Observations from an Armor officer

[Mark Florio]

I really love this game. I have had a passion for war gaming since I was stationed in FRG from 88-90 as part of 2BDE, 3ID. I was a platoon leader and a battalion staff officer in an armor battalion (3/63AR) in that period. My comments on the game so far are positive. Here are my thoughts:
1). The game mechanics and how the weapons are modeled is excellent. But would love to see more independent movement of troops when they come under fire. Too often I see troops in the open not using smoke and not maneuvering well enough? They should break contact when hit but in this game they dont seem to do that as much?
2). The artillery looks too much like direct fire animations... Howitzers shells came in usually at steep angles. You should allow for more mission types to include Rocket munitions and time to target missions. The explosion animations could be boosted a bit... a 155mm shell will create a lot of smoke and debris upon impact.
3). It would be nice to know the effects of night vision. The US forces operated commonly at night and our training included thermal vision gunnery under all weather conditions. The soviets had very little if any night fighting capabilities by the way. The exception was their recon and rotary wing.
4). AI behavior. The soviet doctrine at the time was pretty rigid. Not every tank had radios and those that did were basically following a scripted attack. Jr leaders had very little tactical flexibility. The result was often, at least in their training an aggressive push by increasingly more powerful forces once the vanguard found a weakpoint. But their ability to react mid battle was always predicted to be limited.
5). AI behavior for NATO: I havent played yet against the NATO troops but the strategy should be a mobile defense with local counter attacks by Mech forces. Lots of air power and artillery to slow the wave until the REFORGER forces mobilized.
6). I dont see NBC modeled in AB yet or might not have seen it yet?
7) would like to see rotary wing have more independence. They tend to stay in one spot instead of hopping around behind tree lines and ridgelines?
8) resupply. Mech forces usually did a full top off before action but it wouldnt be unusual for ammo and fuel to be pushed forward.Refueling an Abrams took about 5 minutes. Reloading took about 2 minutes a round if the crew hustled and was not in MOPP.

[kevinkins]

Welcome Mark. All your points are spot on. We all hope AB is a success so the developers gain the resources to improve based on suggestions like yours.

Kevin

[jnpoint]

Great observations - I especially would like the possibility to resupply...

[Blond_Knight]

I feel like resupply and NBC modeling are outside the scope of this game. There's a thread about resupply but lets talk about NBC for a second.
Its highly likely that the Soviets would have utilized NBC warfare in some form to breakthrough or maintain the tempo of their attack. But remember that the main effect of that, for properly equipped soldiers, is increased fatigue and not high casualties.
A huge psychological impact ofcourse, and very tiring running around in MOPP4, but outside the scope of this game.

[CapnDarwin]

Mark, for #8, how far back from the shooting/battle line was this resupply and how much fuel and ammo are we talking? We have three gentlemen who served back in the day on our development team and have discussed battlefield resupply. It was stated that units low on ammo in a platoon, if they where out of the shooting, would transfer fuel and ammo around to even out the loadouts. In absence of being in a position to receive logistical support, I can see that kind of "resupply" going on given the map footprint in AB.

[gbem]

i honestly dont think resupply is beyond the scope of this game... although resupply for tanks can occur in 30 minutes to an hour via a dedicated supply... this is doable within the confines of large battles in AB which can last as long as 4 hours or more... also infantry and artillery especially foot artillery should be readily resuppliable via trucks apcs IFVs etc....

[76mm]

I also served as an armor officer in Europe doing this period and agree with what the OP says about platoon cross-leveling. For resupply from the supply section, I would think it would take 30-60 minutes, which would seem to be within the scope of some of the larger battles (from what I've read--I don't have the game).

[Adam Rinkleff]

Resupply can definitely be setup. I think there should be an adjustable timer (one hour, two hours, five hours?), and then a modifier that can be applied by deploying supply trucks with an area of effect radius. Same goes for water/food/repairs. It'll be the world's most complete wargame, if it becomes worth investing in that fancy new mobile field kitchen. [:)]

[Adam Rinkleff]

ORIGINAL: Blond_Knight
NBC

I think NBC could be modded. Troops wearing protective equipment would simply move more slowly, and shoot less accurately with impaired line of sight perception. The developers could add a chemical gas shell, which only affects troops that lack gas mask equipment. Although from a gameplay perspective, I'm not sure much would come of a battle where one side is well equipped and the other is not. More likely both sides would be equipped, and the main difference would be that infantry are operating with a lot more fatigue. Or conversely, neither side is well equipped, in which case you could just give shells a large radius of effect and watch entire companies die with almost nobody left alive.

