Fighters stats GD1938

[ironduke1955]

I have never quite understood the first and second attack figure for fighters high and low say the ME109'c versus low fighters 44/44 versus high fighters 44/22 or 10/60 against low Bombers but 10/30 against high bombers, as the ME109'c is a low fighter I get the halving of the effectiveness from 60 to 30 for high and low bombers but what does the 10 represent ?

[Bombur]

It’s the offensive valeu of the Bf-109 vs Bombers, it means the Bf-109 is strafing parked bombers (since the Bombers don’t take off to defend their base)

[ironduke1955]

Thanks Bombur so the 10 is strafing value only and is only used during direct attacks on enemy airbases that have bombers, I would have thought that bombers on the ground would have been a lot easier target than bombers in the air.

[Bombur]

A good point, however, bombers is bases are....
1-Not fueled, so they won´t catch fire if hit
2-Protected by some kind of hardened shelter or even in their hangars, protecting them from machinegun fire
3-No need to get back to the base if they are damaged
These are the reasons for smaller values

[ironduke1955]

Yes I get that if camouflage and dispersal are used then that value stands up but if its not then the losses can be a lot higher as Soviet losses were during Barbarossa when Soviet planes deployed near the front were not dispersed or camouflaged due to using smaller Polish airbases so the loss of front line Soviet aircraft was very high.

The Soviet Air Force in World War 2 got a very rude awakening, it endured one of the most devastating defeats in aviation history. At the time of the German attack the force consisted of about 400 000 personnel, and 10 000 to 15 000 aircraft, of which 7 500 were deployed in the Soviet’s Western theatre. Whereas the German Air Force had around 2800 aircraft deployed for Operation Barbarossa. The Germans achieved total surprised and launched an attack with about 1000 bombers against 66 airfields in the Russian border districts. (p. 272)

Aircraft Losses during Operation Barbarossa

The reported losses on these initial attacks vary, but the 1970s Soviet official history states the loss of 800 aircraft destroyed on the ground and a total loss of 1200 aircraft. This basically crippled the Soviet air force stationed near the front lines. These attacks also inflicted significant damage and chaos on the logistical side. Thus, by day three of operation Barbarossa the Luftwaffe was free to focus mainly on supporting the ground troops, who captured the Russian airfields.(p. 273)

Just to note these losses are after just 3 days, the German attacks on UK airbases were winning the battle of Britain until the Germans switched to terror bombing of British cities. It may require some thought as ground units also suffer damage in hexes targeted just for ground attacks on the airbases.

[LJBurstyn]

ORIGINAL: ironduke1955

Yes I get that if camouflage and dispersal are used then that value stands up but if its not then the losses can be a lot higher as Soviet losses were during Barbarossa when Soviet planes deployed near the front were not dispersed or camouflaged due to using smaller Polish airbases so the loss of front line Soviet aircraft was very high.

The Soviet Air Force in World War 2 got a very rude awakening, it endured one of the most devastating defeats in aviation history. At the time of the German attack the force consisted of about 400 000 personnel, and 10 000 to 15 000 aircraft, of which 7 500 were deployed in the Soviet’s Western theatre. Whereas the German Air Force had around 2800 aircraft deployed for Operation Barbarossa. The Germans achieved total surprised and launched an attack with about 1000 bombers against 66 airfields in the Russian border districts. (p. 272)

Aircraft Losses during Operation Barbarossa

The reported losses on these initial attacks vary, but the 1970s Soviet official history states the loss of 800 aircraft destroyed on the ground and a total loss of 1200 aircraft. This basically crippled the Soviet air force stationed near the front lines. These attacks also inflicted significant damage and chaos on the logistical side. Thus, by day three of operation Barbarossa the Luftwaffe was free to focus mainly on supporting the ground troops, who captured the Russian airfields.(p. 273)

Just to note these losses are after just 3 days, the German attacks on UK airbases were winning the battle of Britain until the Germans switched to terror bombing of British cities. It may require some thought as ground units also suffer damage in hexes targeted just for ground attacks on the airbases.

Do you know why the Germans switched to terror bombing of British cities after 3 days of winning the air war by attacking air bases?
Hitler ordered the change after British bombers terror bombed Germany at night. Nighttime bombing was very inaccurate so the best the British could do was to
bomb a city.

[ironduke1955]

Yes I am a Brit so its pretty well known. The battle of Britain is shown starting 10th of July 1940 the British as it says below launched the raid on Berlin on the 25th August 1940 next day Hitler ordered the Blitz on British civilian populations to start.

The first real bombing raid on Berlin would not occur until August 25, 1940, during the Battle of Britain. Hitler had placed London off-limits for bombing, and the Luftwaffe was concentrating on defeating the Royal Air Force in preparation for a cross-Channel invasion. But on the night of August 24, a German plane dropped bombs on London, probably by accident, on its way home from a raid. Prime Minister Winston Churchill immediately ordered the RAF to retaliate with a raid on Berlin. That same night, a force of 81 Vickers Wellingtons and Handley Page Hampdens headed for Berlin. Only about half of them reached the capital, which was obscured by dense clouds. Little damage was done, but one bomb killed the only elephant in the Berlin Zoo.


An incensed Hitler ordered Göring to change their air war strategy. Instead of concentrating on neutralizing the RAF, the Luftwaffe now focused on reprisal raids on English cities, especially London. Conducted mainly at night, “the Blitz” failed to break British morale, and in September Hitler was forced to cancel plans for the invasion.

