Limited nuclear exchange?

[Schr75]

By the way, I can't find the "Fourth of July" scenario. Anyone have a link?

It's in this forum.
The post is " New Scenario for Beta Testing: The 4th of July " from 8/6/2014 (as of now it´s on page 3).

Søren

[Mgellis]

ORIGINAL: mikeCK

Well that presents an interesting dilemma. Since the Soviets intended (from what I understand) to use chemical weapons as a conventional aid to any attack (and considered them conventional weapons) and NATO threatened to respond to the use of chemical/bio weapons with nuclear weapons...was there any way to expect a European war to end any other way than full blown nuclear war?

The only thing I've been able to come up with is scenarios where the war is so limited (and possibly far away from land) that there is no need to employ nuclear weapons (or any that are used are one-shots, like a nuclear torpedo fired by a sub at a ship). A war of "incidents" rather than battles--borders violated by a single submarine or an aircraft that gets shot at, a convoy fending off a couple of missile boats when it gets too close to a restricted area (at least, that's what is claimed later on), etc.

I honestly don't know if this is realistic or not, although it seems at least quasi-plausible.

How far could each side go? I don't know. What if the United States sunk an Alfa or a Victor for getting a little too close to territorial waters? Would the Soviets have gone to war, knowing that hundreds of millions would likely die, over the loss of one sub, especially under questionable circumstances? But what if one week later another Soviet sub went after a couple of tankers coming out of Alaska? Dozens dead, two giant ships lost, massive environmental damage, etc....but would it be worth going to full scale war over that? Or would the U.S. just choose its next "non-essential" target and the "tit for tat" war would slowly become the new normal?

[Mgellis]

I am thinking more and more that the best option for Cold War "wars that did not happen" scenarios will be proxy wars. These can be totally fictional ones (e.g., Mexico vs. Cuba) or real ones where the superpowers sell more equipment to their proxies than they did historically...for example, there's no reason we could not have "Latakia II, 1974" and "Latakia III, 1975" and so on...the Soviets are happy to keep selling Syria missile boats and the Israelis are happy to keep blowing them out of the water.

As for actual limited nuclear wars, the most likely one would be India vs. Pakistan. Another is India vs. China. Far less likely, but, I suppose possible, would be India or Pakistan vs. France or the E.U.

Another option would be the brief period where three former Soviet states had their own nuclear weapons. So...Kazakhstan and China might get into a limited nuclear war. Something like that...

Another option would be a near future situation where a rogue nation has developed nuclear weapons and other regional powers have built their own in self-defense but things get out of hand and we end up with a nuclear exchange of a few dozen bombers and/or missiles. So, Japan vs. North Korea...Saudi Arabia vs. Iran...etc.

Historically, along with the nine current nuclear states (if one counts Israel and North Korea) these nations all had nuclear programs, or are suspected of having them right now, so they might have started one up again...

Argentina
Australia
Brazil
Canada
Egypt
Iran
Libya
Oman
Saudi Arabia
South Africa (actually had them for a while and gave them up, as I understand it)
South Korea
Spain
Sweden
Taiwan
U.A.E.

see http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Nuclear_proliferation for details

Another option would involve a rogue nation having a few nuclear weapons and an attack on a non-nuclear neighbor must be stopped (or a preemptive attack must be launched)...the one that has been talked about a lot recently is Israel vs. Iran.

The final option is China. I don't know what Chinese nuclear doctrine is, but it might include limited exchanges (as I recall, China only has a few hundred warheads in its arsenal, so I suppose any nuclear war involving China might be relatively limited.) Such a war could theoretically take place at any time from about 1960, when the Soviets and the Chinese had their falling out, to the present and the near future.

Not to mention that during the chaos of the 1990s, I suppose it would be entirely possible that some Russian general could have stolen and sold a few nuclear weapons to...well...just about anyone.

Yes, many horrible possibilities here...eek!

[Mgellis]

One more option for a limited nuclear scenario, depending on your definition of a limited nuclear scenario...

Previous to 1960, there were virtually no ICBMs. The U.S. deployed a few Atlas D missiles in 1959, but the Soviets did not have a deployed ICBM until 1961. A few experimental missiles might be available at any time, of course, but one can assume that before 1960, at least 95% of the attacks would take place using bombers.

