Why is it non-historical that the Soviets could have run?

[fbs]

ORIGINAL: The Guru
If, as Hitler, there is no limit to your decision spectrum, then why not, indeed, streamline production immediately, levy the Volksturm in 1941, issue adequate winter supplies to the Army, recall the Einsatzgruppen and implement friendly politics in the conquered territories to increase Hiwi flow and reduce partisan activity, etc.

Exactly the point. Some of these make a convincing case (at least for me), like going to war production in 1941. That, I think, is within the reality of what could have been possible with better planning. Other actions, like treating the occupied territories friendly, seem quite improbable with Hitler being the homicidal maniac he was.

On the Soviet side, the question is whether it could have been possible (or not) that Stalin could have authorized retreat, at about 2-3 weeks into the war. The point for retreat is that Russia did exactly that against Napoleon, that the USSR did very poorly in the Winter War, and Stalin authorized the retreat to Stalingrad in 1942. So, if Stalin got in that mindset in 1942, why couldn't he have reached the same mindset in 1941?

On the other hand, there is one guy that does (serious) gaming of political thinking, and he says he can predict most government's actions with great accuracy by focusing on what the government leaders should do in order to keep themselves in power. If that's true for Stalin, then perhaps the main argument for not retreating is not that Stalin was an idiot, but that he probably thought he would not survive that retreat. The argument for this point of view is that in 1942 he was politically stronger, while in late Jun-1941 he at one point thought he would be shot by his party (that's documented).

[The Guru]

So as the OKH commander you can do what ever you want without a buffoon's meddling, but as STAVKA the player is subject to the vagaries of Uncle Joe???

Not at all. As I said previously:

This is why I don't consider the runaway tactic as plausible and it shouldn't therefore be allowed, at least that easily, in an historical game.
The same is true for the Wehrmacht fleeing back to Poland for Xmas 1941, btw.

For the exact same reasons I think it is essential to compute Hitler into the equation too.
This is why I am all in favour of SD conditions that go both ways. In my opinion, the Germans must attempt to maintain their encroachment in Russia as deep as possible as far as mid-1944 at least, because Hitler still expected to pull some magic trick and win the war.
The problem with the conventional campaign VC - I have mentioned this many times before (I'm not much of a "name" on this forum so there was little or no reaction) is that for the German they are expressed negatively, that is, lose the war as late as possible. Yet, for Hitler and the Germans, it was never a question of trying to make the agony as long as possible. It was victory or death, and they would have been no particular feeling of "better performance" if they had collapsed in June rather than May. So while it is stupid for the german WitE player to gamble his army in a high risk offensive strategy, it made perfect sense from the historical point of view. (interestingly, it is precisely this kind of "wargamer" point of view that leads many people to say that Citadel or the Battle of the Bulge were a waste of resources. It was not, it was the right thing to try, even with 1% chance of success.)

The German player in WitE, depending on the situation, might prepare for the long defensive war as early as the first snows of 1941. Why the hell would he burn his forces in a desperate and overstretched attempt to reach the capital? Why would he ever want to head for the Caucasian oilfields?

This is why I think the campaign VC should be kinda modelled on the scenario ones, with high Victory points for distant locations, hexes near Moscow, etc, to give an incentive for "grabbing that extra city", and a penalty for being too pusillanimous.

[SigUp]

ORIGINAL: fbs

On the Soviet side, the question is whether it could have been possible (or not) that Stalin could have authorized retreat, at about 2-3 weeks into the war. The point for retreat is that Russia did exactly that against Napoleon, that the USSR did very poorly in the Winter War, and Stalin authorized the retreat to Stalingrad in 1942. So, if Stalin got in that mindset in 1942, why couldn't he have reached the same mindset in 1941?

*sigh* Once again, Stalin did not authorize a retreat to Stalingrad. He ordered the Red Army to fight where they stood. But after the Germans trashed the Soviet formations in front of Voronezh, parts of the Red Army lost discipline and flooded backwards. Why else do you think did Stalin think it was necessary to issue Order No. 227 and order the troops to create units shooting people fleeing? You are trying to justify the Red Army running East with a historical inaccuracy.

