A Grey Steppe Eagle (loki100 vs Vigabrand)

Post descriptions of your brilliant victories and unfortunate defeats here.

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loki100
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RE: Turns 98-100: 29 April – 19 May 1943

Post by loki100 »

ORIGINAL: morvael

So those Germans in Leningrad will stay there to help Finland, or is it possible that they will evacuate via ships?

He set it up deliberately, that isn't the result of me breaking through and cutting them off. He had me blocked on the Volkhov but chose to pull back and has set up 3 defensive lines - there is something guarding the entrance to Estonia (only done some small recon but I am going to screen/ignore that), something on a line from Lake Ilmen to Pskov (I need to think about this) and this defense of Leningrad/Finland.

I think as he had some success in leaving boxes where I could advance into in 1942 its an operational set up vigabrand is now using all over the map. I'm less sure it is such a threat given the difference between the Red Army in 1942 and in mid-43?

ORIGINAL: chaos45

ya interesting leaving 12 german divisions in finland...will make leningrad a pain in the butt to retake im sure lol

the bit I am not sure about is the long term value. This clearly protects Finland now ... and as you say makes retaking Leningrad very hard (a concept I am going to test empirically as well as theoretically). But that is the equivalent of an army (there are also a couple of cavalry brigades) effectively isolated. One option is to simply screen them and maybe return to the problem in the winter of 43/44 when the Neva freezes again.

I think I can block them in with about 8-10 divisions so that is a trade off that suits me?

Wondering what happens if I simply treat it as an early version the Courland pocket - annoying, a theoretical threat (but only with the Finnish armoured division) to my rear, but in the end a bit of an open air prison camp?

I've not seen anyone try this before, if anything most games seem to be incredibly disinterested in protecting the Finns once the Soviets regain the initiative?
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RE: Turns 98-100: 29 April – 19 May 1943

Post by STEF78 »

Never seen such a move to protect Finland and I think it's a mistake. I would ignore them and push west. The aim is Berlin not Helsinki
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RE: Turns 98-100: 29 April – 19 May 1943

Post by SigUp »

As far as I can see seven of those divisions are Luftwaffe divisions. They are pretty much useless, at least offensively, so you shouldn't have much issue sealing them off. Agree that it's a mistake. I'd prefer using those divisions as diggers for fallback lines on the road to Berlin (before disbanding them to gain the manpower).
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RE: Turns 98-100: 29 April – 19 May 1943

Post by loki100 »

ORIGINAL: STEF78

Never seen such a move to protect Finland and I think it's a mistake. I would ignore them and push west. The aim is Berlin not Helsinki

The only thing in my mind against this is I wonder if not retaking Leningrad and the Finns still being in the war will make it hard to reach the Berlin + x VP cities for the victory conditions?

My other fear is he has hidden a Pzr Corps up there to attack if I just leave a screening force?
ORIGINAL: SigUp

As far as I can see seven of those divisions are Luftwaffe divisions. They are pretty much useless, at least offensively, so you shouldn't have much issue sealing them off. Agree that it's a mistake. I'd prefer using those divisions as diggers for fallback lines on the road to Berlin (before disbanding them to gain the manpower).

I've had a few goes at dislodging them and you are right. I reckon there are 12 German divisions and 7 or 8 are Luftwaffe or security, but in cities and well dug in they are effective as a static defense. I think the key is I can screen off that sector with the equivalent of a couple of under-strength, second rate armies. I can spare 12 rifle divisions far more easily than the Germans can.
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RE: Turns 98-100: 29 April – 19 May 1943

Post by SigUp »

ORIGINAL: loki100

My other fear is he has hidden a Pzr Corps up there to attack if I just leave a screening force?
I don't think he does and if, it would be a significant error. Considering the quality of the other divisions there it's hardly possible to generate enough force to break through and exploit even against a screening force.

Generally said I'm a bit puzzled by that voluntary retreat since it didn't appear from your earlier reports that the German positions were collapsing. By retreating (and on top of that splitting the forces) the lines are now longer than before. Unless a breakthough south of Lake Ilmen occurs I'd think it more beneficial to fight for every hex up north while slowly swinging back the door to the Luga with Novgorod as anchor point. The terrain, at least until reaching the patch of clear terrain from Oranienbaum south, is pretty favourable for defensive purposes.
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RE: Turns 98-100: 29 April – 19 May 1943

Post by loki100 »

ORIGINAL: SigUp

...