In addition, the number of warheads before 1960 is...okay, it's not good, but it's nothing like it was in the 1980s. In 1955, the Soviets had 200 warheads. In 1960, they had 1,600. (See http://rense.com/general47/global.htm for details.) By comparison, the U.S. had 3,000 in 1955 and about 20,000 in 1960. The Soviets are definitely outgunned, so a scenario would focus more on avoiding a "draw"--the odds of the Soviets winning in, say, 1958 would be very slim but they might do enough damage to the U.S. and Europe that both NATO and the Warsaw Pact would be totally crippled, with hundreds of millions of people dead on both sides, economies utterly destroyed, etc.

By the way, nuclear winter is definitely not a good thing, but the 1815 eruption of Mt. Tambora was estimated at 800 megatons (see http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/1815_erupt ... nt_Tambora for details), so assuming even 1,000 one-megaton warheads went off, there would probably be some climate change for a couple of years, and it would probably be very bad for agriculture and the global economy and so on, but it would probably not be the actual end of the world.

So, in other words, any NATO-Soviet Union conflict set before 1960 could be "limited" in the sense that only a few hundred warheads might be involved, and because they were being delivered by bombers, a large number of these might be stopped. We're still almost certainly talking about one of the worst disasters in human history, tens of millions of people dead at least and tens of millions more injured and displaced, but that's "only" about the same number as World War II. Humanity has survived much worse. It would seem apocalyptic, of course, because it would all happen in seven hours instead of seven years.

[ultradave]

An Argentina Brazil conflict could be interesting. You'd have to assume that civilian governments never took over and military dictatorships continued. Advance a few years to where both countries could have had a very limited number of nuclear weapons. Both countries had emerging enrichment programs and research reactors, which could give them both a HEU and a Pu route to nuclear weapons had they continued.

Pakistan and India could plausibly have a limited exchange. Both have a couple hundred. Supposedly Pakistans are stored with components in separate location so employing them is not just pushing a button.

And yes, you are correct that South Africa had a limited number, but then gave them up and signed the NPT.

[mikeCK]

ORIGINAL: DeltaIV

Chemical weapons were not included in any of the WP warplans against the NATO. During the height of cold war, tactical nukes were the main weapon to secure the victory of advancing land forces. Recently, i just finished reading memories of Czechoslovakian army general, which describe the 60's WP attack doctrine against NATO. Full attack against the west in Europe (along the Czechoslovakian and GDR border) was to be carried out by all available land/air WP assets that were designated and trained for such task. Notable thing to mention, that ~160 tactical nukes were to be launched on the first day of conflict, mostly from aircraft (Sukhoi 7BM). That was the plan for the army, but we can only guess what were the intentions of strategic missile forces on both sides.

EDIT: I dislike the term "Limited nuclear exchange". Last time it happened, it was indeed limited - because the weapon was available to only one belligerent. Today's world is, sadly, different.

I have to disagree that tactical nuclear weapons and chemical weapons were not part of any Soviet offensive battle plan and that the simply NATO propaganda.
Link below is a CIA report from 1984 and that analysis finds the Soviets clearly planned on using chemical and nuclear weapons preemptively if they felt that NATO was preparing to use them first. Such a scenario would include NATO losing the tactical war and moving chemical weapons to the front. So it's not that they would just instantly use them you are correct but they certainly felt that any attack or war in Europe would end in the use of these weapons Whether NATO felt they were going to lose or whether the Soviets did.

Either way it is an interesting article about how both sides viewed chemical weapons ...particular the Soviets

http://www.foia.cia.gov/sites/default/f ... 284028.pdf


Also here is the link to the "Fourth of July" scenario

tm.asp?m=3663149

[Randomizer]

Either way it is an interesting article about how both sides viewed chemical weapons ...particular the Soviets

And the CIA was always correct in its analysis of the Soviet Union? Hindsight seems to indicate that they got more wrong than right.

As Para 15 and 18 of the linked report appear to make clear; they are relying on unaccountable third-party information and also accept that use of chemical weapons by the USSR is not automatic. If there are no prospects of the Soviets crossing the nuclear threshold first it poses several problems for NATO in that escalation from conventional warfare becomes a NATO responsibility and all of the potential political baggage that flows from this remains unstated. Ascribing first use to the USSR neatly squares this circle in the analysis and justifies the continued build up of NATO tactical nuclear weapons in Europe, something that was entirely in line with the Reagan Doctrine of the time. This report is worded to support the American political and military conclusions that were already in place rather than provide any new or impartial analysis of Soviet intentions.

In other words, it told the policy makers exactly what they wanted to hear.

