Will there be A-Bombs?

[mogami]

Hi. Personally I think there should be a way for Japan to win the game. (Not the war) I don't think there is any set of circumstance where the US would have ended the war without the surrender of Japan. I like the "shorten the war" type conditions.
I like "Auto victory" (I would have auto victories for both Japanese and Allied players)
There would/will be much debate over what such conditions would actually be.

One would simply be the Japanese must secure the SRA by a certain date or lose.
One Japanese auto victory condition could be to assign "outer defensive ring" bases a certain point value and if Japan has a certain total past a certain date "Auto victory"

I don't want the game to come down to the US getting the bomb to win (I feel they had already met my victory conditions)

[mdiehl]

However, the end result would be the same, Japan gets defeated. However, I would consider the game lasting until 1946 to be a Total Victory for the Japanese Player.

I completely disagree. As you have just pointed out, the odds of getting the Japanese to commit to a classic blunder in 1942 are not all that great. More likely is a battle of more balanced carrier attritions through mid 1943. IMO, if the victory is determined solely by when the game ends, the Japanese must be required to hold out until 1947.

A better solution however is to award control VP that accumulate each turn into a permanent score. Japan gets very very few control VP for taking "the usual conquests" in 1941 and 1942. Japan gets more VP for holding these easy conquests in 1944 and 1945. The Allies get *lots* of VP for holding Malaya, the PI, Indonesia, and much of the South Pacific in 1942, but the value of these things decreases as the game progresses.

[Hoplosternum]

Hi Mdeihl,

While I agree that the IJN player is unlikely to lose his carriers so early as occurred IRL, I think that any human played Allied power will get to Japan much sooner once he can brush aside the IJN (or has done so). For that reason I agree with Mogami that the Japanese player who can hold on even as long as they historically did will have done very well.

Historically the US / allies pulled the IJN's strike teeth at Coral Sea & Midway very early considering they at that point were still out numbered. However they then slowly ploughed through most of the Solomons and New Guinea once they had halted the Japanese advance at Guadalcanal. It took them well into '44 to complete this. They also used a hugely wasteful twin prong approach after this. One prong through the Marshalls / Marianas and one across NG. A much better strategy would have been a single thrust that threatens multiple objectives. The defender who is now weaker than you in total now has to spread his forces amongst different and not necessarily mutually supporting areas while you destroy them in detail. The allies also spent a lot of time, effort and lives reconquering the Philippines. Not just some of it, all of it.

I doubt people will do this in the game unless the victory conditions force them to (i.e. to win you have to recapture X, Y, Z rather than either invade Japan or do a certain number of bombing raids on its cities by a particular date). They will just go for Japan once they have sea supremacy and the transports to do so. After all that is probably the best way to get the remains of the IJN and the IJA and airforce to commit itself.

Of course the Victory Conditions would really decide this. If you have to clear the Japanese out of all post - Pearl Harbour conquests then that would be a very tough ask.

[mogami]

Hi, I think there will be an endless supply of Japanese Blunders.
Many games will see the Japanese carriers being lost prior to June 42. Also there will be many times where the USN has it's carriers lost piecemeal allowing the Japanese to expand further then historical. I might even suggest there will be really unlucky
Japanese players who lose their first carrier in Dec 41.

(There will be untold numbers of mines laid, and human players will work their submarine forces to death.)

[mdiehl]

I do not view the Japanese' historical performance as optimal. I do not view the USN "brushing aside" the IJN as inevitable. At Midway, most of the damage was done by Yorktown's a/c. A relative handful of planes sank 3 IJN CVs. The reverse could easily happen.

The two pronged approach was neither wasteful nor unnecessary. A campaign of land engagements that ties up the bulk of land based Japanese a/c in attrition warfare is an absolute necessary. Any American player that simply "charges" at Japan without the two prongued campaign, even if he fields 12 CVs, should get his clock knocked by a marginally competant *human* player. More so if the game allows the Japanese to skip over their many idiotic production blunders, hasten pilot training or alter ship a/c type production.

