Things I would like to see in "the patch"

[Zonso]

ORIGINAL: Flaviusx

Good luck ever getting your reinforcements anywhere with this mass of bumblers in 1941. I note that by mid July an enormous mass of reserve units had shown up in front of AGC and was giving it a very hard time. This would be more or less impossible if half or more these guys were running (I use the word advisedly) around at 8 mps.

Just gobsmacked by how many folks buy into this image of the Red Army.

I'm not following you - what image is that? I think you are confusing things here with MPs and 'physically' being able to traverse a certain distance. What I am referring to is the *tempo* of operations and the decision making cycles involved, something the Russian Army as a whole was clearly lacking in ability for some time before learning the realities of modern combat (pick a date). I don't think you can argue that they were the equals of the Germans for the first part of the war in this regard. On what basis then do you support the status quo?

The more I think about it, it seems many ascribe to a competitive point of view mainly whereas others, myself included, want to see a more historical flavor reflecting the opposing sides during their play. Currently, and for many reasons, not just this, WitE dos not deliver.

[Flaviusx]

Zonso, the Red Army is hardly able to attack as is. Immobilizing it on top of that hardly seems necessary and at any rate makes no historical sense whatsoever.

I was just looking over Glantz's Barbarossa derailed. By July 2 AGC was facing 34 Soviet divsions despite wiping out Western Front more or less -- only 14 of those divisions were remnants of Western Front, the rest being reserves. 44 more divisions were on the way. This does not indicate some kind of command paralysis that was tying down reserves and reinforcements. Mind you, all that stuff performed absymally in combat, but moving it around wasn't the problem. The tactical ineptitude of the Red Army is already well represented in other ways.

I'm just not seeing why 12 MP rifle divisions are so out of whack here. (And they mostly will be moving at that rate, only very occasionally will they pass enough admin checks to move faster than that early on.) And people keep ignoring the fact that mech divisions are already tied down by an 18 MP cap (making them virtually useless as they can't move and launch a deliberate attack by and large), so this is really about making rifle divisions incapable of getting anywhere.

[76mm]

Flavius, it is no secret that the Sovs were no slouches at creating conveyors to bring new units forward and evac industry. And no one is talking about "command paralysis that tied down reserves and reinforcements" or movement points (not sure how many times this needs to be repeated...).

I think that myself, Zonso, timmyab, maybe others, are saying that in the game the Sov's command ineffiencies (not paralysis) are not reflected, and the Sovs are too nimble, really every bit as nimble as the Germans (just a bit slower-moving). By "nimble" I mean quick to react, able to respond instantly and correctly, and with certainty, to German moves.

This is simply not the Red Army I've read about, and I would be interested to hear your views on this topic (rather than another response about how many movement points the Sovs should have).

[Flaviusx]

76mm, you claim that MPs aren't the issue and at the same time that the Red Army is too nimble. I can only throw up my hands at this display of cognitive dissonance. I don't know how to respond to this.

I get that the Red Army was tactically inept and performed poorly in battle. This is surely the case already in a game where the Wehrmacht is easily able to sustain 5:1 loss ratio in 1941. But I simply do not accept that a player in this game should have their ability to move stuff around removed and that's what this discussion is amounting to.

[76mm]

ORIGINAL: Flaviusx
76mm, you claim that MPs aren't the issue and at the same time that the Red Army is too nimble. I can only throw up my hands at this display of cognitive dissonance. I don't know how to respond to this.

hmmm, with all due respect, there is no cognitive dissonance here, because there are two separate issues:
1) How far/quickly a unit can move (reflected by MPs); and
2) a commander's ability to get units to do exactly what he wants, when he wants (ie, "nimbleness").

Frankly I am rather mystified why you do not seem able to appreciate the difference. I think that the difference is pretty clearly illustrated by my suggested mechanism under which units would have the exactly the same MPs as units under the current system, but players would simply not be sure how many MPs a unit had until you tried to move them. Thus, the Sovs are just as mobile as under the current system, but their movements would be less coordinated to some degree.

I do not agree that this discussion amounts to "removing" a player's ability to move units around, that's a gross overstatement.

[amatteucci]

ORIGINAL: 76mm

For the umpteenth time, I for one am not talking about decreasing movement points. I wholeheartedly agree that Sov units should be made stronger, but to make them stronger without reflecting some of the Sov's serious C&C deficiencies would give the Sovs too much of an advantage. If you increase Sv "tactical and operational defensive capabilities" to their historical levels--as I agree should be done--then you also need reduce their "strategical capabilities" to their historic levels, because in my view they are overstated in the game, at least for the first several weeks.

