We went through the blizzard with that can best be described as one of contrasts between the different commands.
NORTH - REFUSAL TO GIVE BATTLE
The opening weeks of blizzard saw our German forces in the North repeatedly redeploy away from the enemy - this was sometimes mistakenly refered to as "retreating." This did mean we gave up significant territory, including more easily defended areas like the Valdai. The bulge they created towards lake Ilmen is, by some measures, the closest they now have to Berlin - but also more difficult to defend in itself. However it also frustated the Northern Soviet commander at not being able to have battles. The extra hexes to travel through meant fewer units had the movement points left to initiate deliberate attacks. As a result our units there suffered less in losses of men, material and morale. We assume our opponents gained less in experience or credit to becoming guards. By the time our North started to stand its ground, the Soviet North had lost momentum and ultimately ceased trying to make any attacks at all.
North also covered the frontline down from Kalinin to Moscow and later also to the south of Moscow. A harder defence was established here, but was never really tested. Indeed later North was able to push back Soviet units adjacent to the Moscow-Kalinin rail line so that it could act as a supply route again.
And the areas covered by the Finns actually saw us gain ground on where we started the blizzard.
CENTRE - HARD DEFENCE ... AND OFFENCE
In our centre, from Moscow down to south of Tula, our troops were to standfast and not give an inch. The opening Soviet turn saw us immediately counterattack and seize back what they had captured and this set the flavour for the rest of the blizzard. The main effort of the Soviet offence which started along the Oka and north of Tula shifted southwards as the Blizzard went on - and Centre shifted southwards to meet them. Ultimately the Axis Blizzard offensive started here. As a result our forces went through many battles here but gave virtually no ground - indeed in two hexes the frontlines of Centre ended the blizzard exactly where it had started. Amazingly Tula, which all but our Centre commander assumed would be lost in the blizzard, remained in our hands.
SOUTH - STRETCHED THIN BUT FIGHTING BACK
Our poor south commander had to contend with a long front stretched thin. Hence our opponents were able to conduct numerous battles and farm many wins. And yet many of their wins scored virtually no losses against much of the front which had to be held by regiments, or were losses for allies which we will not have any manpower shortages with for a long time. Nevertheless many of the regiments, particularly the ones interspersed with allies, still got to have low ToEs by the end of the blizzard and very low morale. But as North and Centre became more secure we started to shorten the front covered by South and use fresh arrivals from Germany to bolster the frontlines.
OPERATION RUDOLF THE REDNOSE REINDEER
A special mention should be made of a group of interconnected operational plans. These never happened, at least other than a partial Rudolf operation.
The Janisjarvi line had been formed straight afer Finnish units joined the war in 1941. It meant they were never able to break into Karelia and its defence gave the Soviets their first guards unit. It was the one true success of the Soviet side during 1941. Worryingly for us it left the Soviet side perilously close to Vyborg - and a Finnish surrender. But as Soviet units were being drawn down for operations elsewhere our Northern commander reported he had seen a chink in the lines and believed it could be broken. However this single attack was soon being explored as the first part of a larger operation in which motorised forces supported by transports would follow through any success - this being the genesis of Operation Rudolf.
At this point we added a seperate study of how an attack on the lower Volkhov would impact Karelia - in particular how it could impede or delay any reinforcements. Combined with Rudolf this could have been followed by a further operation we named Reindeer. We game planned what would happen over several turns including what the Soviet reaction would be - and in one case managed to close down the entire rail line in Karelia and surround and isolate all the forces then on the Janisjarvi with other Soviet forces entering Karelia to rescue them being more than a turn away. A successful combined operation of Rudolf/Rednose/Reindeer would have produced high value results but with a very low probability of success. It depended on multiple parts coming together in sequence, many of which were not under our control. In the end changes in Soviet force dispositions the very turn before Rednose was set to begin led to its cancellation. It would not have made sense to deploy the motorised forces to Karelia for Rudolf alone, but with the deployment already started it made more sense to use what was already there.
The end result was a Janisjarvi line that was broken and pushed back hexes to give the defence of Finland in Karelia some strategic depth. Although lowsugar, our summer 1941 North commander, is rarely seen at HQ these days we did contact them specially on this event. And he expressed quiet satisfaction on seeing his old bug bear finally overcome.
FORTS
We had actually created our own forts on the flanks of Moscow, along the Mius and also at the entrances to the Crimea. The orthdox view is these should be used to held raise fortification levels, but should be disbanded before coming into contact with the enemy. Earlier in this AAR we had discussed taking a different approach to take advantage of a special rule

So we had planned to keep the forts with artillery directly attached but still stacked with other combat units to see if the extra disruption compensated for the lesser combat value of forts. At this point we would have reported the results, except that there are n't any. With one exception the forts were never in any battle, the one exception being an error we had not prepared for rather than the intended use. So it remains an open question.
However the forts even if not used (properly) in combat had their uses. They allowed us to deploy some units elswhere that otherwise would have had to be used to dig there, to plan retreat paths and stacking slots to them and to concentrate our efforts in other weaker places. The Soviet team did at least once come adjacent to our forts and may have picked them up with recon, so would be aware of our use of forts and adapted acordingly. Even from afar the forts had an impact.
THE DOGS THAT DID NOT BARK
On three occasions we ended a turn expecting to see the next turn come back with units isolated and possibly set for surrender the following turn.



In every case it never happened. On the other hand in one turn we did get back what we really dreaded...

For only one time did a gap appear in our front lines. But having blown open a hole when we looked for the exploiting cavalry we found none, if ever there was a time made for them this was it and none were to be found. Perhaps only Shakespeare can do justice to this moment:-

Ultimately we lost 4 German support units, 1 Rumanian support unit and 1 fort only during the blizzard - no on map combat units from the order of battle were lost at all. By contrast for the blizzard the Soviet losses included 4 on map rifle units. Inspite of all the losses we never once lost control. Never once did we find cavalry running around our rear. Never once did we have to rescue or lose an on map unit. Losses and retreats we can manage. Chaos and pandaemonium we cannot.