Admiral Kimmel

[BBfanboy]

ORIGINAL: fcooke

Does anyone know if the USN really did start stripping paint, etc before the war? I seem to recall issues with USN cruisers lighting up when getting hit around the Canal because they hadn't yet got rid of paint, paneling, etc.

I think a good part of this was because the FPs were carried already fueled on the catapults amidships (except the newer ships with the catapults and hangars at the stern). I recall reading that it became standard practice to remove the FPs if a night battle was expected. After the first Naval Battle of Guadalcanal FPs that had been sent to Tulagi or Lunga overnight set about rescuing sailors and searching for damaged IJN ships for the Cactus Air Force (although I am not sure if the Navy FPs could Communicate directly with the Army and Marine Airfield).

[USSAmerica]

Excellent discussion, gentlemen!

[USSAmerica]

ORIGINAL: jeffk3510

I was just curious what everyone's take is on a bunch of men and women throughout history. I may do more of these if the response is good.

I find myself reading about Admiral Kimmel from time to time and curious what everyone else thinks about it.

We may never really know if he was a scapegoat or not. I have read good and bad things about him.

At the end of the day, when you're in charge, you are held responsible for the outcomes.

I don't know if he was a "good or bad" admiral so to speak, but I feel like he was probably the scapegoat for what happened at Pearl Harbor.

I've always thought anyone in his position at that time in history would probably of suffered the same fate.

What does everyone else think?

Great idea, Jeff! [8D]

[Mike Dubost]

I want to start by saying thanks for an interesting discussion.

Now, I would like to add a few thoughts sparked by my rather eclectic reading list.

As far as expecting sabotage, we may be being too hard on Short. There is a book by Hector Bywater “The Great Pacific War” that is sometimes touted as having predicted WWII in the Pacific, including an attack on Pearl Harbor. Having read it, I can say that there is a significant difference between his work and subsequent events. He did include an attack on Pearl Harbor, but it was sabotage, not an air strike. So, a respected and knowledgeable commentator on military matters did think sabotage was likely and realistic. By the way, the book is very interesting, and I do recommend it.

Warspite 1 “- Roosevelt adopted policies that were highly likely to push Japan to war. Surely the thought that Japan would back down wasn't really entertained was it? So if that is the case then....” In reply to this, I would mention that Samuel Eliot Morrison talks about the buildup to war in Volume 3 of the History of US Naval Operations in World War II. In this work, he mentions that earlier discussions about a possible oil embargo had resulted in the US ambassador to Japan stating that an oil embargo would cause a significant risk of war, not a certainty. Assuming that FDR and company had this advice in mind when imposing the embargo, this makes the decision a very high stakes gamble, but not a guarantee of failure.

As for the main point, I would mention that Admiral Edwin Layton’s memoirs are titled “And I Was There”. The title is based on an incident in which Layton heard another officer bad-mouthing Kimmel at the time of the Japanese surrender. Layton went off on a mini-rant about how Washington failed to share critical intelligence with Kimmel and set him up to fail “and I was there” to see it. His position as fleet intelligence officer for the Pacific Fleet both means that he really was there to see it, and that he had a stake in it not being the fault of the men on the spot. After reading the whole of the book, I think he was pretty honest about events even if they did not necessarily make him look perfect, so for me, I find the on the spot experience outweighs the incentive to pass the blame, but I do not think the latter is entirely absent. If you are interested, I urge you to obtain a copy of the book and read it. It contains much fascinating info and some good stories, including pre-war service in Japan. Don’t miss the story of his being an alibi for a Yakuza!

[Ian R]

ORIGINAL: Moltrey
....

Related to this subject, after reading the first half of Beans, Bullets and Black Oil I came away with a slightly better impression of Admiral Robert Ghormley's role in the South Pacific. Politics and social standing had and still have a lot of power in the flag ranks of the US Navy. Why should top Admirals (and Generals for that matter) be held responsible when there are perfectly ripe scapegoats "closer to the situation"?

In 1942 the USN operational commanders were learning to fight a war in a way that was only partly anticipated. They were in "makee learnee" status. Some commanders - EG Fletcher & Ghormley failed their exams, & were relieved. Wilson Brown's health failed. Callaghan and Scott were KIA. Fitch (who commanded the carrier TG under Fletcher at Coral Sea) was 'promoted' to AirSoPac. Captain Buckmaster was put ashore in a training role after he was criticised for prematurely abandoning the Yorktown.

Against that, Halsey, Spruance - a cruiser officer thrust into the hot seat at Midway, Lee, and carrier captains Mitscher and Sherman (x2)*, along with Turner, Hill, Conolly and others in the suddenly important amphibious warfare branch, rose to the top. [* Also Captain Mason of the Hornet made flag rank - only Buckmaster's career was derailed by the loss of his ship.]

