How to fix the game.

[Dreamslayer]

rail between Vilnius and Daugavpils

Before the Soviet Army entered to Eastern Poland in September 1939 Wilno(Vilnius) and the area around was the Polish territory. On 10 October 1939 Wilno and the area around was transferred to Lithuania as part of the Soviet-Lithuanian theaty. On 3 August 1940 Lithuania became the part of USSR.
So this area only few months(less than 1 year) was the Baltic(Lithuanian).


Part of the Lithuanian railroad from the Atlas of USSR railroads (published by RKKA's Military Communications Department for the service(internal?) use in 1943). Number of the ways on 1 June 1941.

[chuckfourth]

Thank you all for your replies.
Don't worry xhoel I will get there, at the moment my time is fully sucked up with dealing with Hankies copious amounts of rubbish.

So these are the changes needed to fix the game.
You need the historical rail repair rate, not just to correct German supply reach, but because that allows Germanys critical railway guns to arrive where they are needed at the correct time to deal with Morvaels newly created super forts.
Truck supply range of 26 should be 90, as in North Africa.
You need to have a resupply button on each unit which gives that unit priority resupply with distance modifiers, that will then allow blitzkrieg. You can then get rid of HQ buildup. HQ buildup is just a way of destroying extra German trucks.
German railhead distance modifiers need to be massively relaxed.
Drop the first turn Surprise rule. This is just an unwanted patch that is necessary because the fundamental game settings are wrong, German supply amongst other things.

[Hanny]

Well the circus is back in town, lets see what antics the clown gets up to. viewer discretion is advised as this performance is not suitable for young children, there will be strong language, and frequent piss taking.

ORIGINAL: chuckles the clown
Hanky and Morvael both subscribe to the ridiculous proposition that you need to have half your transport convoy composed of fuel trucks to go long distances. This is their justification for the drop in supply delivered after 10 hexes.

Your fact free ignorant opinion. V what the maths shows, and the historical record contains. Everyone has an opinion, not all opinions are equal, yours is less equal than almost all others.
Halder tells us for AGC in July 13000 tons of supply required daily, but only 6500 arrived at the rail heads, of that 5000 or so makes it to the Divisions requiring it each day. Based on how many trucks are left according to Halder.

Supply branch of the OKH warned Brauchitsch, Halder and Bock 'if the intensity of fighting and the operational rhythm was to be similar to that of the summer campaign, the supply system would be able to cover a bit over 50% of AGC's needs for a space of time of two weeks. More than that, and the system would collapse and the it would be able to deliver just between 10-20% of the total load of supplies needed'.

ORIGINAL: chuckles the clown
First the Germans SET UP PETROL STATIONS.

Incorrect.

ORIGINAL: chuckles the clown
Second they had petrol tanker convoys

Correct but are subject to the limits imposed by reality. Already given you the maths of Mot/Pzr Div resupply Halder diary gives us the data so we know that in reality the fuel demand was always higher than the capacity to deliver it, and that after 300klm, the amount of logistics reaching those consuming it would be in the 15-20% range. Just as shown in the pre war logistical planning.

ORIGINAL: chuckles the clown
Third they could use Russian fuel.

They could, and on 6th July 41 Schwepenburg reported what the effects of doing so were, 30 Pzr III and 4 Pzr 4 total write offs when using captured fuel.
Every, every, author on this is clear, soviet fuel was to low powered for German use. We know this because Halder in the pre war logistics planning notes there cannot be use of captured fuel, and only in 42 did they complete the installations to add benzol to captured fuel for use.

