How much can you do with the LCS?

[jimcarravall]

ORIGINAL: Primarchx

ORIGINAL: mikmyk

Thanks Jim

Do you think the problem is though is that the module designs are also fluid? Not that this is wrong but it does lead people to the conclusion that they're not ready/completed.

Ex. Surface module was first built to deal with swarms in the littoral (guns and small missiles with high rates of fire). Now there is an added requirement of being able to duke it out with a contemporary or Chinese/Russian vessel with defensive systems?

I'm really a fan of these ships!

Mike

Both good points above about cost savings and expectations. But from what I've seen only the LCS ASuW module has actually been effectively deployed to date. The others seem to be chasing a moving target and failing in basic performance benchmarks followed by lengthy 'back to the drawing board' periods. I'm all for finding good TCO economies but what we see more and more of (not just with LCS) are promises of fiscal improvement turning into programs of spiraling cost that struggle to meet even fundamental performance goals.

I have no expectation of LCS competing 1:1 with a well-defended warship. However it should be an offensive/defensive match for a FAC-M, a frequent resident of the littoral region the LCS was designed to operate in. While helos/UAVs help even the scales, organic, all-weather offensive OTH weapons are IMHO necessary to make that happen.

You sound like a war fighter .

If the threat imposed by a FAC-M being deployed in littoral waters were defined in the original mission module(s) requirements, a mission module's engineering solution would address it. My guess is that the original requirements didn't account for that threat capability, and if added now, drive up costs, delay deployment, and cause outside observers to question the wisdom of the program or dictate the need for a follow on program to develop an unanticipated mission module.

[Primarchx]

Some (recent) interesting reading on the subject. https://www.fas.org/sgp/crs/weapons/RL33741.pdf

[jimcarravall]

ORIGINAL: Primarchx

Some (recent) interesting reading on the subject. https://www.fas.org/sgp/crs/weapons/RL33741.pdf

Most interesting for me in the FAS review is defining the LCS as single mission focused platform defined by its mission module. Indicates several platforms, each configured for a specific aspect of the flotilla's mission, would have to be deployed to address a multi threat environment.

Not too different from a ground combined arms unit where several different platform capabilities are combined into a task group, and their combat power multiplied by a robust networked combat environment instead of each platform being charged with addressing multiple threats.

[Primarchx]

This part is pretty telling as well...

March 2016 GAO Report
A March 2016 GAO report assessing DOD weapon acquisition programs stated:

Mine Countermeasures (MCM)
The Navy has accepted six MCM packages without demonstrating that they meet interim or threshold requirements. The package has four increments: the first is designed to remove sailors from the minefield and improve mine detection, classification, and neutralization over legacy vessels. Operational testing for the first increment was scheduled to begin in fiscal 2015. This testing has been suspended following a series of performance and reliability shortfalls during developmental tests. The Navy stated that, when the package was available, it significantly exceeded performance requirements during tests. The Department of Operational Test and Evaluation stated that the Navy did not take into account that the systems were unavailable for 85 of 132 days of testing. Test officials determined that the current MCM system would not be found operationally effective and critical MCM systems and the Independence-variant seaframe are not reliable. Test officials support the Navy's September 2015 decision to suspend further testing and evaluate alternatives to key systems and assess technical and programmatic
risks. The findings of this evaluation have not yet been finalized.

Surface Warfare (SUW)
The Navy has accepted seven SUW packages and plans to accept one more in fiscal 2017. Each increment one package currently consists of two 30 millimeter guns, an armed helicopter, and two rigid hull inflatable boats. In August 2014, the Navy found that the package met interim performance requirements on the Freedom variant and is currently testing the package on the Independence variant. To meet threshold requirements for SUW a surface-to-surface missile is required. The Navy plans to use the Army's Longbow HELLFIRE missile for this capability, as it canceled two previous efforts. According to program officials, initial demonstrations with Longbow HELLFIRE
have been successful and operational testing is planned for fiscal year 2017.

Antisubmarine Warfare (ASW)
According to the Navy, the systems that comprise the ASW mission package are mature, as they have been fielded by United States and foreign navies. In September 2014, the Navy completed development testing aboard the Freedom variant, but the mission package is currently 5 tons over its weight parameters. Navy program officials stated that they recently awarded contracts to reduce package weight by at least 15 percent. The Navy is now planning to meet the threshold requirement for ASW in 2017, a one year delay from last year's estimate, as the Navy redirected funding for ASW to make up for funding shortfalls in the MCM and SUW packages.

Other Program Issues
The Navy continues to procure LCS seaframes, even though the sub-systems necessary to meet threshold mission package requirements have not yet been fully developed and integrated with both seaframe designs. The Navy will not achieve the capability to meet threshold requirements for all three of the mission packages until 2019, by which time it plans to take delivery of 22 ships. The Navy plans to begin procurement of a modified LCS in 2019.

...

GAO Response
The systems that comprise the Navy's mission packages have yet to work together to achieve stated minimum requirements. The failures of the MCM package during testing this year and the subsequent indefinite delay of MCM initial capability are emblematic of the Navy's challenges. In the absence of a defined increment-based approach to sequentially gain knowledge and meet requirements, the Navy's acquisition approach is not in accordance with best practices.

This doesn't just have issues of 'mission creep' with regard to ASuW modules, but both the ASW and particularly the MCM modules, which to my knowledge have not strayed much from their initial project specifications, won't even be to threshold capability, if they pass at all, before 22 vessels have been delivered.

[jimcarravall]

ORIGINAL: Primarchx

This part is pretty telling as well...

