Gary Grigsby’s War in the East: The German-Soviet War 1941-1945 is a turn-based World War II strategy game stretching across the entire Eastern Front. Gamers can engage in an epic campaign, including division-sized battles with realistic and historical terrain, weather, orders of battle, logistics and combat results.
The critically and fan-acclaimed Eastern Front mega-game Gary Grigsby’s War in the East just got bigger and better with Gary Grigsby’s War in the East: Don to the Danube! This expansion to the award-winning War in the East comes with a wide array of later war scenarios ranging from short but intense 6 turn bouts like the Battle for Kharkov (1942) to immense 37-turn engagements taking place across multiple nations like Drama on the Danube (Summer 1944 – Spring 1945).
ORIGINAL: castlebravo
Further clarification. Since experience and morale are closely tied in WiTE, and furthermore, experience cannot be trained higher than morale, in effect you are saying that the average British unit was on par with the average Soviet unit in 1941. I don't know that the literature anywhere supports that argument.
That's wrong way to look at the problem. The correct way would be to ask why is experience closely tied to morale? I see no real reason why it should be.
Well, that's a game design problem. If you are trying to model the real world into a WiTE engine, you are constrained by how the engine goes about things, not how you or I would given a blank canvas. I agree with you that morale and experience shouldn't be tightly coupled...but that's how Gary Grigsby et al decided to implement it.
Additional edit: I understand your perspective on the Soviet morale, especially after the initial month or two, after which Russian units really didn't surrender that much, instead fighting to the death. Low morale units really don't do that kind of thing.
British units I am sorry but I have pretty low opinion about. I mean pure British. There is probably good reason why they constantly put ANZAC in the thick of the action, and used dominion troops to fill in the line (Indian, South African, Canadian etc).
Interesting point, and something I also noticed is that from the British isles, you are more likely to see Scottish, Welsh and Irish units bearing the brunt of casualties than, particularly southern English. Sure, there are exceptions like the Ox and Bucks but as a rule. I'm not sure if this is necessarily a result of southerners actually being soft so much as imperial policy to maintain morale and minimise social discontent in the heart of the empire.
“Old age is the most unexpected of all things that can happen to a man.”
-Leon Trotsky
British units I am sorry but I have pretty low opinion about. I mean pure British. There is probably good reason why they constantly put ANZAC in the thick of the action, and used dominion troops to fill in the line (Indian, South African, Canadian etc).
Interesting point, and something I also noticed is that from the British isles, you are more likely to see Scottish, Welsh and Irish units bearing the brunt of casualties than, particularly southern English. Sure, there are exceptions like the Ox and Bucks but as a rule. I'm not sure if this is necessarily a result of southerners actually being soft so much as imperial policy to maintain morale and minimise social discontent in the heart of the empire.
Before you guys slag off an entire nationality based on... I dont know what, you might want to actually read a little history. Whilst there were disasters in WW2, please explain:
Arras and Dunkirk defence (extremely adverse conditions, good performance against German line infantry)
1940 North Africa (decimated a hugely superior force, albeit Italian)
Alamein (somewhat superior numbers and equipement, but a set piece assault against a well dug in enemy)
Italy 1943/44 (compare the relative performance of UK and US forces (UK were NOT all Dominion, and not all fighting was 'delegated'
Normandy: repeated brutal assaults against the vaste majority of the Panzers in Normandy
1st Airbourne at Arnhem (admittedly elite troops)
You wont like this one: relief of the northern shoulder of the Bulge
Where does a 15 point difference to 'normal' Ge come from?
