Admiral Kimmel

[jeffk3510]

I was just curious what everyone's take is on a bunch of men and women throughout history. I may do more of these if the response is good.

I find myself reading about Admiral Kimmel from time to time and curious what everyone else thinks about it.

We may never really know if he was a scapegoat or not. I have read good and bad things about him.

At the end of the day, when you're in charge, you are held responsible for the outcomes.

I don't know if he was a "good or bad" admiral so to speak, but I feel like he was probably the scapegoat for what happened at Pearl Harbor.

I've always thought anyone in his position at that time in history would probably of suffered the same fate.

What does everyone else think?

[Macclan5]

A very interesting topic indeed.

Personally I do not have especially strong opinions either way.

1) Did Kimmel have complete intelligence ? Did Kimmel deploy usable assets in a 'high alert and defensive deployment as directed to 10 days prior to the attack ?

2) Was he therefore the scapegoat ?

Respectively I think the answers are no and maybe.

This is not because I am an Allied fanboi 'managing in a game' better than Kimmel.

I think there is abundant evidence that Air Patrol Naval Search - Senior Officer Management of early Radar installations - Task Force patrols of any number of sea lane approaches should have been in place. Heightened alert at sea was at least as great a threat as any 'Island 5th Column sabotage' - which he misjudged and over emphasized. There had been war games and mock attacks on Pearl prior to Dec 7 and the risk was known and assessed.

Would have the outcome been any different ?

Potentially not. Despite heightened alert status - naval search and patrols - even confrontation of the KB if discovered could have resulted in even worse circumstances. It might have been that the Carriers were actually deployed in such activity - sunk and lost! The slow BBs and other ships 'might have been lost' near Pearl as opposed to 'in Pearl'.

So if he is a scapegoat it is because of the outcomes and it is legitimately arguable "it could have been worse" had he taken a more proactive stance defending Pearl as ordered to 10 days earlier. However this ignores the order to specifically deploy more 'robustly' prior to the attack and the poor assessment of the risk of sabotage.

Most interestingly - while Congress - and others have recommended his absolution and posthumous re-reinstatement - Presidents Nixon / Regan / and Clinton have all declined to do so - probably on the advice of Senior Military Commanders of the current generations that have had time to reflect on actions and results with the benefit of sober historical assessment.

[Gridley380]

ORIGINAL: jeffk3510

I was just curious what everyone's take is on a bunch of men and women throughout history. I may do more of these if the response is good.

I find myself reading about Admiral Kimmel from time to time and curious what everyone else thinks about it.

We may never really know if he was a scapegoat or not. I have read good and bad things about him.

At the end of the day, when you're in charge, you are held responsible for the outcomes.

I don't know if he was a "good or bad" admiral so to speak, but I feel like he was probably the scapegoat for what happened at Pearl Harbor.

I've always thought anyone in his position at that time in history would probably of suffered the same fate.

What does everyone else think?

A year or two back I read Alan Zimm's "Attack on Pearl Harbor: Strategy, Combat, Myths, Deceptions", and it changed my thinking on the attack. I'd characterized the raid as a military effort which failed only because, luckily, the fleet CV's weren't where PacFleets own August ops plan called for them to be. Zimm makes a convincing argument that the attack was as much a political exercise (as conceived by Yamamoto) as a military one, and as such it actually succeeded in its tactical objective but had a political effect exactly the opposite of what was intended. He also has some harsh words for the quality of Japanese planning and preparation.

Switching my thinking from military to political in that regard gives me more sympathy for Kimmel. It is tough to expect a military commander to anticipate a hostile military action with a flawed political goal.