1947 should be the target date for anything like a "decisive" Japanese win. If they still have half of their 1944 industry in production then, call it a Japanese win. IMO, the September 1945 surrender constitutes an Allied Decisive Victory. Somewhere between then and January 1947 come the fuzzy boundaries between an Allied marginal victory, a draw, and a Japanese marginal victory.

All this is predicated on the assumption that victory is determined by when the game ends, not by some victory point score.

[mogami]

Hi, 1947

Hey I think if the Japanese are above water in Sept 45 they score at least a draw. (In the game not in the war)
I'd have checks every Jan 1st (or even every 6 months)
The game could end on any of these checks if the score ratio (whatever conditions) are met/not met.
There is no way the game should go to 46 (never mind 47)

[TIMJOT]

Originally posted by Hoplosternum
Hi Mdeihl,

The allies also spent a lot of time, effort and lives reconquering the Philippines. Not just some of it, all of it. I doubt people will do this in the game unless the victory conditions force them to.

I have to disagree. Taking the A-bomb out of the equation, it was and should be necessary to either retake the Philipines or Formosa. If we assume minus the A-bomb that operation Olympic was to be carried out. It was absolutely essential, as it should be for a player in WitP, to capture a forward, deepwater, high capacity port, as a stageing base. The US high command identified the only ports that fit that criteria were Manila bay and Taipei.

If UV is a indication. It should be very difficult, if not impossible to sustain a large scale invasion without prepositioning large stockpiles of supplies at either of these two nearby bases. IMO if a player wants to successfully invade Japan he must secure either one of those ports or both, simply because it will be logistically necessary to do so, regardless of the victory points points at stake.

Although a player should be allowed to implement any strategy he wishes. A well designed game should force the player to work within many of the same paremeters that their historical counterparts had to.

[Feinder]

I sorta think we're "over-analyzing" the whole thing here.

Why wouldn't the victory system in WitP be any different than it is in UV?

There are VPs for bases. The more bases you control at the end, the more VPs you end with.

The determination isn't who wins the WAR. Victory conditions (in any game) are more of a yardstick of how well you did in-game, compared to your historical counterpart. Frankly, it's pretty much a foregone conclusion that the US is going to "win the war" against Japan. The only way for Japan to win the WAR is to invade San Franscisco and march all the way to Washington. THAT is what would have been necessary for Japan to win the WAR (ok, not really, but it makes my point). And that's certainly not going to happen.

But as far as victory conditions IN GAME, the yard-stick is can you duplicate the brilliant success of your predecessor? or snatch success from the jaws of defeat? Surely folks have noticed that the VPs for bases (in UV) vary greatly. The Australian bases are worth very little to a US player (because he's likely going to hold them the entire game), but if IJN is actually in posetion of one at the end of the game, their mulitplier is like 50 or something. The same is true for Rabaul and Wewak for IJN. For IJN to control these bases at the end of the game, is no big deal, it's expected and therefore they're not worth much to the IJN. However, if the USN can "change history" and actually capture these bases by December '43, they're worht ALOT of VPs (again, the multiplier is like 50 for each of these). Capturing the bases that were beyond the reach of either historical counterparts is what pushes a player from a marginal to a decisive vicotry. Did you do a "little" better (or worse) than your historical counterpart? Or did you do ALOT better (or worse)than your historical counterpart?

Look at the victory conditons in UV. Pretty much, it's guarenteed that the USN is eventually going to spank IJN as far as how much of the map is going to be controlled at the end. But the measure of how BADLY IJN gets spanked or not spanked (or rather, how well you can hold onto your gains to put a nice spin on it) is what determines victory.

Why wouldn't the same be true for WitP?