ORIGINAL: HMSWarspite
Before you guys slag off an entire nationality based on... I dont know what, you might want to actually read a little history. Whilst there were disasters in WW2, please explain:
Arras and Dunkirk defence (extremely adverse conditions, good performance against German line infantry)
1940 North Africa (decimated a hugely superior force, albeit Italian)
Alamein (somewhat superior numbers and equipement, but a set piece assault against a well dug in enemy)
Italy 1943/44 (compare the relative performance of UK and US forces (UK were NOT all Dominion, and not all fighting was 'delegated'
Normandy: repeated brutal assaults against the vaste majority of the Panzers in Normandy
1st Airbourne at Arnhem (admittedly elite troops)
You wont like this one: relief of the northern shoulder of the Bulge
Dunkirk was a disaster, described best by French phrase "sauve qui peut", something that only best propaganda in the history (British) can turn into, I don't know what, somewhat akin to victory? [:D] I mean how come Napoleon retreat over Berezina is generally thought of as a complete disaster, and Dunkirk is listed among British victories? There can only be one answer - propaganda. Otherwise I'd list them both as pretty similar events.
Incidentally, I think totalitarian Soviet, nazi German or American propaganda are joke when compared to British. Venetian propaganda was also excellent in 12.-17. centuries, that's why all major accounts of Lepanto are still based on Venetian sources and fairy tales, of course painting Venetians in the best light, ridiculing Genoese, and "stealing" glory for coalition victory from Spanish in any way possible, but I digress.
Arnhem is elite forces, they differ from average morale (plus, interesting but again Brits turn defeat into a propaganda victory). Normandy... Canadians? North Africa the brunt of the fighting was by ANZAC, also many dominion troops, Polish too....
Also, I am not "slagging off" entire nation, in fact I consider myself to be anglophile, just setting the record straight. I also love Venetians, my favorite Mediterranean empire ever.
Where does a 15 point difference to 'normal' Ge come from?
Germans marched to freaking Stalingrad, that's almost Asia, to fight there house to house. Something I cannot imagine WW2 Brits ever do, not even under most favorable conditions, let alone fighting every mile of the way.
The question to ask is, where does any difference to Soviets come from? Not in a wildest dream could I say average WW2 Brit infantry had equal, let alone better morale than Soviets. Of course, I understand that morale in WITE represents many other factors, but still...
HMSWarspite, sorry but I've read quite a bit of history and the more I read the less impressive the British performance seems. To respond to your examples:
Arras - a single day's counter-attack. While British performance was decent, I don't seem to recall this as an example of tactical brilliance.
Dunkirk - a good job defending, but again not really anything exceptional.
North Africa - everyone looked great compared to the Italians.
Alamein - about 195k British and commonwealth troops against approx 50k Germans. Commonwealth troops had a big part in this too (Australians especially). Sure the Italians were there as well, but their fighting efficiency was pretty low by that point.
Again, it was a decent performance by 8th Army, but the numbers strongly favored the British.
Italy - do you have examples of the relative performance? I don't either the US or the UK did that well in the Italian campaign.
Normandy - pure attrition warfare. Where were the outstanding performances by the British troops? By way of comparison, studies have shown (I believe) the Germans inflicted about 50% higher casualties than the Americans and British, both attacking and defending. For an army 5 years into the war and clearly past their peak, that is pretty impressive and probably justifies a 15 point difference.
Arnhem - elite troops in a defensive battle.
Bulge - I think this is your weakest example. I know the least about this example, but how much fighting did the British really do?
Overall, the record really isn't that impressive. I agree with Oleg on this - the British army was competent, but not much more than that.
I'm not sure how much water it holds but the cliche of british performance is 'unimaginative on the attack, stubborn on defence.' It's not a war winning combination, but it does make sense in the context of an established, sated empire, fighting off challenges from up and coming economies.
“Old age is the most unexpected of all things that can happen to a man.”
-Leon Trotsky
By way of comparison, studies have shown (I believe) the Germans inflicted about 50% higher casualties than the Americans and British, both attacking and defending.
I would be tempted to give the English 65 in 1939/1940 and then 60 after that. The English army that started the war was much like the 1914 army that was an all volunteer force; well trained and professional at the start, but small. After conscription kicks in, they lose a bit. I agree the ANZAC's should be the best of the Commonwealth troops and the Canadians should be the same or slightly better as the English. Indian troops should be behind along with South African units. ANZAC 70 and Canadians 65 with no changes. India and SA probably 55 or so.
