influence of non-combat equipment

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pekische
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influence of non-combat equipment

Post by pekische »

What influence does non-combat equipment have in unit? For example motorcycle - i lost only one motorcycle in my Flak Bn. What is the effect for this Bn? Or when I lost SdKfz-Radio... again - what is the effect for future fighting of the unit without radio....

Thx!
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wodin
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RE: influence of non-combat equipment

Post by wodin »

I think it's just fluff on the whole.
jimcarravall
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RE: influence of non-combat equipment

Post by jimcarravall »

ORIGINAL: pekische

What influence does non-combat equipment have in unit? For example motorcycle - i lost only one motorcycle in my Flak Bn. What is the effect for this Bn? Or when I lost SdKfz-Radio... again - what is the effect for future fighting of the unit without radio....

Thx!

Can't answer the specifics regarding the impact of the equipment loss on combat power because that's calculated using the proprietary software for the combat engine. One of the game's software gurus will have to tell you how the data is used to emulate combat capability.

But, based on the data collected against the equipment in the Estab file, I think both losses, as a minimum, result in what is known as a "mobility kill" for individual platforms.

Means there is a diminished transport capacity for the owning unit.

Though SdKfz-radio is listed in the Estab, there is no data collected against that designator other than what would normally be used to calculate maneuver / transport capability. So, the equipment is actually a transport platform that has a radio installed. It's loss isn't what is known as a "communications kill" (e.g. denying the platform's assigned crew the ability to communicate with other radio units while the platform itself continues to function in its other missions), but is primarily another "mobility kill" with perhaps some elimination of the unit's ability to target bombardment if the unit is eligible for such a role on the battlefield and all SdKfz-radios assigned it are lost.

I base this on how the logistics organization that employed me used Tables of Organization and Equipment (TO&E) to calculate combat capability (ability to fire on enemy units, maneuver into position to fire, and ability to keep peer units and higher headquarters informed of unit status) based on the equipment assigned real military units. The Estab file contains a subset of the calculable TO&E data used to perform the military organization planning done in current armies. That Estab subset data is aimed primarily at World War II era calculations of maneuver and combat capability with a binary communications capability (either you have a radio or you don't) included.



Take care,

jim
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RE: influence of non-combat equipment

Post by GoodGuy »

see my post below
"Aw Nuts"
General Anthony McAuliffe
December 22nd, 1944
Bastogne

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Arjuna
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RE: influence of non-combat equipment

Post by Arjuna »

The loss of a single motor cycle will probably have no impact on the unit's capabilities. However, motorised units that no longer have the vehicles required to lift the force will be deemed "non-motorised" and move as foot units.
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RE: influence of non-combat equipment

Post by GoodGuy »

ORIGINAL: pekische

What influence does non-combat equipment have in unit? For example motorcycle - i lost only one motorcycle in my Flak Bn. What is the effect for this Bn?

What effect would you expect, if a Flak Bn lost one motorcycle? There is none.

It is different if a Flak Bn loses most or all of its towing vehicles (tractors, halftracks), as its heavy weapons then would suffer of the loss or lack of mobility: Flak guns can still be moved by troops towing or pushing them, but that would mean that the unit would be limited to walking speed (or even less, due to the weight of each gun). In the game, units will lose its "wheeled" status after a certain percentage of its tractor pool had been destroyed.
SdKfz-Radio [car]


Funkwagen (Sd.kfz Radio Cars) were light armored scout cars (wheeled) or heavy armoured scout cars, and they were either unarmed (ie. Sd.Kfz 260 + 261) or equipped with a machine gun, only, usually, but some of the ~190 captured French Panhard 178 (AMD {Automitrailleuse de Découverte} Panhard Model 1935) were converted to Radio Cars, where I am not sure whether they kept their 25mm-guns or not. All Panhards were re-designated "Pz.Späh P 204(f) and issued to the 9th and 20th Panzer-Divisions either shortly before or right after the invasion in Russia started, as full scout complements (these divisions did not receive german scout vehicles until the vehicle pool got "refreshed").

