Turns 22 to 37 Operation PEGASUS PLUCKED: A Retrospective on our 1941/42 Winter - The Plan
The topic of our winter defences first came up again in turn 14. The outline plan from then shows a black line connecting terrain features with a defensive value even during the blizzard such as the valdai hills. While we expected to go beyond this line, we would have also have expected to retreat back to it in winter. Much of it was still in enemy control. But for the parts that were not there was the prospect of building forts to give lots of time to build up high fortification levels. Already a large part of the south that was not near any major cities or our lateral connecting rail line was being left out of this. However the feeling, particularly from our Centre commander Stelteck, was that a more elastic defence was appropriate. In the end forts were built along the Mius and the flanks of Moscow, but not until the clear weather was over.
However one key assumption changed. Rather than assuming that even if we took Moscow we would lose it, Stelteck (then centre commander) assured us that it could be held - but on condition that he got three of the mountain divisions. A commitment that was made and delivered.
Unlike planning for our 1942 summer campaign however little more thought was given to the winter until it was upon us
With timmyab joining the team as our Chief of Staff their first act was to lick our planning for winter into shape. The picture below shows their plan which became our plan for the winter defence. The area immediately south of the Finnish no move line was subsequently changed to weak as we realised in fact, in the worst case scenario, we could withdraw the Finns to defending the base of the isthmus with Leningrad so they need not be outflanked.
Motorised forces that were sent back to winter quarters were specifically to be assigned to "Panzer Hubs" near the front were they would still be available for emergencies or defence on the front if it fell that far back.
Finally the plan called for a reserve to be made - this was planned to be held mostly behind Moscow. The picture below shows the state of our defences at the end of turn 22. Fortification levels shown in grey circles show a healthy cluster around Moscow and on the Mius, but little elsewhere.
The first full systematic reconnaisance was held since the mud period at the end of turn 22. It was becoming really clear that the Soviets were preparing an all out assault for Moscow. The cavalry we saw East of Tula was still there with four lines of units and tank brigades at each end. We expected the main Schwerpunkt to come through here. The terrain is harder for reconnaissance North of Moscow but we assumed there would be a similar build up there for a pincer attack north and south of Moscow. So just as we concentrated our forces to attack Moscow in Operation Tottenritt, the Soviet team were concentrating theirs for a recapture. There was still a tank park at Saratov which presumably were tank brigades still being trained up. And a concentration of units appearing at Stalingrad. But the cavalry near Rostov had gone and there seemed to be little more than a single line of units in the South. All three of their guards divisions on the other hand were being held in defensive positions.
We had a worrying paucity of forces and fortification between the Oka and Tula. We had to counter any attempt on Moscow by reconcentrating our forces between Tula and Kalinin. And just like Operation Tottenritt to take Moscow, it meant all three ground commanders had to play their part in keeping Moscow. North had to guard the northern flank of Moscow. Meanwhile our poor Southern commander, who had been stretched during the summer and was told their boundary would be shifting to south of Voronezh was now told they had to shift their boundary north again - and help in the threatened sector. The calculated risk was that the lack of mobile forces in the far south meant we could afford a shallower line down there.
By turn 25 our recon had still not picked up a larger concentration for Soviet forces north of Moscow that we assumed would be built there. So our chief of staff reassessed that the real northern hinge of the Soviet advance would come much further north in the Valdai sector. As a result we scrambled forces to improve our situation in those areas. This final assesment before the blizzard was very prescient.