March 2016 GAO Report
A March 2016 GAO report assessing DOD weapon acquisition programs stated:

Mine Countermeasures (MCM)
The Navy has accepted six MCM packages without demonstrating that they meet interim or threshold requirements. The package has four increments: the first is designed to remove sailors from the minefield and improve mine detection, classification, and neutralization over legacy vessels. Operational testing for the first increment was scheduled to begin in fiscal 2015. This testing has been suspended following a series of performance and reliability shortfalls during developmental tests. The Navy stated that, when the package was available, it significantly exceeded performance requirements during tests. The Department of Operational Test and Evaluation stated that the Navy did not take into account that the systems were unavailable for 85 of 132 days of testing. Test officials determined that the current MCM system would not be found operationally effective and critical MCM systems and the Independence-variant seaframe are not reliable. Test officials support the Navy's September 2015 decision to suspend further testing and evaluate alternatives to key systems and assess technical and programmatic
risks. The findings of this evaluation have not yet been finalized.

Surface Warfare (SUW)
The Navy has accepted seven SUW packages and plans to accept one more in fiscal 2017. Each increment one package currently consists of two 30 millimeter guns, an armed helicopter, and two rigid hull inflatable boats. In August 2014, the Navy found that the package met interim performance requirements on the Freedom variant and is currently testing the package on the Independence variant. To meet threshold requirements for SUW a surface-to-surface missile is required. The Navy plans to use the Army's Longbow HELLFIRE missile for this capability, as it canceled two previous efforts. According to program officials, initial demonstrations with Longbow HELLFIRE
have been successful and operational testing is planned for fiscal year 2017.

Antisubmarine Warfare (ASW)
According to the Navy, the systems that comprise the ASW mission package are mature, as they have been fielded by United States and foreign navies. In September 2014, the Navy completed development testing aboard the Freedom variant, but the mission package is currently 5 tons over its weight parameters. Navy program officials stated that they recently awarded contracts to reduce package weight by at least 15 percent. The Navy is now planning to meet the threshold requirement for ASW in 2017, a one year delay from last year's estimate, as the Navy redirected funding for ASW to make up for funding shortfalls in the MCM and SUW packages.

Other Program Issues
The Navy continues to procure LCS seaframes, even though the sub-systems necessary to meet threshold mission package requirements have not yet been fully developed and integrated with both seaframe designs. The Navy will not achieve the capability to meet threshold requirements for all three of the mission packages until 2019, by which time it plans to take delivery of 22 ships. The Navy plans to begin procurement of a modified LCS in 2019.

...

GAO Response
The systems that comprise the Navy's mission packages have yet to work together to achieve stated minimum requirements. The failures of the MCM package during testing this year and the subsequent indefinite delay of MCM initial capability are emblematic of the Navy's challenges. In the absence of a defined increment-based approach to sequentially gain knowledge and meet requirements, the Navy's acquisition approach is not in accordance with best practices.

This doesn't just have issues of 'mission creep' with regard to ASuW modules, but both the ASW and particularly the MCM modules, which to my knowledge have not strayed much from their initial project specifications, won't even be to threshold capability, if they pass at all, before 22 vessels have been delivered.

I could write a whole dissertation on the DoD acquisition process and how mandatory spending funding streams get out of phase with technology development dreams causing issues as cited above.

More important than the FAS analysis is how the acquisition is progressing is documentation of the acquisition strategy being used to address that progress. It is due May 1, and was reported as being behind schedule as late as December.

It should have been in place before the two hulls were built and the module development started.

[Primarchx]

We're seeing more of this as acquisition programs do their 'parallel development' of platforms and testing. If testing is done at all, falling to the wayside of vendor 'assurances'. Which then lead to costly overruns when, surprise, surprise, the vendors were blowing smoke and the system doesn't perform as promised after the barn door is closed and units have been delivered.

[jimcarravall]

ORIGINAL: Primarchx

We're seeing more of this as acquisition programs do their 'parallel development' of platforms and testing. If testing is done at all, falling to the wayside of vendor 'assurances'. Which then lead to costly overruns when, surprise, surprise, the vendors were blowing smoke and the system doesn't perform as promised after the barn door is closed and units have been delivered.

In this note you sound like a material developer .

Sometimes deliberate and cautious with new technologies is better than jumping in and sticking war fighters with less than a capability they need.

To go a little deeper (for the final time), one problem is how funds are allocated for development. Some approval votes in the US Congress are focused on where money is spent, and promises are made in individual districts about when the funds arrive to boost the local area's economy. The immature mission module production racing ahead of the platform development screams that promises were made to keep the program funding stream in tact in exchange for favorable votes, and work arounds were used inside the program to develop the skins of modules before the technology timelines they required to be operationally effective were developed. Basically hardware is purchased with holes in capabilities where mature technologies can be inserted when they are finally matured.

The Marine Corps Osprey is a good example, where some of the requirements were met, but the prototype platforms crashed in testing. Boeing raked in double the cash it had planned when it delivered the faulty platforms to test on time, and then demonstrated during test that the platforms already built were deficient in certain aspects and needed more research and development funding than had already been allocated.

The Osprey works now, but at a higher cost in development, and behind the original planned schedule for meeting all requirements than had originally been promised.

I'll get out of this discussion now, not because I don't enjoy it, but because it really isn't focused on the topic of the thread.

If you're interested in some more background on the issues, send me a PM and I'll be glad to discuss them from my perspective from "inside" the system.

[Primarchx]

jim - I really appreciate your insight. Thanks for shedding some 'insider' light on these programs!