Proposal to make Russians fight for territory

[ool]

Actually they did stand and fight after Hitler ordered they fight to the last bullet and the last man. It is generally agreed by the military community that this order by Hitler saved the German army from disintegrating.

As for all the German players that are complaining? We definitely need a cure for all this " Whineritis". As comrade P noted in one of these forums there are players who truly understand all facets of this game that win as the Germans easily and regularly. So how about you German players learn the game better and experiment till your level of game understanding matches those people Camrade P was referring to.

[Skanvak]

I can't help but to feel sympathy for ool's remark. Though as this simulation is intricate, adding some consideration for grain for population or effect of population fleeing would only bring better historical simulation in my point of view. Though I definetly agree that no rule should be made to balance the side or to rail drive people just because they have "Whineritis".

[Magnum88]

One way to add some incentive to the Soviet player to fight hard for territory the first few months would to modify the victory conditions to add some of the smaller scenario conditions. Currently, the cities you presently control are all that goes into the computation. Why not add per turn VPs, if the Axis captures certain cities earlier than a specified date, and that those VPs do not go away when the cities change control. Tune the dates so that only a strong defense would slow the Axis enough to deny them these permenent VPs and not just a token harassing force/checkerboard defense. Now the Soviets would be required to mount a strong forward defense and expose himself to encirlement or save the bulk of his forces and give the Axis player a huge VP advantage for the rest of the game.

This could also be used to give the Axis an incentive not to retreat during the first winter to hold some of those cities that are still giving him VPs.

This may require a better overlay to show which conditional VPs are still available and color-coded for how much longer they are available to help the players maintain situation awareness on the important objectives to defend/conquer.

Also, I think the Sir Robinsk tactic is a straw man of sorts. Sure, it would be stupid for the Soviets to turn all of his units east and run but a good player would probably remove a large contingent further east and keep a small force to make the Axis panzers still slow down to deal with them using a checkerboard defense and the available good defensive terrain. This still slows the Axis down but saves the bulk of his forces from encirclement/annihilation.

The metric I have heard as the goal of a successful balance is that the Axis has the capability to mount an effective, large-scale offensive in Summer '42 (competent players on both side). Without addressing the fact that the Soviet player can easily save far larger numbers of units than they historically did with little negative consequences, will make achieving this goal very difficult. Sure the morale fix coming in Beta 3 and tweaking the blizzard rules could help increase Axis strength but they will still face a far larger Red Army in Spring '42, which was able to punish them even more than historically and that spent far longer digging-in indepth (more troops=more shovels), which makes the dream of a successful large-scale Axis offensive just that, a dream.

[SgtKachalin]

Not about territory per se, but a thought on Soviet casualties. The size of the Red Army in 1942 after only losing say 2 mil vs 4 mil in Barbarossa is arguably not "historical" even though it follows actual recruiting numbers from the war. Why? Because mobilization, and especially commitment of units to combat, was a function of the losses taken earlier. In other words, if the Red Army had taken 2 mil fewer losses in the first months one can logically argue that there would have been 2 mil fewer raw recruits thrown into combat in 1942. Industry, transport, agriculture all suffered because of manpower shortages. And the waste of human life by throwing new divisions straight into combat mere weeks after being raised may have been done but even at the time was acknowledged to be just that, a waste.

Just as Germany's reinforcement schedule is based on not only a timeline but an assumed series of circumstances (confidence in Oct 1941, battered in March 42, confident again in Fall 42, really gearing up in 43 after 'stalingrad', and so on), so are the Soviet's.

[MengJiao]

ORIGINAL: Sgt Barker

Not about territory per se, but a thought on Soviet casualties. The size of the Red Army in 1942 after only losing say 2 mil vs 4 mil in Barbarossa is arguably not "historical" even though it follows actual recruiting numbers from the war. Why? Because mobilization, and especially commitment of units to combat, was a function of the losses taken earlier. In other words, if the Red Army had taken 2 mil fewer losses in the first months one can logically argue that there would have been 2 mil fewer raw recruits thrown into combat in 1942. Industry, transport, agriculture all suffered because of manpower shortages. And the waste of human life by throwing new divisions straight into combat mere weeks after being raised may have been done but even at the time was acknowledged to be just that, a waste.

Just as Germany's reinforcement schedule is based on not only a timeline but an assumed series of circumstances (confidence in Oct 1941, battered in March 42, confident again in Fall 42, really gearing up in 43 after 'stalingrad', and so on), so are the Soviet's.

Very Good point. We really don't know what a lean and mean Russian army would have been like because everybody has been so busy simulating their ineptitude that we have no real idea what a really good Russiand army would be like.

[MengJiao]

ORIGINAL: Sgt Barker

Not about territory per se, but a thought on Soviet casualties. The size of the Red Army in 1942 after only losing say 2 mil vs 4 mil in Barbarossa is arguably not "historical" even though it follows actual recruiting numbers from the war. Why? Because mobilization, and especially commitment of units to combat, was a function of the losses taken earlier. In other words, if the Red Army had taken 2 mil fewer losses in the first months one can logically argue that there would have been 2 mil fewer raw recruits thrown into combat in 1942. Industry, transport, agriculture all suffered because of manpower shortages. And the waste of human life by throwing new divisions straight into combat mere weeks after being raised may have been done but even at the time was acknowledged to be just that, a waste.

Just as Germany's reinforcement schedule is based on not only a timeline but an assumed series of circumstances (confidence in Oct 1941, battered in March 42, confident again in Fall 42, really gearing up in 43 after 'stalingrad', and so on), so are the Soviet's.

So one Russian incentive to hold territory could be some kind of global army efficiency award that gives all their units more movement points and a CV bonus since if they are holding on the must be doing better than the historical russians we always see.

[Skanvak]

Good remark, but it wouldn't be a one for one reduction as the Red Army still lack men with their huge recrutement. There would sure have an impact.

[Mynok]

ORIGINAL: MengJiao
So one Russian incentive to hold territory could be some kind of global army efficiency award that gives all their units more movement points and a CV bonus since if they are holding on the must be doing better than the historical russians we always see.

In the game, this is how morale functions. Perhaps bonuses to morale if the number of units west of xxx is greater than y, or something similar, for the Soviets. Kind of how the Finns morale drops each turn it is south of the No-Attack line.