Axis armour can't shoot
Moderators: Panther Paul, Arjuna
RE: Axis armour can't shoot
Talking about flimsy; look at the difference between the King Tiger and a Sherman. You must have a big pair of cojones if you in your 'Ronson' are gonna go fisticuffs with a Tiger.
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jimcarravall
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RE: Axis armour can't shoot
ORIGINAL: Ramses
Talking about flimsy; look at the difference between the King Tiger and a Sherman. You must have a big pair of cojones if you in your 'Ronson' are gonna go fisticuffs with a Tiger.
It's a kind of tortoise and hare situation.
The Tiger was massive, powerful, and capable of a one shot kill against a Sherman.
Unfortunately for the Nazis, the tortoise had a strong front and shoulder, but a rather weak butt. It couldn't kill enough massed hares to avoid being fatally shot in the butt when they scurried to the behind.
In the end, the war wasn't won by superior technology (until Hiroshima and Nagasaki), but by production capacity.
As JEB Stuart said, the guy who wins is he who gets there "the fustest with the mostest".
RIP in Hitler.
Take care,
jim
jim
RE: Axis armour can't shoot
Some great photographs Ramses, thanks for sharing [:)]
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Phoenix100
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RE: Axis armour can't shoot
Nice pics, Ramses! The La Gleize Tiger looked ok to me. Maybe they've given it a lick of paint. It had lots of interesting battle damage though, including a very deep (but still unsuccessful) penetration on the front armour, right at the apex. Loads of little bullet marks (or shrapnel, I wouldn't know) all over the place. The Panther in Grandmenil looked more compact, yes. It still has the engine in, apparently, which is rare. It has no real battle damage. Not sure where it came from (the guide said it was part of the Grandmenil battle) but it was abandoned, rather than knocked out.
I was stunned by the sheer quantity of metal in the things. Everything huge, massive, heavy. It made my arthritic fingers ache just imagining changing a track.
I was also very surprised by how the 'hilliness' (how steep everything was) of the Ardennes isn't captured very well even by google earth, and certainly not by the flat game maps. It really is striking. As is the massive restrictions on LOS caused by all the trees - not just woods and light woods, just rows of hedges and such like, dotted with trees, all over the place - in some parts less than there was in 1944, in some places more.
You would like the Dutch guy living in Grandmenil, Ramses (Bob Konings)who runs a great, relaxing guest house there (or his wife does) and does the tours. One of his Bulge websites - interesting reading - is www.grandmenil.com
I was stunned by the sheer quantity of metal in the things. Everything huge, massive, heavy. It made my arthritic fingers ache just imagining changing a track.
I was also very surprised by how the 'hilliness' (how steep everything was) of the Ardennes isn't captured very well even by google earth, and certainly not by the flat game maps. It really is striking. As is the massive restrictions on LOS caused by all the trees - not just woods and light woods, just rows of hedges and such like, dotted with trees, all over the place - in some parts less than there was in 1944, in some places more.
You would like the Dutch guy living in Grandmenil, Ramses (Bob Konings)who runs a great, relaxing guest house there (or his wife does) and does the tours. One of his Bulge websites - interesting reading - is www.grandmenil.com
RE: Axis armour can't shoot
That tank gets around! [;)]
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Phoenix100
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RE: Axis armour can't shoot
Great, Dave! When was that?
RE: Axis armour can't shoot
While we are on the subject of tanks, this is a great scene from the Band of Brothers movie. Although its just a movie, it does a good job of showing the kind of bravery you need to be able to get up close, and personal, with one of these monsters, to destroy it with hand help infantry AT weapons.
http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=szTGXeLk2Jg
http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=szTGXeLk2Jg
RE: Axis armour can't shoot
Just read a great section in a Jason Mark book I'm reading about 305th Pioneer Battalion. During a a preliminary attack on the 24th June 1942 A message came through "Pioneers to the front", a T34 was blocking the column path behind the lines in a fores near Zavodnyi, the anti tank guns couldn't get a good angle to get a shot off so it was down to the Pioneers to take it out..the Platoon set off with 3kg demo charges and anti tank mines..Greifter Schingitz sprinted upto the Tank to blow the tracks with the demo charge but it didn't cause any real damage so he fetched a second demo charge and got close enough again and this time it only blew and twisted the drive wheel. Lt Beigel then raced up and placed a anti tank mine with an igniter fuse on the armoured deck close to the turret but it failed to detonate so Unteroffizer Bub grabbed another 3kg demo charge ontop of the anti tank mine and ignited it. This charge combined with the anti tank mine cracked the armour plating and ripped the turret out of it's housing. Flame erupted from the Tank. All the way through this the Tank had been firing both it's main gun and it's MGs. Soon the crew tried to ge tout but where cut down by the waiting Pioneers. Friefter Steinacker was fatally wounded during this close combat after a burst of MG fire hit him in the stomach, fatally wounding him. Griefter Frank was slightly wounded in the right foot by shrapnel and Felwebel Emil Grassel was wounded in the right arm by a shell splinter.