Since vehicles can get tracked in rough terrain, there is probably a way to mod it so that every unit has a percentage chance to fail in random locations. So an infantry platoon walking across an empty field might wind up with a casualty because they tripped over something and tore a hole in their suit.

[kevinkins]

Back in the day when reading about Fort Irwin exercises in the 80's, the dread of Blue was for the OPFOR to break through the defense and get to the supply trains. Those trains were close enough to the front line i.e. within tactical range/time frame (4-8 hrs) during those exercises. Resupply is within the scope of longer AB battles. Supply areas might be something to think about. Infantry fighting deep in a city is another matter. [&:] This is one of those nice to have things.

Kevin

[Sorrow_Knight]

ORIGINAL: Mark Florio

4). Not every tank had radios and those that did were basically following a scripted attack. Jr leaders had very little tactical flexibility. The result was often, at least in their training an aggressive push by increasingly more powerful forces once the vanguard found a weakpoint. But their ability to react mid battle was always predicted to be limited.

And who did say that heresy to you? Since at least T-55 ALL Soviet tanks has radio. And yours vision of Soviet doctrine and tactics is... very far from reality.

[Blond_Knight]

ORIGINAL: Sorrow_Knight

And who did say that heresy to you? Since at least T-55 ALL Soviet tanks has radio. And yours vision of Soviet doctrine and tactics is... very far from reality.

That was what we were taught also, few radios at the company level and below, and very rigid battle drill.

Kevinkin, I was at Irwin in '88 and we did a lot of breaking through and over-running. But we knew the terrain very well and there weren't but so many ways to attack or defend in the field.
Although I still have nightmares about working on those damn Sheridans.

[76mm]

ORIGINAL: Blond_Knight
That was what we were taught also, few radios at the company level and below, and very rigid battle drill.

That is not what I was taught, or at least what I read. Maybe your instructors were thinking of WWII...

[gbem]

hes right about 1 thing... soviet doctrine isnt designed to function with too much initiative in contrast to western doctrine... mobile defense was a far more "fluid" doctrine over the much more rigid and strategically focused deep battle... and he got the vanguard forces finding a weakspot and sending the main body part right... that was soviet doctrine during both ww2 and the cold war... however it must be noted that the main force doesnt attack at a single weakspot however penetrates the enemy defense through multiple weakspots... going through a single weakspot is actually german doctrine during ww2... schwerepunkt...

[Blond_Knight]

ORIGINAL: 76mm

ORIGINAL: Blond_Knight
That was what we were taught also, few radios at the company level and below, and very rigid battle drill.

That is not what I was taught, or at least what I read. Maybe your instructors were thinking of WWII...

At Irwin they tried to make the training as realistic as possible to the extent that our tanks(OPFOR) each carried a set of flags for platoon control, similar to whats seen at the beginning of "The Beast".
Maybe your right about them all having radios in the '80's, its been a long time.

[mikeCK]

ORIGINAL: Sorrow_Knight

ORIGINAL: Mark Florio

4). Not every tank had radios and those that did were basically following a scripted attack. Jr leaders had very little tactical flexibility. The result was often, at least in their training an aggressive push by increasingly more powerful forces once the vanguard found a weakpoint. But their ability to react mid battle was always predicted to be limited.

And who did say that heresy to you? Since at least T-55 ALL Soviet tanks has radio. And yours vision of Soviet doctrine and tactics is... very far from reality.

Radios or not, sorry, but the OP is simply correct about Soviet doctrine. It was rigid. Whether you want it to have been or not, it was. In order to have a western style doctrine where junior officers and NCOs are expected to exercise their own initiative in order to acomplish a goal, they must have significant training and professionalism. We would be given an order “secure a crossing over the river”. It was up to the company commander (for example) to decide on his own, how to accomplish that. He isn’t told “move your company down this route and secure the MIKECK bridge. By encouraging junior officers to make their own determinations as to how to secure the crossing, you allow them to alter plans on the fly to adjust to the unexpected. If I show up and find bridge MIKECK is heavily defended, I can detach a platoon to feint an attack while the rest of my company secures the next bridge over.

Like it or not, the Soviet Army was a conscript Force. They did not (and could not) provide their NCOs and junior officers with the training required to properly analyze a situation and alter the plan while keeping on task. Soviet junior officers and NCOs were expected to follow orders. You take bridge MIKECK. If the company commander gets there and the bridge is heavily defended, he has two choices: attack anyway or radio his senior commmader, relay the situation and request permission to attack another bridge. THAT takes time. By the time the request is routed and permission is given, the defending troops have reacted and are now defending both bridges

It’s just a fact. If you want junior officers to be able to operate with only general objectives (and not directions), you have to train them extensively. The Red army could not. Heck, I was 11B infantry 1988-1994. By the time I was an E-5 Sgt I had been through airborne school, light leader academy, platoon leaders development course and Scout/sniper school (not nearly as rigorous as today’s). That was just for an infantry Sgt in charge of a squad of 6 guys.

