How to judge Japan's attack without the benefit of hindsight?

[Terminus]

That's what they want you to think, LogBoy. Same as with Queen Elizabeth II these days...[:D]

And Herwin, if you're going to throw buzzwords like "autarchy" around, it might seem a bit more impressive if you know how to spell them.

[Mifune]

autarky

http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Autarky

[mike scholl 1]

ORIGINAL: vettim89

Considering that elements of the IJA actually tried to intervene when Hirohito made the final decision to surrender, it is safe to say that short of a complete "beheading" of the IJA hierarchy, peace was not going to come by anything short of what history gave us. Chilling to think that a few never-say-die zealots were willing to bring Japan and the entire Japanese race to the brink of oblivion and almost succeeded.

Yep. The pack of completely gutless moral cowards who led Japan into the war could never face up to the stupidity of that decision, and instead tried to get the whole nation to commit suicide to cover for their idiocy. The slogan seemed to be, "Better the whole nation should die that that we should have to admit our mistakes."

[Historiker]

ORIGINAL: Mifune

autarky

http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Autarky

[:D]

[koontz]

ORIGINAL: Canoerebel

The United States was not going to stand by and let Britain be defeated or heavily pressed in the Pacific while fighting for its life in Europe. The U.S. was already pretty hot over the situation in China.  If Japan had attacked Dutch and British interests in the Pacific and Asia the U.S. either would have immediately declared war or so ramped up preparations in the Philippines and other Pacific Islands that war would have been inevitable and would have taken place in the short or medium term.  Can you imagine the U.S. sitting back while Japan attacks Hong Kong and Singapore and the Royal Navy is heavily engaged?  No way America commits only 1/4th the resources.

  

Hell no! [8D]

The US of A have had secret talks with Britain for ~1 year or so before the day that shall live in infamy.
Warplans for EU and so on.

By why did it take so long to force the Japs to agree on surrender?

[herwin]

ORIGINAL: Nikademus

ORIGINAL: herwin

When Tai-sho died, the new Emperor Showa (Hirohito) redirected Japanese strategic planning from autarky to expansionism.

The Emperors reined, but did not rule. They directed nothing.

Tell that to my (deceased) great-grandfather. (His letters home also made it quite clear the Imperial Family was not pleased about American treatment of Japanese residents.) It was when the Emperor Showa ascended the throne that Japanese strategic planning was reoriented away from development of Japanese oil fields and towards acquisition of the DEI.

[CapAndGown]

I am a little surprised that in all this discussion that the inherent structural problem of all non-democratic governing structures is not mentioned as a reason for Japan's decision to go to war.

I see the government of Japan's problem as similar to that faced by monarchies, empires, and even modern corporations throughout time. Basically, the problem boils down to this: if we don't change course, we are doomed to destruction, but the only course change that can possibly save us is one that means that we, as the governors, are doomed.

Some examples:

Japan, 1941: The US had cut of Japan's access to oil. The empire would run out of oil in a year and the empire would collapse unless the government of Japan made some meaningful moves in China to mollify the US. But if the government did that, then the government would not only fall, its leaders would most likely be assassinated by hard line nationalists. So even if the leaders of the Japanese government do not believe they can win against the US, what have they got to lose since they are going to lose their position and possibly their lives anyway?

Ottoman Empire, 18th-19th Centuries: By this time, the Ottoman Empire, which had been a world class innovator when it came to introducing and developing gun powder weapons, was falling further and further behind its European rivals. The Sultans knew they had to remodel their military if they wanted to keep up. Yet every time they tried the Janasaries revolted and overthrew the current Sultan to replace him with someone who would not rock the boat. Any remodeling of the military would mean the end of the Janasaries and their special privileges. For the Janasaries, the question was the same as for the Japanese government in 1941, do we do nothing, maintain our privileges, but concede the ultimate destruction of the system that provides those privileges, or do we agree to simply give up those privileges now, and if so why? For the greater good of the Sultan? Screw him, we are going to look out for ourselves!

