Invasion of Hawaii

[rustysi]

At the battle of Okinawa , The Yamato was running on soy bean fuel.

Don't know what bio-fuel they're looking into, but the US Navy today is going green.

[Ddog]

I work in the Bio-fuels industry, and there is a bigger demand for Bio/Green products, but if
it were not for the government mandates, we would not make them. Mainly they are expensive to
manufacture, and you could never make enough to replace petroleum products. But they are good to
use in Marine usage, because even when mixed with the petroleum products, it increases the
biodegrading time of spills.

[BBfanboy]

Shouldn't you want to decrease the time a spill takes to bio-degrade?

[rustysi]

ORIGINAL: BBfanboy

Shouldn't you want to decrease the time a spill takes to bio-degrade?

No. Bio-degrading is good. Faster, better.[;)]

[BBfanboy]

ORIGINAL: rustysi

ORIGINAL: BBfanboy

Shouldn't you want to decrease the time a spill takes to bio-degrade?

No. Bio-degrading is good. Faster, better.[;)]

Exactly. faster = less time (decrease) not more time.

[Hotei]

ORIGINAL: Canoerebel

The Japanese could have invaded and held Hawaii about as much as the Confederates could have taken and held New York City.

Even less so assuming the CSA got to the gates of New York, Oahu was really a fortress, massive coastal guns, powerful AA, entrenched regular divisions and massive stocks in underground installations.
The Japanese attacked by the only faintly realistic way and where extremely lucky to get such level of surprise.
If the full level of readiness had been in place, like the week before, the KB squadrons would have been chewed to bits.
Sailing an invasion fleet after the partial success that happened would still have been almost suicide when those coastal batteries started engaging back.

[MakeeLearn]

ORIGINAL: Hotei

ORIGINAL: Canoerebel

The Japanese could have invaded and held Hawaii about as much as the Confederates could have taken and held New York City.

Even less so assuming the CSA got to the gates of New York, Oahu was really a fortress, massive coastal guns, powerful AA, entrenched regular divisions and massive stocks in underground installations.
The Japanese attacked by the only faintly realistic way and where extremely lucky to get such level of surprise.
If the full level of readiness had been in place, like the week before, the KB squadrons would have been chewed to bits.
Sailing an invasion fleet after the partial success that happened would still have been almost suicide when those coastal batteries started engaging back.

divisions? which ones? 24th and 25th Infantry Divisions (incomplete and scattered)?



"...wartime gun emplacements were to be on what was private property, so the guns were still in boxes)"...


Is this true?




"Why Japan Won World War II : An Application of the Operational Factors of War"

Chris Kennedy Lieutenant Commander U. S. Navy



excerpts:



"In operations against America, we must take positive actions such as an invasion of Hawaii."
Admiral Isoroku Yamamoto Lecture to the Japanese Navy Torpedo School, 1928

While the prologue account of the events of 7 December 1941 is fiction in recounting what happened after 1000, it might have actually turned out that way. In fact, most of the Japanese Navy's prewar planning included an invasion of Hawaii, to the extent that it was even wargamed in 1938 (where it succeeded).


They had warning of the incoming strikes almost an hour in advance, but weren't able to make the mental leap necessary to call it an attack. At 0645, over an hour prior to the attack, the destroyer USS Ward sank a minisub that was trying to enter the harbor, but no general alarm was raised.
The fact of the matter is that the U.S. was so mentally unprepared for war that, even though Admiral Knox said on 4 December that "no matter what happens, the U.S. Navy is not going to be caught napping," they were unable to believe that an attack was actually happening until after the first bombs had fallen.
If an invasion had followed the initial strikes, it would probably have been successful.


Although it was first authoritatively discussed in 1932, the invasion of Hawaii should have come as no surprise, as it had been contemplated in Japanese military circles ever since the U.S.
incorporated Hawaii in 1898. In the book Taiheiyo senryaku ron [Discourse on Pacific Strategy], Chuko Ikezaki determined that an invasion of Hawaii was essential in a war with the U.S. for
political as well as military reasons, because it would politically force the United States to sue for peace by militarily threatening targets from Alaska to the Panama Canal.
The head of the Japanese Navy, Admiral Isoroku Yamamoto, also saw the political and military utility of an invasion of Hawaii, because he instinctively understood that an invasion of Hawaii would give the Japanese control over the operational factors of war.