Its pretty clear from ex-Soviet documents that their doctrine opposed first use of nuclear weapons by the USSR but they would likely meet any NATO first use with massive retaliation in Europe and elsewhere. I doubt that there was any humanitarian consideration behind the USSR renouncing first use of nuclear weapons. Rather they recognized, better than the USA, an essential dichotomy of the nuclear era; these most powerful of weapons were essentially useless for actually winning a war.

-C

[mikeCK]

Well neither one of us really knows because it never happened. Do you think that the USSR wouldn't use nuclear weapons or chemicals if a NATO attack (or counter attack) was pressing into Eastern Europe. The only "plan" I've read was the one unearthed in Poland. You can Poo-Poo the CIA but that is the best analysis offered by the best intel at the time and there is no reason to suspect that it is less reliable than the old plans uncovered in documents without context and 25 years old (by 1989). Neither side would allow defeat and if either felt like they were in danger of completely losing a conventional war, nuclear first strike would be a seriously considered option

It was said that I had not provided any evidence so I posted the link. All it says is that a Soviet first strike would happen if they felt NATO was gearing up for one themselves( I didn't claim it stated chemical use was automatic...that was my opinion) . You can choose to discount it of course. Additionally, I never said the Soviets would launch a first nuclear strike. I said that the Soviets often trained in a "chemical environment" and fully accepted it was likely. It was my belief (which was wrong even according to the CIA analysis) that the USSR saw chemical weapons as conventional. They did not, but I have to think would have used them if they felt NATO was or if they felt they were losing.

I just sense this feeling that the US basically "created" this fear of a nuclear war. The West had every reason to fear the USSR and often, it's assessment of their capabilities was wrong or incomplete. So I don't think a plan that envisions a capability that doesn't exist is nefarious or that the publisher is "anti-Soviet".

[Randomizer]

Much of the Cold War came about due to an inability of the former allies to communicate with each other effectively or to appreciate where the other was coming from. In the thirties, US/Soviet relations had become reasonably cordial while all the evidence seems to indicate that Stalin greatly respected FDR. The start of post war Western paranoia can probably be traced to the famous Long Telegram from US Ambassador to Russia, George Kennan in February 1946 that became the foundation of the Truman Doctrine of Containment. Kennan's central thesis' were that all communism was monolithic and centrally controlled from Moscow and that the Soviet Union was doctrinally aggressive and expansionist. This shaped virtually all of our perceptions and coloured everything we interpreted in the actions of the USSR and some consider it the start point of the Cold War.

Except Kennan was mostly wrong. Stalin had already disbanded the COMINTERN and Moscow had virtually nothing to do with the Greek communist insurgency that triggered the Long Telegram in the first place. That was Yugoslavia's Tito, and his actions in Greece were instrumental in the Belgrade/Moscow split. He did believe that the existence of Soviet-friendly buffer states was essential to Soviet security and that this had been implied by the other two of the Big Three. Stalin, paranoid murderer that he was may have really thought for a time that his stated aim of "Socialism In One Country" would allay Anglo-American fears of communist aggression in the early post-war years.

Stalin was genuinely terrified by the US nuclear monopoly and felt betrayed by the United States when Truman refused to discuss reparations from occupied Germany, something that he believed that Roosevelt had approved at Yalta and that the current administration was now appeared to be reneging on. This coupled with public statements starting even before the Berlin Crisis of 1948 from certain US officials recommending an atomic attack on the Soviet Union placed the USSR on a war footing viz a viz the West practically from the start.

There's plenty of acrimony to share around and both sides acted provocatively but if bad Soviet diplomacy triggered the Prague Crisis, Berlin Blockade and the Korean War then the Truman Doctrine, creation of NATO and rearming of West Germany all demonstrated to the Russians that we were surrounding them with a hostile Atlantic Alliance to attack them with nuclear weapons at our leisure. In short, perhaps a little less dogma and a little more diplomatic empathy on both sides might just have paid big dividends. As is both sides considered the other as implacably hostile, continuously indulged in paranoid hyperbole and believed the same rhetoric of the other.

George Kennan's Telegram can be found here:

The Long Telegram

Some good reads for the early Cold War era include:

Stalin and the Bomb by David Holloway - Good from the Soviet POV.

Dark Sun: The Making of the Hydrogen Bomb by Richard Rhodes - The genesis of US anti-Soviet paranoia in the assorted nuclear spy rings.

Stalin: The Court of the Red Czar by Simon Sebag Montifior - A good source for Stalin/Roosevelt relations and Stalin/Truman antipathy.