Scenario #1 (Conventional) : VPs will be similarly assigned as they are in UV. The US is -still- going to get an A-bomb and end the war in August of 1945 (and the game will be over). A "draw" would be for Japan to essentially end the game in a similar historical situation based on the VP of bases held at the end of the game. An IJN "victory" would be where you're in better shape than IJN ended the war historically. Say you still own the Phillapines (since somebody brought the up). But if the US still has a base within B-29 range of Japan, they're still going to drop the bomb, and the war will be over. But again, it doesn't matter who "wins" the war, it's the VPs at the end that says who is the winner of the GAME.

Scenario #2 (Grudgematch) : If you take out the abomb, your only solution is to set either "Kill everything, fight to the last regiment" (bah, Japan losing is still a foregone conclusion), or "Checks for VPs periodically throught the game, if the net difference reaches a certain extreme, one side wins." Still a very viable scenario, and the latter option is obviously the better yard-stick.

Yardstick #3 (historical, but tinkered for balance) : More VPs for bases. The only difference betwen this and #1 is that after play-testers have had many goes at the game, the find that players are able to generally do better or worse than than their historical counterparts. Essentially, the playtesters provide input back to Matrix that might say, "Wow. We've "been playing smart", and as an IJN player, my perimeter at the end of the war is actually to about Guam instead of the home-islands". Here you adjust the victory conditions to reflect that (for whatever reasons), the IJN player tends to do better than historically (in this example). So by VPs in Scen #1, the IJN player will always win. In this case, you adjust the VPs so that the IJN will actually need to hold a farther perimeter by 1945, so that IJN doesn't win all the time. Basically, it's grading on a curve.

-F-

[Jeremy Pritchard]

The PROBLEM about VP's calculated just at the end of the game will result in a lot of gamey things.

The WORST thing that will ocurr is VP grabbing in the last few turns of a game. What does it matter that the Japanese managed to secure the East Indies if they are only to lose it by the end of the game? Would it not be best for the allies to withdraw everything from Malaya, Philippines, East Indies if they get NOTHING for trying to hold these bases? Would it not be better to save these units from destruction, so you can use them for the only time that it counts for VP's, at the end of the game?

With just end of game VP's there will be nothing driving the players to follow anything even remotely close to the Historic Pacific War. Since this is a wargame, it is trying to put the player in the same positions, under the same conditions, that the historic commanders faced from 1941-45. We are benefitted by hindsight. Something in this game must make up for that hindsight, and that is conditional and turn based VP calculations. Otherwize, the Allies will take virtually no risks, and wait until they have overwhelming superiority before they attack, as it does not matter when they secure a base, but rather that they secure a base by the end of the game.

VP's should be conditional (i.e., worth more for different nationalities), and they should also add up over time. This will give the player a bit of urgency, as even the United States was getting a bit war weary by 1945, and if their military showed no sign of progress I could see demands for a change in command, or possibly a change in international policy. The US Civil War comes to mind. The Union made no significant gains against the South until 1863, and even the 1864 election was determined a lot by Grant's success in Virginia. Had the US expended significant resources (manpower and equipment) for little gain (like the US Civil War and Vietnam) then I am sure that some dissident may arise.

This is what I feel that turn based VP's could represent. Without this, all that matters are kill points (realistically will be one sided) and what you end up with at the end of the game (which will also be one sided).

[Feinder]

Good ideas. VPs over time creates urgency. And VPs scaled for each country that recaptures are another potentially good idea.

If using the UK to liberate Burma will net you more VPs than if you use the US, that will "encourage" certain actions in play. At the same time, this is a two-edged sword. While I personally like the idea, it bends the game more towards a historical flow of battle.

-F-

[Odin]

I want to have some options to customize the victory conditions.

[Hoplosternum]

Well perhaps by saying the US will brush aside the IJN I have over stated this. But during late 43 and 44 the US will have a lot of CVs with better planes, stacks of top quality replacements and excellent flak support supplied by his DDs, CLs, CAs and BBs. Plus a lot of LBA and transports. I expect that the Allied player would usually be able to throttle the Japanese as they did historically by mid - '45 even though a human IJN may avoid a Midway type disaster.