My sympathy remains limited, however - Pearl should have been much harder to sneak up on (there was an entire PBY patrol wing there, after all), more 'on alert' (Halsey basically gave a war warning to his task force days earlier, for comparison), and much more expensive to raid (the Army's air and anti-air defenses don't seem to have met even the Navy's alertness level). Kimmel doesn't seem to have conveyed any urgency down-chain to set his command on a war footing, despite clear evidence that a war was coming. The fact that the war wasn't expected to come to Pearl doesn't excuse the failure to start preparing the personnel there to be committed to fight somewhere else. He also seems to have been content to leave defense of his battle-line and primary forward base to the Army (General Short?) without recognizing that they were reliant on the Navy for early warning.

There's also, of course, been some analysis pointing out that a *little* warning might have made things worse for the US; if the battle line had time to get steam up and sortie, any ships sunk would not have been recoverable. That's always struck me as a somewhat pessimistic viewpoint, but I can't dismiss it. However IMO it doesn't help Kimmel's case.

[Canoerebel]

It is the military's job to be prepared and for the commanders to ensure that it's so.

But it sure is hard to be prepared for a sneak attack that begins a war in an unexpected place in an unexpected way.

Yeah, the Allies knew Hawaii was a potential target, but all the intel led them to believe a Japanese attack was imminent in Indochina or the Philippines or possibly Russia. They looked at other possibilities and deemed them much less likely. So they were focused pretty far forward even as the enemy crept and did their work.

And the commanders always look bad when that happens, whether they are in fact negligent or not.

[dcpollay]

If the fleet had sortied would it be worse? Would the Vals with extra heavy bombs have been agile enough to dive-bomb a moving Battleship instead of an anchored one? And would the shallow water modified torpedoes have been able to perform in open-ocean? There are so many what ifs in an alternate history.

[Lovejoy]

I wouldn't say that calling Kimmel a scapegoat is entirely wrong, though there are things other forumites have pointed out that he does have responsibility for.

However, I don't think that, in the aftermath of the attack, it would have been feasible for Kimmel to have been kept on as CINCPAC or COMINCH, and since he was one of the more senior naval officers, I'm not sure what else the Navy could have done with him that wouldn't have been a demotion.

[warspite1]

I would say this:

- Roosevelt adopted policies that were highly likely to push Japan to war. Surely the thought that Japan would back down wasn't really entertained was it? So if that is the case then....

- .....how could the US not be more prepared?....

- ....but then military preparation on the defensive is not necessarily easy or the work of a moment. An attacker has all the options in terms of where and when to strike, while the defender has to cover as many bases as possible without falling foul of the old saying (Frederick the Great?) "he who tries to defend everything, defends nothing"......

- ...so despite everyone's best efforts the Pacific Fleet got a bloody nose in its own backyard....

- ...and its the way of the world that when something like that happens, the buck has to stop with the guy in charge - so its perhaps not surprising what happened at the time.

- So, with hindsight, did Kimmel realistically employ his forces to the best of their ability? or was his plan of defence deficient in some way? That is not something I can answer as I don't know what exactly he had and how exactly he employed what he had, and what, realistically he could have done differently.

- But it appears perhaps strange - certainly in the current general age of forgiveness - that despite a Senate Inquiry recommending they do so, repeated presidents have chosen not to reinstate Kimmel.

- I would be keen to know why the Inquiry was keen to reinstate and why the presidents refused.

[warspite1]

ORIGINAL: jeffk3510

I was just curious what everyone's take is on a bunch of men and women throughout history. I may do more of these if the response is good.

warspite1

Excellent idea [&o]

[BBfanboy]

ORIGINAL: dcpollay

If the fleet had sortied would it be worse? Would the Vals with extra heavy bombs have been agile enough to dive-bomb a moving Battleship instead of an anchored one? And would the shallow water modified torpedoes have been able to perform in open-ocean? There are so many what ifs in an alternate history.

Vals could only carry the 250 KG (550 lb) bomb and that could mess up a ship's upper decks pretty badly.
The Kates were the aircraft that could carry the 1760 lb (or thereabouts) made from converted 16" shells.
The old BBs would have had trouble dodging the torpedoes the Kates dropped, given Japanese training, suicidal bravery, and poor USN AA at the war's start.