Here:
https://books.google.co.uk/books?id=KeD ... ol&f=false
Here:
https://www.joelhayward.org/Hitlers-Quest-Finished.pdf
Moreover, during the eastern campaign German units were unable to utilize captured fuel, as they had during the campaigns of 1939 and 1940. This was because the octane content of Soviet petrol was too low for German vehicles. It could only be used after the addition of benzol in complex installations constructed specifically for that task.
Here:
https://core.ac.uk/download/pdf/35463983.pdf
Moreover, during the eastern campaign German units were unable to utilize captured fuel, as they had during the campaigns of 1939 and 1940. This was because the octane content of Soviet petrol was too low for German vehicles. It could only be used after the addition of benzol in complex installations constructed specifically for that task.46 The oil situation of the eastern armies soon became desperate. For example, on 6 September 1941 Hitler issued War Directive 35, which outlined Operation Taifun, the resumption of the offensive against Moscow.47 Five days later, Generaloberst Franz Halder, the German Army Chief of Staff, recorded in his war diary that the eastern forces needed 27 train loads of fuel per day throughout the rest of September and 29 per day throughout the entire following month if they were to carry out successfully the new offensive.48 However, wrote Halder, the High Command of the Armed Forces (OKW)argued that it could not supply this enormous quantity of fuel. It could supply only 22 trainload daily for the period to 16 September and, whilst it could provide the required 27 trainload per day for the last two weeks of that month, it could supply only 22 per day (less than 75 per cent of those required) for the whole of October. For the month of l\November, when the daily requirements were estimated to be 20 trainload, the OKW believed that only three (or 15 per cent of the required level) could be supplied each day.49 As it turned out, the OKW failed to supply even these lower quantities to the eastern forces.

Here:https://books.google.co.uk/books?id=k-b ... ol&f=false

ORIGINAL: chuckles the clown
Some of the German trucks used diesel, these trucks could happily run on captured Russian diesel of which I'm sure they captured plenty.

June 41, German diesel allocation for EF, 50,000 gallons, total consumed, 38000 tons, by the just under 20,000 diesel MT on EF, Germany had no diesel shortage on EF, it barely had any diesel trucks either. More deflection as its not relavent, "but about as relevant as the temperature on Mars" is how you put it. Note your still incapable of using the forum quote function.

ORIGINAL: chuckles the clown
KB70 and B70 is Russian fuel for their aircraft and light tanks, the Russians had a lot of both. 70 is the octane rating. The German army ran on 70-74 octane so this fuel CAN be pumped straight into the German vehicles.

Nope, B70 is soviet AVgas. 70 is the rich octane number, SU always uses the rich octane value. 7-74 is the lean Octane value for German B3 You used caps for the word can, its considerd bad manners to do this on the net, as its shouting, and is the resort/retort of the inarticulate who have run out of argument. You do it all the time.

ORIGINAL: chuckles the clown
all mogas had a far lower octane level than western European engines could run on and required additives to bring the octane level up high enough to use in engines.
Using the word all makes this a bald faced LIE because KB70 and B70 are the same octane level as German fuel. It can be pumped straight into a German engine.

Only if you intend to destroy them. Neither are the same octane rating as each other.
liars, and you are one such, expect to be lied to and act/think accordingly.

ORIGINAL: chuckles the clown
Hanky also says
German MTV and Russian MTV used different grades of fuel, they were not interchangeable, each destroys the others engines. In Russia you cant use captured fuel stocks until its been converted to the same fuel grade.
Wrong again Hanky, German MTV and Russian light tanks used the SAME grade of fuel, KB70 and B70. So another bald faced LIE.

I am?, so is every author, and so is Halder who explained that no fuel could be used until benzol was added to it to bring its octane level up. For the simple reason they are not even close to being the same grade of octane.
Its rather simple, you post about ww2 but have no fucking clue about ww2.

ORIGINAL: chuckles the clown
You CAN put low octane gas (Russian) in a high octane engine (German) the engine loses power and the fuel can ignite early giving knocking but it still runs. It doesn't necessarily destroy the engine. This depends on how different the ideal and actual octane levels are and the engine itself. Don't forget an engine will run just fine on a quite wide range of fuel octane levels

Only if you intending to destroy the engine.
Your modern car auto shuts down preventing ignition if the wrong fuel is inserted, on idle with B70 in a Panzer, you have major engine rebuild after 90 seconds, if the accelerator is used, its a scrapper within minutes. MT going into Austria in the Anschluss lost 40% to major engine overhauls to single digit octane difference between German and Austrian petrol.