There are any number of mechanisms that could be used to do this; I've suggested one that I think would be easy to implement, but I'm sure there are better approaches. But the main thing is to recognize that none of this can or should be done in a patch, because there are enough serious issues to be fixed as to require essentially a new game.

My point is that a further reduction of Soviet strategical redeployment capabilities will not allow to replicate the historical disposition of forces ordered by the Soviet high command and actually executed by the Red Army.

For example the redeployment of the 8A, 11A (plus 41SK, 1MK) and 27A (plus 21MK) along the Parnu-Pskov-Ostrov line by June 29th, or the deployment of 22A, 19A (plus 23MK), 20A (plus 5MK, 7MK), 13A (plus 20SK, 45SK, 20MK, 4VDK) and 21A (plus 67SK, 25MK) along the line passing trough Idritsa-Polotsk-Vitebsk-Orsha-Rogachev-Rechitsa by July 4th.

Under the current rules I'm struggling just to replicate history, I don't know whether I could do something even remotely resembling the historical movements under more stringent conditions.

[76mm]

OK, but first I'm not sure if you should expect to be able to exactly replicate historical dispositions since your campaign is a priori non-historical.

Second, there are so many differences between the historical campaign and what is seen in this game that I'm sure if the inability to match some particular disposition is the most important--what about the pathetic weakness of Sov units? Maybe you can't match historic dispositions because the Germans are playing much faster and looser because they don't have any fear of Sov counter-attacks or successful defenses? Or maybe MP should be higher? Or maybe it should be easier to win admin rolls? There are so many complex inter-relationships...

Third, the mechanism that I proposed does not mean that it would be any harder to form a line, its just that that line would be less coherent, as some units failed to reach their designated locations, etc.

Just to be clear, I don't think this mechanism I've proposed is particularly good, and it is almost certainly not the best way to replicate Glantz' "stumbling colossus;" it's just that I think that this is an important problem with the game, and I can't think of any better way to deal with it...

[turtlefang]

I understand people's point of view here but I really believe that your mixing apples and oranges here.

At the division and above level, I have simply never read or come across anything that implies the Soviets had major problems in moving around units, committing units, or controlling units. In fact, just the opposite. The Soviets time and time again, after the first week or two of the war, managed to control and move large groups of units to where they wanted them when they wanted them there.

Now, the Soviets made strategic mistakes on positioning units and counter attacks - but that is a different issue.

The Soviets exhibited great problems with cross-coordination with divisions and small unit tactics. Across divisions, attacks did not jump off on time, artillery fire was erratic at best, support didn't arrive, attacks were disjointed, and sometimes in opposite directions. The game stimulates this by greatly limiting deliberate attacks. You may think it needs to do more by limiting attacks from within hexes by divisions even more. Maybe so.

As far as small unit tactics (sub division), I really feel this is where the true Soviet C&C comes into the play. Except for a VERY few units in 1941, its was terrible. Here units got lost, were off track, did not coordinate, failed to execute, tanks launched attacks without support, infantry launched attacks without support, and so on. The game simulates this by the low combat strength of the Soviet division. You can again argue its not enough, not correctly stimulated, etc... but, in general, a Soviet infantry division simply gets eaten alive by any decent German formation. And an early Soviet armor or motorized division is near useless due to the hex cost of the terrain and zocs.

Again, maybe I'm missing something, but I just don't see how hiding MPs or lowering them will help the situation. Or make it more realistic. I simply think the C&C that people talk about happened at a lower level that the strategic level we're playing at here.

[hfarrish]

ORIGINAL: turtlefang

I understand people's point of view here but I really believe that your mixing apples and oranges here.

At the division and above level, I have simply never read or come across anything that implies the Soviets had major problems in moving around units, committing units, or controlling units. In fact, just the opposite. The Soviets time and time again, after the first week or two of the war, managed to control and move large groups of units to where they wanted them when they wanted them there.

Now, the Soviets made strategic mistakes on positioning units and counter attacks - but that is a different issue.

The Soviets exhibited great problems with cross-coordination with divisions and small unit tactics. Across divisions, attacks did not jump off on time, artillery fire was erratic at best, support didn't arrive, attacks were disjointed, and sometimes in opposite directions. The game stimulates this by greatly limiting deliberate attacks. You may think it needs to do more by limiting attacks from within hexes by divisions even more. Maybe so.

