The R's

[Alamander]

One of the R's in action in my game against Mike, serving, I think, as an amphibious escort. These ships really aren't very helpful for most things. I suppose if you can bring them to bear 2 v. 1 against an isolated Japanese BB in narrow straits, they can be effective, given the quality of crew and so forth, but even as convoy escorts they lack the basic AA armaments necessary to do much more than serve as damage soaks: high-priced damage soaks. Even in this role, they do not perform well. A few CLs would serve better, IMO.

These were some cracker-jack pilots. At least a ship with a decent AA package could have shot down some first-rate pilots. As it was, I lost only 1 pilot in the attack.

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Morning Air attack on TF, near Koggala at 32,57

Weather in hex: Light rain

Raid detected at 77 NM, estimated altitude 18,000 feet.
Estimated time to target is 28 minutes

Japanese aircraft
A6M2 Zero x 30
B5N1 Kate x 10
D3A1 Val x 16

Japanese aircraft losses
B5N1 Kate: 1 damaged
D3A1 Val: 3 damaged

Allied Ships
xAP Tabinta, Bomb hits 3, on fire, heavy damage
CA Cornwall, Bomb hits 2
xAP Takliwa, Torpedo hits 4, and is sunk
BB Royal Sovereign, Bomb hits 2, Torpedo hits 3
xAK Arkaba, Bomb hits 1

Allied ground losses:
2135 casualties reported
Squads: 54 destroyed, 15 disabled
Non Combat: 139 destroyed, 55 disabled
Engineers: 0 destroyed, 1 disabled
Guns lost 6 (6 destroyed, 0 disabled)
Vehicles lost 30 (25 destroyed, 5 disabled)

Morning Air attack on TF, near Koggala at 32,57

Weather in hex: Light rain

Raid detected at 79 NM, estimated altitude 16,000 feet.
Estimated time to target is 29 minutes

Japanese aircraft
B5N2 Kate x 11
D3A1 Val x 25

Japanese aircraft losses
D3A1 Val: 4 damaged

Allied Ships
BB Royal Sovereign, Bomb hits 13, on fire
xAP Tiradentes, Bomb hits 2
xAK Dagfred, Bomb hits 6, heavy fires
xAP Empire Kohinoor, Torpedo hits 2, and is sunk
xAP Corio, Torpedo hits 3, and is sunk
AK Bellatrix, Bomb hits 6, heavy fires, heavy damage
xAK Mendoza, Bomb hits 7, heavy fires, heavy damage

Allied ground losses:
2042 casualties reported
Squads: 31 destroyed, 26 disabled
Non Combat: 93 destroyed, 103 disabled
Engineers: 0 destroyed, 2 disabled
Guns lost 20 (18 destroyed, 2 disabled)
Vehicles lost 55 (25 destroyed, 30 disabled)


Morning Air attack on TF, near Koggala at 32,57

Weather in hex: Light rain

Raid detected at 10 NM, estimated altitude 18,000 feet.
Estimated time to target is 4 minutes

Japanese aircraft
B5N1 Kate x 6

Japanese aircraft losses
B5N1 Kate: 2 damaged
B5N1 Kate: 1 destroyed by flak

Allied Ships
BB Royal Sovereign, Torpedo hits 1, on fire
xAP Empire Tugela, Torpedo hits 2, heavy fires, heavy damage

Allied ground losses:
215 casualties reported
Squads: 2 destroyed, 6 disabled
Non Combat: 1 destroyed, 26 disabled
Engineers: 0 destroyed, 0 disabled
Guns lost 5 (1 destroyed, 4 disabled)

Afternoon Air attack on TF, near Koggala at 32,57

Weather in hex: Thunderstorms

Raid detected at 78 NM, estimated altitude 14,000 feet.
Estimated time to target is 33 minutes

Japanese aircraft
A6M2 Zero x 40
B5N1 Kate x 17
B5N2 Kate x 13

Japanese aircraft losses
B5N1 Kate: 4 damaged
B5N1 Kate: 1 destroyed by flak
B5N2 Kate: 3 damaged

Allied Ships
AMC Chitral, Torpedo hits 4, on fire, heavy damage
xAK City of Manchester
BB Royal Sovereign, Torpedo hits 2, and is sunk
xAP Tabinta, heavy fires, heavy damage
xAP Kota Radja, Torpedo hits 2, on fire
DD Anderson
xAP Maetsuycker, Torpedo hits 1, on fire, heavy damage
AK Bellatrix, Torpedo hits 1, heavy fires, heavy damage

Allied ground losses:
195 casualties reported
Squads: 2 destroyed, 1 disabled
Non Combat: 3 destroyed, 39 disabled
Engineers: 1 destroyed, 0 disabled
Guns lost 3 (1 destroyed, 2 disabled)
Vehicles lost 10 (2 destroyed, 8 disabled)

[RangerJoe]

It looks like those ships were misused. There were no defending fighters.