The beaches on the south of the island would have provided good landing areas for the Japanese, and were within easy striking distance of Ewa MC AS, Hickam Airfield, and Pearl Harbor itself. In fact, the Japanese probably could have advanced so quickly that they would have been able to capture CINCPAC headquarters while the staff was still trying to figure out what to do next.


Of the islands' 400,000 residents, 160,000 (almost 40%) were first or second generation Japanese; most of which would probably have gone over to the Japanese side after a successful Japanese invasion.



Not only were its ships and planes lined up in neat rows to make targeting easier, and the island's defenses not set up (wartime gun emplacements were to be on what was private property, so the guns were still in boxes), more importantly, the U.S. was mentally unprepared to fight.

/////////////// End



There are lots of unknowns - to us- that would have influenced the outcome. It's well known of Japan's fuel problems, yet how well known is it that Japan was still refining "California Crude" in 1944?

Money printed in Hawaii

[MakeeLearn]

THE MINORITY PEARL HARBOR REPORT



General Burgin, who commanded the antiaircraft artillery, stated that he and General Murray, who commanded one of the infantry divisions,
personally went to the staff and to General Short, who turned them down and refused to allow the issue of ammunition for the artillery and the infantry ammunition. Colonel Weddington testified that on the morning of December 7th he had insufficient ammunition, that there was none for his rifles and ground machine guns, and that the only extra supply of ammunition was belted ammunition for his extra supply of ammunition was belted ammunition for his aircraft machine guns. (R. 3026-3027)




"They were all ready to go into action immediately, with the exception that the mobile batteries did not have the ammunition. The fixed batteries along the seacoast, those batteries bolted down to concrete, had the ammunition nearby. I had insisted on that with General Short in person and had gotten his permission to take this antiaircraft ammunition, move it into the seacoast gun battery positions, and have it nearby the antiaircraft guns. It was, however, boxed up in wooden boxes and had to be taken out. The ammunition for the mobile guns and batteries was in Aliamanu Crater, which you may know or may not, is about a mile from Port Shafter, up in the old volcano. In addition to that, the mobile batteries had to move out from the various posts to their field positions. They were not in field positions." (R. 2604-2605)

[MakeeLearn]

THE MINORITY PEARL HARBOR REPORT


As to the operability of the aircraft warning service on the morning of December 7th, Commander Taylor testifying said:

"If we had had the Information Center completely manned there would have been some method of identification. Anybody could have told what that (the Japanese) flight was." (R. 1085)

The Navy had not yet participated in the operation, although Commander Taylor said they had been requested to do so about a week before Pearl Harbor. (R. 1086)

This brings us to the question of why General Short or his staff did not take more vigorous action in putting this most important part of the defense into operation, particularly in view of the fact that both the long-distance reconnaissance by the Navy and the inshore reconnaissance by the Army were, for all practical purposes, non-existent.


Colonel Powell, Hawaiian Department Signal Officer, said repeated efforts to get the Navy to cooperate by supplying naval officers to
complete the working of the service were fruitless. They were not interested. (R. 3906)


(They were not interested.)


Colonel Powell testified that the construction of permanent installations did not hold up the placing of the Information Center and
the radar stations into operation because there was adequate equipment for this purpose that was actually installed in temporary buildings for
the Information Center and that radar mobile stations were placed around the Island.

As a consequence the Information Center and the radar stations were in operation some time prior to December 7th. The only reason they were
not operated continuously 24 hours a day was the desire to conserve Tubes, as they were short of tubes and other spare parts.

[bradfordkay]

Those "good landing beaches" on the southern coast of the island were the ones that were covered by the permanent fortified positions - you know, those ones to which the ammunition had been issued. Invasion fleets don't just appear off the coast and start unloading with no warning - not in the case of an island with the extensive air defenses of Oahu. Sure, the Dec 7 attack demolished a lot of those aircraft but that also woke up the command and after that the defenses were manned and fully equipped.

So you either have an attempt to stealthily bring in your invasion fleet to land on an island with a substantial number of PBYs, B17s and B18 which can find that fleet out at sea at least a day away, or you make the sneak air attack first to destroy as many aircraft as possible but trigger the awakening of the land defenses. Either way, I do not believe that the landings would have been made against a sleeping defensive army.

[mind_messing]

The only circumstance where I see a Japanese invasion of Hawaii being a success would be if the IJ landing craft left the boats at the exact same moment as the aircraft started their attack.

American command and control was terrible during and immediately after the air raid, and the only real chance the Japanese had to take the islands was to maximize that disruption to Allied decision-making.