As far as small unit tactics (sub division), I really feel this is where the true Soviet C&C comes into the play. Except for a VERY few units in 1941, its was terrible. Here units got lost, were off track, did not coordinate, failed to execute, tanks launched attacks without support, infantry launched attacks without support, and so on. The game simulates this by the low combat strength of the Soviet division. You can again argue its not enough, not correctly stimulated, etc... but, in general, a Soviet infantry division simply gets eaten alive by any decent German formation. And an early Soviet armor or motorized division is near useless due to the hex cost of the terrain and zocs.

Again, maybe I'm missing something, but I just don't see how hiding MPs or lowering them will help the situation. Or make it more realistic. I simply think the C&C that people talk about happened at a lower level that the strategic level we're playing at here.

+1 - I had been meaning to post effectively this exact note for some time, and this is far better set forth than I ever would have been able to do.

[76mm]

[EDIT-my original post has been edited to make it easier to "connect the dots"...]

Turtlefang,

Thanks for the post, I'm glad that someone has finally addressed the topic at hand. Your points are well-taken, but I would say a couple of things in response:

1) I think that many of the cross-coordination issues you describe were due to the fact that the supporting units were not in fact in place to assist in the attack or defense (ie, they fell a few MP short of ending up where they were supposed to be); they were not always sitting right at the line of deployment and then just failed to cross on time, etc. In other words, I don't think that the problem is that they just didn't synchronize their watches--the units were often simply not at the right place at the right time.

2) You say that Sov command deficiencies are adequately addressed by how combat is handled. I disagree, however, because I think that the current combat model does a very poor job of replicating the results of the opening campaign--Sovs units were on often capable of giving the Germans a good fight and generally succeeded in bleeding the Germans. Generally Sov units in the game are too weak, and most (all?) AARs show that German casualties are much lower than historical pre-blizzard and must be compensated by excessively harsh blizzard conditions. And this is all with the horrible 1:1->2:1 kludge, which frankly has no place in a properly-designed wargame.

Therefore, I think that the combat model needs to be fixed, but to do this without imposing some kind of command limitations on the Sovs would give the Sovs too much of an advantage.

3) Whatever C&C capabilities the Sovs had, in 1941 at least the Germans were much better, were inside the Sovs's "decision cycle", and could literally run rings around the Sovs. The game currently replicates this by allowing panzers to move 20-25 hexes before the Sovs can react at all, which I think is an unsatisfactory solution. I think that fixing this will be a challenge.

4) The trickiest issue in any Barbarossa game, and one that I'm not sure can really be addressed, is that I think that many of the Sov's "strategic mistakes" were not simple mistakes that could have been avoided by making a better choice--in fact the Sovs had many poor commanders and moreover just didn't appreciate German capabilities or understand their own deficiencies and thus almost could not make proper strategic decisions, while players have 20/20 hindsight. While I'm sure you can cite examples where Zhukov wanted to do this, and stalin overrode him with disasterous effects, Zhukov could not be everywhere and I think that the Sov command apparatus as a whole is treated too generously in this game.

5) Another very tricky (and perhaps insoluble) issue--while generally it would be bad to force players to make historical mistakes, if they don't do so, games will end up very different from history. Obvious examples in multiple AARs are that Sovs are too free to retreat to the east, and the Germans break off their attack on Moscow too early, pull back during the blizzard, etc. Victory conditions can obviously help here, but I'm not sure that that is enough--I would hate to find out at some point in 1945 that I lost the campaign because the Germans took Smolensk on Turn 8 rather than Turn 9, etc. As another example, the Germans have no real reason to push hard for Moscow in late 1941, whereas IRL they thought it could win them the war...

The bottom line is that I think that:
a) The Sovs had significant issues with C&C;
b) The current combat model does a poor job of replicating the results of the 1941 campaign;
c) To fix (a) without addressing (b) would give the Sovs too much of an advantage, so some solution should be found; and
d) Some means has to be found of encouraging/compelling players to repeat historical mistakes, or the game will necessarily end up playing very differently from history.

[janh]

ORIGINAL: turtlefang
At the division and above level, I have simply never read or come across anything that implies the Soviets had major problems in moving around units, committing units, or controlling units. In fact, just the opposite. ...

Now, the Soviets made strategic mistakes on positioning units and counter attacks - but that is a different issue.

The Soviets exhibited great problems with cross-coordination with divisions and small unit tactics. Across divisions, attacks did not jump off on time, artillery fire was erratic at best, support didn't arrive, attacks were disjointed, and sometimes in opposite directions. The game stimulates this by greatly limiting deliberate attacks. You may think it needs to do more by limiting attacks from within hexes by divisions even more. Maybe so.

