealing the British Army a decisive blow before it can train up to a level of competency and free up the PP to buy out initially restricted units needs to be a key early war objective for Japan.
Your thoughts?
RE: Why is holding Burma so hard for Japan?
Good Idea, but how do you engage the British?
RE: Why is holding Burma so hard for Japan?
Long standing issue. WitP engine never was able to properly represent Burma. Issues include:
1) Hindsight - Allied player starts building Burma defenses from turn 2 onward. historically the British dithered as they tried to organize defenses elsewhere.
2) supply abstraction - In the game supply flows far easier from India to Burma than in RL where, prior to the Ledo (new Burma) road supply was virtually nil, a factor which made Rangoon so strategically important, it was the main supply hub and entry point for supplies. This anomoly allows saavy players to build strong defense lines usually at Mandalay and NE Burma at Myitkyina. example - current AAR, the latter was the major stand along with Akyab. Each base had no less than 20 units stacked each, and dug in long before Joe's forces got there. Supply was not an issue despite our holding Rangoon.
3) Overgenerous SPS values for frontier bases. Historically the logistical net forced 4E and most 2E's to operate around the Calcutta area, the forward bases were stocked mainly with F and FB types.
4) map favors Allied holding of Akyab. - Also a big hindsight issue. I've yet to face as Japan, an Allied player who doesn't immediately start fortifying it . (As player two, i do the same!) Combined with generous SPS value Akyab along with other bases can dominate Burma airwise
5) Logistical situation in India overrepresented - India historically did not become the massive logistical platform it had the potential of being till 44. Due to a combination of war priorities, civil unrest, and poor administration. In the game one only has PP restrictions which doesn't impact large # of Air HQ's and support units.
6) introduction of "free reinforcements' - Raise your hand if you send the 18th Div to Singapore. [:D]. Curtain doesn't get his wish with two Oz divisions.
AE until patched also introduced a major issue producing uber air to ground attacks. It caused Joe's forces in our game with the Dasterdly duo from Oz to virtually abandon Burma to the Allied uber air army as they were erasing whole LCU's from the map. Fixed in a patch but allied airpower is still fairly easy to acumulate
My take , biggest issue is logistics and ability to prep. One feature i always liked about Norm's "Operational Art of War" was the ability to implement Theater activation after triggering certain events. Would work here. Fixing the supply situation and adjusting SPS values (the latter i did a long time ago in stock under Nikmod) would also further make Burma less defendable so early on.
1) Hindsight - Allied player starts building Burma defenses from turn 2 onward. historically the British dithered as they tried to organize defenses elsewhere.
2) supply abstraction - In the game supply flows far easier from India to Burma than in RL where, prior to the Ledo (new Burma) road supply was virtually nil, a factor which made Rangoon so strategically important, it was the main supply hub and entry point for supplies. This anomoly allows saavy players to build strong defense lines usually at Mandalay and NE Burma at Myitkyina. example - current AAR, the latter was the major stand along with Akyab. Each base had no less than 20 units stacked each, and dug in long before Joe's forces got there. Supply was not an issue despite our holding Rangoon.
3) Overgenerous SPS values for frontier bases. Historically the logistical net forced 4E and most 2E's to operate around the Calcutta area, the forward bases were stocked mainly with F and FB types.
4) map favors Allied holding of Akyab. - Also a big hindsight issue. I've yet to face as Japan, an Allied player who doesn't immediately start fortifying it . (As player two, i do the same!) Combined with generous SPS value Akyab along with other bases can dominate Burma airwise
5) Logistical situation in India overrepresented - India historically did not become the massive logistical platform it had the potential of being till 44. Due to a combination of war priorities, civil unrest, and poor administration. In the game one only has PP restrictions which doesn't impact large # of Air HQ's and support units.
6) introduction of "free reinforcements' - Raise your hand if you send the 18th Div to Singapore. [:D]. Curtain doesn't get his wish with two Oz divisions.
AE until patched also introduced a major issue producing uber air to ground attacks. It caused Joe's forces in our game with the Dasterdly duo from Oz to virtually abandon Burma to the Allied uber air army as they were erasing whole LCU's from the map. Fixed in a patch but allied airpower is still fairly easy to acumulate
My take , biggest issue is logistics and ability to prep. One feature i always liked about Norm's "Operational Art of War" was the ability to implement Theater activation after triggering certain events. Would work here. Fixing the supply situation and adjusting SPS values (the latter i did a long time ago in stock under Nikmod) would also further make Burma less defendable so early on.
