OIL
Moderators: Joel Billings, elmo3, Sabre21
RE: OIL
According to the game manual, unless the fuel supplies are kept up then the movement rates for mechanized and motorized units start falling. Also Baku is one of the two supply conduits for the Soviets in the game. Oil also contributes to the creation of supplies.
21.1. THE PRODUCTION SYSTEM
Production is conducted by various factories located in town, city and urban hexes. The
exception is Lend Lease supplies and vehicles, which are automatically added to the applicable
pool during the logistics phase. Some factories, including all Lend Lease factories, are located
off-map. Each factory point will produce a certain amount of an item each turn if the town, city
or urban hex it is located in is connected to the supply grid (20.1) and sufficient basic items
are stored at the factory location for local use. There are three basic items required to allow
the production system to run; resources, oil and manpower. Resources are required by Heavy
Industry factories to produce supplies and by synthetic fuel factories to produce synthetic fuel.
Supplies are required by armament, aircraft, AFV and combat vehicle factories to build the
equipment for air group units and ground elements. Oil is required by fuel factories to produce
fuel to allow motorized units to move and generic vehicles to operate. Manpower factories
provide the men that are matched with equipment during the replacement phase to build
complete ground elements that flow to the units. There are two types of production rates used
for factories. Some factories (Heavy Industry, Fuel, Synthetic Fuel, Vehicle and Armaments)
have a static multiplier for each year (1941-45) that is used to determine the amount of production for each factory point. The ratio of basic items required to produce the end product
remains the same. For example, if a notional amount of 1000 resources is required to produce
1000 supplies, a one to one ratio of resources to supplies will be required no matter what the
multiplier may be. Each other factory type has a fixed production rate that will not change.
However, for aircraft, AFV, and combat vehicle factories the number of factory points of each
type of factory in each town, city or urban hex will increase over time based on its expansion
rate until its build limit is reached.
RE: OIL
Not really. But it seems that the capture of Baku somehow has an effect on Lend-lease transfers - at least I have that impression.
BTW on an earlier topic, many non-Russian nationalities living within the USSR did throw in their lot with the advancing Germans. This was especially the case in '42 when basically the Germans were advancing on lands inhabited by peoples who were antipathy towards Russians, the Communist Party apparatus or both. The help the Germans recieved from Cossacks, Ukraninans and several of the peoples of the Caucasus, is well documented and was a combination of past national rivalries and the heavy handedness of the Soviet system.
As to the capture of Baku and its effect in real terms, there can be endless disputes, since it is a what if scenario. Had the Germans taken Stalingrad, the bulk of the oil and its byproducts would not have been available to the Soviet Union anyway, since it was moved via barges along the Volga mostly. I would seriously doubt that even if the Germans did not arrive at Baku proper, if the whole south Caucasus was cut off from the rest of the USSR (by the fall of Stalingrad), there might (and I repeat MIGHT) have been an insurruction of the local population which would have had the same effect on the USSR.
Whiich puts in perspective the value of that piece of real estate in real life and frankly blows up the myth that the Germans made a strategic mistake in going for Stalingrad (they actually made of tactical mistake in not surrounding and then capturing the place but previous experience showed them that they could remove the Red Army easily enough from built up places). It was their underestimation of Russian resolve and utter Russian ruthlessness that held the Germans at bay and frankly, turned the tide of war in the allies favour...
BTW on an earlier topic, many non-Russian nationalities living within the USSR did throw in their lot with the advancing Germans. This was especially the case in '42 when basically the Germans were advancing on lands inhabited by peoples who were antipathy towards Russians, the Communist Party apparatus or both. The help the Germans recieved from Cossacks, Ukraninans and several of the peoples of the Caucasus, is well documented and was a combination of past national rivalries and the heavy handedness of the Soviet system.
As to the capture of Baku and its effect in real terms, there can be endless disputes, since it is a what if scenario. Had the Germans taken Stalingrad, the bulk of the oil and its byproducts would not have been available to the Soviet Union anyway, since it was moved via barges along the Volga mostly. I would seriously doubt that even if the Germans did not arrive at Baku proper, if the whole south Caucasus was cut off from the rest of the USSR (by the fall of Stalingrad), there might (and I repeat MIGHT) have been an insurruction of the local population which would have had the same effect on the USSR.
Whiich puts in perspective the value of that piece of real estate in real life and frankly blows up the myth that the Germans made a strategic mistake in going for Stalingrad (they actually made of tactical mistake in not surrounding and then capturing the place but previous experience showed them that they could remove the Red Army easily enough from built up places). It was their underestimation of Russian resolve and utter Russian ruthlessness that held the Germans at bay and frankly, turned the tide of war in the allies favour...