Well, probably quite accurate what you write, but also at the corps and above levels there were some issues that diverge from how players can use or coordinate large formations. One was probably the stance and goals such large formations adhered to desperately until surrounded, or failed to grasp etc. This probably is convoluted into the stats of leaders, representing the staffs as well, leading due to failed admin rolls to short MPs and suboptimal placement capabilities.

ORIGINAL: turtlefang
As far as small unit tactics (sub division), I really feel this is where the true Soviet C&C comes into the play. Except for a VERY few units in 1941, its was terrible. Here units got lost, were off track, did not coordinate, failed to execute, tanks launched attacks without support, infantry launched attacks without support, and so on. The game simulates this by the low combat strength of the Soviet division.

Again, maybe I'm missing something, but I just don't see how hiding MPs or lowering them will help the situation.

Me thinks you and 76mm talk about the same thing. Low combat strength certainly has to do with "did not coordinate, failed to execute, tanks launched attacks without support", and low MP/failed admin rolls "units got lost, were off track, did not coordinate".

Yet giving units generally poor combat strength already means generally denying the possibility that some random/rare attacks may come of well. So I do hope the low combat strength here is not meant to model poor coordination, but just poor training/small unit doctrine/proficiency or whatever.

In fact, due to the fact that you know your low MPs at all times accurately, one also is rid of the serious problem of screwing up attacks because "did not coordinate, failed to execute, launched attacks without support". It is just the opposite in this game as in reality:

Either you cannot execute a deliberate attack because of MPs, which is a fine result that ought to occur as well (aka units too late for attack, but commander knows and plans for that == minutely perfect C&C), or you have them an can execute a perfectly coordinated deliberate attack, which, however, can suffer some penalties if many commands are involved. In the latter case, no chaos ensues, since all of the units selected will participate. In the first case, you simply will not screw up because you'll likely not attempt a hasty attack with the poor CV ants, so you are permanently in perfect control and never loose it. There is no such case as having selected units for a deliberate attack, but the event than disintegrating into a series or separate unsupported events, or just leaving units behind. In fact, with some luck, you even get reserves.

I think no matter how poor leader stats, how low MPs or whatever, it ultimately feels like perfect control. Maybe the units are slow, but you can at least perfectly and flawlessly plan for it. And if they have not enough MPs for a deliberate attack, you just leave it be and retreat a bit, but you don't see a formally promising assault degenerate into a series of slaughters and spontaneously wish to swap commander or so... Knowing all the stats, and not having such random events misguiding units, or breaking up actions, means poor units, but perfect control.

[amatteucci]

ORIGINAL: janh


In fact, due to the fact that you know your low MPs at all times accurately, one also is rid of the serious problem of screwing up attacks because "did not coordinate, failed to execute, launched attacks without support". It is just the opposite in this game as in reality:

Either you cannot execute a deliberate attack because of MPs, which is a fine result that ought to occur as well (aka units too late for attack, but commander knows and plans for that == minutely perfect C&C), or you have them an can execute a perfectly coordinated deliberate attack, which, however, can suffer some penalties if many commands are involved. In the latter case, no chaos ensues, since all of the units selected will participate. In the first case, you simply will not screw up because you'll likely not attempt a hasty attack with the poor CV ants, so you are permanently in perfect control and never loose it. There is no such case as having selected units for a deliberate attack, but the event than disintegrating into a series or separate unsupported events, or just leaving units behind. In fact, with some luck, you even get reserves.

I think no matter how poor leader stats, how low MPs or whatever, it ultimately feels like perfect control. Maybe the units are slow, but you can at least perfectly and flawlessly plan for it. And if they have not enough MPs for a deliberate attack, you just leave it be and retreat a bit, but you don't see a formally promising assault degenerate into a series of slaughters and spontaneously wish to swap commander or so... Knowing all the stats, and not having such random events misguiding units, or breaking up actions, means poor units, but perfect control.

If you are saying that one has a perfect control on the outcome of something that one won't even bother to attempt you're, obviously, right.

But if your point is that the Soviet player should have some incentive to try and attack, even if it's like taking a gamble each time (and I can agree, in principle, with this idea) I think that it's the combat routines that should be modified, not the MP allowances. If the committment of some SU or reserve units could really make a difference in most of the combats (from the Red Army perspective) the Soviet player could be tempted to risk. Now he doesn't, simply because 90% of the times, it doesn't matter what the units, commanders, MPs etc. are, your attack is destined to end in a catastophic failure anyway.