- Bradley7735
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RE: Why is holding Burma so hard for Japan?
Hindsight is the problem. It works for both sides. Allied player will not ship more units to Singapore. Those units will defend Eastern India, and be prepared to invade Burma in the Fall of 42.
The japanese player can choose to run rampant in China, or move divisions to Burma to hold back the tide a bit longer. It's hard to press the allies in every theater.
The japanese player can choose to run rampant in China, or move divisions to Burma to hold back the tide a bit longer. It's hard to press the allies in every theater.
The older I get, the better I was.
RE: Why is holding Burma so hard for Japan?
ORIGINAL: Wirraway_Ace
Many AARs show tremendous pressure being put on Burma by the British in the fall of 1942, 2 years ahead of the historical pace. Some Japanese players cry foul and point to issues of restricted units marching across borders and the ease of supply movement through jungle hexes. While these may be issues in game play and mechanics, I think players also overlook the obvious difference between actual British Commonwealth performance and capabilities during the first year of the war and what often happens in the game.
Historically, British forces lost over 166,000 men and large amounts of equipment in Hong Kong and the Malaya. This included not just the 9th and 11th Indian Divisions along with the bulk of the 8th Australian Division, but the entire 18th British Division, 2 brigades (originally of the 17th Ind Div) and 9,000 British, Indian and Australian replacements that arrived in Singapore just before the fall. Add to this having 2 more divisions and a veteran armour bde (the 7th Armour Bde walked out of Burma, having either lost or had to abandon all its tanks and transport) wrecked in Burma, the historical British force structure lost 6 divisions plus a huge number of replacements in the first 4 months of the war. It took two years for the British Army to recover, and it can be argued, it never fully recovered.
Most Allied players will not lose anything like this. By March 42, British Commonwealth forces throughout the theater will be at 100 prep points and begin training to their national max of 55. The rate of experience improvement will vary through chance and the admin skill of the leader, but even the worst Indian units (starting at 20 experience) will be 50ish by the fall of 42. No wonder many Japanese players are finding tremendous pressure on the Burma front by the fall of 42.
I feel that dealing the British Army a decisive blow before it can train up to a level of competency and free up the PP to buy out initially restricted units needs to be a key early war objective for Japan.
Your thoughts?
I am working with the following H.Rs regarding India-Burma in my game vs Cantona2:
3.6 Home Rules regarding India
During 1942, the British authorities in India had to address the security of their main colony ("the jewel in the crown") that was a hotbed of rebellion, with an atmosphere poisoned by passive resistance and revolts. Gandhi had mobilized their followers of the Congress Party and the unwillingness of people to the British was growing. There was a fear in the British commanders that the Japanese would benefit from this circumstance (as they had effectively planned with the Indian National Army) and Wavell, commanding general of India had to dedicate 57 battalions only to maintain order. So critical was the situation that Slim had to find recruits for his reserve among venereal disease patients in hospitals in Calcutta and Barrackpore.
To be considered initially:
1 .- During 1942, no Restricted allied unit in India may change its command area.
2 .- If Japanese forces cross the border with India, all political points spent by units of the Commonwealth can only be made to send reinforcements units to India.
Now let´s consider the political price of a Japanese invasion of India.
Obviously, these rules will allow an easy conquest of Burma and the arrival to the Indian border, this is no reason to believe that the Japanese were to attempt an invasion of India that would be interpreted by Hindus as a "liberation" of their British oppressors, this idea was substantiated by the formation of the aforementioned "Indian National Army." If the Japanese player wants to take the decision to invade Indian borders before 1944 he must also have a stock of political points (just as in the case of Australia). This reserve will be of 4,000 political points and will be relieved from the obligation to maintain it at the time they fall into his hands either Calcutta or Bombay or Colombo and Trincomalee. Also, all units of the IJA that are to cross the border with India or land in Ceylon must have at least 80 preparation points.
- I know could be improved, any suggestion or criticism will be wellcomed -
Best wishes
Ramón

WITP-AE, WITE
- Wirraway_Ace
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RE: Why is holding Burma so hard for Japan?
I found the scale of actual British reinforcements to Singapore astoundingORIGINAL: Nikademus
6) introduction of "free reinforcements' - Raise your hand if you send the 18th Div to Singapore. [:D]. Curtain doesn't get his wish with two Oz divisions.