ORIGINAL: chuckles the clown
And here's something I found very interesting from Van Creveld no less.
https://forum.axishistory.com/viewtopic.php?t=209233
Fuel consumption by both armoured groups was very high, but could be met because that of ammunition was correspondingly low, and because Panzergruppe 2 made a TIMELY DISCOVERY OF A LARGE RUSSIAN RESEVIOUR near Baranovichi.

Crvald page 150, using Halders explanation of why no use of fuel was made in the planning of the campaign.
"Nor was there much hope of utilizing captured fuel, for Russian petrol had a low octane content, and could only be used by German vehicles after the addition of benzol in specially-constructed installations".
What is crevald referring to?, when he mentions Guderian use of captured fuel?.https://www.scmglobe.com/battle-smolens ... on-russia/


Its the stocks of AVGas B78 in the Air fuel depot, refined at the intact captured refinery at Baranovich, one of 5 in the whole SU who in total produced 40,600 gallons of B78 to fuel the most modern of the SU fighters. Guderian is low on fuel, cannot advance and asks for team of petro chemist to be flown in from IG Farben, to see if the AVgas B 78 can be modified for MOgas use, the reports/findings are at fishertroppe archive, they blended, running it through the refinery, German B3 with SU B78 and got on a 4 to 1 ratio and thus increased Guderians fuel stocks, allowing him to continue. Engineers then worked out how much benzol ( blending B70 was a no go cording to the petro chemists) to add to B70 and set in motion the creation of installations to refine captured SU fuels on the eastern front.

ORIGINAL: chuckles the clown
Hanky note this is in JUNE 41. In the game the Germans cannot find any large Russian reservoirs near anywhere. But here we have an example of a whole Panzergruppe finding enough RUSSIAN FUEL to run on.

I take note note of your ignorance of the meaning of the quote, i take not note of your ignorance of what Crevald wrote of the use of captured AVgas.

Again with the caps, to draw attention to your ignorance of the events being refereed to. There were 195 SU refanaries in June 41, producing 883,600 tons AVgas, 3.477 million tons of Mogas, in the 12 months leading up to war. At the start of the war, the Red Army Fuel Service had 247 fixed storage facilities and fuelling stations. 90% of the Red Armys fuel stores were located in the border military districts. Seventy-three fixed tank farms with a storage capacity of 171,000 m3 were lost in just the first month of military operations. Germany had a large captured stock of AvGas and Mogas by end of the first month, the tonnage of captured B78 it could blend was insignificant.

ORIGINAL: chuckles the clown
Oh and just a point on etiquette for you Hanky here's something you said,
Soviet account: from "Technical Support of Armoured Forces in the Vistula-Oder Operation" is that they could not use captured enemy fuel dumps until they had been tested for octane rating, water contamination, type of fuel, etc which was done by the Army laboratory but took some time to find out if the fuel was usable. '
You lifted this word for word straight out of
https://forum.axishistory.com/viewtopic.php?t=226225
with no acknowledgement that you lifted it from that article and the whole thing should be in quotes not just the title, that plagiarism my friend. You presented this as though you had read the reference and they were you words, but you copied it. So what other stuff have you made up? seems you are a liar and a thief. or maybe a just leave it at lying thief.

For a poster who is offensive in the extreme to anyone who points out the errors in your posts content, who failed to follow board rules and got banned, your in no position to give points of etiquette or how to behave.

I wrote: German MTV and Russian MTV used different grades of fuel, they were not interchangeable, each destroys the others engines. Unlike in France where the Heer simply topped up from French petrol stations, who used the same form of fuel, and went on, in Russia you cant use captured fuel stocks until its been converted to the same fuel grade.
Its also common sense that the average German Div did not have an refinery in its TOE to convert soviet fuel for use.

You claim i was a lair, denied there were 4 SU fuels, i pointed out the links you used show that to be the case, and you should read them, i linked you to a book using the same, (Technical Support of Armoured Forces in the Vistula-Oder Operation, lieutenant general Milovskiy, 6.41 to 5.45, from the soviet QM reports, and is the original wartime source) you just again linked to a thread that again explains that to be the case and refers back to the origibnalm source, Now you dont like any of that, and claim its plagiarism. this is called deflection, and is the resort of the inherently dishonest when faced with the facts they refuse to face. You do it all the time.