Wall Street, 2008: The financial structure of the world economy is coming crashing down around our ears. The largest bank run in the history of the world has just "broken the buck" at one of the largest money market funds in the US. Unless capital in injected into the banking system the entire system is going to shut down. But of course, no politician really wants to just hand over a bunch of money to the banks, especially when they caused the problem in the first place. So politicians start talking about putting salary caps on the CEO's of any bank receiving TARP money. And what do these CEO's say? If you limit our salaries in any way, we won't take the money, even if it means our bank goes broke. So we see a similar situation. If the bank goes broke, the CEO will lose his nice cushy salary. But if he takes the TARP money to keep his bank from going under, he will also see his salary cut. Many of these CEO's were basically saying: since I would lose either way, I would rather risk the destruction of the bank than the certain curtailment of my salary.

In a non-democratic system, the people at the top are looking out for themselves, not for the greater good. This could be said of democratic systems as well, except that democratic governors have a great deal of incentive to look out for the greater good since it means that if they are at least a little successful, they can stay in office.

[xj900uk]

The United States was not going to stand by and let Britain be defeated or heavily pressed in the Pacific while fighting for its life in Europe. The U.S. was already pretty hot over the situation in China. If Japan had attacked Dutch and British interests in the Pacific and Asia the U.S. either would have immediately declared war or so ramped up preparations in the Philippines and other Pacific Islands that war would have been inevitable and would have taken place in the short or medium term. Can you imagine the U.S. sitting back while Japan attacks Hong Kong and Singapore and the Royal Navy is heavily engaged?

Sorry, but IMO the US would never have been so committed to the War in the Pacific were it not for the sneak attack on Pearl Harbour. If the IJN had contented itself with going after the DEI and Malaysia, there is honestly no way I can ever imagine Roosevelt being able to convince either congress nor the American Public of waging indefinite all-out war and costing countless US lives for as long as it takes purely to prop up fading European Colonial interests in S E Asia. Some sort of limited intervention, agreed - but indefinite all out war? No way sorry.

[herwin]

ORIGINAL: cap_and_gown

In a non-democratic system, the people at the top are looking out for themselves, not for the greater good. This could be said of democratic systems as well, except that democratic governors have a great deal of incentive to look out for the greater good since it means that if they are at least a little successful, they can stay in office.

I had an interesting discussion with a KGB analyst shortly before the collapse of the Soviet Union about the problems they were having removing the dead hands of the nomenklatura from the controls of the Soviet airplane.

[wdolson]

Bulwinkle had the right idea even if the terms were a little off.  During a declared war, US industry comes under control of the government.  The government didn't take over many industries, though they did take over Brewster due to their incompetent management.  The government pretty much dictated what company built what.  The bureaucrats who were in charge realized that industrial leaders would work better if given a say, so a committee of government and industry people were put together in WW II, but that was just a tweak for better efficiency over past wars.

Anyone who could crunch the numbers would realize that taking on the US in a long war was a very bad idea.  Japan's merchant ships per capita was close to the US's, but that is a statistic that looks good until you drill down into it.  Japan is an island nation poor in natural resources.  Most of the raw materials for production have to be imported, which ties down the merchant fleet importing goods into Japan.

The US's merchant fleet was primarily built to export manufactured goods to other countries.  There were only a few industrial materials that were not available in abundance inside the US borders.  Rubber was the most critical and the petroleum industry largely had that issue beat by the time the US entered the war.

The US was also willing to put its female population to work in factories freeing up young men for war and the total US industrial capacity was around 50% of the entire world's output in 1940.  A staggering figure when you think about it.  The US, industrially, was roughly where China is today with a much smaller population and home access to most of the resources it needed.

The naval treaty also gave the US a larger navy than Japan.  Until just upon the eve of the war with the US, the US had 6 large fleet carriers and Japan only had 4.  The Shokaku and Zuikaku were commissioned just before the war started which gave Japan parity.  The US had an even bigger lopsided advantage in battleships.  When the naval treaty expired, everyone started building ships.  Japan's industry could barely manage to build two Yamatos and two Shokaku carriers.  The Shokakus were ready before any US post treaty carriers, but Japan knew that the first Essex class carriers were under construction and the first of the fast battleships were launched before the Pearl Harbor attack.