Singapore major ground reinforcements (from Willmott)
14 Jan 42 - 45th Ind Bde (17th Ind Div); 53rd Bde (18th Brit Div)
22 Jan 42 - 44th Ind Bde (17th Ind Div;) 7,000 Indian Army replacements (for 11th Ind Div)
25 Jan 42 - Aus MG Bn; 1,900 replacements (for 8th Aus Div)
29 Jan 42 - HQ 18th Brit Div and 2 remaining Bdes of the Div
This does not include the significant air reinforcements including large numbers of Hurricanes.
RE: Why is holding Burma so hard for Japan?
Well I think you touched on one of the main reasons the Commonwealth forces are able to counterattack so soon: the Allied player is not bound to sending the 18th UK plus the Indian BGD's to certain death. Instead these usually go to India or Ceylon where as you pointed out the can be trained up. I think another factor is that the garrison requirements in India are likely too low. While the Indian populace may not have been as rife for open rebellion as the Japanese hoped, they were still restless. Also there was a severe drought throughout most of the war in India. I suspect that perhaps the drain on resources just to keep the civilian population fed cannot be reflected in the game. Lastly I think a lot of Japanese players fail to keep the pressure on in this area. They take all the bases in Burma and stop. Even a modest overland invasion would keep the pressure on the Allies and keep at least some of the LCU's out of rest mode. Historically the IJA was still on the offensive in this theatre in 1944
"We have met the enemy and they are ours" - Commodore O.H. Perry
- Wirraway_Ace
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RE: Why is holding Burma so hard for Japan?
I think you have to take the fight to them early, and if the pull out of Malaya and Burma, that means India...ORIGINAL: Nomad
Good Idea, but how do you engage the British?
RE: Why is holding Burma so hard for Japan?
To me it's all logistics. The India/Burma border is just much much easier to move supplies accross than IRL. The Arakan Offensive failed mostly because of logistics, and that was a shoestring operation of an understrength Corps, not the 10-division invasion the Allies can launch in 1943 in AE.
Not sure how to model it, but that's really the problem to me.
Not sure how to model it, but that's really the problem to me.
- Wirraway_Ace
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RE: Why is holding Burma so hard for Japan?
This is fine, but only makes a few months differenceORIGINAL: Fletcher
1 .- During 1942, no Restricted allied unit in India may change its command area.
ORIGINAL: Fletcher
2 .- If Japanese forces cross the border with India, all political points spent by units of the Commonwealth can only be made to send reinforcements units to India.
Don't think this would work. Australia and NZ were tied to the U.S. by April 42. They would continue to fight the war from their perspective regardless of India
I think I understand where you are going with this type of rule. You need the political will to overcome IJA or IJN objections to various major operations that they were historically in disagreement on. If you do this, there needs to be similiar friction for British - American coordination of strategic objectives. For example, it would have been very difficult to commit major US ground forces to India/Burma in support of Britain regaining/retaining her colonial possessions. Using U.S. PBYs to evacuate British units from Singapore while U.S. units are left trapped on the Bataan is another example of this type of issue.ORIGINAL: Fletcher
Now let´s consider the political price of a Japanese invasion of India.
Obviously, these rules will allow an easy conquest of Burma and the arrival to the Indian border, this is no reason to believe that the Japanese were to attempt an invasion of India that would be interpreted by Hindus as a "liberation" of their British oppressors, this idea was substantiated by the formation of the aforementioned "Indian National Army." If the Japanese player wants to take the decision to invade Indian borders before 1944 he must also have a stock of political points (just as in the case of Australia). This reserve will be of 4,000 political points and will be relieved from the obligation to maintain it at the time they fall into his hands either Calcutta or Bombay or Colombo and Trincomalee. Also, all units of the IJA that are to cross the border with India or land in Ceylon must have at least 80 preparation points.
- Wirraway_Ace
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RE: Why is holding Burma so hard for Japan?
My take is that 1st Arakan failed to due to an inept tactical plan executed by inexperience troops against a very competent enemy.ORIGINAL: Q-Ball
To me it's all logistics. The India/Burma border is just much much easier to move supplies accross than IRL. The Arakan Offensive failed mostly because of logistics, and that was a shoestring operation of an understrength Corps, not the 10-division invasion the Allies can launch in 1943 in AE.
Not sure how to model it, but that's really the problem to me.
That being said, I agree that a 10 division offensive throught the jungles of Burma was simply not logistically possible in 43, and may not have been possible at all. I would note that the problem facing Japan is bigger than that. Those ten divisions don't have to march through the jungle. The game certainly allows the Allied player to assemble sufficient transport and naval forces in the Indian Ocean to conduct large scale amphib ops. Burma, Sumatra and Java are all possible targets.