Mogami - I agree there will be plenty of blunders and if UV is any guide the IJN capital ships are quite frail re their US counterparts due to damage control. Still I expect the Japanese will usually do better (as long as the Philippines, East Indies and Malaya can actually be taken!). After the initial conquests I would expect them to be a little more cautious than they were historically and make sure there CVs are usually covered by their long range LBA. I just don't think the IJN will be able to stop the US fleet in 44 unless it has been hugely successful in 42 and can continuously attrite the US reinforcements far more than they did historically.


Mdiehl - I am surprised you are impressed by the two prong strategy. I have heard almost nothing good about it and cannot think how it does anything but slow down the attacks. A single main stroke is surely much better.

Consider the position after the Marshalls are captured. The Japanese do not know whether the US will go for the Marianas (threatening the Bonins and the Philippines) or the Carolines (cutting off all their forces in eastern NG and the Solomons). Historically they took the Marianas then threatened three key Japanese bases (Carolines, Philippines and Bonins). But IRL they were still sending huge amounts of reinforcements, planes and shipping to support attacks along the coast of NG. As transport shipping was by that stage the key determinant of how fast the allies could advance (in all theatres not just the Pacific) how could this be anything other than a hindrance? I am not saying that the other theatres go into hibernation. They can and should be used to distract the IJN player. If he abandons a theatre (which historically he never did) then relatively light forces could make limited advances. The thrust need not be through the central Pacific. It may follow the MacArthur route, or even from Australia towards the Eastern East Indies and then north (if logistically possible). The whole advantage of the single thrust is that it concentrates your forces but is not entirely predictable to your opponent. He must spread out.

As a human IJN may not have lost his pre war CV fleet and will simply concentrate against one prong, possibly getting a victory he is highly unlikely to get against a single prong attack. I have never seen any commentator on the period expressing the virtues of the two pronged attacks (although many do not either praise or criticise). It seems to fly in the face of most military strategy I am familiar with.

Timjot - Yes the US will need a base to assault Japan either the Philippines or Taiwan. But they need not conquer all of the Philippines as they historically did to get this base. I am aware that from the time the allies get sea superiority (late 43 or early 44 even if the IJN avoids a Midway unless the US are continuously being battered) they still have a lot to do. Each attack and then stock piling for the next will take time. This is another reason why a human player will not go all 'two pronged' in his advance. He will concentrate his transports supporting one front so these stockpiles are built as soon as possible.

Feinder - I think you are correct that the Victory Conditions may well be similar to the UV ones. Actually I hope that it is.

As I believe that a single stroke will be very hard to stop I am quite hopeful that victory is not determined on some kind of 'get X number of B - 29s on size Y airbases by mid 45 in range of Japan'. I think it will be almost unstoppable even if the Japanese play a good early game. A system based on bases will at least encourage the allies to push forward sooner and so give the Japanese some chance in the end game phase. It may also force the allies to split up their attacking force to take the necessary objectives.

[mdiehl]

The two prongued strategy accomplished (accomplishes) several tasks. 1. It tied/ties up more Japanese forces in an attrition battle that is stacked in favor of the US. 2. It resulted/will likely result in the dstruction of far more Japanese troops & material than Allied ones (and these will not be available for deployment or reaction elsewhere). 3. It provides more locations from which the US may base superior aircraft in superior numbers and thereyby reduce Japanese installations and attrit their a/c further down the line. 4. It makes Allied objectives that much more ambiguous.

Since the Allies have sufficient infrastructure to support simultaneously a 2-prongued approach, it seems the best way to me. The 1-thrust thing only works if the Japanese player does not anticipate where you will attack. If he does, then it will fail (or simply fail to progress as rapidly as is needed) in spectaular fashion.