Generally said I'm a bit puzzled by that voluntary retreat since it didn't appear from your earlier reports that the German positions were collapsing. By retreating (and on top of that splitting the forces) the lines are now longer than before. Unless a breakthough south of Lake Ilmen occurs I'd think it more beneficial to fight for every hex up north while slowly swinging back the door to the Luga with Novgorod as anchor point. The terrain, at least until reaching the patch of clear terrain from Oranienbaum south, is pretty favourable for defensive purposes.

Me too. My understanding was that he was locking up my Volkhov offensive with about 20 infantry divisions (incl LW etc) backed by 3 Pzr/Mot divisions. The result was it was taking me about 2 turns to take and secure a hex. One turn I could put together a strong enough attack to dislodge his defenders but had to use so much that my advance was weak. Second I could make a weaker attack and secure the hex as a result.

So every now and then he had to give up some of the flanking hexes to restore his front but it was taking say 4 turns to secure a hex row. This was tieing down 2 shock armies stuffed with Gds Rifle Corps, lots of specialist artillery and 2 tank armies.

My fear was if I pulled this lot out, Leningrad Front was too weak to actually hold the gains and I could be forced back behing the Volkhov.

At some stage, on the original model I would reach the clear terrain but it could easily take all summer.

As it is I now reckon he has 12+ divisions on the Neva, 6-8 guarding the entrance to Estonia (I'm not quite sure what is here but it is a strong line) and has to guard the long line between Lake Ilmen and Pskov. So he's not freed up defensive formations.

In addition he's not really solved the key problem which is that the sort of offensive power in my SW Front can take almost any hex on the map if it is concentrated. I think this is a major shift and one that German players in the mid-game for the first time perhaps don't expect. But even in 1943 its easy enough to get a Gds Rifle Corp to 16-17 cv, so a two sided attack can have around 90 cv (assuming some loss for more than 1 army) and be backed by a lot of artillery (which improves the effective chance of winning due to the number of disruptions). That makes any hex <70cv at risk. By the time you can attack from 3 sides, a defensive stack of 90-100 is potentially vulnerable.

My guess is he is hoping to stretch my supply lines and perhaps rout/surround formations that move too fast. But my instinct is that time is now very much on my side. My only real geographical goals between now and April 1944 is to be securely over the Dneipr and preferably the Berezina. In both cases, I suspect the actual crossings would have been winter projects in any case. As it is, with the road to Pskov now open, I suspect I can turn the Berezina before the autumn muds and due to its east-west orientation the Dauga is not really an effective barrier if I am attacking both from the north and the east.

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RE: Turns 98-100: 29 April – 19 May 1943

Post by SigUp »

ORIGINAL: loki100

As it is I now reckon he has 12+ divisions on the Neva, 6-8 guarding the entrance to Estonia (I'm not quite sure what is here but it is a strong line) and has to guard the long line between Lake Ilmen and Pskov. So he's not freed up defensive formations.
He's also given up the Luga line?
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RE: Turns 98-100: 29 April – 19 May 1943

Post by loki100 »

ORIGINAL: SigUp

ORIGINAL: loki100

As it is I now reckon he has 12+ divisions on the Neva, 6-8 guarding the entrance to Estonia (I'm not quite sure what is here but it is a strong line) and has to guard the long line between Lake Ilmen and Pskov. So he's not freed up defensive formations.
He's also given up the Luga line?

we are a few turns ahead (I've just sent him T107), but yes he'd pulled back to somewhere around Pskov giving up all the woods/marshes and rivers to the north. Not sure where he is as I am following up relatively slowly
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T101-103: 20 May 1943 – 12 June 1943

Post by loki100 »

T101-103: 20 May 1943 – 12 June 1943

The highly variable spring weather dominated military planning in the period from late May to mid-June. Among periods of rain and mud, at times the ground dried out to enable localised offensives.