ORIGINAL: chuckles the clown
Shalkai I looked at your links but I still cannot understand how to fix more that 6 railway hexes a turn to get to Jelgava in two turns. Can you explain how that is done?

Not sure whats more pathetic, your inept incompetent attempt to play the game, arising from ignorance of the rules that govern supply, or your imbecility. Btw when people go out of there way to help you, you have instead of thanking them, insulted them.

My last post to you fuckwit.

[chuckfourth]

Well, Well Hanky, Your last post to me, so looks like you are a coward as well as a lying thief.
Won't look good on your resume will it, but probably doesn't matter too much as your still living with your parents I guess.
So we wont be treated to any more of your vile gloating posts then, you know most people in this forum find your posts repulsive, If you had any social skills (Read friends here) you would be aware of this. I guess you are just as repulsive in real life as you are in this forum which is why you are such a sad little troll.
You went hard on the petrol because you knew you were wrong. Call it avgas, muddy the waters as much as you like, if an engine uses petrol with octane rating of 70 then you can put Russian or German 70 octane petrol through it no problem.
As usual posts about supply shortages during the winter etc, I'm talking about the supply cliff at the end of turn 2.
The Germans set did up PETROL stations at least that's what Handbook on German Military Forces says but I guess you are a lot more knowledgeable than the US War department.
Oh and of course you like everyone else in this forum you won't touch Rommel trucking supplies over 900 miles, reality doesn't seem to fit in with your idiotic calculations does it Hanky.
Oh and the Germans made use of enough Russian fuel to run a panzer army on in JUNE 41 oops another inconvenient fact, you idiotic little twerp.
I know it feels bad to lose the argument. Anyway you go away an have a good sook, you little baby. Maybe in the interum you might grow up.

Its how we Roll eh Morveal.

[Denniss]

Out of arguments, proven wrong multiple times and now you attack him?
I can see the banhammer swinging above you .......

[chuckfourth]

Its how we roll Dennis arn't you listening?
Thanks for the threat, sort of thing I've come to expect here.
How exactly do you explain Rommel trucking supplies over 900 miles
or put another way how exactly did Hanny prove this is wrong?

[Michael T]

This thread needs to end.

[chuckfourth]

Ok so here's a summary of where we have arrived.
Russian octane 70 fuel can be poured straight into a German truck, This fuel was used by Russian light tanks. So there must have been a lot of it about. So HQ fuel captures should be in the tens and hundreds of tons not single digits. Fuel that wasn't an appropriate octane rating could be used later after being doctored. The capture of cities and towns should be considered to add Fuel, Food and Fodder to the German Supply.
According to Van Crevald a whole panzer army managed to run some distance on captured Russian fuel in June 41.
Rommel ran truck supply lines for 900 miles, The game only allows a road supply line to be 260 miles long so the supply range needs to be increased. At 900 miles supply was clearly not 0 so the game supply delivery decrease with distance going to 0 at 260 miles is wrong. It shouldn't even be 0 at 900 miles.
Baltic had a European paved road network. So truck supply ranges in the Baltic zone need to be longer than in Russia proper. This is another argument for having the correct Baltic boundary,
Red lancer good point but as far as Baltic rail goes moving one of the tracks across is relatively simple. The willing cooperation of the Baltic rail organization and the superior Baltic infrastructure is more important than rail gauge. This helpfulness and infrastructure would correspond to the real Baltic boundary.
The game determines which units get supply based on distance. Giving each unit a resupply preference button incorporating a distance modifier would allow the player to decide.
At the end of turn two German panzer units that use up their full movement allocation and get forward without fighting will be nearly out of supply. Anyone can see this by running a test game. One player tried a different tack to just abusing me and pretended instead that the turn 2 supply cliff actually doesn't exist. When asked how they avoided the cliff they disappeared.
It would be great addition to the game to allow the player to place his units as he wishes at the start of the game instead of having to conform to the historical placement.
And I would end with a question, If a unit is a long way away and only qualifies for 10% of its supply, what happens to the remaining 90% does it evaporate or is it held over until the next turn?

[Dinglir]

Please stop...