Clark G. Reynolds' The Fast Carriers gives a very good account of the sink or swim nature of this. The Peter Principle in action.

[warspite1]

ORIGINAL: Mike Dubost

Warspite 1 “- Roosevelt adopted policies that were highly likely to push Japan to war. Surely the thought that Japan would back down wasn't really entertained was it? So if that is the case then....” In reply to this, I would mention that Samuel Eliot Morrison talks about the buildup to war in Volume 3 of the History of US Naval Operations in World War II. In this work, he mentions that earlier discussions about a possible oil embargo had resulted in the US ambassador to Japan stating that an oil embargo would cause a significant risk of war, not a certainty. Assuming that FDR and company had this advice in mind when imposing the embargo, this makes the decision a very high stakes gamble, but not a guarantee of failure.

warspite1

Well maybe this is hindsight talking, but personally I don't think so. Firstly, there are few guarantees in life - other than death, taxes and the fact that Spurs won't win the Premiership in my lifetime. But I think it would have been a total dereliction of thinking for anyone in the Roosevelt administration not to believe that there was an extremely high risk of war following the oil embargo and the freezing of assets. I have no idea what the context of that ambassador's remarks were or when he said it, but they sound about right. The US, Britain and the NEI have just cut off 90% of Japan's oil supply and limitations on key materials and turning the taps back on is dependent upon Japan quitting French Indo-China and Japan. Yes, I think 'significant risk' is pretty accurate.....

If Japan refuse to back down then what option do they have? They have just been effectively neutered. That is an intolerable position for any proud nation. But who really thought the Japanese would back down?

But regardless, let's suppose there was hope within the administration that the Japanese would decide to opt for peace. But it would not be prudent to assume this surely? Hope yes, but simply refuse to accept there is a good chance Japan will head for war? I don't believe that for a moment.

But that is only part of the argument here. Because in the five months or so from the embargo, the situation would not have been static. What may have been hoped for in July was clearly not happening - the Japanese were still in China and French Indo-China in November. Intel coming out of Japan was suggesting war was more and more likely. This is where the criticism in the various inquiries points to that intel not being passed down to Short and Kimmel.

As said, I don't know sufficient about the situation on the ground to know what Kimmel and Short could've, should've, would've done in the absence of specific information that appears not to have been passed to them. But I do know that no commander can have his forces on high alert at all times for an indefinite period. There are many problems associated with that, fatigue from being kept at such a state of readiness, inertia from starting to believe its all a waste of time, and of course the financial impact of doing so, are just three reasons.

So I'm keen to keep reading comments of those who do know what Kimmel and Short realistically should/could/would have done - with the information they had available - and AW1Steve appears to have put some meat on those bones. At the same time I find your comments re Layton interesting as these seems to support the comments of the various inquiries i.e. that there was a key failure to ensure the commanders on the spot were given the latest intelligence.

The latter indicates there were indeed others to blame, while the former indicates that regardless of this failure, the actions of Kimmel and Short were not as one would expect from competent commanders (although a few other posters have made the point that had Short and Kimmel taken action suggested by AW1Steve then things could have been worse).

Incredibly interesting.

[Mike Dubost]

ORIGINAL: warspite1

ORIGINAL: Mike Dubost

Warspite 1 “- Roosevelt adopted policies that were highly likely to push Japan to war. Surely the thought that Japan would back down wasn't really entertained was it? So if that is the case then....” In reply to this, I would mention that Samuel Eliot Morrison talks about the buildup to war in Volume 3 of the History of US Naval Operations in World War II. In this work, he mentions that earlier discussions about a possible oil embargo had resulted in the US ambassador to Japan stating that an oil embargo would cause a significant risk of war, not a certainty. Assuming that FDR and company had this advice in mind when imposing the embargo, this makes the decision a very high stakes gamble, but not a guarantee of failure.

warspite1

Well maybe this is hindsight talking, but personally I don't think so. Firstly, there are few guarantees in life - other than death, taxes and the fact that Spurs won't win the Premiership in my lifetime. But I think it would have been a total dereliction of thinking for anyone in the Roosevelt administration not to believe that there was an extremely high risk of war following the oil embargo and the freezing of assets. I have no idea what the context of that ambassador's remarks were or when he said it, but they sound about right. The US, Britain and the NEI have just cut off 90% of Japan's oil supply and limitations on key materials and turning the taps back on is dependent upon Japan quitting French Indo-China and Japan. Yes, I think 'significant risk' is pretty accurate.....