In the south, late May saw a period of clear weather that allowed the Cavalry-Mechanised formations of North Caucasus Front (Coastal, 37 and 38 Armies) to over-run the sector held by Romanian and Italian formations. In what became known as the 'Mius gallop' a series of strong points were simply overwhelmed as a retreat escalated into a rout.

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After five days, the Soviet mobile units pulled off the line allowing the Rifle Divisions of Trans-Caucasus Front to dig in on the east bank of the Mius. Rokossovsky was promoted for his role in this sudden victory.

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In the north, the reality was much more grim. Spread out over a number of weeks, South-Western Front made 4 major attempts to storm Leningrad.

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[1]

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[2]

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However, the main feature had been a major German withdrawal across the front from north of the Dombas to just east of Orel and to the gates of Novgorod.

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However, the lull in combat operations was matched by intensive planning for the Soviet summer offensive. Unlike in 1942, this time the Red Army intended to press the advantage it had gained in the winter battles.

In addition, the fall out from the September 1942 disasters and the hard winter fighting had led to the emergence of a small elite cadre of formations supplied by a large bulk of rifle divisions. Stavka divided up the Fronts into one of three categories:

a) Elite – Kalinin, Western, South-Western, Voronezh. Each of these had very few non-Guards formations or contained the great bulk of the Soviet armoured might;
b) Mixed – North-Western, Volkhov, Bryansk, Southern, North-Caucasus, typically these had 2-3 elite armies but the balance was made up of regular rifle divisions;
c) Weak – Leningrad, Central, Steppe, no Gds formations, purely rifle divisions, many of low experience or morale. Useful for holding a defensive line but lacking any offensive capacity. In addition Volga MD retained operational control of the two armies that maintained the limited Soviet presence in the Crimea

In addition, the Stavka reserve (actually these report to either Volga or Moscow Mds) consisted of 4 artillery corps. These deployed around 15 artillery and rocket divisions and were allocated to support major operations.

At the moment, Steppe, North-Caucasus, Voronezh and Bryansk Fronts were all pulled back into reserve and each of the other fronts had detached formations to rest and recover. The main debate was the future use of South-Western Front. Its mix of elite Shock and Tank Armies made it a powerful force but it was wasted if it had to fight in the marshes and woods on the Luga-Pskov sector. Orders were sent for it to disengage from the attempt to take Leningrad and prepare to move back into the Ukraine. Its place would be taken by the freshly raised formations of Steppe Front.

Basically Stavka identified two plans that made use of the current location of the main offensive groupings. Which was chosen would be left till after the current front line was broken and the relative strengths of the German army identified. At the moment, it was clear that they had retained a substantial armoured reserve at Kursk. The primary goal was to reach a line from Velikie Luki to Smolensk and then the east bank of the Dneipr down into the Ukraine by the end of the summer.

New equipment was arriving.

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(although increasingly outgunned by the new German tanks, the T-34/76 remained the core of the Soviet tank force)

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And the VVS was able to deploy its most modern fighters and bombers at the forward airbases. Even the Yak-1, the mainstay of 1942, was now treated as a training aircraft and left in the rear bases in the Urals.

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(The La-5F was now the main VVS fighter)


[1] With hindsight that first attack misled me. As a result I believed that if I could get very lucky (say 1/5) the city would fall. In truth it looks as if that first attack was the one in which everything went in my favour and the more usual outcome was to end with a 1-1 result.
[2] That cheered me up, as well as eliminate any real threat of a German breakout (Leningrad is screened to the south by two city hexes)
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RE: T101-103: 20 May 1943 – 12 June 1943

Post by SigUp »

I will follow the development in the north with much interest. As it stands I consider it nigh impossible to hold the line Pskov - Lake Ilmen without massive panzer backup. Breaking that line will jeopardise the entire front from Lake Ilmen southwards. The only way such a retreat will save troops is by pulling back to a line Velikaya - hills/forests/marshlands west of Velikiye Luki - landbridge east of Vitebsk. Depending on how much you focus on it I would estimate it possible to reach the Daugava in the winter of 43-44.
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RE: T101-103: 20 May 1943 – 12 June 1943

Post by loki100 »

ORIGINAL: SigUp

I will follow the development in the north with much interest. As it stands I consider it nigh impossible to hold the line Pskov - Lake Ilmen without massive panzer backup. Breaking that line will jeopardise the entire front from Lake Ilmen southwards. The only way such a retreat will save troops is by pulling back to a line Velikaya - hills/forests/marshlands west of Velikiye Luki - landbridge east of Vitebsk. Depending on how much you focus on it I would estimate it possible to reach the Daugava in the winter of 43-44.