RE: Axis armour can't shoot
It certainly did take an extraordinary type of person to go head to head with a tank, Jason. Ironically the thing tankers probably feared the most was infantry as well.
RE: Axis armour can't shoot
I would like to add another story about the sturdiness of tanks from the Eastern front; it is from the great read: "German small unit tactics in Russia" which is freely available on the internet. I think the story is originally from 'Panzer Operations' by Erhard Raus, I found it there as well.
When Germany launched her attack against Russia on the morning of 22 June 1941, Army Group North jumped off from positions along the border separating East Prussia from Lithuania. On D plus 1 the 6th Panzer Division, which was part of Army Group North, sians were knocked down by the impact. Before the prisoners could close in again, the sergeant freed his other arm and fired the machine pistol into the midst of the group. The effect of the fire was devastating. Only the lieutenant and a few others escaped; the rest were killed.
The sergeant and the driver returned to the bridgehead with the empty truck and informed their commanding officer that the only supply route to the bridgehead was blocked by a heavy tank of the KV type. The Russian tank crew had meanwhile severed telephone communication between the bridgehead and the division command post.
The Russian plan was not clear. In estimating the situation, the bridgehead commander felt that because of the encounter with the tank an attack against the rear of the bridgehead was to be expected; accordingly, he organized his force immediately for all-around defense. An antitank battery was moved to high ground near the command post, one of the howitzer batteries reversed its field of fire so as to face southwestward, and the engineer company prepared to mine the road and the area in front of the defense position. The tank battalion, which was deployed in a forest southeast of the bridgehead, prepared for a counterattack.
During the rest of the day the tank did not move. The next morning, 24 June, the division tried to send 12 supply trucks from Rossienie to the bridgehead. All 12 were destroyed by the Russian tank. A German reconnaissance patrol sent out around noon could find no evidence that a general Russian attack was impending.
The Germans could not evacuate their wounded from the bridgehead. Every attempt to bypass the tank failed because any vehicle that drove off the road got stuck in the mud and fell prey to Russians hiding in the surrounding forest.
On the same day, an antitank battery with 50-mm. guns was ordered to work its way forward and destroy the tank. The battery confidently accepted this mission. As the first guns approached to within 1,000 yards of the KV, it remained in place, apparently unaware of the German movement. Within the next 30 minutes the entire battery, well camouflaged, had worked its way to within firing range.
Still the tank did not move. It was such a perfect target that the battery commander felt that it must have been damaged and abandoned, but he nevertheless decided to fire. The first round, from about 600 yards, was a direct hit. A second and a third round followed. The troops assembled on the hill near the combat team's command post cheered like spectators at a shooting match. Still the tank did not move.
By the time that the eighth hit was scored, the Russian tank crew had discovered the position of the firing battery. Taking careful aim, they silenced the entire battery with a few 76-mm. shells, which destroyed two guns and damaged the others. Having suffered heavy casualties, the gun crews were withdrawn to avoid further losses. Not until after dark could the damaged guns be recovered.
Since the 50-mm. antitank guns had failed to pierce the 3-inch armor, it was decided that only the 88-mm. flak gun with its armor-piercing shells would be effective. That same afternoon an 88-mm. flak gun was pulled out of its position near Rossienie and cautiously moved up in the direction of the tank, which was then facing the bridgehead. Well camouflaged with branches and concealed by the burned-out German trucks lining the road, the gun safely reached the edge of the forest and stopped 900 yards from the tank.
Just as the German crew was maneuvering the gun into position, the tank swung its turret and fired, blasting the flak gun into a ditch. Every round scored a direct hit, and the gun crew suffered heavy casualties. Machinegun fire from the tank made it impossible to retrieve the gun or the bodies of the German dead. The Russians had allowed the gun to approach undisturbed, knowing that it was no threat while in motion and that the nearer it came the more certain was its destruction.