Later ARVs featured AT guns, short-barreled 75mm Inf guns, etc.

The majority of these Recon and radio vehicles were closed-top vehicles, but the factories delivered quite some open-top Armored Scout Vehicles (ARV) and halftracks (eg. radio halftrack 250/3 in Africa, Rommel's favored command vehicle) equipped with capable radios and antennas, as well.
For example, the Sdkfz 260 and derivates (1.4m to 2m rod Antenna) and the 261 (retractable frame or "star" antenna) both offered protection, good radio ranges and high speeds:
  • Quite contrary to popular belief, the Sdkfz 263 (huge frame antenna plus a retractable radio mast that could be extended up to 8 {radio FuG 9 and above} or even 9 meters with a crankshaft drive) wasn't just used by Recon Bns, but it was also used by signal Bns (or signal detachments) and by higher and highest echelon Army staffs (means it was used or employed by HQ/staff posts), too.
  • Sd.Kfz 232, a heavy radio vehicle (a ARV built by Magirus and Daimler-Benz), had a (cruising) range of 300 kilometers, due to its large fuel tank of 105 liters, and despite its 6-cyl. engine with 68 HP (DB engine, 3.66 liters) or 70 HP (Magirus engine, 4.56 liters), where the Daimler-Benz engine consumed 40 liters per 100 km. It could go 62 km/h , in forward gear AND in reverse gear !
    Not very economical, fuel consumption-wise, but still a very effective scout vehicle in terms of cruising range, if compared to the range of the early german scout car/radio car "workhorses", the Sd.Kfz 221/222/223 (257 km range, 80 km/h top speed), where the 223 was the dedicated radio car version (with FuG 10 SE 30 and FuG 12 later on) and the dedicated radio scout cars 260/261 (1941 + 1942).
  • The 221/222 turned out to be less effective on Russian terrain, so it was replaced by the halftrack 250/9 (which featured the same turret), and limited to use in Western Europe and North Africa. The 223 radio version was also removed from the Russian front and replaced by the 250/3, the radio version of the halftrack.
  • Late 8-wheel-versions of the Sd.Kfz 231 featured the Büssing-NAG L 8 V engines, with 8-cylinders, 150 hp (90 km/h), 180 hp with an improved version (100 km/h), and all-wheel-drive.
  • Sd.Kfz 234/1 had a 360 liters-tank, which allowed for a range of 1000 kilometers on flat terrain, a top-speed of 90 km/h - with its 12-cyl. engine. Weight: 11.5 tons.
  • The new Sd.Kfz 234/2, dubbed "Puma" later on, featured a turret with the 50mm-KwK 39 gun and a "pig's head"-mantlet, a similar weight (11.74 tons) and top speed, afaik. Very late versions (25 manufactured in 1944, 73 produced in 1945) featured the 75mm-Pak(AT)40 L/46-gun, as the short-barreled 75mm-KwK 37 (assault gun) of version 234/3 (88 vehicles in 1944), had not performed well.
  • Sd.Kfz 247 was an armored 4-wheel car (unarmed) used as mobile command post in Recon Bns, exclusively, afaik. Its 8-cyl. 3.8 liters engine could maintain a top-speed of 80 km/h.

That said, I don't think that these high levels of mobility and speed (of up to 100 km/h, depending on the vehicle/version) are rendered in the game, let alone the impressive ranges of some of those vehicles (up to 1000 km).
Consumption and resupply requests in the game don't seem to reflect actual historical sizes of such cars' fuel tanks and their engines' actual fuel consumption.
Considering the described speeds and ranges, Armored Scout/recon units featuring one of the vehicles mentioned above, should be detached and displayed/organized as individual platoons or scout "detachments" (of recon Coys) in the game, in order to benefit from their speed, impressive range and recon/radio capabilities.