I think you are right, its the only place where the front is shorter allowing for either a stronger front line or some reserves. But it gives me a lot for free, and if I break it then the Germans will need to abandon Estonia and be defending the Dauga in the winter of 43/44 ..
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Turn 104: 10 – 16 June 1943

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Turn 104: 10 – 16 June 1943

The highly variable weather again dominated planning and limited the scope for major offensive operations.

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To the south of Kharkov, both sides remained stuck in the spring mud. Here the Germans continued their recent retreat towards the Donets. Soviet formations of the Southern Front followed up cautiously in case this was a trap.

East of Smolensk, Kalinin Front launched a limited offensive designed to establish a bridgehead over the Dnepr and to threaten the German rail connection at Yelnya.

In turn, North-Western Front made some gains north of Velikie Luki primarily designed to test the location and strength of the German reserves. This also saw a limited paratroop operation designed to cut supply to the German formations east of the city.

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However, Orel was the main Soviet target. It was protected by strong German defences and prevented any attempt to attack towards Bryansk or south towards Kursk. To overwhelm the German defences,the bulk of 3 Soviet Fronts (Western, Bryansk and Voronezh) commenced an attempt to encircle the city.

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(SU-152 in support of 13 Army)

The offensive opened with Western Front breaking the German front between the Oka and the Zhizdra to the north-west of the city. Backed by specialist artillery formations and supported by Heavy Tank regiments the Soviet offensive was strong enough not just to breach the German lines but also fend off a counter-attack by 18 Panzer division.

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After several days fighting, this had disrupted the western flank of the German defensive lines. Bryansk Front then struck southwards trying to cut off the rail line running west.

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At the same Voronezh Front attacked to the south-east of the city. Again, a limited paratroop operation tried to disrupt the German communication and supply networks as 1st and 2nd Tank Armies overran their front line.

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After a weeks fighting, the German front had been broken to the north-west and east of the city but the Soviets had been unable to exploit their gains. Limited information about the location of the Panzer reserves left Stavka cautious about exposing the Soviet armoured formations to the risk of encirclement.

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(Soviet infantry and armour in action near Livny)

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Due to the limited scope of the actual fighting, losses for both sides were relatively light. The Germans lost 26,000 men, 13 tanks and 80 planes for Soviet losses of 47,000 men, 60 tanks and 260 planes.
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RE: Turn 64: 3-9 September 1942

Post by c00per »

Excellent AAR
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RE: Turn 64: 3-9 September 1942

Post by loki100 »

ORIGINAL: c00per

Excellent AAR

thank you
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Turns 105-107: 17 June – 7 July 1943

Post by loki100 »

Turns 105-107: 17 June – 7 July 1943

A combination of periods of rain on different sectors, the Germans pulling back on parts of the front and Stavka needing to reinforce some Fronts led to a lull in combat in the early summer. As the war entered its third year, the only significant combat was at Leningrad where South-Western Front made a final attempt to storm Leningrad.

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[1]

In turn, North-Western Front's offensive in the Valdai provoked a massive German counterattack as the bulk of a Panzer Army cut off the Soviet spearheads.

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Later in June, the Germans hit elements of Volkhov Front advancing to the north of Smolensk.

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The strength of the German defences on the Smolensk-Velikie Luki line led Stavka to cancel the orders to South-Western Front to move to the Ukraine. Instead, the summer offensive was re-organised.

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In the north, Steppe Front took on the role of screening the German forces along the Neva. To assist, most of the VVS' U2s were sent to this sector and commenced a regular campaign of bombing Finnish airforce bases and combat units.

The rest of the Leningrad Front was deployed to screen the Finns in the north, the Germans blocking the direct route into Estonia and as an advanced guard for the main advance. Stavka intended to use the assault formations of South-West and North-West fronts north of the Dauga with the goal of reaching Riga.