We certainly feared them but they also genuinely feared us and every action on both sides was viewed through the lens of mutual nuclear terror, at least after 1949. My whole point in commenting on this thread is to make the case that, while the Red Army had plans to attack across the Inter-German Border the Politburo under any of the chairmen including Stalin never seriously considered doing so. STAVKA as a competent military staff, prepared such contingency plans often independent of political considerations but to take these out of their political context or the reasons for the specific operational aspects of any plan risks distorting the evidence and again, misunderstanding the other side.

Know your enemy as you know yourself and you will win 100-victories in 100-battles.
Sun Tzu.

-C

[FlyingBear]

Randomizer,

I think you can simplify your reasoning significantly by separating the two issues: Whether a war would be fought, versus how a war would be fought.

How would it be fought:
- NATO: Flexible response; a war might progress from a conventional phase to a limited nuclear phase to a global nuclear phase, and the escalation might be prevented from one phase the next (as well as within the phases, through lateral or horizontal escalation).
- Soviet: Either there is war or there is not war. There is nothing in between.

Any NATO conventional or nuclear attack would result in a Soviet nuclar response. Any Soviet attack would be nuclear from the beginning and result in a NATO nuclear response.

Therefore I do not see a scenario where NATO misunderstands the Soviet strategy so that a limited NATO nuclear response to a conventional Soviet attack results in an unanticipated Soviet all out nuclear attack. Reason: There would be no such thing as a conventional Soviet attack that NATO could try to counter with a limited nuclear response.

Whether it would be fought:
- Neither side wanted it and neither side intended to start it.
- Both sides planned for it, and both sides had plans for pre-emptive attacks ("plan" does of course not equal "intention").
- Not easy to predict under what situations either side would actually consider starting the war first. In my view a pre-requisite would be that either side considered war to be both imminent and unavoidable and it is now only a matter of who strikes first.
- NATO's threshold to war might have been lower, since NATO did not calculate that any war would necessarily go nuclear. But I do not believe that is a very good point, since I cannot think of a case where NATO would start a conventional war with the Soviets; I view a NATO nuclear first strike as marginally less unlikely.
- Soviet's threshold to nuclear war would have been low once war started.

/FlyingBear

[mikeCK]

I think there are so many variables that whatever the plans are at the beginning (relating to when and how nukes will be used) would change during the conflict. It's one thing to say "we won't use them first". It's something else to see the enemy breaking through your lines in nicely packed armor formations

[Mgellis]

ORIGINAL: FlyingBear


Any NATO conventional or nuclear attack would result in a Soviet nuclar response. Any Soviet attack would be nuclear from the beginning and result in a NATO nuclear response.

Therefore I do not see a scenario where NATO misunderstands the Soviet strategy so that a limited NATO nuclear response to a conventional Soviet attack results in an unanticipated Soviet all out nuclear attack. Reason: There would be no such thing as a conventional Soviet attack that NATO could try to counter with a limited nuclear response.


/FlyingBear

Just curious...what do you think of this situation:

One of the superpowers attacks an ally of the other one (e.g., the U.S. attacks Syria, the Soviet Union attacks Japan, etc.) Neither superpower is directly threatened, but the ally is important enough that the superpower allied with it feels it has to do something and moves forces to help defend its ally.

For example, say the Soviet Union had attacked Pakistan in 1982. Not even an invasion, but blowing up some air bases that it believed were providing help to Afghan rebels. An American carrier battle group in the area aids Pakistan in defending itself. So American and Soviet forces are directly engaged, but there is no direct threat to either the Soviet Union or the United States. Could a war like this stay regional, in effect another Vietnam? Or would it automatically escalate into a global confrontation?

Related question...what if the Soviets used tactical nukes against Pakistan?

A somewhat different question...is there any way to model chemical weapons in Command?

What are your thoughts?

[FlyingBear]

I can easily answer that: I don't know. [:)] In my somewhat categorical statements I was considering the big deal, a direct, major confrontation between NATO and the Soviets.

I think it is obvious that the risk of escalation was the reason why both sides were extremely reluctant to directly attack each other's allies, even "less important" allies like Syria. Let's recall the Yom Kippur Defcon 3 incident...

[lowchi]

ORIGINAL: Mgellis

A somewhat different question...is there any way to model chemical weapons in Command?

As i Recall, the devs said that they probably implement this in the future.

BUT in the Mega FAQ if found something interesting:


What kinds of warhead types and explosives types are modelled?






http://www.warfaresims.com/?page_id=2920#412


but I found no Chem/Bio/EMP weapons in the DB....

The antielectr. BLU-114/B however is modelled, but i have not tested it yet

Devs?? [:)]