Of course, how do you hide the KB and the invasion shipping?

[US87891]

ORIGINAL: MakeeLearn
"...wartime gun emplacements were to be on what was private property, so the guns were still in boxes)"...

Is this true?

Not really. Several "wartime" emplacements were on private land, but "wartime" was after December 7.

Listing of harbor and coast defense weapons, and nominal placement, as of December 7, 1941. Of the totals, almost all were emplaced between 1917 to 1939 and serviced by 15th and 16th Regiments, US Army Coast Artillery. Also included in the totals, are 12x 155mm and 4x 90mm DP guns which were deployed to Oahu November 9, 1940 with the 251st Coast Artillery Regiment. If any weapons were still in crates, they might be some of these, but the proposition is doubtful because they were all emplaced in military reservations or other government property.

Pearl Harbor, from Puu O Hulu above Barber’s Point to Fort Kamehameha:
4x 16”, 8x 12” M, 4x 12” G, 4x 8”, 6x 6”, 12x 155mm, 2x 4.5”, 4x 90mm, 4x 3”
Honolulu, from Fort Shafter to Koko Head:
2x 14”, 12x 12”M, 2x 8”, 2x 6”, 4x 155mm, 4x 4.7”, 2x 3”
Kaneohe and North Shore:
16x 8”, 12x 155mm

In addition, there were 20x 240mm howitzers, for beach/landing defense, in 10 semi-mobile battery sections of 2 guns each.

Many additional guns were added after December 7, 1941, some immediately thereafter. The battery placements of several are indicated as outside military/govt reservations, i.e., private land.

Pearl Harbor and Honolulu, added, post 12/7/41:
3x 14”, 10x 8”, 9x 7”, 6x 6”, 7x 5”, 34x 155mm, 10x 90mm
Kaneohe and North Shore, added, post 12/7/41:
3x 14”, 22x 8”, 6x 6”, 4x 5”, 16x 155mm, 8x 4”, 6x 90mm, 2x 3”

US Army Coast Artillery Training Center, The Coast Artillery Journal, Fort Monroe, VA, 1922 – 1948
Records of the Hawaiian Coast Artillery District, records group 392

[ed] Of course, to these, one must add the 5", 6", 8", 14" and 16" guns of any and all US Navy ships that survived the initial air strike.

[MakeeLearn]

Thanks US87891.


Storming here today and the connection keeps dropping.

[US87891]

@MakeeLearn, you're welcome.
@mind_messing,
Absolutely right, C3 rather sucks when staffs are confronted with the unexpected. Tactical C3, however, would recover relatively more quickly because of routine (training/practice/positional familiarity and awareness). This might be aided by the artifacts of Japanese amphibious doctrine and technique. In short, Japan might effect a successful ‘landing’ on Oahu, but certainly not a successful ‘invasion’.

Japanese landing technique was to put a limited number of assault troops ashore on relatively weakly defended beaches. The number of first-wave assault troops are characterized as limited because of the lift limitations of assault landing craft, in terms of both number and employment.

A very few ships were configured as, what we would call, APs. This group were termed, and latterly officially designated as, Landing Craft Carriers. The vast majority were configured as simple transports, in a similar manner to our USATs. The LCCs would carry the invasion landing craft and the Shipping Engineer elements that operated them. LCCs would host some assault element troops but most would be on the transports.

The invasion task group would anchor and the LCCs deploy the landing craft. These would go to designated transports, load the landing troops, and proceed to the beach. Those landing craft that survived would return to transports of the second wave, load, and continue to the beach; then the third wave, then the fourth, and so on. This a long and involved process requiring the task group to remain in place for a long period. It also necessitated assaults engaging in relatively smaller, periodic, waves, or ‘impulses’, over a relatively extended period. This is a big factor in Japan’s inclination for initial landings at night at poorly defended or undefended locations.

The gift of time and presentation of combat power in detail would allow the tactical defense to get its sh.., act together. Sooner or later, the panic at ‘higher’ might subside somewhat if the beach defenses maintained an adequate posture.

Of note is that LCCs, Shipping Engineers, and the landing craft themselves, were controlled by, and indeed part of, the IJ Army. The Navy wasn’t in it and was only superficially aware of Army amphibious technique. The Navy could plan all it wanted, but then the plan would be handed off to the Army who was in complete control of the mechanics and timing of the assault.

The devil is always in the details.