Meanwhile, the bridgehead's supplies were running so low that the troops had to eat their canned emergency rations. A staff meeting was therefore called to discuss further ways and means of dealing with the tank. It was decided that an engineer detachment should attempt to blow it up in a night operation.
When the engineer company commander asked for 12 volunteers, the men were so anxious to succeed where others had failed that the entire company of 120 volunteered. He ordered the company to count off and chose every tenth man. The detachment was told about its mission, given detailed instructions, and issued explosives and other essential equipment.
Under cover of darkness the detachment moved out, led by the company commander. The route followed was a little-used sandy path which led past Hill 400 and into the woods that surrounded the location of the tank. As the engineers approached the tank, they could distinguish its contours in the pale starlight. After removing their boots, they crawled to the edge of the road to observe the tank more closely and to decide how to approach their task.
Suddenly there was a noise from the opposite side of the road, and the movement of several dark figures could be discerned. The Germans thought that the tank crew had dismounted. A moment later, however, the sound of tapping against the side of the tank was heard and the turret was slowly raised. The figures handed something to the tank crew, and the sound of clinking dishes could be heard. The Germans concluded that these were partisans bringing food to the tank crew. The temptation to overpower them was great, and ,it probably would have been a simple matter. Such an action, however, would have alerted the tank crew and perhaps have wrecked the entire scheme. After about an hour the partisans withdrew, and the tank turret was closed.
It was about 0100 before the engineers could finally get to work. They attached one explosive charge to the track and the side of the tank and withdrew after lighting the fuse. A violent explosion ripped the air. The last echoes of the roar had hardly faded away when the tank's machineguns began to sweep the area with fire. The tank did not move. Its tracks appeared to be damaged, but no close examination could be made in the face of the intense machinegun fire. Doubtful of success, the engineer detachment returned to the bridgehead and made its report. One of the twelve men was listed as missing.
Shortly before daylight a second explosion was heard from the vicinity of the tank, again followed by the sound of machinegun fire; then, after some time had passed, silence reigned once more.
Later that same morning, as the personnel around the command post of Combat Team R were resuming their normal duties, they noticed a barefoot soldier with a pair of boots under his arm crossing the bivouac area. When the commanding officer halted the lone wanderer, all eyes turned to watch. The colonel was heard asking the soldier for an explanation of his unmilitary appearance. Soon the sound of their voices became inaudible as the two principals in this little drama engaged in earnest conversation.
As they talked, the colonel's face brightened, and after a few minutes he offered the soldier a cigarette, which the latter accepted, visibly embarrasssed. Finally, the colonel patted the soldier on the back, shook his hand, and the two parted, the soldier still carrying his boots. The curiosity of the onlookers was not satisfied until the order of the day was published, together with the following extract from the barefoot soldier's report:
I was detailed as an observer for the detachment that was sent to blow up the Russian tank. After all preparations had been made, the company commander and I attached a charge of about double the normal size to the tank track, and I returned to the ditch which was my observation post. The ditch was deep enough to offer protection against splinters, and I waited there to observe the effect of the explosion. The tank, however, covered the area with sporadic machinegun fire following the explosion. After about an hour, when everything had quieted down, I crept to the tank and examined the place where I had attached the charge. Hardly half of the track was destroyed, and I could find no other damage to the tank. I returned to the assembly point only to find that the detachment had departed. While looking for my boots I found that another demolition charge had been left behind. I took it, returned to the tank, climbed onto it, and fastened the charge to the gun barrel in the hope of destroying at least that part of the tank, the charge not being large enough to do any greater damage. I crept under the tank and detonated the charge. The tank immediately covered the edge of the forest with machinegun fire which did not cease until dawn, when I was finally able to crawl out from under the tank. When I inspected the effect of the demolition, I saw, to my regret, that the charge I had used was too weak. The gun was only slightly damaged. Upon returning to the assembly point, I found a pair of boots, which I tried to put on, but they were too small. Someone had apparently taken my boots by mistake. That is why I returned barefoot and late to my company.
Here was the explanation of the missing man, the morning explosion, and the second burst of machinegun fire.
Three German attempts had failed. The tank still blocked the road and could fire at will. Plan 4, calling for an attack on the tank by dive bombers, had to be canceled when it was learned that no such aircraft could be made available. Whether the dive bombers could have succeeded in scoring a direct hit on the tank is questionable, but it is certain that anything short of that would not have eliminated it.