Another interesting feature to have, could be variable MP costs for attacks (i.e. you still must have x MPs to initiate combat but the amount of MPs, that is time, you'll actually burn, could be a fraction of that, according to the difficulty of the combat itself). That would, incidentally, also solve another problem: the German player won't spend the same time pushing aside a boder guards regiment or three rifle divisions and the Soviet player could be tempted to try a serious forward defense (and not putting up checkerboards or pickets... something that would've never be seen historically) if he could reasonably hope to slow down the German advance, thus trading men for time and space. Now it works only the other way.

[turtlefang]

76mm,

Just to be clear, I'm enjoying the conversation, and I think you're bringing up some valid points. But I think you have now expanded the discussion to trying to correct a lot of issues in the game rather than discuss a lack of C&C and try to fix that with a variable MP issue, which didn't address the issue:

1) I think that many of the cross-coordination issues you describe were due to the fact that the supporting units were not in fact in place to assist in the attack or defense (ie, they fell a few MP short of ending up where they were supposed to be); they were not always sitting right at the line of deployment and then just failed to cross on time, etc. In other words, I don't think that the problem is that they just didn't synchronize their watches--the units were often simply not at the right place at the right time.

I believe the primary issue here was not strategic movement but tactical movement and communications. The Soviets simply did NOT have a communication net at the tactical level that allowed them to coordinate these assets. The doubling - and in some cases tripling - of the army's size between 39-41 was highly uneven. And the most neglected part was the communications network in ALL Soviet formations. Just looking at the authorized - must less issued - radios, and Soviets had no chance to fight any type of non-set piece battle. Where the Germans did run into trouble, the Soviets usually had two to four days to prepare and run telephone cable. Artillery deployment in 41 was usually petty good - it kept up at the division and Corps level. Artillery use in 41 was terrible - it was generally line of sight. And the result was a large number of guns knocked out by the Germans in action. This is reported time and time again in German AARs. Indirect fire, by the Soviets, was simply not used to any great extend in 41 until Leningrad.

When artillery use was good, the Soviets had time to run wire, pre-register fire and set up. The few times that happened, the Germans did get take losses.

2) You say that Sov command deficiencies are adequately addressed by how combat is handled. I disagree, however, because I think that the current combat model does a very poor job of replicating the results of the opening campaign--Sovs units were on often capable of giving the Germans a good fight and generally succeeded in bleeding the Germans. Generally Sov units in the game are too weak, and most (all?) AARs show that German casualties are much lower than historical pre-blizzard and must be compensated by excessively harsh blizzard conditions. And this is all with the horrible 1:1->2:1 kludge, which frankly has no place in a properly-designed wargame.

Therefore, I think that the combat model needs to be fixed, but to do this without imposing some kind of command limitations on the Sovs would give the Sovs too much of an advantage.

Could be. On the other hand, I think the overall attrition rate too low for the Germans and a too high for Soviets and should be adjusted. And the blizzard rules are too harsh - just not sure how much too harsh as the Germans took a real pounding there. These could be adjusted several ways - a much higher attrition rate, a change in the CV values, etc... But right now, the Soviets should not be able to push the Germans back three hundred miles.

And in 41, a 1:1/2:1 advantage isn't out of the question. This should change as the war goes on and the Germans get worse and the Soviets get better.

As far as the combat model goes, that's a completely different discussion. And I will admit that I'm not as well versed in it as others are but "it seems" to give about the right results for combat at that time.

3) Whatever C&C capabilities the Sovs had, in 1941 at least the Germans were much better, were inside the Sovs's "decision cycle", and could literally run rings around the Sovs. The game currently replicates this by allowing panzers to move 20-25 hexes before the Sovs can react at all, which I think is an unsatisfactory solution. I think that fixing this will be a challenge.

The decision cycle - again - to me, was at the tactical level. And the German Army in 41 was the best mass army in the world - and maybe ever in the world for that technology. The individual company and battalion commanders simply ran rings around the Soviets. And it wasn't just the Panzers. German Infantry was greatly superior to Soviet - for intends and purposes - untrained infantry. Does this translate into a strategic movement advantage? I just don't believe it does unless you achieve a breakthrough.

4) The trickiest issue in any Barbarossa game, and one that I'm not sure can really be addressed, is that I think that many of the Sov's "strategic mistakes" were not simple mistakes that could have been avoided by making a better choice--in fact the Sovs had many poor commanders and moreover just didn't appreciate German capabilities or understand their own deficiencies and thus almost could not make proper strategic decisions, while players have 20/20 hindsight. While I'm sure you can cite examples where Zhukov wanted to do this, and stalin overrode him with disasterous effects, Zhukov could not be everywhere and I think that the Sov command apparatus as a whole is treated too generously in this game.