Matt

[mind_messing]

ORIGINAL: US87891

@MakeeLearn, you're welcome.
@mind_messing,
Absolutely right, C3 rather sucks when staffs are confronted with the unexpected. Tactical C3, however, would recover relatively more quickly because of routine (training/practice/positional familiarity and awareness). This might be aided by the artifacts of Japanese amphibious doctrine and technique. In short, Japan might effect a successful ‘landing’ on Oahu, but certainly not a successful ‘invasion’.

Japanese landing technique was to put a limited number of assault troops ashore on relatively weakly defended beaches. The number of first-wave assault troops are characterized as limited because of the lift limitations of assault landing craft, in terms of both number and employment.

A very few ships were configured as, what we would call, APs. This group were termed, and latterly officially designated as, Landing Craft Carriers. The vast majority were configured as simple transports, in a similar manner to our USATs. The LCCs would carry the invasion landing craft and the Shipping Engineer elements that operated them. LCCs would host some assault element troops but most would be on the transports.

The invasion task group would anchor and the LCCs deploy the landing craft. These would go to designated transports, load the landing troops, and proceed to the beach. Those landing craft that survived would return to transports of the second wave, load, and continue to the beach; then the third wave, then the fourth, and so on. This a long and involved process requiring the task group to remain in place for a long period. It also necessitated assaults engaging in relatively smaller, periodic, waves, or ‘impulses’, over a relatively extended period. This is a big factor in Japan’s inclination for initial landings at night at poorly defended or undefended locations.

The gift of time and presentation of combat power in detail would allow the tactical defense to get its sh.., act together. Sooner or later, the panic at ‘higher’ might subside somewhat if the beach defenses maintained an adequate posture.

Of note is that LCCs, Shipping Engineers, and the landing craft themselves, were controlled by, and indeed part of, the IJ Army. The Navy wasn’t in it and was only superficially aware of Army amphibious technique. The Navy could plan all it wanted, but then the plan would be handed off to the Army who was in complete control of the mechanics and timing of the assault.

The devil is always in the details.

Matt

Oh, absolutely. My point was that the only way that the Japanese could have possibly overcame the odds stacked against them would have been if they'd deliberately harnessed the "surprise factor" of the Dec 7th raid to the fullest extent. Of course, they didn't really guess what effect the Dec 7th raid would have had on US forces psychologically, but hindsight gives the best insight.

Even at that, the actual presence of the enemy on Hawaii may have stiffened the American psychological outlook. I think that part of the "Dec 7th shock" was mainly how the Japanese appeared from nowhere, inflicted the damage they did, and then were gone that day.

[spence]

Oh, absolutely. My point was that the only way that the Japanese could have possibly overcame the odds stacked against them would have been if they'd deliberately harnessed the "surprise factor" of the Dec 7th raid to the fullest extent. Of course, they didn't really guess what effect the Dec 7th raid would have had on US forces psychologically, but hindsight gives the best insight.

The problem would tend to be having about 100 "invisible" merchant ships approach Oahu/Hawaii undetected. Even the numbest pilot would have been moved to report any group of foreign merchant ships heading towards Hawaii. The initial raid absolutely has to precede the approach of the invasion force by an interval that must be large enough to preclude detection of the invasion fleet prior to that initial raid. Sailing 50000 IJA soldiers through the North Pacific in winter is hardly practical: the transports' pumps wouldn't be able to keep up with the puke. So that leaves an approach from the WSW or thereabouts past an indeterminate but possibly substantial American search.

[witpqs]

ORIGINAL: spence

Oh, absolutely. My point was that the only way that the Japanese could have possibly overcame the odds stacked against them would have been if they'd deliberately harnessed the "surprise factor" of the Dec 7th raid to the fullest extent. Of course, they didn't really guess what effect the Dec 7th raid would have had on US forces psychologically, but hindsight gives the best insight.

The problem would tend to be having about 100 "invisible" merchant ships approach Oahu/Hawaii undetected. Even the numbest pilot would have been moved to report any group of foreign merchant ships heading towards Hawaii. The initial raid absolutely has to precede the approach of the invasion force by an interval that must be large enough to preclude detection of the invasion fleet prior to that initial raid. Sailing 50000 IJA soldiers through the North Pacific in winter is hardly practical: the transports' pumps wouldn't be able to keep up with the puke. So that leaves an approach from the WSW or thereabouts past an indeterminate but possibly substantial American search.

Now THIS is the kind of historical perspective that you just can't get most places! [:D] That's why I come here.