RE: OIL
Hmmmm....Pelton is talking about how easy it would be to convert about a thousand miles of rail (or more), find enough tanker cars that could be spared from pulling oil from Romania, sending them all the way into the Caucasus, over multiple large rivers, some of which didn't have adequate bridges for heavy freight, plus continue to send supplies to the front....yep, sounds easy to me.
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RE: OIL
Don't forget that paullus "it's not like germany needed the oil" anyway[;)]
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RE: OIL
Most bulk oil traffic from Romania most likely used barges on the Danube river.
Similarly most bulk oil from Baku would have used the Volga. The difficult bit would be transferring loads to the Don the 50 km via Stalingrad, but after that it is plain sailing.
The Soviets built a connecting canal post-war that could take 5,000 ton ships.
Similarly most bulk oil from Baku would have used the Volga. The difficult bit would be transferring loads to the Don the 50 km via Stalingrad, but after that it is plain sailing.
The Soviets built a connecting canal post-war that could take 5,000 ton ships.
RE: OIL
ORIGINAL: paullus99
Hmmmm....Pelton is talking about how easy it would be to convert about a thousand miles of rail (or more), find enough tanker cars that could be spared from pulling oil from Romania, sending them all the way into the Caucasus, over multiple large rivers, some of which didn't have adequate bridges for heavy freight, plus continue to send supplies to the front....yep, sounds easy to me.
But first, they have to rebuild all the derricks etc to get the stuff out. And let's not forget those pesky partisans.
Building a new PC.
RE: OIL
And not like there would be any pipelines remaining or seeing Germany divert the massive amount of steel production necessary to built the pipe that would be needed.....much less the replacement equipment to repair the "scorched earth" damage to the wells or refineries themselves.
Germany could deny those resources to Russia, but never could have made use of them - at least in the context of the war years.
Germany could deny those resources to Russia, but never could have made use of them - at least in the context of the war years.
Never Underestimate the Power of a Small Tactical Nuclear Weapon...
RE: OIL
ORIGINAL: wulfgar
Most bulk oil traffic from Romania most likely used barges on the Danube river.
Similarly most bulk oil from Baku would have used the Volga. The difficult bit would be transferring loads to the Don the 50 km via Stalingrad, but after that it is plain sailing.
The Soviets built a connecting canal post-war that could take 5,000 ton ships.
How do germans get the barges to Volga? Or protect them while they are there?
RE: OIL
ORIGINAL: wulfgar
ORIGINAL: Karri
How do germans get the barges to Volga? Or protect them while they are there?
How about clearing the entire route up to Stalingrad of enemy forces?
You think the 6th Army was in Stalingrad because they liked the name?
You don't see any problems getting the barges to Stalingrad(with the supply situation being what it is)? Or any problems patrolling the whole lenght of Volga and the Caspian Sea?
When it comes to logistics clearing the area of enemy troops is just the first step.
RE: OIL
Well, perhaps people better be aware that European Russia is one big flat pancake. Moscow itself is only 150 meters above sea level. And with those big rivers and canals it's possible to move cargo from the Black sea to the Baltic.
In any case the standard route form the Caspian to the Black Sea is up the Volga and down the Don via Stalingrad. Post war they built the canal but would have been a portage system prior. When Germans complained about the roads, we forget the way to get around was via the rivers.
As far as shipping oil to Germany, it's to the Black Sea and up the Danube.

http://www.archipelago.nu/SKARGARD/ENGE ... system.htm
In any case the standard route form the Caspian to the Black Sea is up the Volga and down the Don via Stalingrad. Post war they built the canal but would have been a portage system prior. When Germans complained about the roads, we forget the way to get around was via the rivers.
As far as shipping oil to Germany, it's to the Black Sea and up the Danube.

http://www.archipelago.nu/SKARGARD/ENGE ... system.htm
RE: OIL
ORIGINAL: wulfgar
Well, perhaps people better be aware that European Russia is one big flat pancake. Moscow itself is only 150 meters above sea level. And with those big rivers and canals it's possible to move cargo from the Black sea to the Baltic.
In any case the standard route form the Caspian to the Black Sea is up the Volga and down the Don via Stalingrad. Post war they built the canal but would have been a portage system prior. When Germans complained about the roads, we forget the way to get around was via the rivers.