No argument here. And I would add the fear factor. Stalin's purge remained on the minds of many of the higher level commanders and compounded their mistakes to fight forward. And you had a dual command structure with the Commissars. If I was actually addressing this, I would lower the Soviet Corps, Army and Front command ratings in 41, then raise them in 42 when mud or blizzard starts to where they are now. And I do think they are too low in 42 right now so I would take them up to 24 at the army level. Where they were before I started playing the game according to some back post, I think.

In any case, your right. This one's hard. But the flip side just as hard. How do you model Hitler's no retreat rules later in the war that allowed Stalingrad and AGC? You can't do one without the other - and I have no answers here.

But if you address the Soviets in the 41, you have to address the Germans in late 42, 43 and 44. And how do you address Gunderian's initial refusal to move and support AGS pocket before opening the Battle of Moscow? I just think your maybe opening a can of worms that can't be addressed well here. Or will get a lot of players disinterested in the game due to C&C rules.

5) Another very tricky (and perhaps insoluble) issue--while generally it would be bad to force players to make historical mistakes, if they don't do so, games will end up very different from history. Obvious examples in multiple AARs are that Sovs are too free to retreat to the east, and the Germans break off their attack on Moscow too early, pull back during the blizzard, etc. Victory conditions can obviously help here, but I'm not sure that that is enough--I would hate to find out at some point in 1945 that I lost the campaign because the Germans took Smolensk on Turn 8 rather than Turn 9, etc. As another example, the Germans have no real reason to push hard for Moscow in late 1941, whereas IRL they thought it could win them the war...

As far as history goes, so what? You set up the historical conditions, then let the players play. If they recreate it, fine. But most players I know have studied history and try to avoid the historical mistakes. And they don't want to be forced into those mistakes. That's the whole point of playing.

This is an opinion, but I'm not a fan of victory conditions. In truth, nothing really mattered in the East except Berlin and Stalin. I might suggested a morale adjustment to the Soviets for certain cities - Kiev, Kharkov, Leningrad, a bigger one for Moscow, but reality is - none of these represented a make or break for the Soviets except maybe Moscow. The Soviets LOST 40% of their territory and population centers and still won. That petty much tells you the land grab wasn't relevant to the victory conditions.

The bigger problem, and the one that would convince me to have victory conditions, is getting the German player to play PAST 42 rather than just resign and go home - or quit. On that side, I think you have a good argument. But that's not history. But I would support that position.

[76mm]

Turtlefang, I too am enjoying the discussion; I've expanded it because I think that these issues are all related, and solving some of these problems will only introduce new problems that warp the game. This time I'll keep my comments brief:

I guess we can disagree about the combat model, but I don't understand your comment about the 1:1->2:1 kludge: as far as I know, this has no more basis in reality than sprinkling fairy dust on the battlefield to turn a Sov loss into a victory, and it is in the game only as balancing mechanism, since the combat model does not seem capable of representing combat in this period without this kludge. Why else would this mechanism suddenly disappear in March 42? This issue is important, because if the combat model must be changed, C&C must also be modified in some way or else the Sovs would be too powerful in 1941.

I'm surprised that you think that the Germans "decision cycle" superiority was only at the tactical level, I guess we can save that discussion for another thread...

I generally agree with your comments about historical mistakes, but if everyone is completely free to avoid them, and the game deviates widely from history, then the game will simply not be about the Eastern Front as people have come to know it. I'm pessimistic that there is a satifactory solution to this issue.

[turtlefang]

jahn -

I think the bigger issue here is not that the Soviet player "can perfectly plan his attacks" but that the Soviet player doesn't attack anywhere near as much as he did historically.

And that reason has nothing to do with the Soviet's ability to use deliberate attacks or not. It's more centered on the inability of the Soviet to mass enough firepower, in 1941, to attack a German occupied hex, period.

The historical Soviet Army in 1941 was tactically trained (such as it was) as an offensive arm, not a defensive one. Now, you can question how effective these were, but that is a different issue. So, in 1941, the Soviets launch a large number of counter attacks at the local level - just as they had been taught. And they were destroyed piecemeal.

The player, knowing the poor state of the Soviet Army in relationship to the German Army, and the supply situation, simply doesn't do that. And its not an issue of coordination, but one of looking at a difference between the CV value of a stack of Soviet units versus a stack of German units. It makes no logical sense. As a Soviet player, I might launch a few attacks against the Axis minor allies and an exposure, weak German motorize BG or unit until winter, but that's about it. So its not very many. And most AAR support that approach. Has nothing to do with MPs or deliberate attacks versus hasty attacks - the German units are just damn difficult to attack in 41. And the player knows it, so he simply doesn't attack often.