For the moment, the Volkhov Front was ordered to threaten the German positions between Vyazma and Orsha but it was expected this would be too strongly defended for a single front to attack.

To the south of the Dneipr , Kalinin and Western Fronts co-operated on a planned offensive towards Mogilev and Gomel. Actually crossing the Dneipr was unlikely until the river froze but it was hoped that Soviet operations north of the Dauga might force the Germans to send their mobile reserves north. If so, the opportunity to force the last major barrier on the road to the Reich might occur in the autumn.

In the northern Ukraine, Central Front had a similar role to Leningrad Front. It was essentially a defensive formation designed to hold the quieter sectors of the front. The main offensive power was provided by Bryansk and Volkhov Fronts and these were ordered to push southwards towards Sumy, Chernigov and ultimately Kiev. In doing so it was hoped this would force the German to abandon Kharkov and the Dombas.

In the far south, Southern and North Caucasus Fronts provided the main offensive power. At this stage, Stavka was unsure whether to attack across the Donets to cut off Stalino or to drive due west crossing the Donets to the south of Kharkov.

As Soviet armies reinforced and redeployed, little sustained combat took place. The main exception was the early July clashes on the Bryansk-Smolensk sector as Kalinin and Western Front's probed the German defences.

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(Bridging equipment moving up to support Kalinin Front)

In the meantime to the north of the Dauga it became clear the Germans had pulled back to the Poltava and the rough ground to the west of Velikie Luki.

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My overall plan is to stop building new combat formations once I reach 8 million. I then need to revise my support units, in particular to assign the plentiful SU-76s to replace a variety of older units (like the ski battalions that were effective in 1941-2).

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Losses reflected the relative lack of combat in these three weeks. The Germans lost around 20,000 men a week and Soviet losses averaged 39,000 per week.

Gradually, US lend-lease trucks improved the mobility of the Red Army as well as the ability to resupply those formations pushing west.

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(Trucks supporting the advance of Leningrad Front)


[1] My gamble has been to see if one of those rare combat results occur where all the luck goes my way and none to my opponent. As it is, all I am doing is shedding morale and taking losses from formations better used elsewhere.
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Attacks on Leningrad/

Post by BrianG »

You said it was your final attempt to storm.

Do you have other idea on how to rid yourself of the Fins?

btw, I liked the very large CV for the defenders.

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RE: Attacks on Leningrad/

Post by loki100 »

ORIGINAL: BrianG

You said it was your final attempt to storm.

Do you have other idea on how to rid yourself of the Fins?

btw, I liked the very large CV for the defenders.


I'll return to the problem in the winter. My feeling is I can bring 2 powerful armies (6 Gds corps of 20+ each) plus a mass of artillery against the non-urban hexes. That should put me in the range where a lucky attack will succeed (and I only need to get lucky once), once I'm over the Neva its a matter of time.

Basically my view is get to the west bank of the Dneipr first in the winter 43/44 and then I'll have a chance to do some redeployments.

At the moment, its a trade off of manpower that suits me. 3 Armies (two under-strength and freshly raised) have him as boxed in as I am boxed out. There also seem to be about 12-14 German infantry divisions up there (ok mostly LW and security) and they are probably doing less good than if they were digging fall back fortification lines on the road to Berlin?

I think Pelton is right about the error of saving the Finnish manpower 'for later', but in this case he can't make any real use of it even if he tried to go back onto the attack now.

So I really am not sure, I think the situation on balance favours me. But there was no gain to pounding 2 elite Shock Armies on a hex where the best I got was 1.5-1 ... the odds against ever reaching 2-1 were far too small to be worth carrying on with.
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Turns 108-110: 8-28 July 1943

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Turns 108-110: 8-28 July 1943

A combination of the weather and a German retreat limited the amount of combat in mid-July. Bryansk was abandoned on 9 July, Kursk on 14 July without any fighting. Apart from the VVS campaign aimed at weakening the Finns, most of the long front was quiet till 21 July.

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22 July saw the start of fierce fighting north of Belgorod. Voronezh and Bryansk Fronts combined in an offensive designed to capture Sumy and unhinge the German defences at Kharkov and the Dombas.