The US had two oceans to cover and Japan only had one, but the war in the Atlantic was not a big ship war.  The US might be short of DDs due to the u-boat threat, but the carriers and BBs were going to be free to deploy to the Pacific eventually with a trickle of new ships in 1942 that was going to turn into a huge influx of ships starting in 1943.

A pre-war analyst might not have predicted the speed at which US industry spun up and the speed at which it was able to crank out material (Henry Kaiser surprised everyone at the speed with which he built his shipyards and cranked out ships for example), but even a conservative estimate would show the US was an industrial giant loping along far from full capacity in 1940.  And history would have shown what the US does when committed to a total war.

The isolationists were a strong political movement in the US that an analyst might take into account in 1939, but the isolationist movement starting to come apart during the Blitz on London and by the eve of Pearl Harbor the American public was split close to 50/50 about getting into the war in Europe.  If nothing else, Lend Lease had helped the US economy quite a bit.

Bill

[Nikademus]

ORIGINAL: herwin

Tell that to my (deceased) great-grandfather. (His letters home also made it quite clear the Imperial Family was not pleased about American treatment of Japanese residents.) It was when the Emperor Showa ascended the throne that Japanese strategic planning was reoriented away from development of Japanese oil fields and towards acquisition of the DEI.

Theoretically, the Emperor had plenary power, all state decisions needed his sanction. But according to tradition, once the Cabinet and military leaders had agreed on a policy, he could not withhold his approval. He was to remain above politics and transcend party considerations and feuds, for he represented the entire nation.

John Tolland: The rise and fall of the Japanese Empire.

The military had the ulitmate power and dominated policymaking as it could exclude civilian oversight on matters considered linked to national defense. It could bring down any cabinet through resignation and It's goal of exploiting resources in China was approved under the Emperor Taisho.

[Bullwinkle58]

ORIGINAL: wdolson

Bulwinkle had the right idea even if the terms were a little off.  During a declared war, US industry comes under control of the government.  The government didn't take over many industries, though they did take over Brewster due to their incompetent management.  The government pretty much dictated what company built what.  The bureaucrats who were in charge realized that industrial leaders would work better if given a say, so a committee of government and industry people were put together in WW II, but that was just a tweak for better efficiency over past wars.

I think my term--socialism--was correct for US federal behavior during WWII. It was temporary, not structural, but it happened. Lots of people today don't know this history, however. Wikipedia is not always a great source, but this entry on the WPB is correct as far as it goes, and gives an overview to how deeply the federal government reached into the private sector during the war:

"The War Production Board (WPB) was established as a government agency on January 16, 1942 by executive order of Franklin D. Roosevelt.

The purpose of the board was to regulate the production and allocation of materials and fuel during World War II in the United States. The WPB converted and expanded peacetime industries to meet war needs, allocated scarce materials vital to war production, established priorities in the distribution of materials and services, and prohibited nonessential production. It rationed such things as gasoline, heating oil, metals, rubber, paper[1] and plastics. It was dissolved shortly after the defeat of Japan in 1945, and was replaced by the Civilian Production Administration in late 1945.

The first chairman of the Board was Donald M. Nelson from 1942 to 1944 followed by Julius A. Krug from 1944 until the Board was dissolved.

Established by Executive Order 9024 on January 16, 1942, the WPB replaced the Supply Priorities and Allocation Board as well as the Office of Production Management. The national WPB constituted the chair, the secretaries of war, navy, and agriculture, the federal loan administrator, lieutenant general in charge of war department production, administrator of the office of price administration, chair of the board of economic warfare, and special assistant to the president who supervised the defense aid program. The board created advisory, policy-making, and progress-reporting divisions.

The WPB managed twelve regional offices, and operated one hundred twenty field offices throughout the nation. They worked alongside state war production boards, which maintained records on state war production facilities as well as helped state businesses obtain war contracts and loans.