Maybe I'm wrong on this one, but I would love to see a "promising assault" as a Soviet player. I just don't see them in 1941. And if I do see them, I can't get there anyway as I don't have the movement points as it now stands for a deliberate attack.

And the few deliberate attacks that I can execute (as in two or three until winter), it always has to be with units that start one hex away from the Germans/Allies. So not much flexibly. And then the combat system seems to hand me my head on a platter when I do attack as the Soviets anyway. I just don't see much point in changing the system to stop two or three attacks right now. As far as reserves go on the attack as the Soviets in 41 before the blizzard, I have never gotten a single one. Ever. (Of course, that could mean I'm not that good a player, which I'm perfectly willing to admit).

[76mm]

ORIGINAL: turtlefang
...the Soviet player doesn't attack anywhere near as much as he did historically.

And that reason has nothing to do with the Soviet's ability to use deliberate attacks or not. It's more centered on the inability of the Soviet to mass enough firepower, in 1941, to attack a German occupied hex, period.

The historical Soviet Army in 1941 was tactically trained (such as it was) as an offensive arm, not a defensive one. Now, you can question how effective these were, but that is a different issue. So, in 1941, the Soviets launch a large number of counter attacks at the local level - just as they had been taught. And they were destroyed piecemeal.

The player, knowing the poor state of the Soviet Army in relationship to the German Army, and the supply situation, simply doesn't do that.

As you say, historically the Sovs launched many smallish counter-attacks, most of which failed, but often after inflicting meaningful German casualties as well. Most of these attacks were not against a "division" but against smaller outposts, against which the Sovs could muster a local superiority (in numbers at least).

The reason Sov players don't attack is that there are no such smallish outposts, they have to attack a whole division (forget about a stack), usually with catastrophic results--maybe a handful of German casualties vs several thousand Sov losses. This is not mentioning the fact that to concentrate the several divisions necesary to hope for a successful attack means that they are pocket bait.

So it has nothing to do with Sov players being too cautious, and everything to do with failure of the combat model to reflect the constant small-scale engagements which bled the Germans.

[gingerbread]

Attrition happens in the logistics phase, right?

Do you really expect a game with the entire war in the east as it's theme to have a combat model that reflects small-scale engagements by anything other than an abstraction?

[turtlefang]

As you say, historically the Sovs launched many smallish counter-attacks, most of which failed, but often after inflicting meaningful German casualties as well. Most of these attacks were not against a "division" but against smaller outposts, against which the Sovs could muster a local superiority (in numbers at least).

The problem with this argument is twofold, neither one of which has anything to do with the combat model:

1)your arguing for a totally different scale for the game, one below the division level. That's a totally different game with units representing BG/Regiments not division/corps - or, potentially, lower. And one I won't play as it would take way too much time to simply move the units in an I Go You Go system.

2) I will go back to my prior statement "I think the overall attrition rate too low for the Germans and a too high for Soviets and should be adjusted." These type of attacks and losses should be simulated by the attrition rate as they are at a lower level of activity than the combat or movement system the designer has chosen. Since these represent training or doctrine issues, and the designer has chosen to use an attrition like approach, this is where those types of actions across the front should be simulated. Not in the combat results model.

The combat results represent the times when division/corps level units engage in sustain combat over a period of time. It is a high intensity combat situation where most of the division/corps assets are brought into combat. The question is, do the combat results reflect the results of these types of engagements? If so, then the combat results model is accurate. If not, then it is not.

The lower level engagements should reflect the training/doctrine issues, the skirmishing that takes place, and other, non-combat losses. If so, then the attrition rates are correct, if not, then they are not.

You can't take a part of the game, claim its wrong when it doesn't do what its not intended to do. If all of the parts hanging together don't give the "right" results, then the game is designed poorly (remembering, however, you also have to solve for balance which may skew some of the historical factors).

In this case, your arguing that total German losses are too light before winter, then winter makes losses too high. So the combat model is wrong. I guess I would argue that the combat model is more or less right or give close to correct results in high intensity types of combat. At least it "feels" right to me. But the attrition model across the front feels wrong. German losses are too light and should increase via attrition to more accurately reflect the German total losses.

I come by this view as most German divisions, excluding the Mech units, were fairly close in losses by the end of the mud season (say +-5% of TOE in combat strength). This, to me, reflects an issue across the front, not an issue with individual combat results. Hence, the attrition fix - across the board rather than a combat model fix. The Mech units, due to their high combat utilization, represent a different story.

And both of us agree that winter rules aren't correct and too harsh. It allows the Soviet to achieve advances that simply weren't possible by the Soviets at that time.