This first air raid on Berlin is a little-known event, even to most Berliners. The German Propaganda Ministry stated the next day that an air raid drill had been held. News of the raid was no doubt suppressed because an air attack on the capital would have embarrassed Adolf Hitler and especially Hermann Göring, the air minister, who had bragged before the war, “If any bombs fall on the Reich I will change my name to Maier.” (Contrary to popular belief, this was not an anti-Semitic slur: Maier is a common German name, especially in Bavaria, and Göring was implying that he would just be a “nobody.”) In France, the news of this dangerous raid may have satisfied the leaders’ desire for revenge, even though symbolic, but it was obscured by the general chaos and confusion resulting from the massive German blitzkrieg that was rapidly overrunning France and the Low Countries.

As everyone knows, more or less, the Luftwaffe came close to overwhelming the RAF several times in that hot summer, not least when it attacked the visible and vital radar masts at key airfields on 12 August. Puffed up by overly optimistic reports about damage done and puzzled by British resilience (the radar system was much better than they realised), Göring failed to stick to winning ways. Unable to resolve the rival claims of his bomber and fighter chiefs for priority, his frequent changes let the RAF off the hook more than once.

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The greatest strategic error arose from a chain of accidents. German fighters had been escorting the bombers, often at great cost in terms of lives and aircraft, but Hitler had told them not to bomb London except on his express orders. Then, in late August, the British capital was accidentally bombed in mistake for military targets. The RAF duly bombed Berlin in retaliation on 25 August – something Germans had been assured would never happen.

Hitler was furious. In a speech on 4 September, he mocked the British for asking “Why doesn’t he come?” “Calm yourselves, calm yourselves, he is coming,” he said, to tumultuous applause.

But he wasn’t coming. As usual, he was misreading his enemy, too. An offer to repatriate 40,000 PoWs might have worked better.

Berlin switched its full attention to daylight raids on British cities on 7 September, with 400 bombers and 600 fighters attacking key targets such as the London docks. The Blitz had begun. But the attacks on airfields ended and Fighter Command was spared to fight on, heavy losses rapidly forcing the Luftwaffe later to confine itself to night bombing raids.

[ironduke1955]

Just to note these losses are just after three days

This refers to the comment above that Soviets losses were reached, "by day three of operation Barbarossa" so with GD1938 a monthly turn would yield more casualties to aircraft at air bases, at the moment tactical attacks on airbases yield quite sparse casualties to aircraft on the ground due to attack factors being around 10. the yield is so low that what players do is to use strategic bombing on a airbase that inflicts few if any casualties on the planes on the ground but reduces the airbase to 0 and the readiness of the aircraft based there also to 10/20 not enough for missions but just enough to get the planes out and back to safer airbases, but they suffer hardly any casualties just a big hit to readiness.

[ironduke1955]

Just my thoughts on the choice between attacking enemy air forces at there bases, and using your air force to give ground support or strategic bombing, at the moment tactical bombing of enemy airbases is just not worth the effort as the casualty yields are to low.

[Bombur]

Don´t forget that soviet aircraft in Barbarossa were neither dispersed not protected and a substatial number of losses were caused by bombers (and fighter bombers). Use your bombers against airfields, they have pretty good ratings against parked aircraft.

[Bombur]

This said it´s true you cannot simulate Barbarossa or Pearl Harbor with the standard values, you need to give a readiness penalty to the defender or a combat bonus to the attacker (similar to shock values in TOAW). A combat penalty for the defender won´t work well.

[ironduke1955]

I had not forgotten that the Barbarossa example came with a caveat that the Soviets were using smaller Polish airbases and could not disperse there aircraft.

Soviet planes deployed near the front were not dispersed or camouflaged due to using smaller Polish airbases so the loss of front line Soviet aircraft was very high.

But that being said I still think that casualties for a airforce that is flying from airbases that are within range of enemy airforce tactical bombers supported by fighters should be a lot higher than they currently are, with early fighter ranges being 3 hexes there is not much of southern England that is in range of the ME109'c but those airbases that are should if targeted suffer a lot more losses then they currently do at the moment targeting enemy airbases with tactical bombers escorted by fighters does not do sufficient damage to make the tactic viable, but clearly it was a tactic used with some success.

[Bombur]

A trouble with GD 1938 is that it´s easy to build thousands of fighters and make large raids with 1200 aircraft, which in turn are opposed by other 1000´s of aircraft, in such circumstances, damage done by bombers will be somewhat limited by the fighter opposition, also consider that only bombers can be destroyed in the ground (the fighters will take off to fight the raid) and the number of bombers is usually a small % of the airforce, also it´s common to station bombers in rear areas to make them less vulnerable to raids.
In GD-1938 the Bf-109 can reach London, they couldn´t go further IRL.

[ironduke1955]

Yes all of that is true but if the air base does contain a large amount of Bombers with a small force of fighters defending, and that is not unheard of it would be more accurate if those bombers on the ground sustained more casualties then they currently do, and later in the game you have fighters like the P51 that can range over much greater distances and possibly reach some of those rear area air bases that are relatively lightly defended by defending fighters in those cases higher casualty rates would be expected for bombers on the ground. Its not a game changing alteration but effective tactical raids on enemy airbases would have a authentic feel to them. And reflect documented real world events. As you say in most cases the defending fighters will do the job of protecting the airbases, but in the cases where they are not present or overwhelmed than a higher kill ratio for Bombers on the ground would not be out of place.

[Bombur]

But then it´s possible that the trouble is with Bombers offensive value against Bombers. I´ve been increasing this ratings in both mods (Bombur mod and GD1938). In GD 1938v3, the value of medium bombers, in particular, will be almost doubled. But I still think "pure" fighters should have low "strafing values" (fighter bombers are another thing, of course).

[ironduke1955]

Thanks for looking at it certainly Bomber/FBomber V Bomber could be upped so that given the right battlefield circumstances real damage can be done to enemy bombers on the ground.