While the Germans used "Fieseler Storch" planes (short range aerial recon), medium and even long range recon planes (their few long range quad-engine planes were assigned to naval recon mission over the Atlantic ocean, exclusively, though), the Germans had a lack of medium and long range recon capabilities, so they heavily depended on fast scouting on the ground, using vehicles with corresponding radio ranges.

The consistent lack of aerial recon put the Germans at a serious disadvantage, especially before upcoming Russian grand operations, but also before or during their attacks on Stalingrad (where they did not recon/interdict Russian artillery and supply efforts on the right river bank) and at Kursk (where they didn't identify the several deep layers of Russian AT "belts" and fortifications).
Or when I lost SdKfz-Radio... again - what is the effect for future fighting of the unit without radio....

While the loss of a Sd.Kfz Radio ARV reduced a particular Recon company's capability to maintain medium/long range radio contact with HQ or combat units and to conduct deep recon missions outside normal radio range, the loss of a single radio car did not affect a recon unit's capabilities to scout or patrol, plus a recon company still had at least 2 more radio vehicles to replace an individual radio car. Furthermore, the Recon Abteilung (Bn) could replace the vehicle with a radio car from a sister recon Coy.

In the game, the loss of a radio car will not affect the ability to spot (thus report) enemy units.

Historically, armored radio cars were not only used as mobile command posts or communication hubs, they also served as long range recon vehicles, executing long range recon (Russia, North Africa) missions. Some of them were sent out alone (means 1 or 2 vehicles max., like in North Africa, eg. to find alt routes (like the special forces unit Sonderverband Brandenburg's secret mission to Asyut, just 375 km south of Cairo, to drop off 2 secret agents {Johannes Eppler and a radio operator} who then made it to Cairo, in May 1942), or to scout and exploit gaps in enemy defensive lines, or even in small groups (with and without escorts) as recon-spearhead and/or to screen enemy lines and enemy movement. Another method was that armed scout cars would screen the area, report sightings to the radio scout car, which then relayed the info to the HQ or to medium/heavy combat vehicles.

Let's say a recon element had lost the only radio car at its disposal, then it would have had an impact on intel, thus on command and control, IF the recon element's remaining vehicles were already operating outside their specific (limited) radio ranges, because command HQ would have less or even no info about enemy movement in that particular area.

The radio car or the command car (both with extensive radio range, and therefor less space for guns/weapons or ammunition) usually maintained radio contact either with the closest spearheading combat unit, with the Division's Radio Company/signal Bn, or with a unit's radio troop/platoon. Some radio cars were also equipped with radios covering the frequencies used by Luftwaffe units, in order to be able to contact/coordinate with airforce units conducting air-to-ground missions.

Afaik, a motorized radio troop ("Funktrupp") had the Kfz 15 or the Kfz 17 (regular truck housing large stationary radio equipment in its freight hold, and equipped with a 8-10m mast antenna) at its disposal, where the latter was also used by the Luftwaffe as radio control ("tower") on airfields, due to its radio's long range.

German radios came in packs, featuring two (independent) devices or two boxes, featuring either transmitter and receiver, or radio and battery box, except for the portable field radios, where radio and battery was combined in a kind of backpack case with antenna, that could be carried by one soldier.

Early small tanks had only a receiver, where only the command vehicle featured both, transmitter and receiver.
While the receivers offered some range, early transmitter models lacked output (transmission) power.
  • Portable "Tornister" (Knapsack) radios (clunky boxes looking like flight cases, either carried by one or by 2 soldiers, depending on the model) were used by inf forward artillery observers and other troops. Model "d2", for example, consisted of 2 cases (radio + battery), where each case had a weight of 11 kg.
  • The knapsack Radio "b1" (freq.: 3 - 6.6 MHz, output: 0,6 Watt), usually used by artillery units, mainly for the communication between the Artillery Regiment HQ and its Bns, had a range of 10 km (voice radio), and a range of 25 km if using morse telegraphy.
    The knapsack radio "d2" (34-38 MHz, 1 Watt) was used by infantry units, and had a range of 4 km for voice transmissions and 17 km if sending in morse mode.