[The Guru]

Stalin did not authorize a retreat to Stalingrad

I concur. As I mentioned in my earlier post, that "retreat" started as a rout

So, if Stalin got in that mindset in 1942, why couldn't he have reached the same mindset in 1941

So he actually did not get into that mindset. He only reached some limited acceptance of the idea of retreat during the Caucasus episode. And only after one year of one after the other abysmal failures at mandated counterattacks. So no, no way he could have got into that mindset in 1941.

[Easo79]

ORIGINAL: SigUp

ORIGINAL: fbs

On the Soviet side, the question is whether it could have been possible (or not) that Stalin could have authorized retreat, at about 2-3 weeks into the war. The point for retreat is that Russia did exactly that against Napoleon, that the USSR did very poorly in the Winter War, and Stalin authorized the retreat to Stalingrad in 1942. So, if Stalin got in that mindset in 1942, why couldn't he have reached the same mindset in 1941?

*sigh* Once again, Stalin did not authorize a retreat to Stalingrad. He ordered the Red Army to fight where they stood. But after the Germans trashed the Soviet formations in front of Voronezh, parts of the Red Army lost discipline and flooded backwards. Why else do you think did Stalin think it was necessary to issue Order No. 227 and order the troops to create units shooting people fleeing? You are trying to justify the Red Army running East with a historical inaccuracy.

It seems to me that both of you are partially correct.

"More significantly, the German advance (in 1942) failed to duplicate the massive prisoner hauls of the previous year. Stalin and Timoshenko had learned from their mistakes, and on 6 July , the Stavka wisely directed the Southwestern and Southern Fronts to conduct a strategic retreat, rather than to stand and fight" (Glantz, When Titans clashed).

Order 227 was issued 3 weeks after that instruction (which did not allowed a retreat all the way to Stalingrad).

It seems that there was a change in mindset after all, but that this was prompted by the previous failures. How many failures were necessary to accept than running East was sometimes the best thing to do can only be speculated over.

[Walloc]

ORIGINAL: The Guru

This is why I think the campaign VC should be kinda modelled on the scenario ones, with high Victory points for distant locations, hexes near Moscow, etc, to give an incentive for "grabbing that extra city", and a penalty for being too pusillanimous.

I understand and agree that, that might happen depending on players psyche. On the other hand it doesnt only give that incetives. U might as well forster a i grab all up to a line. Then i fortify this line with intend to hold on for longer. Ala Pelton or Stef defensive strategies. If ur able to hold that line longer going WWI than what u would be able to grab and hold by being offensive. Then the VP system forster a defensive game where possibly again depending om player psyche u would for go a 42 offensive amd a 43 counter attack. If u have achieved a line in 41 that give enough VP to give u victory if ur able to hold on.

The just grab the next city might work on some ppl possibly ending in a Stalingrad. The problem is that it just doesnt only give that incentive. It also gives the incentive to avoid a Stalingrad and the losses of such if by going defensive once reached a certain line where VP is enough to if u just hold on to that for X longer.

VP isnt necesarrily a magic cure. The longer a scenario/campaign becomes the more variables plays in. In a short scn where teh attacker/defender normally is more made up by pre hand conditions pre its much easier to make such work with out having ways of gaming the system.

VP in the campaigns are clearly a voiced opinion of many. Just saying this can just as well become a system that is being gamed too. Unless u have a stringent set of take city X by then and also city Y by then and changing yearly, which what u could do but u then also reduce teh player ability to create his own campaigns. If u hafta in eseence through gaining enough VP in 41 to hafta as german to go for both Leningrad, Kharkov and Rhzev. Then u reduce the player ability to say ill go for a Leningrad option this time around rather than a AGC advance and u forced to take city X Y and Z else u dont gain enough VP. U get all the more predicteble campaigns. If u make a option of VP is spread out all over the map and its up too players to get which ones they want. U Possibly end up in the above stated case where u dont necesarrily foster a offensive german campaign in 42+ but hey ill just sit on these cities with the manpower boosts given by the game going for the WWI solution. VP for cities doesnt only give the incentive u just get 1 more it as said also depending on player psyches givs the incitives to hold them and more so than gaining new ones.