As far as shipping oil to Germany, it's to the Black Sea and up the Danube.
http://www.archipelago.nu/SKARGARD/ENGE ... system.htm
Yes, but moving a barge, let alone the required number(assuming the oil wells would be working at all) is no small feat. And where would the barges come from anyways? They are very much needed in central Europe as well. As for Don and Volga, do they link?
The there's the whole Caspian sea, witht he Soviets still on the other side of it(and Allies in Persia). You'd need to move a whole fleet there to protect the shipping.
Assuming that Baku would somehow solve Axis oil problems is a bit silly when you know that Maikop didn't help them one bit. Any such plan would take years to be put into effect.
RE: OIL
ORIGINAL: Karri
Yes, but moving a barge, let alone the required number(assuming the oil wells would be working at all) is no small feat. And where would the barges come from anyways? They are very much needed in central Europe as well. As for Don and Volga, do they link?
The there's the whole Caspian sea, witht he Soviets still on the other side of it(and Allies in Persia). You'd need to move a whole fleet there to protect the shipping.
Assuming that Baku would somehow solve Axis oil problems is a bit silly when you know that Maikop didn't help them one bit. Any such plan would take years to be put into effect.
http://premier.gov.ru/eng/visits/ru/6044/info/1589/
The total length of the Volga-Don waterway is 1045 km, with a guaranteed depth of 4 m. Estimated channel capacity of the inter basin transport system for transit between the Azov and Caspian Seas is 16.5 million tons. The average navigation period is 200 days.
Maintenance of the waterway, which can be divided into three sections ¬¬-- the Volga section, the Volga-Don canal and the Don section -- is performed by the Volga, Volga-Don and Azov-Don state waterway and shipping administrations. These federal state administrations' sphere of activity includes management of ports -- Volgograd, Astrakhan, Kalachev, Volga-Don, Liskinsk, Voronezh, Azov and Rostov.
The history of creation and operation of inland waterways and the hydro-engineering constructions built on them is connected with the development of the Russian transport network. People used convenient portages between rivers from the earliest stages of economic development.
Portage between the Volga and the Don at their closest points had been used for many centuries, making the Volga-Don route attractive for transportation.
Peter the Great started construction of the canal in 1697, for both strategic purposes and for trade with the Black Sea countries of the Middle East. More than 30 attempts to connect the Volga and the Don were made between then and 1917, but most were never implemented.
The new Soviet government discussed the construction of the Volga-Don canal back in 1918. The project was assigned a top priority status, and construction works were to be implemented in several stages.
The first part of the Volga-Don canal was the Kochetov hydro-system built in 1919 some 178 km away from the estuary of the Don River. It was built to create backwater to ensure maintenance of depths at the confluence of the Don and its first tributary, the Seversky Donets River. Its commissioning had significant economic importance for the waterways of the Don basin, as it enabled regular transportation of coal from the of Donetsk coal basin and of bread produced on the fertile irrigated land of the steppe.
Between 1949 and 1952 the following infrastructure facilities were put into operation:
1. The 101 km long Volga-Don canal with 13 canal locks, 3 pumping stations, 13 dams and dykes, 7 spillways and floodgates, 22 navigation channels, 2 bulkhead gates, 8 rail and road bridges, ferry crossings, stations, piers and a 100 km channel-side highway. This amounts to 96 hydro-engineering constructions on the channel.
2. The Tsimlyansky hydro-system in Volgodonsk, with 2 canal locks, a hydroelectric power station, an earth dam, outside irrigation system and railway and highway crossings.
3. The Don main irrigation canal, the Nizhny-Don distribution canal and the Azov distribution canal.
The canal gets its water from the Don River. Three pumping stations (with a design capacity of 45 cub. m/s each) pump Don water from the Tsimlyansky Reservoir successively to the Karpovsk, Bereslavsk, and Varvarovsk Reservoirs. This water is also used for irrigation and water supply. The pumping stations are controlled from a single control centre which is part of Marinovsk hydro-system. The pumping stations are currently being refitted. Hydraulic units with an enhanced capacity of 20 cub. m/s instead of the original 15 cub. m/s are being installed at the Karpovsk and Varvarovsk pumping stations. Units of the original capacity are installed at the Marinovsk station, but their number will be increased from 3 to 4, with a total capacity of 60 cub. m/s.
The Volga-Don canal connects all the seas of European Russia in a single system.
RE: OIL
So portage, which means overland connection. Doesn't answer any of the other questions.