Plan 5 involved a calculated risk and called for deceiving the tank crew. It was hoped that in this way German losses would be kept to a minimum. A feint frontal attack was to be executed by a tank formation approaching from \rarious points in the forest east of the road while another 88-mm. gun was to be brought up from Rossienie to destroy the tank. The terrain was quite suitable for this operation; the forest was lightly wooded and presented no obstacle to tank maneuver.
The German armor deployed and attacked the Russian tank from three sides. The Russian crew, clearly excited, swung the gun turret around and around in an effort to hit the German tanks which kept up a continuous fire from the woods.
Meanwhile, the 88-mm. gun took up a position to the rear of the tank. The very first round was a direct hit and, as the crew tried to turn the gun to the rear, a second and a third shell struck home. Mortally wounded, the tank remained motionless, but did not burn. Four more 88-mm. armor-piercing shells hit their mark. Then, following the last hit, the tank gun rose straight up as if, even now, to defy its attackers.
The Germans closest to the tank dismounted and moved in on their victim. To their great surprise they found that but two of the 88-mm. shells had pierced the tank armor, the five others having made only deep dents. Eight blue marks, made by direct hits of the 50-mm. antitank guns, were found. The results of the engineer attack had amounted to only a damaged track and a slight dent in the gun barrel. No trace of the fire from the German tanks could be found.
When Germany launched her attack against Russia on the morning of 22 June 1941, Army Group North jumped off from positions along the border separating East Prussia from Lithuania. On D plus 1 the 6th Panzer Division, which was part of Army Group North, sians were knocked down by the impact. Before the prisoners could close in again, the sergeant freed his other arm and fired the machine pistol into the midst of the group. The effect of the fire was devastating. Only the lieutenant and a few others escaped; the rest were killed.
The sergeant and the driver returned to the bridgehead with the empty truck and informed their commanding officer that the only supply route to the bridgehead was blocked by a heavy tank of the KV type. The Russian tank crew had meanwhile severed telephone communication between the bridgehead and the division command post.
The Russian plan was not clear. In estimating the situation, the bridgehead commander felt that because of the encounter with the tank an attack against the rear of the bridgehead was to be expected; accordingly, he organized his force immediately for all-around defense. An antitank battery was moved to high ground near the command post, one of the howitzer batteries reversed its field of fire so as to face southwestward, and the engineer company prepared to mine the road and the area in front of the defense position. The tank battalion, which was deployed in a forest southeast of the bridgehead, prepared for a counterattack.
During the rest of the day the tank did not move. The next morning, 24 June, the division tried to send 12 supply trucks from Rossienie to the bridgehead. All 12 were destroyed by the Russian tank. A German reconnaissance patrol sent out around noon could find no evidence that a general Russian attack was impending.
The Germans could not evacuate their wounded from the bridgehead. Every attempt to bypass the tank failed because any vehicle that drove off the road got stuck in the mud and fell prey to Russians hiding in the surrounding forest.
On the same day, an antitank battery with 50-mm. guns was ordered to work its way forward and destroy the tank. The battery confidently accepted this mission. As the first guns approached to within 1,000 yards of the KV, it remained in place, apparently unaware of the German movement. Within the next 30 minutes the entire battery, well camouflaged, had worked its way to within firing range.
Still the tank did not move. It was such a perfect target that the battery commander felt that it must have been damaged and abandoned, but he nevertheless decided to fire. The first round, from about 600 yards, was a direct hit. A second and a third round followed. The troops assembled on the hill near the combat team's command post cheered like spectators at a shooting match. Still the tank did not move.
By the time that the eighth hit was scored, the Russian tank crew had discovered the position of the firing battery. Taking careful aim, they silenced the entire battery with a few 76-mm. shells, which destroyed two guns and damaged the others. Having suffered heavy casualties, the gun crews were withdrawn to avoid further losses. Not until after dark could the damaged guns be recovered.
Since the 50-mm. antitank guns had failed to pierce the 3-inch armor, it was decided that only the 88-mm. flak gun with its armor-piercing shells would be effective. That same afternoon an 88-mm. flak gun was pulled out of its position near Rossienie and cautiously moved up in the direction of the tank, which was then facing the bridgehead. Well camouflaged with branches and concealed by the burned-out German trucks lining the road, the gun safely reached the edge of the forest and stopped 900 yards from the tank.
