ORIGINAL: khyberbill
I have been trying to refrain from posting until I have all the facts about what went wrong in Fukushima-but I suspect that wont be available for awhile. I have actually been to the Fukushima site on business in 1998 but my reactor expertise was with PWRs and not BWRs. I did spend a year removing highly radioactive components from the spent fuel pools of two American BWRa and can say that the building structure above spent fuel pools in PWRs and BWRs are not designed to contain a hydrogen explosion-or most any other type. As some recall, there was a hydrogen explosion at Three Mile Island although it was in the containment.
I'm a nuclear engineer with both PWR and BWR experience. In every plant where I have worked, the emergency procedures will direct the operators to run a fire hose to the spent fuel pool (if the spent fuel pool cooling system is lost). When I heard about the Fukushima accident, the first thought that entered my mind was "I hope they ran the red rubber hoses to the spent fuel pools". I'm wondering why they didn't do this at Fukushima. My speculations:
- They ignored their emergency procedures, or
- They got a bad case of tunnel vision & their only concern was reestablishing safety injection to the reactor vessels, or
- All of their portable generators were being used for water injection into the reactor vessels & none were available to pump water into the spent fuel pools
I wonder how the industry is going to address the problem going forward? In the high radiation flux inside the reactor, water is broken down into H and O. O being very reactive is not desirable (it causes rust and rust gets to become very radioactive Mn54, Co60 etc) and so H is added to reactor water to recombine the free O into H2O. This explosive potential will exist as long as water is used as a coolant. CO2 and sodium have been briefly used but discarded. I imagine these hydrogen explosions will be a weapon for the anti-nukes in any future licensing effort-at least here in the US. I know I am interested in how current or future designs mitigate the problem.
Actually, during an accident the majority of the hydrogen production isn't from the disassociation of water, it's caused by the "zirc-water" reaction between the zircalloy cladding of the fuel rods and water (or steam). When the zircalloy cladding reaches approximately 2200 deg-F, it undergoes an exothermic reaction with water creating zirconium dioxide and hydrogen. Due to the hydrogen explosion inside the containment at Three Mile Island, all U.S. PWRs (and maybe the newer BWRs ?) have been required to install hydrogen recombiners or hydrogen burners inside containment. For the older BWRs with the "light-bulb and torus" type containments, hydrogen recombiners are not required. These older BWRs have a hardened & filtered vent that runs between the wetwell region of the containment & the plant stack. My guess is that the hydrogen explosions seen at Fukushima were due to zirc-water reactions in the spent fuel pools (this is definitely what happened at Fukushima 4, since there was no fuel in the number 4 reactor).