In short incentivces when going a turn based VP system isnt always as clear as ppl might think and it becomes yet another system that can possibly be gamed.

Kind regards,

Rasmus

[loki100]

ORIGINAL: SigUp
*sigh* Once again, Stalin did not authorize a retreat to Stalingrad. He ordered the Red Army to fight where they stood. But after the Germans trashed the Soviet formations in front of Voronezh, parts of the Red Army lost discipline and flooded backwards. Why else do you think did Stalin think it was necessary to issue Order No. 227 and order the troops to create units shooting people fleeing? You are trying to justify the Red Army running East with a historical inaccuracy.

to be honest in the period May-July 1942 Stalin veered all over the place around this idea. Mekhlis' grand screw up in the Crimea fed into his opinion that the Red Army had to attack as it lacked the discipline to defend (hence the decision to push on with the Kharkov offensive). At the start of Blau on the Voronezh axis, he switched from defend at all costs to allowing a flexible retreat. At Rostov, the NKVD formations held the west bank till the bulk of the Soviet formations had crossed safely and then held it till the bridges were properly blown.

By accident, the Soviets managed a flexible defense along the lower Don but a lot of Soviet memoires note just how demolarised those units were as they fell back to Stalingrad.

I think Order 227 has to be seen as a realistic (if needlessly cruel) statement that as at Moscow in November 1941 there simply was no more room to retreat?

[fbs]

ORIGINAL: SigUp
*sigh* Once again, Stalin did not authorize a retreat to Stalingrad. He ordered the Red Army to fight where they stood. But after the Germans trashed the Soviet formations in front of Voronezh, parts of the Red Army lost discipline and flooded backwards. Why else do you think did Stalin think it was necessary to issue Order No. 227 and order the troops to create units shooting people fleeing? You are trying to justify the Red Army running East with a historical inaccuracy.

John Keegan, in "The Second World War": "July 1942... At the Stavka, A. M. Vasilevsky had succeeded in persuading Stalin that "stand fast" orders [I reckon he means #227] issued for their own sake were undesirable, since they served the Ostheer's ends, and in extracting permission for threatened Russian formations to slip away out of danger."

History Place: "Hitler's offensive, which he named Operation Blue... it was almost too easy. On closer look, German field commanders realized that Russian battle tactics had changed. Instead of stubbornly standing their ground and inviting encirclement, the Red Army had adopted a new strategy, the fighting retreat, to minimize losses and draw the Germans ever deeper into Russia, thereby stretching already-overtaxed supply lines to the breaking point."

I reckon I can find a few more references that Stalin indeed authorized retreats in 1942 - those two took some 10 minutes only.

But I give you part of the point - there is a distinction between a "fighting retreat" that would appease Stalin, and shamelessly "running away" like peeps do in games here. Perhaps the "running like a gazelle" strategy is indeed not realistic, but the fighting retreat was.

[fbs]

Btw, one way that could simulate Stalin's interference and his liking for stand-and-die postures may be to add a random chance to freeze Soviet units for a turn in 1941 whenever they move East more than x hexes...

That certainly would be stand and die in 1941.

[SigUp]

I don't have my source, that quotes from orders to the Soviet formations, here. When I find it, I'll post it here.

[fbs]

Well, you convinced me that "running like a rabbit" was indeed non-historical.

How do you feel about fighting retreat? Is it realistic to allow the Soviet player some sort of limited retreat?

[SigUp]

ORIGINAL: fbs

Well, you convinced me that "running like a rabbit" was indeed non-historical.

How do you feel about fighting retreat? Is it realistic to allow the Soviet player some sort of limited retreat?

I have nothing against limited retreats, for example out of obvious pocket situations. While I am a proponent of historical plausibility, you don't get much of a game if you are 100% restricted to historicity. My issue is, it is a wargame, and a wargame shouldn't be dominated by non-combat situations.

[The Guru]

Regarding VP, I don't mean them to straightjacket the players into some predefined and mandatory axes of progression. I think they should indeed be spread all over them map with distant and valuable locations being more valuable (I thnk there should be a VP count for how close the germans get to Moscow). I also think there should be a per turn count, so as give incentive to the "hold to the very last man and bullet" and the dilemna of holding longer vs risking encirclement.