RE: Why is holding Burma so hard for Japan?
I think the disagreement between IJA and IJN were very different that British with Americans... British untrust on Chinese wills (i.e. Anakin offensive), but they have no problems with americans (only perhaps with Gen.Stilwell, but he has enough "headache" with chinese leader). But IJA and IJN leaders have a great coordination problem regarding all theaters (IJA considers only CHINA like the main target and Soviet Union like main threat...).
At end of the War, british had no problems to subordinate to CINCPAC for naval operations with RN Pacific Fleet.
Americans had their own problems in the Pacific in the first stage of the war, about that I have some home rules, regarding British-American different interest:
3.8 Restrictions on the Royal Navy
The Royal Navy was vigilant for the interests of the British Empire and its Condominium and its interests in the Pacific were almost nil.
Therefore:
1. - Until September 1942 no high-value (HV) units (consider CV, CVL, BB, BC) will operate in the Pacific (except for repairs, transit to ports in US and return from them).
2. - From January 1943 a single high-value naval unit could operate in the Pacific (as happened with HMS Victorious in the Solomon campaign, which operated alongside the USS Saratoga)
3. - From 1945 onwards the Royal Navy can operate freely in the Pacific (creation of the Pacific Fleet under U.S. command).
Kind Regards
Ramón
At end of the War, british had no problems to subordinate to CINCPAC for naval operations with RN Pacific Fleet.
Americans had their own problems in the Pacific in the first stage of the war, about that I have some home rules, regarding British-American different interest:
3.8 Restrictions on the Royal Navy
The Royal Navy was vigilant for the interests of the British Empire and its Condominium and its interests in the Pacific were almost nil.
Therefore:
1. - Until September 1942 no high-value (HV) units (consider CV, CVL, BB, BC) will operate in the Pacific (except for repairs, transit to ports in US and return from them).
2. - From January 1943 a single high-value naval unit could operate in the Pacific (as happened with HMS Victorious in the Solomon campaign, which operated alongside the USS Saratoga)
3. - From 1945 onwards the Royal Navy can operate freely in the Pacific (creation of the Pacific Fleet under U.S. command).
Kind Regards
Ramón

WITP-AE, WITE
RE: Why is holding Burma so hard for Japan?
Absolutely agree !... but this is a national issue. This is easy to avoid with H.R.Using U.S. PBYs to evacuate British units from Singapore while U.S. units are left trapped on the Bataan is another example of this type of issue.
I understand your point of view about Burma frontiers... I know the H.R. I comment you is only a time question...surely, but like Japanese you have enough time in 1942 to reinforce and fortify strongly your positions (IMHO of course). Cross India-Burma border is not an easy task for japanese or british if the border bases are good defended ...
Kind Regards
Ramón

WITP-AE, WITE
- vonSchnitter
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RE: Why is holding Burma so hard for Japan?
Sorry Fletcher,
but your comment on developing bases in Burma in 42 for the IJ - while it sounds reasonable - is not supported by the game engine or the scenario (scen 1 in my case)
Call me names - no prob - but first af all keeping supplies in Burma is one thing - not to speak of resource/oil and fuel fluctuations - but getting supplies to the bases you care fore most is a different issue anyway.
Just a quick one:
bases in the red on supplies are not expanding facilities (WitP logic) right ?
If so, how come Myitkinia (sp) - which never gor out of red in 42 in my game (ai) - kept expanding the AF and forts ?
And gauging by proxy - chinese units gaining supplies while off the road/rail network - may the same apply to Burma ?
but your comment on developing bases in Burma in 42 for the IJ - while it sounds reasonable - is not supported by the game engine or the scenario (scen 1 in my case)
Call me names - no prob - but first af all keeping supplies in Burma is one thing - not to speak of resource/oil and fuel fluctuations - but getting supplies to the bases you care fore most is a different issue anyway.
Just a quick one:
bases in the red on supplies are not expanding facilities (WitP logic) right ?
If so, how come Myitkinia (sp) - which never gor out of red in 42 in my game (ai) - kept expanding the AF and forts ?
And gauging by proxy - chinese units gaining supplies while off the road/rail network - may the same apply to Burma ?

Remember that the first law of motion is to look where you're going. A man with a stiff neck has no place in an airplane.
Technical Manual No. 1-210, Elementary Flying, War Department, Washington,
RE: Why is holding Burma so hard for Japan?
Hi vonSchnitter,
Agree, of course, but we can not change engine performance, only House rules can help something, not like R.L., of course, I know...