As far as context of Ambassador Grew's remarks, they date from 1938 when Japan and China were at war, but the general war in Europe had not started. The quote from Mr. Morrison; "Why then did the United States government allow exports of oil and scrap to continue?...On the legal level, any such restriction would have violated the existing commercial treaty with Japan. On the level of broad policy, any drastic action would have united Japan behind the militarists and destroyed our hope that the unexpectedly stout resistance of Chiang Kai-Shek would discredit them and bring liberal elements back into power. Mr. Grew warned his government in 1938 that if Japan were deprived of oil she would move south and take what she wanted in Borneo and Sumatra. Consequently, neither an oil embargo nor any other economic sanction should be imposed until and unless the United States was 'prepared to see them through to their logical conclusion, and that might mean war'."

Seen from hindsight, yes, this was pretty exact. However, Japan was still negotiating with the US even right up to the last minute. There were proposals on the table earlier in 1941 for a "summit meeting" (I think the term is a later usage, but conveys the meaning). A wishful thinker could see this as a sign that the pressure was working. I think that it should have been clear that this was a very risky gamble, but absent hindsight, it is hard to see it as a sure road to war between Japan and the US.

I think you and I differ more in degree than in fundamentals here. At the end of the day, the US government knew or should have known that a war was very likely. I think it was less clear at the time than you do that it would happen, though.

They were not entirely blind to the risks, since they did in fact take some steps elsewhere to prepare, such as sending all those bombers to the Philippines, and starting some intelligence sharing with the UK on Japanese codes. In fact the "Purple" machine intended for Hawaii was sent to the British instead, and Layton was assured by Washington that relevant intelligence would be sent to him, as it was during an earlier period of high tension in July of 1941. It sounded to me as though he was still rather bitter about the fact that info was cut off without Washington telling him it had been, but that is another story.

[Buckrock]

ORIGINAL: AW1Steve

ORIGINAL: fcooke

Does anyone know if the USN really did start stripping paint, etc before the war? I seem to recall issues with USN cruisers lighting up when getting hit around the Canal because they hadn't yet got rid of paint, paneling, etc.

According to Samuel Elliott Morrison not till after Savo Island.

The Fleet was aware of certain no-nos from WWI and of the current Brit experiences in WWII. This led to some effort prior to Dec 7th to reduce firehazards but it was far short of the measures that would be taken once war began. Several of the BBs at Pearl Harbor suffered intense fires because they still had elaborate furnishings, large paper record libraries, etc. Paint had also not been stripped down as standard and linoleum was still used onboard.

Coral Sea and Midway showed more improvements were needed. The Fleet orders for those changes were issued just prior to the Guadalcanal Campaign but there had been insufficient time to apply them prior to Savo, a battle which in turn brought further lessons. It was probably not until the Guadalcanal battles during November '42 that the spartan, stripped-down condition was finally becoming the norm through the Fleet.

[warspite1]

ORIGINAL: Mike Dubost

ORIGINAL: warspite1

ORIGINAL: Mike Dubost

Warspite 1 “- Roosevelt adopted policies that were highly likely to push Japan to war. Surely the thought that Japan would back down wasn't really entertained was it? So if that is the case then....” In reply to this, I would mention that Samuel Eliot Morrison talks about the buildup to war in Volume 3 of the History of US Naval Operations in World War II. In this work, he mentions that earlier discussions about a possible oil embargo had resulted in the US ambassador to Japan stating that an oil embargo would cause a significant risk of war, not a certainty. Assuming that FDR and company had this advice in mind when imposing the embargo, this makes the decision a very high stakes gamble, but not a guarantee of failure.

warspite1

Well maybe this is hindsight talking, but personally I don't think so. Firstly, there are few guarantees in life - other than death, taxes and the fact that Spurs won't win the Premiership in my lifetime. But I think it would have been a total dereliction of thinking for anyone in the Roosevelt administration not to believe that there was an extremely high risk of war following the oil embargo and the freezing of assets. I have no idea what the context of that ambassador's remarks were or when he said it, but they sound about right. The US, Britain and the NEI have just cut off 90% of Japan's oil supply and limitations on key materials and turning the taps back on is dependent upon Japan quitting French Indo-China and Japan. Yes, I think 'significant risk' is pretty accurate.....

As far as context of Ambassador Grew's remarks, they date from 1938 when Japan and China were at war, but the general war in Europe had not started..... Mr. Grew warned his government in 1938 that if Japan were deprived of oil she would move south and take what she wanted in Borneo and Sumatra. Consequently, neither an oil embargo nor any other economic sanction should be imposed until and unless the United States was 'prepared to see them through to their logical conclusion, and that might mean war'."

warspite1

That this comment was 1938 is even more surprising then. That was his view before war in Europe - when Japanese forces heading to Borneo and Sumatra would face British, French and Dutch reinforcement from Europe.