Elements of Central Front opened the offensive. As was usual the intent was to draw off German reserves and confuse them as to the direction of the main attack. To everyone's shock, the attack by 12 Army actually suceeded as it caught the Germans completely by surprise.

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[1]

However, the Germans had become used to the pattern of a Soviet offensive and kept their main reserves back.

The main attack commenced on the 23rd as the two Combined Arms armies of Voronezh Front (34 and 46), backed by a massive artillery bombardment, captured Prilepy despite the intervention of 22 Panzer Division [2]. In turn, the freshly raised 6 Tank Army went into action for the first time only to be caught by a massive German counter-attack.

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Despite this set back, Soviet tanks captured Prokhorovka on the 24th and drove south towards Belgorod. With the German infantry falling back in panic, Tolbukhin released his elite 1 Tank Army. By 28 July, Soviet tanks had reached the northern edge of Belgorod.

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(SU-122s in action north of Belgorod)

At the same time, Bryansk Front struck along the gap between the Desna and Seym. Strong German resistance limited gains but for the first time in a year, Soviet forces held a small portion of the Northern Ukraine.

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The other major battle was the attempt by Kalinin and Volkhov Fronts to force the Germans back towards the Dneipr.

Volkhov Front opened the battle by trying to force the Dnepr and cut the German lines of communication. Although, their initial attempt failed, a renewed attack allowed them to cross the river.

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(Soviet artillery crossing the Dneipr)

In turn, Kalinin Front managed to establish a small bridgehead over the Sozh, threatening the German salient at Smolensk with encirclement.

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Losses for the final week in July increased as the tempo of combat picked up. The Germans lost 27,000 men (12,000 kia), 20 tanks and 130 planes for Soviet losses of 43,000 men (24,000 kia), 270 tanks and 290 planes.

[1] – that left me a bit open mouthed when the Germans actually lost. I guess that is the sort of extreme luck I was hoping for at Leningrad.
[2] – I've been converting regular rifle divisions to corps in key formations. By late summer the Combined Arms armies in my main offensive fronts (South-West, Kalinin, Western, Voronezh and North-Cauc) will all be based around Rifle Corps. My logic is these have a cv of around 10-12, so two stacks give me about 55 (with a malus for more than one army), enough to clear out a weaker defensive stack or provide decent flank support. As the main front starts to shorten, I need less rifle divisions to spread out.

edits: having problems with the interaction between this forum software and the image hosting site I use ... things seem to work fine when first posted and then disappear into the ether

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Turn 111: 29 July – 4 August 1943

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Turn 111: 29 July – 4 August 1943

The period from April to late July was one a of a relative lull across the front. Fierce battles had flared up around key cities only to die away as the weather intervened or the Germans redeployed. However, late summer was to see the first major Soviet offensive on a line stretching from Lake Peipus in the north to the Black Sea. Even as the final orders were sent out, news reached Moscow that Italy had surrendered to the Western Allies.

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The result was to convince Stavka that the Axis defences in the Dombas had been weakened. The result of this over-optimism was to be a major Soviet defeat.

The Dombas Disaster

After the German defensive victory at Voroshilovgrad and the brief Soviet Mius offensive this sector had lain quiet. The Germans had withdrawn to the line of the Donets-Mius and were facing three Soviet fronts. Trans-Caucasus was drawn up on the Mius, Southern guarded the east and north bank of the Donets and North Caucasus was in reserve.

Some early Soviet plans had considered committing North Caucasus in an attack aimed at Kharkov but this would have left a powerful German army around Stalino and the two screening fronts would have lacked significant reserves.

Accordingly Stavka set the Dombas as the primary objective. The Soviet offensive opened by attacks by Trans-Caucasus and Southern Front to force the Mius and Donets respectively.

By the start of August, it was clear the Soviets had badly under-estimated the strength of the German reserves. Trans-Caucasus Front had had to suspend its offensive with its few first rate units badly battered. Southern Front at least inflicted heavy losses on the Germans but failed to cross the Donets.

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[1]

In desperation, on 3 August, the mobile formations of North Caucasus Front were committed, not to exploit the initial victories but to actually cross the Donets.

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The result was to carve out a narrow bridgehead 20 km wide but no more than 10 km deep. An attempt to deepen the bridgehead met with bloody failure.