[chuckfourth]

Thank you Dingllir for being polite.

[Vifee]

What a terrible thread. Wish I had an imageboard style "sage" option, so I could post without bumping. Someone more experienced than me can correct this, but my understanding is that at high level play, Germany has an ahistorically easy supply situation, while the Russians, in turn, have the advantage of being able to retreat without fearing being shot by Stalin, the ultimate lose condition.
But the goalpost moving is truly something else, OP went from claiming that Germans should be able to supply units out to 250 miles from the railhead, and when informed that was the case, instead decided to claim that Germans should be able to supply up to 900 miles away. I agree, this thread should be locked, or at least anchored.

[joelmar]

Please stop...[;)]

[Hanny]

If you feed them, the clowns will come...field of clowns......... certificate R, starring K Costner as the voice of the clown.[:D]

[Ian R]

ORIGINAL: Red Lancer

I'm beginning to think this is some bizarre form of trolling...

Hi Red ( & Dennis)

I can't be bothered to read this whole thread, but has somewhere referred the OP to Van Crevald's Supplying War, and suggested he read it?

[Telemecus]

ORIGINAL: Ian R

ORIGINAL: Red Lancer

I'm beginning to think this is some bizarre form of trolling...

Hi Red ( & Dennis)

I can't be bothered to read this whole thread, but has somewhere referred the OP to Van Crevald's Supplying War, and suggested he read it?

Yes

[Ian R]

Good

[chuckfourth]

Hi Vifee
Its a Undisputed Uncomfortable FACT for all the revisionists in this forum that Rommel ran supplies in trucks 900 miles along the Via Balbia. The game only allows supplies to be run 260 miles on the Eastern front. OK the Via Balbia was paved but they had to use desert tracks all the way around Tobruck, and don't forget Baltic has plenty of paved roads and between Moscow to Minsk the road was paved, and probably elsewhere. Gen. Lt. a.D, Max Bork a Branch Chief in the Transportation Division says Group North's road network was good enough to "meet all demands" for supply. But hey what would he know.
As far as Van Creveld goes have a look at this post
https://rommelsriposte.com/2011/06/01/c ... ours-1941/
He made a whole lot of claims based on FALSE ASSUMPTIONS just the same as his disciples here in the game are doing.
Anyone can take an inflated estimate of German supply requirements completely ignore captured Russian supplies overestimate the difficulties of travel and come up with a dodgy German supply system, child's play. Getting it right is the hard bit. The German Supply/Movement system is far too restrictive which is why there has to be the first turn surprise rule, so they can reach the historic first week objectives and still keep the too restrictive supply situation. Remove the bogus first turn surprise rule and supply will have to be improved to something more realistic to compensate.
People tell me go and read Van Creveld, thats just an way of not answering the question 900 miles. If you guys have read it then why cant you just tell me why German trucks can't run 900 miles in Russia when they could do it in North Africa.
If the Russians can safely retreat OBVIOUSLY there is something seriously wrong with the game and here a hint, its German supply nerfing.
I know you guys are terrified of change, but The German is fighting the roads, not the Russians and that's really, really Boring.

[Hanny]

If you feed them they will come...

ORIGINAL: chuckles the clown
Its a Undisputed Uncomfortable FACT for all the revisionists in this forum that Rommel ran supplies in trucks 900 miles along the Via Balbia.

Its also fact that your ignorant, incompetent and innumerate and ought to have been banned long ago. To be relevant you need to show how much a week reached Rommel, and have a working explantion why a N Africa supplied German division had 10 times the logistical support of one on the eastern front. You seem totally unaware that the only revisionist is you, no one else, just you, disagreeing with anyone and everyone.

For anyone interested in logistics for N Africa a good general place to start is the Official histories, from which the following draws on for casual readers. https://warfarehistorynetwork.com/2018/ ... logistics/

DRZW vol. III is the Official German history and blames logistics failures brought about by Rommels own actions.

ORIGINAL: chuckles the clown
The game only allows supplies to be run 260 miles on the Eastern front.

Fact free.