The national WPB's primary task was converting civilian industry to war production. The board assigned priorities and allocated scarce materials such as steel, aluminum, and rubber, prohibited nonessential industrial activities such as producing nylons and refrigerators, controlled wages and prices, and mobilized the people through patriotic propaganda such as "give your scrap metal and help Oklahoma boys save our way of life."[2] It initiated events such as scrap metal drives, which were carried out locally to great success. For example, a national scrap metal drive in October 1942 resulted in an average of almost eighty-two pounds of scrap per American.[3]"

http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/War_Production_Board

[zaquex]

Ive read a few books and articles on the topic and i beleive that most people on this forum forgets a realy important factor.

Cant prove this is correct but there is many hints that points in this direction and its also one of the most plausible and logical explanations for Japans behaviour although i understand that there are people that never could accept it.

The Brittish was in real trouble in Europe and Roosevelt was doing what he could to support them but it was not quite enough and to do more US needed to enter the war. But politically there was no support for entering a war in Europe neither among the politicians or among the public.

Some of the posters here have touched the subject and i wont go in to the topic of US political asperations in Asia etc but it seems clear to me that Roosvelt needed an excuse to enter the war and by provoking Japan with oil embargo etc an excuse could be produced. And with Japan desperate, to gather so the massive numbers of ships in PH was like waving a red blanket in front of a bull...


Most of the ships gathered in PH wheres obsolete/in need of uppgrades.

US knew about the attack well in advance AND KB was spotted ahead of the attack but nothing was done.

The days after PH the recruitment offices enlisted over one million men - the public oppinion had turned and the approval rating for the war weas close to 100%.

Japan did know that long term a war was impossible to win but the oil embargo would make them lose without a single shoot fired - they did however beleive that there was a chance to reach a situation where US would be prepared to negotiate.

I dont thing the Japanese was as stupid and ignorant as most seem to think, they where put in a desperate situation where the choices where to give up without a fight or to fight a war they at best could draw. With the Samurai mentality in Japan it wasnt even a choice.

Sometimes things are simpler than they appear.

[warspite1]

ORIGINAL: zaquex

Ive read a few books and articles on the topic and i beleive that most people on this forum forgets a realy important factor.

Cant prove this is correct but there is many hints that points in this direction and its also one of the most plausible and logical explanations for Japans behaviour although i understand that there are people that never could accept it.

The Brittish was in real trouble in Europe and Roosevelt was doing what he could to support them but it was not quite enough and to do more US needed to enter the war. But politically there was no support for entering a war in Europe neither among the politicians or among the public.

Some of the posters here have touched the subject and i wont go in to the topic of US political asperations in Asia etc but it seems clear to me that Roosvelt needed an excuse to enter the war and by provoking Japan with oil embargo etc an excuse could be produced. And with Japan desperate, to gather so the massive numbers of ships in PH was like waving a red blanket in front of a bull...


Most of the ships gathered in PH wheres obsolete/in need of uppgrades.

US knew about the attack well in advance AND KB was spotted ahead of the attack but nothing was done.

The days after PH the recruitment offices enlisted over one million men - the public oppinion had turned and the approval rating for the war weas close to 100%.

Japan did know that long term a war was impossible to win but the oil embargo would make them lose without a single shoot fired - they did however beleive that there was a chance to reach a situation where US would be prepared to negotiate.

I dont thing the Japanese was as stupid and ignorant as most seem to think, they where put in a desperate situation where the choices where to give up without a fight or to fight a war they at best could draw. With the Samurai mentality in Japan it wasnt even a choice.

Sometimes things are simpler than they appear.

Warspite1

.......or too simple for words. So Roosevelt's the bad guy and the poor Japanese were given no choice?

One word: Nanking

[mike scholl 1]

ORIGINAL: zaquex

Ive read a few books and articles on the topic and i beleive that most people on this forum forgets a realy important factor.

Cant prove this is correct but there is many hints that points in this direction and its also one of the most plausible and logical explanations for Japans behaviour although i understand that there are people that never could accept it.

The Brittish was in real trouble in Europe and Roosevelt was doing what he could to support them but it was not quite enough and to do more US needed to enter the war. But politically there was no support for entering a war in Europe neither among the politicians or among the public.