[Ian R]

I have a question:

Did your amphibious TF (or transport?) come within strike range of what looks like an IJ air combat TF with at least two carriers (and one + fleet carrier with Vals), with no fighter cover? If so ...

The Royal Sovereign's fate is fairly typical of what would happen to any BB caught by highly trained early war IJN Kate crews - who apparently scored 7 hits from 10 torpedoes carried in the first strike, 5 from 11 in the second, then 3 from 6, and then only 10 in the last strike - but I suspect not all the 30 Kates were carrying torpedoes by then given ordnance limits. Basically those Kate crews were striking at a 50+% hit rate, subject to fog of war.

[Alamander]

The point that I am trying to make, I think, is that BBs in amphibious groups, in my opinion, especially these R-class BBs with almost no AA package, offer nothing to the group, extract little from attackers, and are simply big floating targets which ensure that even non-aggressive CV commanders will launch a full, or near-full, strike package against the TF.

In this case, there were allied CVs nearby. The TF commanders were Fujita and and a CV commander, both with aggression ratings in the low 50s. The range was 7 hexes and multiple elements of both the morning and afternoon packages did not arrive at the target. Had all the planes arrived, it would have been close to a full-strike package. With enemy CVs nearby and detected, Fujita does not launch a full strike package at that amphibious group, in my opinion, if it does not contain that BB. In this case, Royal Sovereign did more to harm the amphibious group than to help it. Sovereign did not even shoot down a single plane. The AMC shot down the Kate and killed the pilot: the only Japanese casualty.

I have been patrolling the entrance to the Indian Ocean almost regularly with at least subs, often other pickets, and sometimes even CVs, for 6 months. I had a good inkling from various means that something big was in the works. For Op sec reasons, I can't divulge more than that or how I knew, almost exactly, where the TF would be. It was moving to rendezvous with a CV group for air-cover and was 1 day away from doing so.

It is not as though Mike was sending it in randomly without air cover. I just happened upon it on the only day it would have been vulnerable to air attack. I'm sure it was covered by LBA the day prior and would have been covered by CV air the next day. It was a hit-and-run strike that worked out for me.

[Ian R]

You are IMHO reaching the wrong conclusion.

The problem here was not that the BB attracted attention. The problem is that your opponent was performing an amphib OP (with xAP and xAK... so slow unloads as well) without first establishing air superiority.
In the face of enemy carriers (which likely have more strike power than RN carriers). What is your game date? Perhaps he is trying to do too much too early. There is a reason why the USN did not commence operations on the CENTPAC axis until November 1943 - they didn't have enough carriers and enough F6Fs to establish local air superiority. This also explains the torpid pace of the advances in the Solomons/PNG - everything there had to wait for the building of air bases to push the air umbrella forward. The British/Indians didn't land anywhere until 1945, despite Mr Churchill's penchant for schemes to land on Sumatra etc, because .... not enough air cover.

BBs, particularly the old slow ones like the "R"s, New Yorks, etc, are as precious as diamonds in a big amph TF conducting an assault landing. Not only do they provide immense suppressive fire at close range with multiple calibres of guns, they are a magnet for all the CD guns etc that fire at your TF. It is marvellous fun watching the various 4", 5", 6" and even 8" (203mm) hits bounce off their belt armour instead of obliterating your landing craft. I have a particular fondness for the Arkansas, and all those 12" rifles. She literally smothers well reconned shore defences. The Brooklyns with their 15 x 6" are good too where the CD guns are of equal/lesser calibre.

I am suggesting Mike simply failed to get all his ducks in a row before going on the offensive.

[Alamander]

The date is November 7th, 1942.

I'm not convinced that the CV group nearby contained only British CVs. I have a strong suspicion that U.S. CVs may have been there as well: possibly all of them. I am not sure, and this is pure speculation on my part. He may well have been thinking that a full complement of CVs in the Indian Ocean would give him local air superiority. If I had been certain that only British CVs were present, I would have moved to engage the main body and the CVs. As it was, I decided on a hit-and-run.

The Brooklyn CLs as amphibious components, I agree with completely. Coastal artillery struggles to land blows on highly maneuverable CLs.

The other problem with BBs as components of amphibious groups is that they tend to linger for several phases as ships unload, leaving them vulnerable in surface engagements as they deplete their ammunition. If used as pure bombardment groups, they discharge their munitions and leave, oftentimes reserving some ammo in case a surface battle ensues.