VP should be seen as a "confidence capital" that you need to obtain and maintain to stay in the race. Of course, the necessary amount depends on the timeline...

Now, I admit VPs are an abstract concept , and this is why I am strongly - if not fanatically - in favour of a VP<>National morale direct incidence, so as to produce a tangible effect for under or overperformance
It would also motivate a player to push further even if he has attained its "confidence VP total"

There is also a brilliant concept in Totaler Krieg the wargame which I think is worth exploring: the final German VP score is adjusted by the "Highwater score", that is, how far the Wehrmacht has been. Since the victory conditions of a wargame should reflect performance and not simply who won the war, I think that is perfectly justifiable.
The concept even brings a brilliantly smart solution to a question that many WWII strategic wargames before have never managed to tackle satisfactorily: the German player decides when he places his highwater marker. After that he no longer scores for any further conquests (so basically he doesn't go any further and just tries to defend Festung Europa. But when he places his highwater marker, he receives increased replacements and fortification benefits. ( The Germans just realized they are in for a long and difficult war and push their war economy one gear up). So players try and go as far as they can during the "optimism phase", always hoping to get that extra city to increase the score, and then, when they give up all hope to push any further, they place their marker and enjoy the defensive benefits.

Why should a German player that has retreated to Poland in 1941 and lost Berlin in June 1945 be considered to have outperformed its historical counterpart. I would make for much more a flamboyant game (and more realistic) to consider teh performance of a German player that managed to grab Moscow, or Leningrad, or the Caucasus oilfields, or all three, even if he loses Berlin in May or even one month earlier.

[Aurelian]

Russia Besieged has victory conditions I think would work well.

There is no draw, one side either wins or not.

German Victory:

Capture Lgrad, Moscow, and Sgrad and hold them for a complete turn.

Or Baku, Astrakan. Sgrad. and Voronezh fro a complete turn.

They also win if the Russians don't win by Jun 45.

Russia wins:

Take Berlin by the end of June 45.

Prevent the Germans from:

Holding 16 major cities at the end of Dec 42.

9 major cities at the end of Dec 43.

4 major cities at the end of Dec 44.

If the Germans fail to do any of it, they lose.

[SigUp]

Another idea to specifically deter Soviet running in 1941 could be tying parts of the blizzard effects to the numbers of casualties caused by the Red Army. If the casualties are below a certain amount they will not kick in (e.g. like due to unexpectedly low ammunition and fuel expenditures, rail capacity is freed up to send winter equipment forward).

[Flaviusx]

ORIGINAL: SigUp

Another idea to specifically deter Soviet running in 1941 could be tying parts of the blizzard effects to the numbers of casualties caused by the Red Army. If the casualties are below a certain amount they will not kick in (e.g. like due to unexpectedly low ammunition and fuel expenditures, rail capacity is freed up to send winter equipment forward).

This doesn't really make any sense to me. The Soviets would have been winterized in any case, the failure was all on the German end. Their logistical system more or less collapsed.

Me, I favor hitting the side that runs with random general reassignments and a hefty AP hit. Your perfect command arrangements will be...rearranged by Stalin or Hitler. And the AP hit means you'll be stuck with their pet generals for a bit.

The AP hit alone should be a big deterrent to running on the Soviet side. For the Germans, not quite so much, but still.

[SigUp]

ORIGINAL: Flaviusx

ORIGINAL: SigUp

Another idea to specifically deter Soviet running in 1941 could be tying parts of the blizzard effects to the numbers of casualties caused by the Red Army. If the casualties are below a certain amount they will not kick in (e.g. like due to unexpectedly low ammunition and fuel expenditures, rail capacity is freed up to send winter equipment forward).

This doesn't really make any sense to me. The Soviets would have been winterized in any case, the failure was all on the German end. Their logistical system more or less collapsed.

Me, I favor hitting the side that runs with random general reassignments and a hefty AP hit. Your perfect command arrangements will be...rearranged by Stalin or Hitler. And the AP hit means you'll be stuck with their pet generals for a bit.