ORIGINAL: chuckles the clown
As far as Van Creveld goes have a look at this post
https://rommelsriposte.com/2011/06/01/c ... ours-1941/
He made a whole lot of claims based on FALSE ASSUMPTIONS just the same as his disciples here in the game are doing.

Being wrong is easy, here is a good example of how to be wrong on multiple levels. He made no assumptions, as anyone who has read the book knows, your not such a person, but reading is not the same as being capable of comprehending, which is certainly a problem you have. The incorrect assumptions are yours, because you have not read the book and do not know what is in it, nor are you mentally capable of understanding its content.

ORIGINAL: chuckles the clown
https://rommelsriposte.com/2011/06/01/c ... ours-1941/
Based on van Creveld's book, the port capacities of Tripoli and Benghazi are 1,500 tons/day and 2,700 tons/day, respectively, with RAF attacks downgrading Benghazi to 750 tons/day (while I presume this is for 1942, I should have thought that RAF bombing in 1941 also had significant impacts). No footnotes are given for these numbers, and it is quite strange, since many other things are very well footnoted, and van Creveld clearly had access to primary documents. In any case, this equates to a monthly capacity of 46,000 tons for Tripoli and 82,000 tons (ideal)/23,000 tons (effective) for Benghazi. Based on further discussion, I think it can safely be said that van Creveld is quite completely wrong on this.
[/quote]

No need to presume, they are from the Italian records ( also they are the numbers used several Official histories file:///C:/Users/User1/Downloads/Cargo%20Libya.pdf) of military logistical stores loaded/unloaded.summer 1941 was:

Tripoli - 1,964 tons/day
Benghazi - 757.5 tons/day by same time next year 1,500 tons/day.

Tripoli in Summer 42, had a theoretic port capacity he writes of 1500 a day, but achieved 600 in actuality.( page 187 with footnotes) Benghazi in May 1941 was again a theoretical 2700 tons/day but achieved 7/800 a day in actuality.( Crevald footnotes the theoretical and actual numbers from the italian/german records and makes clear what time period he is referring to).
31 days theory/actual for Tripoli in summer of 42 is 46500/18600. For Benghazi in 42: 83700/21700-24800.
The person being wrong is the author who has fallied to read the footnotes, or do the math correctly. He ends by agreeing with Supplying War, only differing in the scale of port loading unloading as a limiting factor. So the person being utterly wrong, is Chuckles the clown.

ORIGINAL: chuckles the clown
The situation in reality appears to be as follows:
Tripoli
On ideal days, 5,000 tons could be discharged in summer1941 (remark by Admiral Sansonetti during a staff discussion on supply in Rome in September 1941, to be found in Panzergruppe War Diary Appendices Chefsachen)

Problem is that its irrelevant, ( leaving aside that 155000 tons a month is vastly over its infrastructure theoretical total capacity and around twice the actual tonnage ever delivered) and is referring to summer of 41, 20000 tons for that month was unloaded from ships inbound from Italy, and reloaded onto coastal craft to move to ports nearer to the front line, the rest went by truck and was a pittance. Hence the roughly half port capacity was achieved, as the capacity was first used to unload it and then reload it on other ships to move by the coast towards Rommel, as set out in Supplying war.
Rather large problem of contextual ignorance of logistical functionality.

ORIGINAL: chuckles the clown
So the primary data supports that daily discharge rates could be a combined 6,700 tons, while van Creveld claims it was no more than 2,250 to 4,200 tons/day.