OTOH, any attempts at level bombing by KB's bombers would likely have had poor results. If the big bombs were released too low they might not build up enough speed to get full penetration to magazines and machinery spaces. If they were released higher the ship has a few seconds to try and dodge them, and the pilot's errors in estimating speed and course have much more chance of causing a miss.

[BBfanboy]

ORIGINAL: warspite1

ORIGINAL: jeffk3510

I was just curious what everyone's take is on a bunch of men and women throughout history. I may do more of these if the response is good.

warspite1

Excellent idea [&o]

I prefer a bunch of women ... Can I start with Cleopatra and her handmaidens?

[geofflambert]

If the battle wagons had put to sea, they might have been missed entirely, or not. However, one thing that was missed were the tank farms. If those had been properly hit it would have put the Allied war effort back months. I think everyone just uses the old BBs as artillery for landings.

[Dili]

I think Kimmel was incompetent = a major naval base without a proper naval search? , but i also think there was more incompetence around and he was made scapegoat too.

[mind_messing]

Context is important.

There had been a general rumbling of war for weeks leading up to Pearl, but no concrete evidence. Japan was already involved in China, and what solid signal intelligence the Americans had wasn't getting passed on to where it was needed.

The impact of air power was also not fully understood by most of the Navy. Despite demonstrations of it in fleet exercises and in other instances (eg Taranto), the notion of a trans-Pacific airstrike was a hard sell.

The less discussed factor is the general unwillingness of the American public towards involvement in the war prior to Pearl Harbour. Linked, and in conflict to it, is the political agenda of the US government at the time. The debate between neutrality and intervention in America was very much still an ongoing debate prior to Dec 7th.

Had Kimmel/Short been "prepared for war" in a manner that would have been effective, they would have been severely reprimanded - barbed wire on beaches and AA guns blocking streets makes a poor political impact in a country that had a strong vein of non-interventionism right at the heart of politics.

[fcooke]

MM - that's a bit of hyperbole with the wire on the beaches and AA batteries blocking streets. That was not an option and not realistic. Nobody expected an invasion until after the attack. Better manning of existing defenses, actual aircraft dispersal, more Cat patrols, maybe some standing CAP MIGHT (not certain would) have helped. Or not. But to treat sabotage as the biggest threat seems to be a mistake. They would have to get onto the base in the first place, and realistically how much could they take out?

And (he ducks), Mac got a free pass for very similar mistakes/oversights.

Just my thoughts.

[Gridley380]

ORIGINAL: fcooke

And (he ducks), Mac got a free pass for very similar mistakes/oversights.

Just my thoughts.

You know, I've never really put those two together before, but you're right. The two big differences, of course, were first that Kimmel lost four BB's (two recoverable, but that wasn't certain at the time) while Dugout Doug's only immediate losses were some aircraft. In the end of course he lost the Philippines but no sane person (which of course didn't include Doug) actually expected us to be able to hold them. Second, Mac had excellent PR skills and was happy to use them. I've never seen any indication that Kimmel played the political game any more than any flag officer has to.

[Gridley380]

ORIGINAL: mind_messing

The impact of air power was also not fully understood by most of the Navy. Despite demonstrations of it in fleet exercises and in other instances (eg Taranto), the notion of a trans-Pacific airstrike was a hard sell.

If air attack wasn't considered a reasonable threat why were there multiple AA *regiments* guarding the harbor? Not to mention the Army fighters.

Had Kimmel/Short been "prepared for war" in a manner that would have been effective, they would have been severely reprimanded - barbed wire on beaches and AA guns blocking streets makes a poor political impact in a country that had a strong vein of non-interventionism right at the heart of politics.