Some of the posters here have touched the subject and i wont go in to the topic of US political asperations in Asia etc but it seems clear to me that Roosvelt needed an excuse to enter the war and by provoking Japan with oil embargo etc an excuse could be produced. And with Japan desperate, to gather so the massive numbers of ships in PH was like waving a red blanket in front of a bull...


Most of the ships gathered in PH wheres obsolete/in need of uppgrades.

US knew about the attack well in advance AND KB was spotted ahead of the attack but nothing was done.

The days after PH the recruitment offices enlisted over one million men - the public oppinion had turned and the approval rating for the war weas close to 100%.

Japan did know that long term a war was impossible to win but the oil embargo would make them lose without a single shoot fired - they did however beleive that there was a chance to reach a situation where US would be prepared to negotiate.

I dont thing the Japanese was as stupid and ignorant as most seem to think, they where put in a desperate situation where the choices where to give up without a fight or to fight a war they at best could draw. With the Samurai mentality in Japan it wasnt even a choice.

Sometimes things are simpler than they appear.

And now you can tell us about Atlantis and Ancient Astronauts and the Grassy Knoll and all the other goofy "conspiracy stories" you've "read a book about". The only thing "simple" about this stuff is the mind it takes to believe such nonsense.

[vinnie71]

I don't like to think in terms of good guys vs bad guys. Its important to focus on what pushed nations to go to war. Throughout history second tier nations risked war with bigger brethern because they felt threatened (or at least their national interests). Japan was caught between the proverbial rock and the hard place. It wanted desperately to expand for various reasons but butting against 2 different animals - other empires and a nation that was essentially committed to destroying these same empires. My personal belief is that if it was up to the Europeans alone, they wouldn't have minded Japan taking over Chinese land (as long as it respected European enclaves and concession ports, which as far as I know, Japan did). The US on the other hand had a large China lobby which naturally tagged Japan as enemy no 1.
 
My impression is that Roosvelt wasn't courting war with Japan, though he did try to engineer a war with the Germans, whcih he regarded as the principal antagonist to the American way. The problem with understanding Roosvelt is that his actions are hard to interpret even with hindsight. What one sees as vacillation another might think that Roosvelt was playing a deep game. One has to admit though that he was a master of extracting every ounce of advantage from mistakes made by his adversaries.

[warspite1]

ORIGINAL: Offworlder

I don't like to think in terms of good guys vs bad guys.

Warspite1

I agree to a point - after all, only as children did we think that the Allies all wear white hats, while the evil Axis all wore black. Life can be and is more complicated than that.

However, what I find difficult to stomach is the complete turn around that simply and naively forgets things like the Rape of Nanking and other atrocities and tries to re-write history with words and phrases like:

..and with Japan desperate - she was desparate because she chose an aggresive war in China

..to gather so the massive numbers of ships in PH was like waving a red blanket in front of a bull - Yes, a warning blanket to Japan to try and persuade her to stop waging that war

..Most of the ships gathered in PH wheres obsolete/in need of uppgrades and US knew about the attack well in advance AND KB was spotted ahead of the attack but nothing was done - so Roosevelt the democrat become Roosevelt the evil mass murderer of his own people

I dont thing the Japanese was as stupid and ignorant as most seem to think - Well knowing they could not win but sending the country to its fiery doom is pretty stupid - and its pretty ignorant, plus a few other words like inhumane.

..they where put in a desperate situation - no, their hatred of "inferior" Chinese, Koreans etc put them in a desperate situation, NOT Franklin D Roosevelt.

[koontz]

Also the "japs" threated with kill ~100k of POW if they invaded HI.

But after all Japan come out very well after ww2 and about the "quilt"
So was the "Reich" who took the "doghead" by her self.

EDIT: "The Bomb" was first intended for Germany.

[noguaranteeofsanity]

ORIGINAL: zaquex

Ive read a few books and articles on the topic and i beleive that most people on this forum forgets a realy important factor.

Cant prove this is correct but there is many hints that points in this direction and its also one of the most plausible and logical explanations for Japans behaviour although i understand that there are people that never could accept it.