[thantis]

Actually, the Japanese player with have three to four prongs to worry about:

1) SWPAC - Solomons, New Guinea & beyond

2) SOPAC - Mid Pacific Offensive

3) Indian Ocean, SE Asia & Java - a British Offensive from India through Burma & possibly Air/Sea offensive back into the Pacific & into Indonesia

4) China - on going actions against the Chinese & the potential for more aid & more agressive operations by the allies in this theater

5) Soviet Union - eventually they will become a player (hopefully an option in the game)

The amount of forces necessary to truly tie down the allies is more than the Japanese had at any time during the conflict. It will be interesting to see how play balance is addressed....

[TIMJOT]

Originally posted by mdiehl
The two prongued strategy accomplished (accomplishes) several tasks. 1. It tied/ties up more Japanese forces in an attrition battle that is stacked in favor of the US. 2. It resulted/will likely result in the dstruction of far more Japanese troops & material than Allied ones (and these will not be available for deployment or reaction elsewhere). 3. It provides more locations from which the US may base superior aircraft in superior numbers and thereyby reduce Japanese installations and attrit their a/c further down the line. 4. It makes Allied objectives that much more ambiguous.

Since the Allies have sufficient infrastructure to support simultaneously a 2-prongued approach, it seems the best way to me. The 1-thrust thing only works if the Japanese player does not anticipate where you will attack. If he does, then it will fail (or simply fail to progress as rapidly as is needed) in spectaular fashion.

Mdiehl

Although I agree with you that the two prong approached worked well enough and offered some distinct advantages. It had never been envisioned as the planed strategy to defeat Japan. Its implemention was due to compromised default rather than some grand enlighten strategy.

Just because one strategy worked doesnt exclude the possibility of other strategies could have worked just as well or better.

If you are saying that the long planned for single central pacific thrust could not have succeeded without SOPAC/SWP campaign. I totally disagree. The USN had planed for nearly 40 years for just such a strategy and certainly it could have and most likely would have succeeded. All the attrition inflicted in Sopac would most likely also been attained in the Central Pacific. If anything the attrition would have been more favorable because the US surface radar advantage would not have been nullified as it was early on by Slot geography. The geography in the centpac favors the offense where barren atolls are easily isolated and offer no where to hide. The small size of the islands do not allow for large scale deployments. If the centpac offense starts earlier (landing craft shortages not withstanding) then the garrisons are going to be even weaker than historical.

Certainly the CenPac advance entails its own set of hazards and difficulties, but to state unequivically that "it would fail in spectacular fasion" is a bit overstated to say the least

Regards

[mdiehl]

If you are saying that the long planned for single central pacific thrust could not have succeeded without SOPAC/SWP campaign. I totally disagree.

I'm not saying it *would not* have succeeded. However, there's the distinct possibility (and a higher probability than with a multi-prongued approach, IMO) that Japan could have met such a thrust on more-equal terms, possibly even obtaining the desired "decisive battle." They'd have lost such a battle, IMO, even without the substantial lessons learned in the water and in the air in the SOPAC, but the cost might have been *much* greater to the US.

The USN had planed for nearly 40 years for just such a strategy and certainly it could have and most likely would have succeeded.

I disagree with "certainly" and marginally agree with "most likely" with the caveat that the success might easily have come at a much higher price. Bear in mind that the 30 years of study devoted to the problem was conducted at a time when the real effectiveness of airpower to control the battle and to sink ships was not known. Aircraft lethality towards ships increased by leaps and bounds after 1939. Guam and Saipan alone could have based a thousand aircraft.

All the attrition inflicted in Sopac would most likely also been attained in the Central Pacific.