Of all the European armies, the Germans hated fighting the English the worst, especially when the English were defending. They did not fear the English attacking as they felt they were very slow, predictable, and methodical. US troops, the Germans found they often broke fairly easy when attacked and were not that good under artillery fire, but the Germans feared the US on the attack as they felt the Americans had a real zest for the offense and mobile action. Of course, the US had their moments when they could be tenacious as well (Elsenborn Ridge in the Battle of the Bulge as one example that did not include elite US forces like say the 82nd Airborne at Bastogne ).
ORIGINAL: Q-Ball
UNITED STATES:
1942: 50
1943: 60
1944: 65
1945: 65
The US Army started out slow, but gradually grew into it's combat power, and ended the war fairly efficient. I'm not sure the US Army really became a high-efficiency force, but became a killing machine mostly because of it's mobility, artillery firepower, and piles and piles of tanks. And logistics.
I disagree . You are basically saying the US in 1942 is about as efficient as the Russians were in 1941. If you take the 1941 Wehrmacht as being 70 (average) and elite German units being 80+, then the average American unit would be at least 60 in 1942.
There are lots of battles, from the get go (ie, Operation Torch in Tunisia) where the Americans had neither superior equipment, nor overwhelming numbers, nor air superiority, where their performance isn't as embarrassing as a 15-20 point differential in morale will actually result in game mechanics.
The Soviet morale ratings for the game are 40 for 1941, then 50 the rest of the way. Q-Ball's suggested numbers only match the Sovs in 1942.
You are mixing your drinks. I was reacting to several broad generalisations, and in addition, I think we are all not clear what we are arguing about. What does this 'morale' thing in the game actually represent? Someone suggested proficiency, and that aligns with my view. It is not true morale, but rather an assembly of all training, national characteristics and (low level, NOT high level - that is accounted separately) leadership - squad, section, company, not div/corp/army. But it is also sub unit supply distribution effectiveness (i.e. given identical supply conditions at Army/Corp, do my squads get ammo, regular hot food, etc), medical facilities (are my squads confident that were they to be wounded they would be evacuated to the best of the army's ability and probably a whole host of other factors that influence how well a unit fights. Even stuff like 'is my loved one being bombed/starved/3000 plus miles away living in almost peacetime conditions?'
Now, all of the above is literally impossibly to quantify, so the game rating is IMHO, the factor that determines who will usually win, and how often, between 2 hypothetical identical combat effectiveness units, with equivalent supply at army/corp, terrain, weather/equipment etc etc, and can only be assessed subjectively as a whole, trying to exclude those factors covered elsewhere by other ratings.
Back to the debate, I cited the battles I did NOT because I rate them all British victories, far from it. But I used them to ask where the evidence was that the British Army performed in a league with 1940 French/Belgian/Dutch performance?
At Dunkirk the defence was tenacious in the most adverse of circumstances... 2 weeks of contiuous outflanked retreat, orders to destroy heavy kit, etc. Find me a better example of a fighting evacuation. It was NOT A VICTORY and I never said I thought it was. At best it was the mitigation of a disaster.
Arnhem - elite forces, as I said at the outset. Described by some German sources with experience of the eastern front as the equal to the most vicious built up area fighting of the war. How does a 'minor nation equivalent' performing army produce the best elite performance...? (and no 1 AB was NOT all Welsh and Scottish!:))
You missed the slam dunk argument for your case I would have thought.. Malaya and Singapore probably with a dose of the retreat through Burma... Wasn't this one of the best examples of 'poor morale'? Or was it an abberation by under trained and equipped second line troops used as a dumping ground for all misfits and failures from the active units, lead by a set of Donkeys, and starved of modern kit?
As for 'could the British army have marched to Stalingrad?' No, or course not. For too many reasons to name, but for instance, the field army in Europe being smaller than a German Army Group, probably being one of them. Is it due to this 'morale' factor. I suggest not.
And, whilst I was seriously tempted to leave this bit out... Kasserine was neatly glossed over as under German air superiority... a little bit glib for a performance well equal to 1940 France I would have thought. Indicating US should be equal in morale to France 1940? Actually I dont think so. A bit higher but with truly questionable training I think... Kasserine shows 2 things: how poor the initial performance of the US was, and how fast it improved afterwards!