    B1 and some other models either operated in short wave range or lower medium wave range, which made them vulnerable to bad weather conditions too, in addition to unfavorable terrain. Still, with favorable weather conditions, ranges of 100 km were very well possible. It was very hard to compute this and Radio operators were usually not able/trained to do that, so that such large radio ranges could be considered to be some rare coincidence or "luck".
  • Receiver "Tornisterempfänger b" was a special version that featured a receiver only, but it was able to pick up a very wide range of frequencies, ranging from 96.6 kHz to 7096 kHz (7.096 MHz).
  • The combined backpack field radios mentioned above (with the Model "b" being the most widely used version) were usually used for communication and coordination of Inf elements with tank elements, and with Model "h" for communication between infantry and assault artillery (where the assault artillery usually had a Fu.15 UKW radio set that did not contain a transmitter), but these devices' radio transmission ranges did not exceed 1 to 1.2 kilometers.
  • The Germans did not manage to get a miniaturized hand-held radio comparable to the very capable Quartz controlled US "walkie talkie" to serial production stage until October 1944, where they then started to issue these radios (dubbed "Dorette", containing a new/small type of tube) in very small numbers, due to the low production output of dry batteries needed for these models. The Dorette featured a range of 3 km.
  • Despite being portable, the knapsack radios offered ranges of 5-25 km already, depending on type of antenna, operation mode (voice or morse) and type/layout of the terrain.

Due to the somewhat limited transmission range of "regular" scout cars (means those ARVs that were not dedicated radio vehicles), a recon unit that lost its only available radio car - resulting in operating outside its radio transmission range - could not call in air strikes/artillery bombardments or report enemy positions and movement; it had to return to a position within the radio range boundaries or dispatch a messenger.
  • Many Armored recon cars (means regular "Sd.Kfz" armored recon cars, not their dedicated "Funk" {radio} versions) were not equipped with radio sets, initially, they got equipped with radios eventually, like the Sd.Kfz 231 with the FuG 12 (80 Watts output) in 1942. The 221 series received radios in 1941, 222 and 223 in 1942.
  • The output power and transmission range of the radios in the "regular" heavy recon vehicles (ie. 231, 233,234/1-4) still exceeded the power/range of radios in tanks (20 Watts output max.), command tanks (30 Watts) and command halftracks (15 Watts max.), even if they were not equipped with the long 8-10 meters antennas and radios of their dedicated "Funkwagen" ("radio car") counterpart versions that featured transmitters with up to 100 Watts output power, or radio halftracks with transmitters with up to 80 Watts output.

According to german sources, for the majority of recon missions, the heavy Sd.Kfz 231 scout vehicle was employed in a group consisting of 2 light armored recon vehicles and 1 heavy armored recon vehicle (the 231), or a pair of one 231 and one 232 (the radio version of the 231, to cater for long radio distances) for deep recon missions.
According to the KStN, a Panzer-recon company had three Sd.Kfz. 231 and three Sd.Kfz. 232, until 1943.



That said, it would be desirable to detach long range scout elements as well as to consider radio ranges in the game. If a unit would be out of radio range on large maps (40+ km), it would neither be able to contact artillery units to call in arty bombardments, nor would it be able to call in air strikes or report enemy positions to HQ.

It would be interesting to have another feature where a deep recon unit would "freeze", means where the commander (player) then would not be able to control the unit anymore, once it would leave the radio range boundaries, so that friendly intel would only report the "last known position". Corresponding to the aggro level (say min.) and route (say avoid enemy), such unit would then have to make it back to friendly lines on its own (using a tiny routine), reporting
  • a) spotted enemy units/positions along its route
  • b) back to HQ (which would put it back under the player's control)

only AFTER it had returned to player controlled territory or to the radio range boundary[/b].
"Aw Nuts"
General Anthony McAuliffe
December 22nd, 1944
Bastogne

---
"I've always felt that the AA (Alied Assault engine) had the potential to be [....] big."
Tim Stone
8th of August, 2006
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