Maybe, but from where? Sailing TF 38 or 58 up to say, Guam, out of the range of US land based a/c, in the face of an unattrited IJN land air flotilla (since you're assuming no Cactus or no New Guinea campaign, let's assume 11th Air Fleet), is a much riskier proposition than attriting IJN air projection by dragging them into a losing war in New Guinea or the Solomons (where the Allies held the advantage). In each case (to Truk, then to Guam/Saipan/Tinian) the US CVs go it alone against Japanese CVs and land bases wityh well-developed, mutually supporting airfileds. Then there's the ground combat, with US CVs tied down in support of the operation until US land bases can be built (or Japanese ones captured), and all the while with Japanese CVs free to hit you when and how they want.

It'd be Marianas w/o the Turkey Shoot. Several times over. Good way to run the USN/USMC pilot pool into the ground, even if you don't lose half the CVs in the process.

If anything the attrition would have been more favorable because the US surface radar advantage would not have been nullified as it was early on by Slot geography.

Well, so you're suggesting a complete delay in confronting the Japanese until what, SJ radar is available? It's not like SC is going to give you that much of an advantage in a decsisive naval battle fought near Truk or the Marianas in 1942. In the meantime, Japan's unattrited pilot pool expands and gets better.

The geography in the centpac favors the offense where barren atolls are easily isolated and offer no where to hide.
The small size of the islands do not allow for large scale deployments.

This is only true for the, first chain (Marshalls?). Basically, Midway, Wake, Tarawa, and possibly Eniwetok and Kwajalein. Once you're up against Truk or Guam/Saipan/Tinian you're up against a hard know of substantial land masses with multiple airfields capable of mutual support.

If the centpac offense starts earlier (landing craft shortages not withstanding) then the garrisons are going to be even weaker than historical.

I agree with *that* at any event. But I think the only places you're going to grab easily, in the face of a largely unattrited Japanese pool of pilots and a/c, are on the margins.

[Snigbert]

Any two prong or multi prong attacks means that the Allies are dividing their forces, making multiple weaker forces. Although historically the Japanese were unwilling to abandon any areas, in the game the Japanese could withdraw everything but token forces from one of the allied axis's (how do you pluralize axis?) of advance and attempt to defeat the divided allied forces in detail. That's what Napoleon would have done, at least. Easier said then done, but I think when you have overwhelming superiority you want to concentrate your forces for the knock out blow.

On the other hand, the odds are so one sided that you can divide into two forces and each one has the ability to inflict the knock out blow. But I think it goes against conventional military wisdom.

[bradfordkay]

In the long run, the US followed two and a half axes (I believe that it is spelled that way) of attack: Central Pacific, Solomons/New Guinea/Phillipines, and supplying the Commonwealth attack through Burma.



Personally I think that the Japanese player should receive VP for transporting resource points back to Japan. This, after all, is the reason for the war. Scoring VPs for delivering raw materials to Japan would also even out a system that only counts VP for bases controlled at the end of the game.

[mdiehl]

I tried to respond yesterday but there was some sort of error.

Anyhow, *one* prong straight through the CenPac actually weakens the US attack. Two prongs allows the Allies to bring the USAAF and RAAF into the fray, enabling the Allies thereby to take full advantage of their overwhelming logistical superiority. One prong through the CenPac means that the US CVs multitask CAP, airfield suppression, ground support, and perimeter defense (including bagging any pesky Japanese CVs that show up). Multitasking CVs is a stupid idea, as the IJN learned at Midway, unless you have overwhelming air supremacy. Since the cenpac island bases held by Japan can in theory base thousands of a/c, the USN will not have air supremacy. Since you've given the Japanese the luxury of concentrating them all against your point of attack, odds are you lose 2 CVs every time you move against another island. By the time you get to Guam, there are no US CVs left with which to continue the assault.

In sum the one-prong approach is a great way to get the decisive battle that Japan wants on odds that most favor Japan.

[Yamamoto]

The US should face some sort of victory point penalty for not making it a priority ofLiberating the Philippeans prior to advancing on the home islands. Historically it was very important for the US to liberate the American territory.

Yamamoto