US Army Artillery in WWII was second to none, and that's not just because my Gramps was a WWII Artilleryman.
The US Army had first-rate communications equipment and doctrine (easily the best), superior mobility for it's artillery, and more shells. The Artillery attracted many of the brightest officers (My Gramps was #2 in his ROTC class at Illinois), and the training was quite good. There was a strong Espirit d' Corps in the Artillery, as least from what I can tell.
You ought to read up about the British artillery. I think there is a efficient vs effective thing going on here. US art was undoubtably effective, and made up for a lot of the infantry issues cited earlier. I think the German art was efficient, but not always effective, usually by being too rigidly parcelled out, and (in terms of what was avialable to the average sub unit) too small calibre... although their late war learning from the Russians (Nebelwerfer etc) did make up for some of that.
The British system was (I think) the most efficient of all (i.e. the most 'applied nastiness per lb of available shell'), and effective. Its flexibility was second to none.
"In his book 'Gunners at War' Shelford Bidwell wrote as follows:
"According to Marshal Zhukov, it was only in 1945 that the Russians, who consider themselves the most accomplished of artillerymen, even thought of attempting to coordinate movement with fire: their techniques were roughly equivalent to the British methods of 1915-6. The American artillery was admirable, well-organized and with the best equipment on the whole of any; but it was slow, prone to indulge in 'artillery preparation' of the type the British gave up after the Somme and Third Ypres, and all decisions to engage even at battery level were referred back to command posts far in the rear and out of sight of the battle. The British system, so simple, so obvious, so flexible and which had taken so long to be accepted rested on (1) reserve of control at a high level, like the Americans; but (2) off-setting this with intimate trust and liaison at each level of command: no one was ever denied fire when he wanted it as a result of centralization; (3) concentration of fire; (4) giving the right to take decisions to the man at the front; (5) an obsession with speed in reply to calls for fire; and above all (6), on maintaining an elaborate system of radio communications linking every user, every agency, and every battery together.'"
The US Army is kind of a unique WWII animal in many ways
No debate there from me (and not meant in a bad way... kind of 'when it was good it was very, very good, but when it was bad it was horrid' kind of thing
Russian artillery depended on mass, mass and more mass along with overwhelming amounts of ammunition that had to be built up. It was very inflexible however for the most part. Germans that were allowed to pull back (or did it anyway) used to evacuate their forward positions when they thought a barrage was coming, watch said barrage, then go back in. Germans that stayed through the barrage generally got pulverized.
US Artillery had excellent communications and ammo was available in plentiful supplies. One of its finest moments is considered the Battle of the Bulge where it was credited as one of the factors in slowing down the German attack, especially in the north.
German artillery was fairly efficient, but generally suffered from supply issues after the initial invasion of Russia. Hitler used to apply WW1 artillery concepts to the eastern front to help stop the Russian attacks (mass artillery barrages to stop the Russian attacks in their tracks) when the truth was the troops at the front did not have even close to the amount of shells to employ such tactics. Lack of overall artillery didn't help matters either, but when it was massed (as in the Crimea), it was very effective.
Italian artillery was probably the best branch of their army as well, which isn't saying much, but it was respected by the English in the desert.
British artillery was highly respected by the Germans and as the war went along, was probably the best of any army across the board in terms of availability, ammo, etc (Warspite hit it best on "applied nastiness per lb of available shell). As the war went along, the British depended more and more on artillery to soften the enemy up to help reduce casualties when they did attack.
As far as Dunkirk goes, credit should also be given to the French forces in the area who also fought very hard to give time for the evacuation to be as successful as it was.
I've been researching the ToEs for the Allied units in the West, 1943 to 1945.
Here’s a very brief summary of what I’m finding:
I'm not as concerned about Morale as I am about Experience. There were masses of inexperienced troops seeing combat for the first time in Italy as well as NWE. Experience for most units in NWE should initially be below-average, but rise rapidly. Also, during the Winter of 1944, the British ordered that all men with five or more years of service overseas, were to be returned to England, and assigned other duties. This stripped the 21st Army Group of many of it’s senior NCOs, and alot of the desert veterans. This would reduce WitW unit “Experience.”