Just as the German crew was maneuvering the gun into position, the tank swung its turret and fired, blasting the flak gun into a ditch. Every round scored a direct hit, and the gun crew suffered heavy casualties. Machinegun fire from the tank made it impossible to retrieve the gun or the bodies of the German dead. The Russians had allowed the gun to approach undisturbed, knowing that it was no threat while in motion and that the nearer it came the more certain was its destruction.
Meanwhile, the bridgehead's supplies were running so low that the troops had to eat their canned emergency rations. A staff meeting was therefore called to discuss further ways and means of dealing with the tank. It was decided that an engineer detachment should attempt to blow it up in a night operation.
When the engineer company commander asked for 12 volunteers, the men were so anxious to succeed where others had failed that the entire company of 120 volunteered. He ordered the company to count off and chose every tenth man. The detachment was told about its mission, given detailed instructions, and issued explosives and other essential equipment.
Under cover of darkness the detachment moved out, led by the company commander. The route followed was a little-used sandy path which led past Hill 400 and into the woods that surrounded the location of the tank. As the engineers approached the tank, they could distinguish its contours in the pale starlight. After removing their boots, they crawled to the edge of the road to observe the tank more closely and to decide how to approach their task.
Suddenly there was a noise from the opposite side of the road, and the movement of several dark figures could be discerned. The Germans thought that the tank crew had dismounted. A moment later, however, the sound of tapping against the side of the tank was heard and the turret was slowly raised. The figures handed something to the tank crew, and the sound of clinking dishes could be heard. The Germans concluded that these were partisans bringing food to the tank crew. The temptation to overpower them was great, and ,it probably would have been a simple matter. Such an action, however, would have alerted the tank crew and perhaps have wrecked the entire scheme. After about an hour the partisans withdrew, and the tank turret was closed.
It was about 0100 before the engineers could finally get to work. They attached one explosive charge to the track and the side of the tank and withdrew after lighting the fuse. A violent explosion ripped the air. The last echoes of the roar had hardly faded away when the tank's machineguns began to sweep the area with fire. The tank did not move. Its tracks appeared to be damaged, but no close examination could be made in the face of the intense machinegun fire. Doubtful of success, the engineer detachment returned to the bridgehead and made its report. One of the twelve men was listed as missing.
Shortly before daylight a second explosion was heard from the vicinity of the tank, again followed by the sound of machinegun fire; then, after some time had passed, silence reigned once more.
Later that same morning, as the personnel around the command post of Combat Team R were resuming their normal duties, they noticed a barefoot soldier with a pair of boots under his arm crossing the bivouac area. When the commanding officer halted the lone wanderer, all eyes turned to watch. The colonel was heard asking the soldier for an explanation of his unmilitary appearance. Soon the sound of their voices became inaudible as the two principals in this little drama engaged in earnest conversation.
As they talked, the colonel's face brightened, and after a few minutes he offered the soldier a cigarette, which the latter accepted, visibly embarrasssed. Finally, the colonel patted the soldier on the back, shook his hand, and the two parted, the soldier still carrying his boots. The curiosity of the onlookers was not satisfied until the order of the day was published, together with the following extract from the barefoot soldier's report:
I was detailed as an observer for the detachment that was sent to blow up the Russian tank. After all preparations had been made, the company commander and I attached a charge of about double the normal size to the tank track, and I returned to the ditch which was my observation post. The ditch was deep enough to offer protection against splinters, and I waited there to observe the effect of the explosion. The tank, however, covered the area with sporadic machinegun fire following the explosion. After about an hour, when everything had quieted down, I crept to the tank and examined the place where I had attached the charge. Hardly half of the track was destroyed, and I could find no other damage to the tank. I returned to the assembly point only to find that the detachment had departed. While looking for my boots I found that another demolition charge had been left behind. I took it, returned to the tank, climbed onto it, and fastened the charge to the gun barrel in the hope of destroying at least that part of the tank, the charge not being large enough to do any greater damage. I crept under the tank and detonated the charge. The tank immediately covered the edge of the forest with machinegun fire which did not cease until dawn, when I was finally able to crawl out from under the tank. When I inspected the effect of the demolition, I saw, to my regret, that the charge I had used was too weak. The gun was only slightly damaged. Upon returning to the assembly point, I found a pair of boots, which I tried to put on, but they were too small. Someone had apparently taken my boots by mistake. That is why I returned barefoot and late to my company.
Here was the explanation of the missing man, the morning explosion, and the second burst of machinegun fire.