[RangerJoe]

Too many Allies want to counterattack too soon. Especially with the Indian and Commonwealth forces.

[Alamander]

ORIGINAL: RangerJoe

Too many Allies want to counterattack too soon. Especially with the Indian and Commonwealth forces.

There are far more units present in the Western theater than Indian and Commonwealth forces. There is a large U.S. expeditionary force there as well. It's going to be quite a battle for Burma coming up. It has been brewing for some time.

He seems rather intent on trying to trap a large body of Japanese forces there, so I am going to have to fight it out. I might have considering withdrawing from the central Burma plain (though not Rangoon) without much of a fight if he would have pushed along a broad front, as I can no longer count on air superiority with the P-40Ks and P-38s coming in,. As it is, I have a lot of chips in that pot, and I am not going to leave them there for the taking without a massive battle.

[BBfanboy]

ORIGINAL: Alamander

The date is November 7th, 1942.

I'm not convinced that the CV group nearby contained only British CVs. I have a strong suspicion that U.S. CVs may have been there as well: possibly all of them. I am not sure, and this is pure speculation on my part. He may well have been thinking that a full complement of CVs in the Indian Ocean would give him local air superiority. If I had been certain that only British CVs were present, I would have moved to engage the main body and the CVs. As it was, I decided on a hit-and-run.

The Brooklyn CLs as amphibious components, I agree with completely. Coastal artillery struggles to land blows on highly maneuverable CLs.

The other problem with BBs as components of amphibious groups is that they tend to linger for several phases as ships unload, leaving them vulnerable in surface engagements as they deplete their ammunition. If used as pure bombardment groups, they discharge their munitions and leave, oftentimes reserving some ammo in case a surface battle ensues.

You need to plan for the BBs using up most of their ammo on the first turn of landing. If I expect the landings to go on for more than one turn, I have another set of BBs or CAs to swap into the landing force and remove the low ammo BBs to go back somewhere and replenish. This is all part of the ballet that you must organize to do a big amphib landing. It takes about half a dozen landings to get good at organizing everything from minesweeping to ASW to bombardment to surface protection to air cover to HQm support to cycling out damaged/empty ships, etc.

[Alamander]

ORIGINAL: BBfanboy
You need to plan for the BBs using up most of their ammo on the first turn of landing. If I expect the landings to go on for more than one turn, I have another set of BBs or CAs to swap into the landing force and remove the low ammo BBs to go back somewhere and replenish. This is all part of the ballet that you must organize to do a big amphib landing. It takes about half a dozen landings to get good at organizing everything from minesweeping to ASW to bombardment to surface protection to air cover to HQm support to cycling out damaged/empty ships, etc.

Lol... As a Japanese player, I don't have the luxury of so many BBs and CAs that I can swap things in and out for an amphibious landing. I suppose if you orchestrate it all and provide cover to retiring ships... . Just be wary of crafty Japanese players who don't like to attack landing sites so much as to maneuver to attack support ships and Oilers, which always seem to be standing off about 2 or 3 days sailing. I don't know anyone like that... lol.

[BBfanboy]

ORIGINAL: Alamander

ORIGINAL: BBfanboy
You need to plan for the BBs using up most of their ammo on the first turn of landing. If I expect the landings to go on for more than one turn, I have another set of BBs or CAs to swap into the landing force and remove the low ammo BBs to go back somewhere and replenish. This is all part of the ballet that you must organize to do a big amphib landing. It takes about half a dozen landings to get good at organizing everything from minesweeping to ASW to bombardment to surface protection to air cover to HQm support to cycling out damaged/empty ships, etc.

Lol... As a Japanese player, I don't have the luxury of so many BBs and CAs that I can swap things in and out for an amphibious landing. I suppose if you orchestrate it all and provide cover to retiring ships... . Just be wary of crafty Japanese players who don't like to attack landing sites so much as to maneuver to attack support ships and Oilers, which always seem to be standing off about 2 or 3 days sailing. I don't know anyone like that... lol.

It's a matter of scale. When the Japanese are doing their landings almost all of their targets are weakly held and weakly defended by mines and CD guns - you don't need any BBs embedded with the amphibs.
By the time the Allies get large scale invasions going, the Japanese have built vicious defences at every worthwhile target.

[Alamander]

I guess I have to agree that if you are going to land at spot with a coastal fortress with heavy guns, such as Truk, BBs embedded in the amphibious group are helpful when combined with other BBs doing standard bombardment missions to bring to bear as much firepower as possible while also using absorbing some potential hits that might otherwise land on APAs and the like.