I'm with fcooke - that's reductio ad absurdum. To be prepared for war the patrol wings should have been practicing patrol missions - which they could easily do by flying real search patterns. There were more than adequate planes available to maintain an acceptable op cycle while still providing long-range recon. To be prepared for war the Army should have had at least a "dawn patrol" of fighters up. To be prepared for war the AA guns around the harbor should have had ready ammunition available - note that the guns wouldn't need to have been moved from their actual December 7th positions to have been useful.

If and when the search planes spotted something (an incoming invasion force would have given plenty of warning, and even an hour or two could have been given for the actual raid), then you can take additional measures. You should have *plans* for those, of course (the rapidity with which steps were taken after the raid indicates some level of planning, though not necessarily enough).

[tolsdorff]

Ïn a biography of Nimitz by Potter, Nimitz is quoted as saying the following :

Let me say one thing," continued the elder Nimitz. "I do believe that we
are going to have a major war, with Japan and Germany, and that the war is
going to start by a very serious surprise attack and defeat of U.S. armed forces,
and that there is going to be a major revulsion on the part of the political
power in Washington against all those in command at sea, and they're all going
to be thrown out, though it won't be their fault necessarily. And I wish to be in
a position of sufficient prominence so that I will then be considered as one to
be sent to sea, because that appears to be the route."

I always interpreted this as meaning: Kimmel was relatively powerless in his position CinCPAC due to geopolitical reasons, no matter what he did.

[spence]

However, one thing that was missed were the tank farms. If those had been properly hit it would have put the Allied war effort back months.

Actually Zimm in his book analyzes the attack on the tank farms extensively (apparently Fuchida read what Nimitz wrote after the war and decided he needed to show how he would have done better than Nagumo had he been in charge). Zimms analysis quite clearly shows that the bombing of the tank farms a) would have done much less damage than Nimitz postulated (due to the weapons loads of the Japanese aircraft and the quantity thereof AND the physical characteristics of the oil in the tanks (140+ degrees just to make it flow like a liquid should).
b) the non-difficulty in constructing new tanks AND the number of ships/tankers required to rebuild the tanks AND replace the oil in them in different time frames.
Mimitz made an offhand remark in the immediate aftermath of the attackconcerning the tanks (which has been incorporated into the urban legend about the attack) but never ordered or made an in-depth study of the ramifications of such an attack on the tank farms.

In the final analysis though, Adm Kimmel was responsible for whatever happened to his command while he was on watch - politicians are never responsible for anything unless they take credit for somebody else's actions.

[CaptBeefheart]

I think the nation needed scapegoats and Short and Kimmel were appropriately chosen, regardless of their actual culpability, since it was their commands that were caught with their pants down. You can't have that kind of screw up without some heads rolling.

You could argue the same for MacArthur, what with Clark Field getting hammered with eight hours of warning, but his political capital was too high and FDR saw him as a net asset for the country's morale (plus a potential political foe).

Cheers,
CB

[PaxMondo]

As CaptBH states above, I'm of the opinion that Kimmel was doomed with the outcome of the attack. Whether he was actually able to exercise some of his other options is debatable. My memory is that he had some rather direct cables from the Naval Chief Stark and he basically followed those, correct me if I am wrong. I think he was sacrificed in lieu of the Naval Chief Stark, but Stark was moved shortly after when it wasn't so apparent and replaced with King.

As for Mac, well I'm no fan. Still, I can't hold him too liable for PI overall or Clark in particular. Based upon order of battle as presented in WitP, the only way to avoid the destruction of Clark is if the IJ chooses to target Manila instead. To avoid the early collapse would have required assets ( 2 - 4 more fighter groups, another marine division, 2 - 4 units of SeaBees) that simply did not exist. The catch is "early collapse" because the IJ could and would have been able to apply more force and still effect the taking of the PI, but at an even higher cost to the allies.

Yes, higher state of readiness, yadi yadi yadi, but getting personnel to a high state of readiness without war is tough to do. Elite units, sure. But average units … and the tactics used today to attain high readiness were not available in the '40's. Mostly they were developed in the 80/90's some 50 year later.