Three German attempts had failed. The tank still blocked the road and could fire at will. Plan 4, calling for an attack on the tank by dive bombers, had to be canceled when it was learned that no such aircraft could be made available. Whether the dive bombers could have succeeded in scoring a direct hit on the tank is questionable, but it is certain that anything short of that would not have eliminated it.
Plan 5 involved a calculated risk and called for deceiving the tank crew. It was hoped that in this way German losses would be kept to a minimum. A feint frontal attack was to be executed by a tank formation approaching from \rarious points in the forest east of the road while another 88-mm. gun was to be brought up from Rossienie to destroy the tank. The terrain was quite suitable for this operation; the forest was lightly wooded and presented no obstacle to tank maneuver.
The German armor deployed and attacked the Russian tank from three sides. The Russian crew, clearly excited, swung the gun turret around and around in an effort to hit the German tanks which kept up a continuous fire from the woods.
Meanwhile, the 88-mm. gun took up a position to the rear of the tank. The very first round was a direct hit and, as the crew tried to turn the gun to the rear, a second and a third shell struck home. Mortally wounded, the tank remained motionless, but did not burn. Four more 88-mm. armor-piercing shells hit their mark. Then, following the last hit, the tank gun rose straight up as if, even now, to defy its attackers.
The Germans closest to the tank dismounted and moved in on their victim. To their great surprise they found that but two of the 88-mm. shells had pierced the tank armor, the five others having made only deep dents. Eight blue marks, made by direct hits of the 50-mm. antitank guns, were found. The results of the engineer attack had amounted to only a damaged track and a slight dent in the gun barrel. No trace of the fire from the German tanks could be found.
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RE: Axis armour can't shoot
Panzer Operations is a superb book..I remember reading about that KV1..held them up for ages.
RE: Axis armour can't shoot
ORIGINAL: wodin
Panzer Operations is a superb book..
You remember the story about crossing the major swamps and finally reaching the Luga river and establishing the Porechye bridgehead Wodin? Superb reading indeed.
Sorry for hijacking this thread, only trying to make the wait for the test results a little more bearable.
RE: Axis armour can't shoot
Yep I do mate..thats where they bumped into the KV 1.
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Phoenix100
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- Joined: Tue Sep 28, 2010 12:26 pm
RE: Axis armour can't shoot
Great stories. Thanks Ramses, and Wodin.
Might look for that book.
Still REALLY enjoying your recom about Chill and the Jagdpanthers, Ramses. Superb book.
Might look for that book.
Still REALLY enjoying your recom about Chill and the Jagdpanthers, Ramses. Superb book.
RE: Axis armour can't shoot
ORIGINAL: phoenix
Still REALLY enjoying your recom about Chill and the Jagdpanthers, Ramses. Superb book.
Glad you like it Phoenix, would have felt bad if you didn't........
RE: Axis armour can't shoot
ORIGINAL: phoenix
Still REALLY enjoying your recom about Chill and the Jagdpanthers, Ramses. Superb book.
Which book are you referring to ??
Txema
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Phoenix100
- Posts: 2946
- Joined: Tue Sep 28, 2010 12:26 pm
RE: Axis armour can't shoot
Autumn Gale. It's a big, lavishly illustrated,800 photo book by Jack Didden and Maarten Swarts, concentrating on the late war histories of KG Chill and schwere Heeres Panzer-jager Abteilung 559, mainly in the period of the German 'recovery' in Holland during Autumn 1944. It's not just photos though, the text is excellent. You can get it here - www.autumngale.com - but like all these books with loads of photos it's not cheap. 80 euros, I think.
RE: Axis armour can't shoot
Wow, I wasn't aware how big this thing is.ORIGINAL: Arjuna
That tank gets around! [;)]
RE: Axis armour can't shoot
Back on topic sort of... I been doing some trials with the Household Cavalry - I have had cases where Axis armour can shoot. All Shermans destroyed in short order by some Pz IV/70s and cases where they cannot - 6 panthers destroyed by armoured cars. I started it as a separate topic as I was concerned about how indestructible some armoured cars appear to be. Link below.
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tm.asp?m=3455837&mpage=1&key=�
RE: Axis armour can't shoot
Hey Skarp, I have been following your topic in the tech support section also. Yes, as noted on I think page 2 of this thread, they have no problems against enemy armor, it is just some enemy AC units that seem to be the problem. I am doing some further testing also, have been playing in the database/estab editor as well, will release my results maybe tomorrow, have a couple other points I want to test, then I want to see if my estab edits have affected it in comparison with the stock estab file.