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(evacuating wounded troops from the Dombas fighting)

The Psel-Seym operation

Here the Soviets had more success. The Germans had made a local counterattack north of Belgorod and had sealed off the direct route south. In response Voronezh Front swung north and drove into the rear of the German units defending the line of the Seym.

Voronezh Front's offensive was supported by the Bryansk Front. Operating between the Svapa and the Desna. 40 Army pushed south and started to threaten the rail junction at Vorozhba that was one of the main connections between AGS and Kiev.

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The Dauga/Dvina Offensive

The final sector with sustained fighting was north of the Dauga/Dvina. North-Western Front struck towards Polosk where the German line was weaker.

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Initially this was designed to support the main attack on the Poltava and to threaten the northern flank of the powerful German line between Vitebsk and Orsha. However, the relative success of the initial attacks encouraged Stavka to plan to reinforce this with the addition of airborne assets and the newly raised heavy artillery corps.

The intention was to land the main blow on the Poltava, South-Western Front had moved up in the previous week and the two Shock Armies quickly established a bridgehead.

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(elements of 5 Shock Army over the Poltava)

The northern crossing was exploited by elements of 3 Tank Army and Soviet patrols reached the southern edge of Lake Peipus. While of little military significance it was the first time that the Red Army had occupied any part of Estonia since August 1941.

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To the south of the Dvina, Soviet patrols found a strong German defensive line between Vitebsk and Orsha and that the Germans had pulled back to the west bank of the Dneipr. For the moment, no attempt was made to force either of these defensive lines.

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The growing intensity of the fighting led to increasingly heavy losses. The Germans lost 33,000 men (15,000 kia), 50 tanks and 130 planes. Soviet losses were 53,000 men (25.000 kia), 700 tanks and 300 planes.


[1] Typical of most of this sequence of attacks, at least I have done some damage but ...
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loki100
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Turn 112: 5 -11 August 1943

Post by loki100 »

Turn 112: 5 -11 August 1943

Early August saw major German counter-attacks in the south. The limited Soviet bridgehead over the Donets was eliminated but of more concern, the bulk of 1 Tank Army was cut off south of the Seym. In the north, the Germans forced the Soviets back over the Poltava.

In effect all the gains of the previous week had been lost.

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In the north, since a land invasion of Finland was impossible, Stavka ordered the VVS to conduct a campaign against industrial and population centres. The opening phase was a series of raids on Helsinki as well as continued attacks on the Finnish airforce.

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[1]

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(Lend-Lease B-25 preparing for the raid on Helsinki)

In the south, the Seym-Desna battles continued and Voronezh Front managed to force the Germans back, allowing 1 Tank to escape encirclement.

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To the west, the Germans pulled back enabling Bryansk Front to threaten their western flank.

At Kharkov, elements of Southern Front managed to force the Dnepr near Kharkov. Despite this gain, most of North Caucasus Front was kept in reserve as it recovered from the losses of the previous week.

In the north, North-Western Front made more gains to the north of Vitebsk as the German V Corps was forced back over 20 miles and took heavy losses.

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(3 Shock Army moving forward north of the Dvina)

In turn South-Western Front shifted the angle of its attacks and struck south, threatening the rear of the German units facing NW Front.

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Of more importance than any fighting in this week was a major re-organisation of front boundaries. Kalinin Front, heavily reinforced by fresh artillery moved north of the Dneipr so as to attack the German line between Vitebsk and Orsha.

In turn, Volkhov Front moved to the south. Its rifle divisions moved up to east bank of the Dneipr around Mogilev while the mobile and assault formations of 1 and 2 Shock Army deployed on the intersection with the Western Front. Soviet reconnaissance reports indicated that the Gomel-Chernigov sector was only weakly defended.

Stavka was determined to use the offensive to the north of the Dvina in order to break the German defences on the upper Dneipr. If possible, the intention was to have some bridgeheads over the Dvina before winter, capture Riga and reach the Berezina. This would make a winter offensive to liberate Minsk the main focus of the Red Army.


[1] – I tried this a few more times with similarly dismal results. Clearly the VVS is not set up for an independent strategic bombing campaign.
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