It’s not an insult...it’s just a fact that Soviet doctrine at a tactical level was rigid and company/battalion commanders were expected to follow direction. If they felt it wasn’t a good idea, they had to get new direction. American officers could take immediate action and change plans on the fly

[Phoenix100]

I would think that right now with this game the OP's first point is, for me, the most crucial, urgent development point. I see no real reaction to fire from units at the moment. Mostly, once they have been spotted and fired upon, they just sit in place taking losses or getting wiped out.

[gbem]

All soviet tanks during and after the T-34-85 were equipped with radios... the myth of soviet tanks not having radios only apply to the T-34 mod 41/42 or earlier...

[pinwolf]

Written 1984 in Charles Messenger "Armies of World War 3":

[Sorrow_Knight]

ORIGINAL: mikeCK

ORIGINAL: Sorrow_Knight
Radios or not, sorry, but the OP is simply correct about Soviet doctrine. It was rigid. Whether you want it to have been or not, it was. In order to have a western style doctrine where junior officers and NCOs are expected to exercise their own initiative in order to acomplish a goal, they must have significant training and professionalism. We would be given an order “secure a crossing over the river”. It was up to the company commander (for example) to decide on his own, how to accomplish that. He isn’t told “move your company down this route and secure the MIKECK bridge. By encouraging junior officers to make their own determinations as to how to secure the crossing, you allow them to alter plans on the fly to adjust to the unexpected. If I show up and find bridge MIKECK is heavily defended, I can detach a platoon to feint an attack while the rest of my company secures the next bridge over.

Like it or not, the Soviet Army was a conscript Force. They did not (and could not) provide their NCOs and junior officers with the training required to properly analyze a situation and alter the plan while keeping on task. Soviet junior officers and NCOs were expected to follow orders. You take bridge MIKECK. If the company commander gets there and the bridge is heavily defended, he has two choices: attack anyway or radio his senior commmader, relay the situation and request permission to attack another bridge. THAT takes time. By the time the request is routed and permission is given, the defending troops have reacted and are now defending both bridges

It’s just a fact. If you want junior officers to be able to operate with only general objectives (and not directions), you have to train them extensively. The Red army could not.

It’s not an insult...it’s just a fact that Soviet doctrine at a tactical level was rigid and company/battalion commanders were expected to follow direction. If they felt it wasn’t a good idea, they had to get new direction. American officers could take immediate action and change plans on the fly

For me, born in USSR and now living in Russia its alwayfunny to listen/read such things about Soviet doctrine from the other side.
This is what Soviet Army Regulations and Fspeak about NCOs and how they must act:
"Управление подразделениями в ходе боя заключается в сборе данных об обстановке, их обработке, принятии решения и постановке новых боевых задач. Сбор данных об обстановке осуществляется непрерывно на протяжении всего боя. Командир роты ( взвода ) получает данные в результате личного наблюдения, докладов подчиненных, информации от вышестоящего командира и соседей. Все поступившие данные командир роты ( взвода ) анализирует, изучает, оценивает и в виде выводов представляет (докладывает) вышестоящему командиру.
На основе имеющихся данных об обстановке при необходимости ранее принятое решение уточняется, а при резком изменении обстановки принимается новое. На основе принятого решения, которое обязательно должно быть утверждено вышестоящим командиром, командир роты ( взвода ) определяет боевые задачи подчиненным. В первую очередь они доводятся до тех подразделений, которые решают главные задачи или начинают действовать первыми."

(Google Translate): "The management of units in the course of the battle consists in collecting data on the situation, processing them, making decisions and setting new combat missions. The collection of data on the situation is carried out continuously throughout the battle. The commander of the company (platoon) receives data as a result of personal observation, reports of subordinates, information from the superior commander and neighbors. The commander of a company (platoon) analyzes all received data, studies, evaluates and presents (reports) to the higher commander in the form of conclusions.
On the basis of the available data on the situation, if necessary, the earlier decision is clarified, and with a sharp change in the situation, a new one is adopted. On the basis of the decision, which must necessarily be approved by a higher commander, the company (platoon) commander determines the combat missions to his subordinates. First of all, they are communicated to those units that solve the main tasks or begin to act first."

As you can see Soviet NCO was not able, bot obliget to act on their own if things gone wrong and there is not option to act as previously ordered.