I think a perfect example of what's not right is the air system. It doesn't provide either the results that happened historically or provide a "check and balance" to correct for play balance - in other words, it doesn't work, or work well.

[turtlefang]

As far as the 1:1/2:1 suddenly disappearing, my bad writing. I think the advantage should slowly change over the war as the Soviets get better and the Germans get worse. And I don't know the correct ratio. The 1:1/2:1 already seems worked into the game, so I just went with it. I have seen arguments for everything from 1:1/5:1 to 1:1/1:1.5 over the years.

Pick whatever your comfortable with to start with and then slowly decrease it each year as the Soviets gain tactical expertise and the Germans lose it. This one is really subjective and whatever the designer feels most comfortable with using - I just don't think its static. The Soviet Army in 45 isn't at the same tactical skill level as the Soviet Army in 41 - and neither is the German Army.

Regarding the decision cycle superiority. This one is an interesting topic and one we can discuss deeper at another time. What I have found, both in history and having experienced it in person, it that the higher up you go in and organization, the more similar organizations tend to be in speed to decision making.

Where decision cycle time really makes a difference is how empowered lower level officers/managers are. These are the people that literally make hundreds or thousands of decisions each day. If these mid and lower level people feel empowered to make these decisions, organizations move very quickly. If they don't, organizations move very slowly EVEN WHEN decisions are made at the top and already communicated downward. And in 1941, German training pushed this cycle time down to the battalion/company/platoon leader. And this is literally what killed the Soviets. Reading AAR from the Germans showed that platoon and company commanders routinely took aggressive action that their Soviet equivalents would stop and wait on orders before proceeding. It killed them at the tactical level.

At the divisional level and above, decision makers usually had hours to make decisions, not minutes or seconds. And days, especially in regards to unit movement or deployment over any type of distance. So the differential - which is what you have to measure - is just not as great.

[76mm]

ORIGINAL: gingerbread
Do you really expect a game with the entire war in the east as it's theme to have a combat model that reflects small-scale engagements by anything other than an abstraction?

These types of losses could be reflected in the combat model by having German units suffer greater casualties even when victorious, or in the attrition model, currently it is not reflected in either. While I see the benefit of doing this with the attrition model, I think the problem is that attrition losses would become completely ruinous for the Sovs, when in fact I think that these low-level attacks should be able to be turned on/off. Maybe the right way would be to be able to give the Sovs an active or passive "stance" to regulate this.

ORIGINAL: turtlefang
1)your arguing for a totally different scale for the game, one below the division level. That's a totally different game with units representing BG/Regiments not division/corps - or, potentially, lower.

not necessarily, see above.

ORIGINAL: turtlefang
The combat results represent the times when division/corps level units engage in sustain combat over a period of time. It is a high intensity combat situation where most of the division/corps assets are brought into combat. The question is, do the combat results reflect the results of these types of engagements? If so, then the combat results model is accurate. If not, then it is not.

I would say that for 1941 they do not, see below.

ORIGINAL: turtlefang
You can't take a part of the game, claim its wrong when it doesn't do what its not intended to do. If all of the parts hanging together don't give the "right" results, then the game is designed poorly (remembering, however, you also have to solve for balance which may skew some of the historical factors).

I most emphatically think that all the parts of this game DO NOT hang together, hence my rather wide-ranging comments on problem areas.

ORIGINAL: turtlefang
I come by this view as most German divisions, excluding the Mech units, were fairly close in losses by the end of the mud season (say +-5% of TOE in combat strength).

Maybe, or maybe their losses were actually very different and their TOE was leveled off with via replacements, etc.

ORIGINAL: turtlefang
As far as the 1:1/2:1 suddenly disappearing, my bad writing. I think the advantage should slowly change over the war as the Soviets get better and the Germans get worse. And I don't know the correct ratio. The 1:1/2:1 already seems worked into the game, so I just went with it. I have seen arguments for everything from 1:1/5:1 to 1:1/1:1.5 over the years.

Sorry, I completely fail to understand why there should be any such artifical advantage, or why it should disappear when the Sovs get better?

I also don't see how someone can say that the combat model works fine as long as this kludge remains in the game. Of course the Sov army changed dramatically over the course of the war, but that should be handled by intrinsic TOE, strength, experience, and morale factors, etc., rather than some artificial boost to Sov attacks in 1941. Doesn't this (strongly) suggest that maybe Sov units are underpowered in 1941? (Note that this could be a result of faulty TOEs, etc., but I doubt that 2x3 was that sloppy, so have to point a finger at the combat model.)

Let's not even get started on the airwar...