RE: OIL
Wulfgar, just so I am clear, you are arguing that the Germans could have exploited the oilfields at Baku provided they 1) capture them 2) repair them 3) capture Moscow 4) capture Leningrad 5) capture Stalingrad 6) build over 3 years a massive infrastructure program to connect two waterways 7) Keep the area clear of enemy action 8) construct a large fleet of oil barges 9) move them to the region. And at that point, after only 4 or 5 years and massive industrial expense (the Germans had lots of spare capacity around this time, yes?) then they could have had the extra oil they needed to complete all those projects above. wow, that is so easy the real life Germans must have been such idiots not to do it!
Ok, seriously, because the Soviets manage to ship things in the 50s doesn't mean the Germans had any hope, in any scenario that doesn't involve aliens, of doing it in any way. Please please tell me you don't actually think it is possible....
Ok, seriously, because the Soviets manage to ship things in the 50s doesn't mean the Germans had any hope, in any scenario that doesn't involve aliens, of doing it in any way. Please please tell me you don't actually think it is possible....
RE: OIL
Actually, to settle the argument as to the historical use of the oil fields / refineries by the Germans. If the Germans had captured those fields in any semblance of working order, all it would have taken is a couple of large raids by either the RAF or USAAF to put the oilfields out of commission to an extent to make them useless to the Germans.
Given the large allied presence in the Middle East (which would have been expanded if the Germans threatened to cross the border into Persia / Iraq), it would not have been inconceivable to have some bomber groups based there that would have easily been in range of any captured oil fields.
Given the large allied presence in the Middle East (which would have been expanded if the Germans threatened to cross the border into Persia / Iraq), it would not have been inconceivable to have some bomber groups based there that would have easily been in range of any captured oil fields.
Never Underestimate the Power of a Small Tactical Nuclear Weapon...
RE: OIL
Well not that easy. Even the Ploesti fields weren't knocked out completely by the RAF and USAAF from bases in Italy and I doubt that in '42 the allies would have had the necessary strength in the air and on the ground to really have an effect in the area, considering that they were stripping this area in particular to reinforce their asian and pacific defences. Frankly, if (big if) the Germans had destroyed Soviet resistance in the Caucasus, even the North African Campaign could have taken a completely different turn. Indian divisions would have have been spread between desert, Persia, ex Italian colonies and defence of India proper. Few British forces would have been available and Australian units were being sent home (ie Pacific) once the Japanese struck.
On the other hand, the only way the Germans could send oil from Baku to the rest of occupied/allied Europe was by taking the Southern Black Sea ports. Which would have meant a greater expenditure of manpower (or at least the stationing of large contingents of allies) and policies that did not make the locals turn hostile. This all the while having to run a war. Frankly the advantage in capturing the Caucasus was limited in war years, since at most the area would have produced the fuel for the southern army groups (given the Volga is in German hands), its food and little else. The whole point of aquiing the Caucasus was essentially in denying its riches to the USSR rather than in aqcuiring resources for immediate use.
On the other hand, the only way the Germans could send oil from Baku to the rest of occupied/allied Europe was by taking the Southern Black Sea ports. Which would have meant a greater expenditure of manpower (or at least the stationing of large contingents of allies) and policies that did not make the locals turn hostile. This all the while having to run a war. Frankly the advantage in capturing the Caucasus was limited in war years, since at most the area would have produced the fuel for the southern army groups (given the Volga is in German hands), its food and little else. The whole point of aquiing the Caucasus was essentially in denying its riches to the USSR rather than in aqcuiring resources for immediate use.
RE: OIL
The problem that has been pointed out already is that oil is just window dressing in WitE. You'd have to either be a complete moron as an axis player or just maybe feeling historically silly to go for the oil. It's not going to help the axis player and it will not hurt the Soviet player. Unless somebody can give any concrete examples from any of their games, this is what my experience has been to date. In fact I would go so far as to say that WitE is somewhat seriously flawed because there's no good reason for the Axis gain any territory at all in 42 an onward. Just bagging Sov units is what they need to do, maybe delay the inevitable.
Even if WitE just added certain axis incentives for key areas or cities (i.e. morale boost or reductions for Sov). Maybe some Turkish units are lent? Just something to take the staleness out of 42 and beyond for the axis player. These types of incentives could also apply for the Sov later to make them push attacks early and later in the game.
Make it an optional game setting?
Even if WitE just added certain axis incentives for key areas or cities (i.e. morale boost or reductions for Sov). Maybe some Turkish units are lent? Just something to take the staleness out of 42 and beyond for the axis player. These types of incentives could also apply for the Sov later to make them push attacks early and later in the game.
Make it an optional game setting?