Replacement problems for all of the Allied units were severe, excepting the Poles, who eventually set up a system for integrating ex-Heer personnel into their units, actually being able to expand their units in Italy.
In late-1944, the British and Canadians reduced their Rifle Battalions from four to three Rifle Companies, and converted two of their divisonal Antiaircraft and Antitank Regiments batteries (each) to Rifle Companies. These Reserve Rifle Companies were not just disbanded, and the troops sent to the Rifle Battalions as needed, but maintained intact. In the Royal Artillery, lineage lies at battery-level, so this arrangement would keep the battery itself intact.
In late 1944, to alleviate some of the manpower shortages, the British decided to "disband" two of the standing Infantry Divisions in NWE. The 59th Infantry Division was the junior formation in the 21st Army Group, and was “stood down” on 10/18/44, with the divisional HQ going into “suspended animation,” and it’s units being distributed as various GHQ units. The 50th Infantry Division was "stood down" on 12/16/44, and returned to England as a "Reserve Division." The British unit and replacement system was region-based. Recruitment for a specific unit could only take place in that region. The 50th was recruited from the northeast of the UK, and replacements were becoming scarce in this region. Most of the infantry of the 59th Infantry Division went to the general replacement pool, but the units and troops of the 50th Infantry Division, which was an experienced unit, were distributed more carefully. This division was “stood down” more because of catastophic losses, and the remote possibility of obtaining replacements, than to benefit the rest of the army by distributing it’s assets. Keep in mind that the expedient of “disbanding“ these two divisions was to keep from having to feed them with future replacements, rather than being able to distribute their existing personnel and assets to other divisions.
During 1945, several Royal Artillery AA Brigades serving in England were converted to Infantry for line of communications and garrison duties, in order to relieve “regular” units from these duties, and to occupy Germany. Again, these units were not just “disbanded” and sent to the general pool. The British Regimental Tradition system was a definate deterrent to aquiring replacements.
Once initial contact was made, British infantry-type units were reduced to the 50-65% of ToE range. Arms and equipment were not a problem. Because of the efficiency of the equipment-replacement system, there seemd to be an almost infinite supply of these items. The Armoured units had delivery units that maintained at least operational strength, even in combat, with tanks and crews ready to replace damaged or destroyed tanks, and wounded crew members, almost immediately. Infantry-type and artillery equipment was plentiful. The only issue was personnel. All of the “ground-pounder” types suffered from chronic personnel shortages, throughout the war.
US forces also suffered from chronic personnel shortages. The average Infantry Division rifle personnel strength was about two-thirds of ToE. This persisted until the end of the war in Europe. As an example, in October, 1944, the 3rd Army was short the equivalent of 55 Rifle Companies in combat personnel. The US started to disband superfluous AA units to provide rifle company replacements, with very mixed results. The replacements were only given scant rifleman training in-theater, and the results were heavy casualties among these replacements. There were not enough replacements passing through the training organization in the US to meet demand.
The other major shortage that occurred was fuel. By early September, 1944, the Allied armies in northwest Europe were, essentially, “dry.” There were several reasons for this – the lack of ports, damage to the ports that were captured, lack of transport, the inability to use rail, etc. Over 90% of fuel delivered to the continent was still coming over the Normandy beaches. This problem was not truly alleviated until several ports could be repaired, and a more organized system of delivery could be created. The period from June, 1944 to September, 1944 was termed the time of “Frantic Supply” by the US Logistics folks. The fuel shortage needs to be modelled in some way in WitW.
Artillery
In action reports after the war, the Germans considered the British to be superior to any other Western army in their employment of artillery. The British had perfected their system of use of artillery during the First World War. Also, British FOs were given much more lattitude in ordering fire missions than in other armies. These FOs were able to call in fire missions, including hundreds of tubes at once, from many diverse formations, including divisional artillery, and the AGRAs – all at once.