I'm talking about the Germans. If the Soviets run and thereby inflict too few casualties on the Wehrmacht, a certain part of the blizzard penalties won't kick in. Although it's somewhat unrealistic, one can imagine it as some kind of scenario in which the consumption is low enough to allow more trains with winter equipment to roll forward, or something like that.

In another matter, are you doing beta testing for WITW?

[Flaviusx]

I'm retired from beta testing.

The blizzard needs to handled outside the victory point system altogether, imo. I want it redesigned from the ground up to more closely approximate the historical effects. I do not think Soviet withdrawals from the front should affect it in any way, however. Rather, it would be mitigated by how far the Axis advances, if they go into early winter quarters, that sort of thing. A sliding scale of penalties depending on conditions and choices made, to be applied on a unit basis, rather than globally. The logistical breakdown would still occur, but not necessarily so severely as is now the case or as globally.

[Walloc]

ORIGINAL: The Guru

There is also a brilliant concept in Totaler Krieg the wargame which I think is worth exploring: the final German VP score is adjusted by the "Highwater score", that is, how far the Wehrmacht has been. Since the victory conditions of a wargame should reflect performance and not simply who won the war, I think that is perfectly justifiable.
The concept even brings a brilliantly smart solution to a question that many WWII strategic wargames before have never managed to tackle satisfactorily: the German player decides when he places his highwater marker. After that he no longer scores for any further conquests (so basically he doesn't go any further and just tries to defend Festung Europa. But when he places his highwater marker, he receives increased replacements and fortification benefits. ( The Germans just realized they are in for a long and difficult war and push their war economy one gear up). So players try and go as far as they can during the "optimism phase", always hoping to get that extra city to increase the score, and then, when they give up all hope to push any further, they place their marker and enjoy the defensive benefits.

Why should a German player that has retreated to Poland in 1941 and lost Berlin in June 1945 be considered to have outperformed its historical counterpart. I would make for much more a flamboyant game (and more realistic) to consider teh performance of a German player that managed to grab Moscow, or Leningrad, or the Caucasus oilfields, or all three, even if he loses Berlin in May or even one month earlier.

They shouldnt but ur line thot is fine when ppl "follow the script" problem is what happens when ppl doesnt follow the script.
Imagien a pre case blue situasion: So u get 10 VP per turn for Stalingrad and 2 for Rostov per turn. Incentive is to go for Stalingrad if ppl follow the script.
Problem is u might hold Stalingrad for 1 turn but becasue u overextend ur self u suffer a Uranus type defeat that Means u will hafta retreat back to Kursk.
Now if u instead make a Defensive at Rostov, keeping it and the cities behind for 5 turns longer than in the above example. U if succesfull u gained more VP than going for Stalingrad and keeping Stalingrad for 1 turn.
Doing a 1 hex per turn defense as per shown by several. Just saying the incentices u think u forster isnt as clear cut and it might as well better pay to make a WWI defences than going for Stalingrad. Thats the incentive u ALSO foster by VP per turns. That being if i understand u exactly not what u want.

I like the highwater mark idea but u would have to rebalance 1941 completly. Taking away all the top german players u still easily see advances beyound the historic ones as it is atm. A self declared newbie as Bozo makes it Tambov in pbems. Pre 1.07.06 Leningrad fell in 80% of the AARs.

Ppl seem to forget why ppl run and think that if we make them not run that it makes the situasion better. U would have to rebalance making teh russian side much stronger than now if u gona have a sitasuion where the russian side can survive non running, and at the same time keep the german to a on average near historical advance in 41(if using highwater mark idea) with the current setup of logistics(or lack there of), Lvov, airrefueling and so on.

Kind regards,

Rasmus

[Bozo_the_Clown]

A self declared newbie as Bozo makes it Tambov in pbems.

Walloc,
I really made an impression on you with that Tambov move. [:)] However, in that game my opponent just retreated, retreated, retreated. He gave up everything without a fight. Even Leningrad was barely defended. The slightest threat of a pocket was answered with a full retreat of the entire front. It was a perfect example of a Soviet player preserving his troops and simply waiting for the blizzard. I believe in the entire game there was only one counterattack on turn 16. Not much fun but very effective.