However, I think that like IJA player you can use Rangoon like Air Transport base to send any neededs in forward bases... it´s only an idea, not a "must to be done"... basically like Japanese player you need the following bases unlinked by railway:
AKYAB
KALEMYO
All other bases are linked by railway or main road.
I can tell you about my own example in my PBEM game... with only 12 Ki-56 I sent from Chiang Mai to Rangoon four road construction units in only 10-11 days... there are troops, not supplies, well..but you can send supplies to these two bases from rearguard.
IF british cross the borders whenever they want, you can move your reserves by railway or main road, but british must to move by jungle by no less than 3 hexes to reach Schwebo railway to Mitkyina.
Best wishes.
Ramón
Agree, of course, but we can not change engine performance, only House rules can help something, not like R.L., of course, I know...
However, I think that like IJA player you can use Rangoon like Air Transport base to send any neededs in forward bases... it´s only an idea, not a "must to be done"... basically like Japanese player you need the following bases unlinked by railway:
AKYAB
KALEMYO
All other bases are linked by railway or main road.
I can tell you about my own example in my PBEM game... with only 12 Ki-56 I sent from Chiang Mai to Rangoon four road construction units in only 10-11 days... there are troops, not supplies, well..but you can send supplies to these two bases from rearguard.
IF british cross the borders whenever they want, you can move your reserves by railway or main road, but british must to move by jungle by no less than 3 hexes to reach Schwebo railway to Mitkyina.
Best wishes.
Ramón

WITP-AE, WITE
RE: Why is holding Burma so hard for Japan?
Use the map mod/patch who adds roads and rail on historicle dates... then u get a rail line to Burma = a lot easyer and also historicle
- vonSchnitter
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RE: Why is holding Burma so hard for Japan?
Ramon,
air transport - at least in my game (scen 1 ai - through a couple patches ) did not help at all.
If the engine has an issue with supply and resource flow, I would think it is about time to find out - and ask the defs to fix it - or at least to admit a problem.
air transport - at least in my game (scen 1 ai - through a couple patches ) did not help at all.
If the engine has an issue with supply and resource flow, I would think it is about time to find out - and ask the defs to fix it - or at least to admit a problem.

Remember that the first law of motion is to look where you're going. A man with a stiff neck has no place in an airplane.
Technical Manual No. 1-210, Elementary Flying, War Department, Washington,
RE: Why is holding Burma so hard for Japan?
ORIGINAL: Wirraway_Ace
My take is that 1st Arakan failed to due to an inept tactical plan executed by inexperience troops against a very competent enemy.ORIGINAL: Q-Ball
To me it's all logistics. The India/Burma border is just much much easier to move supplies accross than IRL. The Arakan Offensive failed mostly because of logistics, and that was a shoestring operation of an understrength Corps, not the 10-division invasion the Allies can launch in 1943 in AE.
Not sure how to model it, but that's really the problem to me.
Having just read Slim's "Defeat into Victory" I wouldn't be quite so harsh ... it was probably more inept upper level commanders (i.e. not Slim) who kept interfering with operational parameters and in actual operations ... but certainly, yes, the Japanese were tactically competent ... much more so than the British in many ways. Of course, they took huge risks and, if less unrealistic constraints had been put on the British forces these risks may not have paid off (of course, if less constraints had been put on the Brits they may not have undertaken the campaign until they had a larger force available).
Oh, btw, thanks to those posters on other threads who recommended to all and sundry to read "Defeat into Victory" ... an excellent insight into the campaign!
Phil
Author, Space Opera (FGU); RBB #1 (FASA); Road to Armageddon; Farm, Forge and Steam; Orbis Mundi; Displaced (PGD)
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Email: aspqrz@tpg.com.au
RE: Why is holding Burma so hard for Japan?
Let's face it; even the worst allied players and simplest of AI engines cannot duplicate the pathethic and utterly incompetent performance of the British Army. Man for man arguably the finest troops in any army, but the high command was still fighting WWI. The only place they enjoyed success was in North Arfica where they fought an even worse army, the Italians. So, is it any mystery that the Brits will out perform their historical record?
RE: Why is holding Burma so hard for Japan?
Maybe this is one area that can be addressed by having allied production. India currently swims in supplies and has easy access to fuel. What if the allied player had to develop the infrastructure in order to generate sufficient supplies for the army? That could take quite a long time (1 to 1and a half years) and would slow allied advance, especially if the player has an airwar on his hands and a need to expand and fortify a lot of bases. I guess supply is key