No the primary data does no such thing.
No, the data Crvalds uses is the ports theoretical limits based on infrastructure to do the role, and the actual tonnage achieved in performing the role, i.e. he lists the actual Italian loading and unloading figures, and also gives the practical limits and offers explanation as to why actual capacity was far lower than theritical. He also draws readers attenmtion to human cargo that comprises tonnage delivered and then makes its own way forward unlike dry and liquid tonnage that does not.
The author seems unaware that Tripoli in 42 with its 18600 actual port loading and unloading was insignificant in supply for Rommel 900klm away. Or that 20,000 tons were reloaded onto coastal ships to move to nearer ports to again be unloaded. Montanari,'Le Operazioni in Africa Settentrionale' (Vol. 3" 20,000 tons to be unloaded from larger ships and loaded on smaller coastal boats")
For the month in question:
Tripoli = 45k capacity, 20,000t forward lift by coastal shipping
Bengasi = 45,000t (1,500t/day)
Tobruk = 30,000t (1,000t/day)
Marsa Matruh = 12,000t (400t/day)
Derna/Ras Ilal/Sollum/Bardia = 13,000t (100t/day each port)
So Tripoli with its 45000 tons received for the month from Italy, unloads 18600 and reloads it onto coastal shipping, 37200 tons capacity used, 7200 tons left to move by truck towards Rommel. Truck supply from 900klm away comprise 7200/12000 is 6% of DAK logistical demand met by trucks from 900klm distance. Tripoli in its entirety is 25800/120000 is 22% of requirements. 120k was QM requirements.

ORIGINAL: chuckles the clown
Anyone can take an inflated estimate of German supply requirements completely ignore captured Russian supplies overestimate the difficulties of travel and come up with a dodgy German supply system, child's play. Getting it right is the hard bit.

Your talking about yourself.

ORIGINAL: chuckles the clown
People tell me go and read Van Creveld, thats just an way of not answering the question 900 miles. If you guys have read it then why cant you just tell me why German trucks can't run 900 miles in Russia when they could do it in North Africa.

Indeed they did, and you have not. Nor have you learnt how to count or what to count or spotted that N Africa is not modelled in WitE. Nor is simple things like Benghazi having no liquid fuel storage capacity, until late 42, before then fuel tankers had no means to of load the cargo except straight into tankers/drums.

Die 21.Panzerdivision in Nord Afrika 1941-1943 H-D Aberger Pr. Militär Verlag 1994 https://www.amazon.co.uk/Die-lei-Panzer ... 3927292176
page 73:" The supplies flowed into Tripoli and often lay there for weeks because no transport was available. "

p35:" The advance of the German units (February 1941) imposed strong demands on the supply columns. To relieve them the Ib put in motion the coastal shipping. Smaller vessels with 30 to 300 ton loading capacity ran from the port of Tripoli to the landing places Buerat and Syrte. These places had no harbour but only simple landing stages which made unloading very difficult with rough seas. Perishable goods like food were often lost, barrels with fuel were thrown overboard and drawn on shore with the aid of people and ropes. "

p143:"Soon it became clear that the fuel usage which had been calculated based on the European situation, was much higher in the tropics. Part of the trucks could not be used in the desert and were bound by the roads. Aside from higher usage of fuel there was also a higher usage of oil and cooling water. The wearing of the tyres particularly when driving on stone tracks was much higher than the usual life expectancy. Even the coastal road ,the Via Balbia was soon called 'the tyre killer' by the drivers."

How many more tyres is that?. Around 25% more. https://www.armyupress.army.mil/Portals ... /toppe.pdf

ORIGINAL: chuckles the clown
Motorised columns (Kraftwagenkolonnen) are in general employed on good roads. They can cover up to 125 miles per day
So in a one week turn a Kraftwagenkolonnen can cover 7*125 or 875 miles, its a round trip so halve it giving a Kraftwagenkolonnen max range of 437 miles from a railhead.

Game runs on a weekly logistical turnaround, 900klm in a week means the trucks you *think* can reach 900klm in a week using your own data, actually shows them to be unable to do so leaving 0 as the tonnage delivers as the game engine works, just as happened in real life in a weeks time frame.
To any moderator, reading please ban him as he is clearly a troll desperate for any attention at all, has nothing to contribute but ignorance/incompetence and innumeracy.

[uw06670]

Hanny,

Question about lend lease vehicles. British and American tanks rolled in to help the Sovs eventually and 100's of Thousands of trucks. So how did they provide fuel for them? Or did the US companies do something to adjust the engine fuel requirements for these? (I think the Shermans sent to USSR were diesel now that I dig my memory).

thanks,

[Denniss]

I assume the lend lease trucks were able to operate on lower grade fuel made from soviet oil.
Don't know thow how soviet motor fuel compares to the motor fuel required by these engine but I think it would be a bad idea to supply truck who required special fuel.