The Brittish was in real trouble in Europe and Roosevelt was doing what he could to support them but it was not quite enough and to do more US needed to enter the war. But politically there was no support for entering a war in Europe neither among the politicians or among the public.

Some of the posters here have touched the subject and i wont go in to the topic of US political asperations in Asia etc but it seems clear to me that Roosvelt needed an excuse to enter the war and by provoking Japan with oil embargo etc an excuse could be produced. And with Japan desperate, to gather so the massive numbers of ships in PH was like waving a red blanket in front of a bull...


Most of the ships gathered in PH wheres obsolete/in need of uppgrades.

US knew about the attack well in advance AND KB was spotted ahead of the attack but nothing was done.

The days after PH the recruitment offices enlisted over one million men - the public oppinion had turned and the approval rating for the war weas close to 100%.

Japan did know that long term a war was impossible to win but the oil embargo would make them lose without a single shoot fired - they did however beleive that there was a chance to reach a situation where US would be prepared to negotiate.

I dont thing the Japanese was as stupid and ignorant as most seem to think, they where put in a desperate situation where the choices where to give up without a fight or to fight a war they at best could draw. With the Samurai mentality in Japan it wasnt even a choice.

Sometimes things are simpler than they appear.

Roosevelt might have been looking to involve the US in the war in Europe prior to the Pearl Harbour attack, but to claim he allowed the attack to place in order to enter the war in Europe is somewhat illogical. The biggest flaw in that argument, is that it was Germany who declared war on the US and not the other way around. If Germany had not done so, the US might have never entered the war in Europe and only fought the Japanese in the Pacific, apart from providing aid to the Allies and the Atlantic convoys. It is considered one of Hitler's biggest mistakes, up there with invading Russia, as it was not required by the Tripartite treaty, which only came into effect if Germany, Japan or Italy were attacked, not if they attacked another nation first. It also would of been somewhat illogical for the US to declare war on Germany, once Pearl Harbour had been attacked and likely to have raised the question, why fight in Europe, if the US was already at war with Japan in the Pacific? American anger would of been directed at Japan and not Germany, so declaring war on Germany could have been seen as ignoring the Japanese and directing the military response at the wrong target.

As to whether the attack on Pearl Harbour was foreseeable, there is no 'smoking gun' evidence as to that claim. The war with Japan, itself was a very real possibility or even certainty, given the situation that had developed by 1941, but there is no absolute proof that Roosevelt allowed the attack to place and only what you might call circumstantial evidence. A lot of the claims of proof that Japan was planning to attack Pearl Harbour, actually pre-date the Japan decision and plans to attack, so are very unlikely to be authentic. While if there was some evidence that Roosevelt knew, I highly doubt it would of been able to be kept secret all of this time and someone would have found it or come forward to reveal the truth by now.

[vinnie71]

Warspite:
 
I totally agree with you on every issue you mentioned - though I still think that FDR was actually looking for war with Germany (Japan was a relative minor concern in 1941).
 
My reasoning regarding good vs bad is that when one discusses history, one has to try to get away from one's personal bias on the issue at hand. Therefore I've been trained to try to put myself as much as possible in the shoes of each side, in order to better understand the unfolding of events. As an individual I have my ideas (and believe me, I'm no revisionist[:'(]), but I try to put myself in the mindset of each combattant.
 
Ex: There is no denying that Japan was an aggressive nation out to carve its own empire and therefore wanted to upset the status quo. That is the reality as we percieve it from our angle. From the Japanese angle in the 1930's, the European colonial empires shut her out from potential lucrative markets while the US was intent on dismantling all empires (including Japan's one might add). One must also try to see it in the context of the times when empire was equated with wealth, power and prestige. In short the Japanese saw the Europeans and the US as denying them the hallowed 'place in the sun'.
 
Which is why when such arguments crop up I tend to remove the good/bad guy tag and see what's underneath. 
 
@ noguaranteeofsanity: agreed. FDR was putting American ships in harm's way in the Atlantic. My guess is that since in WWI American intervention was triggered by sinking of ships, the US could come into war in the same manner. In a way the Japanese nearly screwed up and only thanks to Hitler did the Americans end up in the West.