There was a temporary shortage of ammo in late 1944, and several US Artillery Battalions were equipped with captured German guns and ammo until this shortage was alleviated.
Brad
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The other major shortage that occurred was fuel. By early September, 1944, the Allied armies in northwest Europe were, essentially, “dry.” There were several reasons for this – the lack of ports, damage to the ports that were captured, lack of transport, the inability to use rail, etc. Over 90% of fuel delivered to the continent was still coming over the Normandy beaches. This problem was not truly alleviated until several ports could be repaired, and a more organized system of delivery could be created. The period from June, 1944 to September, 1944 was termed the time of “Frantic Supply” by the US Logistics folks. The fuel shortage needs to be modelled in some way in WitW.
[...
I agree with almost everything you write. However you have missed something. The fuel (and other supplies) shortage in Sept 1944 was not 'special'. The beach capacity was fixed, and no major port was both captured and functioning. Cherbourg was largely destroyed by the Germans, and Antwerp was captured largely intact, but the access to the sea was still controlled by Germany (one of the biggest blunders of the war btw - not clearing the Scheldt instead of doing Market Garden). The allies broke out from Normandy and got to more or less the German border in about a month. A distance of over 300 miles. The rail lines are not converted, and there is no effective supply source. The situation will model it self with any half decent supply rules. One reason for the huge 'debate' between Montgomery and Bradley was the lack of supply to enable two thrusts in mid sept/early Oct.
...
The other major shortage that occurred was fuel. By early September, 1944, the Allied armies in northwest Europe were, essentially, “dry.” There were several reasons for this – the lack of ports, damage to the ports that were captured, lack of transport, the inability to use rail, etc. Over 90% of fuel delivered to the continent was still coming over the Normandy beaches. This problem was not truly alleviated until several ports could be repaired, and a more organized system of delivery could be created. The period from June, 1944 to September, 1944 was termed the time of “Frantic Supply” by the US Logistics folks. The fuel shortage needs to be modelled in some way in WitW.
[...
I agree with almost everything you write. However you have missed something. The fuel (and other supplies) shortage in Sept 1944 was not 'special'. The beach capacity was fixed, and no major port was both captured and functioning. Cherbourg was largely destroyed by the Germans, and Antwerp was captured largely intact, but the access to the sea was still controlled by Germany (one of the biggest blunders of the war btw - not clearing the Scheldt instead of doing Market Garden). The allies broke out from Normandy and got to more or less the German border in about a month. A distance of over 300 miles. The rail lines are not converted, and there is no effective supply source. The situation will model it self with any half decent supply rules. One reason for the huge 'debate' between Montgomery and Bradley was the lack of supply to enable two thrusts in mid sept/early Oct.
I had been reading the British Official Histories, and these made many references to the US "Green Books."
Actually, the Cherbourg fuel docking and storage facilities were captured intact. The Allies were very surprised. The rest of the port facilities were a mess. They had the fuel facilities up-and-running in a matter of days. The holdup was the laying of pipelines to supply the trucks carrying the fuel to the front (in "Jerry Cans"). Also, a sufficient stockpile of fuel had not been created prior to the invasion.
See "Logistical Support of the Armies - Volume I - May 1941-September 1944," pp. 649-671 and pp. 674-679, and "The Quartermaster Corps: Operations in the War Against Germany," pp. 489-543 (the "Green Books").
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Interesting read... but doesn't invalidate my basic point above...
I wasn't trying to invalidate your point - we agree that the lack of fuel, for whatever reason, should be a limiting factor.
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I won't chime in too much here being a Brit myself but what I would say on the various quoted battles above I don't think (other than Far East 1941/early 42 debacles) you could call any of the 'poor' performances of the British due to low morale. Maybe poor strategic planning, low experience, poor leadership etc but not low morale. The Brit's were and are one of the most stubborn resolute people as a whole so morale was not the problem in the majority of cases IMO.
. You are basically saying the US in 1942 is about as efficient as the Russians were in 1941. If you take the 1941 Wehrmacht as being 70 (average) and elite German units being 80+, then the average American unit would be at least 60 in 1942. 