But once France and the Netherlands had been defeated (and Indo-China occupied), the UK under threat of expulsion from the Middle East, and with the Soviet Union seemingly about to collapse, why would there be any cause to revise Japan's intentions more positively?

That makes no sense and his view:

Consequently, neither an oil embargo nor any other economic sanction should be imposed until and unless the United States was 'prepared to see them through to their logical conclusion, and that might mean war'.

would appear the prudent one. Especially when allied to the fact that talks during the autumn are not coming up with anything concrete and there is not even a sign of Japan withdrawing anywhere.

[Ian R]

ORIGINAL: AW1Steve

ORIGINAL: fcooke

Does anyone know if the USN really did start stripping paint, etc before the war? I seem to recall issues with USN cruisers lighting up when getting hit around the Canal because they hadn't yet got rid of paint, paneling, etc.

According to Samuel Elliott Morrison not till after Savo Island.

The pendulum is swing back to "No, proper steps had not been taken to put them in frighting trim".

I wonder if Richardson would have ordered the captains to get the ships "stripped"? By all accounts he was a strong and decisive leader, very possibly on is way to the CNO billet before he was sacked.

Edited to remove a split infinitive.

[fcooke]

BB - thanks for bringing up the FPs. I am currently reading a couple of the 'Warship' (suggested reading for all interested in naval affairs) volumes and one covers British CA development prior to WW2. It seems a fair bit of consideration was given to the effects of firing blast on the (generally lightly constructed) FPs when trying to figure out where to place them - ie - on top of B turret not such a good idea. It would seem this somehow got lost in terms of comms to the guys running the ships as there are numerous cases of FPs getting damaged/destroyed during the war.

That said, keeping 4 fully fueled SOCs on the catapults made for a quick launch capability, but also 4 nice sources of fire. Did the USN generally even fly SOCs at night? I know it is a pain in the ass but maybe only keep one ready to go and fuel / de-fuel the others each day?

A bit of hindsight I know.

Thoughts?

[PaxMondo]

ORIGINAL: warspite1

ORIGINAL: warspite1

- I would be keen to know why the Inquiry was keen to reinstate and why the presidents refused.

warspite1

Well I've only been able to find a few bits and pieces, but I do think it curious that there is open criticism of Marshall and Stark - but only Kimmel and Short were left to hang.

....Excerpts From the Pearl Harbor Investigations


the dorn report (1995)

``Responsibility for the Pearl Harbor disaster should not
fall solely on the shoulders of Admiral Kimmel and General
Short; it should be broadly shared.''
``It is clear today, as it should have been since 1946 to
any serious reader of the JCC (Joint Congressional Committee)
hearing record, that Admiral Kimmel and General Short were
not solely responsible for the defeat at Pearl Harbor.''
``. . . the evidence of the handling of these
(intelligence) messages in Washington reveals some
ineptitude, some unwarranted assumptions and misestimates,
limited coordination, ambiguous language, and lack of
clarification and follow-up at higher levels.''
``The `pilot', `fourteen-point' and `one o'clock' messages
point, by the evening of December 6th, to war at dawn
(Hawaiian time) on the 7th--not to an attack on Hawaii--but
officials in Washington were neither energetic nor effective
in getting that warning to the Hawaiian commanders.''


The Army Board for the Correction of Military Records (1991)

``The Army Pearl Harbor Board (of 1944), held that General
Marshall and the Chief of War Plans Division of the War
Department shared in the responsibility for the disaster.''
``The applicant in this case . . . must show . . . that the
FSM (in this case Major General Short) was unjustly treated
by the Army . . . the majority found evidence of injustice.''
``In this regard, the majority was of the opinion that the
FSM, singularly or with the Naval commander, was unjustly
held responsible for the Pearl Harbor disaster.''
``Considering the passage of time as well as the burden and
stigma carried until his untimely death in 1949, it would be
equitable and just to restore the FSM to his former rank of
lieutenant general on the retired list.''
``Recommendation.--That all of the Department of the Army
records, related to this case be corrected by advancing the
individual concerned to the rank of lieutenant general on the
retired list.''


the army pearl harbor board inquiry (1944)

