Winning the Meeting Engagement

[Panzer_Leader]

Given the aggression and pace of the AI-controlled Soviet forces in FPC-RS, most scenarios tend to end in some form of advance to contact or meeting engagement. 'Rhino' is an excellent example of this. I've had to programme myself when playing NATO to expect contact about 1/3 closer to my starting point than my initial estimate. If I don't, I'll make contact with the Soviets prematurely, usually at the march, and start the scenario on the back foot.

Anyway, trawling through some back issues of ARMOR magazine, I came across this article 'Winning the Meeting Engagement' from the May-June 83 edition which provides a detailed explanation of Soviet doctrine and tactics relating to the meeting engagement (advance to contact) and provides some recommendations for NATO to counter them. As such, I thought it may be of interest to players of FPC-RS of Soviet or NATO inclination.

https://dl.dropboxusercontent.com/u/716 ... -FEB87.pdf

Cheers

[PaladinZeroSix]

Hey Panzer_Leader! (This is MDF from the Steel beasts forum).

That's an excellent article, but a word of caution -- or, perhaps, lament -- is in order. The USSR TO&Es in the FPRS scenarios don't accurately represent the Soviet task organization for meeting engagements, nor do they portray the actual timelines between each successive "layer" of a Soviet regiment's advance (i.e., regimental recce precedes everything by 30-50 KM; CRPs are 5-10 KM ahead of the FSE, etc.)

[Mad Russian]

ORIGINAL: PaladinZeroSix

That's an excellent article, but a word of caution -- or, perhaps, lament -- is in order. The USSR TO&Es in the FPRS scenarios don't accurately represent the Soviet task organization for meeting engagements, nor do they portray the actual timelines between each successive "layer" of a Soviet regiment's advance (i.e., regimental recce precedes everything by 30-50 KM; CRPs are 5-10 KM ahead of the FSE, etc.)

The reason for the shortened distances is, that during the kind of attack that I envisioned the Soviets to have launched, I would have expected them to shorten the layering and concentrate as much as possible in the early going. When the threat of battlefield nuclear weapons was at it's lowest.

I would not have expected the Soviets to be completely locked into their normal organizations because of the nuclear threat and would have expected them to maximize their force multipliers just as NATO would have done with theirs.

Of course, you can put the actual distances in any scenario you like and try those to see how they would work. Anything is possible.

Good Hunting.

MR

[Panzer_Leader]

Hi MDF

Nice to see you over here too. I take your point about Soviet doctrinal distances not being reflected by the AI, and understand Mad Russian's reasoning above, but think the article provides a nice summary of Soviet doctrine and tactics and an aide memoir for human players who want to play using authentic Soviet tactics, as understood, as I do - though, like Mad Russian, I'll modify based on task, own forces and my concept of operations as needed. The article also provides some ideas on how to defeat the Soviets in a meeting engagement for the NATO player, which may be helpful to NATO players in a PBEM match with a human opponent applying "authentic" Soviet doctrine.

Anyway, I love the canvas FPC-RS provides to experiment with real life concepts at battalion-plus level, whether they can be applied perfectly, or successfully, or not.

[PaladinZeroSix]

ORIGINAL: Mad Russian

ORIGINAL: PaladinZeroSix

That's an excellent article, but a word of caution -- or, perhaps, lament -- is in order. The USSR TO&Es in the FPRS scenarios don't accurately represent the Soviet task organization for meeting engagements, nor do they portray the actual timelines between each successive "layer" of a Soviet regiment's advance (i.e., regimental recce precedes everything by 30-50 KM; CRPs are 5-10 KM ahead of the FSE, etc.)

The reason for the shortened distances is, that during the kind of attack that I envisioned the Soviets to have launched, I would have expected them to shorten the layering and concentrate as much as possible in the early going. When the threat of battlefield nuclear weapons was at it's lowest.

I would not have expected the Soviets to be completely locked into their normal organizations because of the nuclear threat and would have expected them to maximize their force multipliers just as NATO would have done with theirs.

Of course, you can put the actual distances in any scenario you like and try those to see how they would work. Anything is possible.

I am new to FCRS, so please forgive me if there is a published "back story" that describes the nature of the overarching campaign, such as the degree of forewarning had by NATO. Assuming that the WP attacked on relatively short notice, one would expect that the NATO front lines would be disorganized and nonlinear, which would seem to be an apt situation for the WP leading elements to advance in march formation and arrayed for a meeting engagement as described in the Armor article referenced above. The separation between each layer of that formation was not, as I understand it, responsive to the level of nuclear threat. Instead, it was intended to give the commander of each successive element the optimum amount of time to react based on what the preceding element(s) were reporting/doing.

That said, NATO did maintain a strong covering force along the border, and I would imagine that the leading recce elements would have a tough time filtering through. I suppose there would have been massive fire strikes on every suspected OP/BP.

Anyway, I think my original observation still stands. The techniques outlined in the Armor article are based on exploiting windows of opportunity presented by the layered nature of the Soviet march formation. So, to the extent that is not reflected in the available FCRS missions, the article is of limited utility. It's still a good read and undoubtedly of great interest to many FCRS players.

And you're right....anyone can create scenarios reflecting their own view of things. Maybe one of these days I'll create a more "orthodox" meeting engagement scenario.

[Mad Russian]

ORIGINAL: PaladinZeroSix

And you're right....anyone can create scenarios reflecting their own view of things. Maybe one of these days I'll create a more "orthodox" meeting engagement scenario.

I look forward to seeing what those look like.

Good Hunting.

MR

[loki100]

ORIGINAL: PaladinZeroSix

....

That said, NATO did maintain a strong covering force along the border, and I would imagine that the leading recce elements would have a tough time filtering through. I suppose there would have been massive fire strikes on every suspected OP/BP.

perhaps worth remembering that this claim was more for public consumption than reality. By the mid-80s BAOR had effectively stop having a permanent screen on the border in its sector (due to budget cuts). Thats a sizeable chunk of Northern Germany open if the Soviets managed the strategic surprise that FP is premised on