``The Chief of Staff of the Army, General George C.
Marshall, failed in his relations with the Hawaiian
Department in the following particulars:
(a) To keep the Commanding General of the Hawaiian
Department fully advised of the growing tenseness of the
Japanese situation which indicated an increasing necessity
for better preparation for war, of which information he had
an abundance and Short had little.
(b) To send additional instructions to the Commanding
General of the Hawaiian Department on November 28, 1941, when
evidently he failed to realize the import of General Short's
reply of November 27th, which indicated clearly that General
Short had misunderstood and misconstrued the message of
November 27 and had not adequately alerted his command for
war.
(c) To get to General Short on the evening of December 6th
and the early morning of December 7th, the critical
information indicating an almost imminent break with Japan,
though there was ample time to have accomplished this.''
``Chief of War Plans Division War Department General Staff,
Major General Leonard T. Gerow, failed in his duties in the
following respects:
(a) To send to the Commanding General of the Hawaiian
Department on November 27, 1941, a clear, concise directive;
on the contrary, he approved the message of November 27,
1941, which contained the confusing statements.
(b) To realize that the state of readiness reported in
Short's reply to the November 27th message was not a state of
war readiness, and he failed to take corrective action.''


the naval court of inquiry (1944)

``It is a prime obligation of Command to keep subordinate
commanders, particularly those in distant areas, constantly
supplied with information. To fail to meet this obligation is
to commit a military error.''
``It is a fact that Admiral Stark, as Chief of Naval
Operations and responsible for the operation of the Pacific
Fleet, and having important information in his possession
during this critical period, especially on the morning of 7
December, failed to transmit this information to Admiral
Kimmel, this depriving the latter of a clear picture of the
existing Japanese situation as seen in Washington.''
``The Court is of the opinion that the deficiencies in
personnel and materiel which existed in 1941, had a direct
adverse bearing upon the effectiveness of the defense of
Pearl Harbor on and prior to 7 December.''
``The Court is of the opinion that Admiral Kimmel's
decision, made after the dispatch of 24 November, to continue
preparations of the Pacific Fleet for war, was sound in light
of the information then available to him.''
``The Court is of the opinion that Admiral Harold R. Stark,
U.S.N., Chief of Naval Operations . . . failed to display the
sound judgement expected of him in that he did not transmit
to Admiral Kimmel . . . during the very critical period 26
November to 7 December, important information which he had
regarding the Japanese situation, and especially on the
morning of 7 December 1941, he did not transmit immediately
the fact that a message had been received which appeared to
indicate that a break in diplomatic relations was imminent,
and that an attack in the Hawaiian area might be expected
soon.''


the joint congressional committee report (1946)

``The errors made by the Hawaiian commanders were errors of
judgment and not derelictions of duty.''
``The War Plans Divisions of the War and Navy Departments
failed:
``(a) To give careful and thoughtful consideration to the
intercepted messages from Tokyo to Honolulu of September 24,
November 15, and November 20 (the harbor berth plan and
related dispatches) and to raise a question as to their
significance. Since they indicated a particular interest in
the Pacific Fleet's base, this intelligence should have been
appreciated and supplied to the Hawaiian commanders for their
assistance, along with other information available to them,
in making their estimate of the situation.
``(b) To be properly on the qui vive to receive the `one
o'clock' intercept and to recognize in the message the fact
that some Japanese military action would very possibly occur
somewhere at 1 p.m., December 7. If properly appreciated this
intelligence should have suggested a dispatch to all Pacific
outpost commanders supplying this information, as General
Marshall attempted to do immediately upon seeing it.''

Yeah, this is what I recall … also you can access the communique's from 1941. I think they have all been declassified now. Any rate, I remember reading them some years back (back then it was archive request, now I suspect you can d/l them). I wasn't focused on the army side, just the naval side. So, my focus was Stark/Kimmel. I thought the notes from Stark were incriminating at best. As others note, the commander prior to Kimmel had been dismissed earlier in 41, so Kimmel knew what would happen if he strayed.
I can't say if Kimmel was a good commander or just average. Peace time records being what they are, its always hard to tell. But for me, Stark at least (higher up too?) were clearly culpable.
The problem is that above Stark, you simply don't have enough written communication. Stark would have had verbal direction from above, so you can't know if or by whom the direction originated.
Just my $0.02 on this.

[jagsdomain]

Conspiracy aside that FDR new. I dont think Kimmiel did anything different than we would today.
Hinsight tells us that this info and that bit of info should have told them. We were at peace and many did not want to provoke. Having your airforce stand down on Sunday was not a good plan but over all I dont think he really did anything wrong.
McArther on the other hand knew about Pearl and did nothing. He should jas been fired not Kimmil.

[PaxMondo]

No idea about conspiracy stuff …

[Orm]

Thank you for the interesting insights. [:)]

[Dili]

If you don't know you do things to know or at least to not be surprised.