Keep in mind though that there are only a couple of coastal defense batteries that are not static and these do not contain the heaviest guns. There are also some base forces that have some lighter dual-purpose guns that can ransack poorly executed landings. Again, however, these contain light guns and nothing that would be very threatening even to a CL.

Hence, my question earlier about using Japanese 10 cm and 15 cm guns as auxiliary coastal defense batteries. The problem, however, is that these are also the best counter-battery weapons that Japan has, and most divisions, if they have anything heavier than 75 mm guns, usually have the 15 cm howitzers that are not effective as coastal defense auxiliaries (especially against embedded BBs).

I am trying out some of my 10 cm and 15 cm guns in my current game at likely landing spots (though only some, since I want the rest for counter-battery fire against allied siege stacks). I will let you know how it works out and how they fare against allied BBs and so forth.

[BBfanboy]

ORIGINAL: Alamander

I guess I have to agree that if you are going to land at spot with a coastal fortress with heavy guns, such as Truk, BBs embedded in the amphibious group are helpful when combined with other BBs doing standard bombardment missions to bring to bear as much firepower as possible while also using absorbing some potential hits that might otherwise land on APAs and the like.

Keep in mind though that there are only a couple of coastal defense batteries that are not static and these do not contain the heaviest guns. There are also some base forces that have some lighter dual-purpose guns that can ransack poorly executed landings. Again, however, these contain light guns and nothing that would be very threatening even to a CL.

Hence, my question earlier about using Japanese 10 cm and 15 cm guns as auxiliary coastal defense batteries. The problem, however, is that these are also the best counter-battery weapons that Japan has, and most divisions, if they have anything heavier than 75 mm guns, usually have the 15 cm howitzers that are not effective as coastal defense auxiliaries (especially against embedded BBs).

I am trying out some of my 10 cm and 15 cm guns in my current game at likely landing spots (though only some, since I want the rest for counter-battery fire against allied siege stacks). I will let you know how it works out and how they fare against allied BBs and so forth.

As I understand it, the game does not allow land-based artillery to fire against bombarding ships unless it is a Coast Defence/Naval Fort unit or has DP guns. Standard artillery will not return suppressing fire, but will fire at landing troops.

[Ambassador]

ORIGINAL: Alamander

The other problem with BBs as components of amphibious groups is that they tend to linger for several phases as ships unload, leaving them vulnerable in surface engagements as they deplete their ammunition. If used as pure bombardment groups, they discharge their munitions and leave, oftentimes reserving some ammo in case a surface battle ensues.

Besides what BBfanboy said about swapping big-guns in and out of amphib TF to replenish their ammo, I believe your basic misconception is what the BB are used for in an amphib TF.

They’re not there to defend against air attacks - that’s what you LBA or CV fighters are there for. A CV TF should not just linger nearby, to attack KB when it shows, but actively provide LRCAP to fend off attacks. Lack of CAP means the attack runs are not disrupted, hence the high success rates of the attacks. Plus, in ‘42 there are not many ships with great AAA ratings anyway,

Likewise, they’re not there to defend against ship attacks - that’s what your dedicated SAG groups (with an « s » at groups) are for, with more modern ships. And a strong air arm to deter attackers.

BBs in an amphib TF are only there to defend against coastal defenses. Lighter ships, like the Brooklyns, risk heavy damage if they get roughed up by 6- or 8-inch CD, and they attract less fire from CD than heavier supports. Even if they’re not at risk of sinking, it means they’ll spend more time in the repair yard, and you’ll have less support available for future amphibious (leading either to a slowed pace of progression or more damage on your landing ships). However, BBs will get at most a few points of sys damage, while being focused more by the CD guns, and thus your amphib TF as a whole suffers less damage.
With their many guns (main battery of 8x15in, secondary of 8x6in), the R-class BB will also pack more punch to disrupt the enemy LCU, be they CD or infantry. Same for the Arkansas, New York - they all keep a full secondary battery of naval guns, very good for amphibious support

As for ammo, that’s what AE (and AKE, if you can get a nearby undefended base to invade as a forward support) are there for. If, as the Allies, you try to invade somewhere without a full train of various TF (multiple SAG, multiple ASW, CV, preferably CVE too, minesweepers, various tenders, dedicated supply amphib TF, etc), you’re not doing your job really well.

As Japan though, if you invade somewhere heavily defended, you’re not doing your job really well. Past ‘42, even sometimes past mid-‘42, Japan just can’t invade successfully - or at least, as an AFB I’d be delighted to see my IJ opponent try and invade beyond the RL goals and overextend itself, presenting a host of possibilities to increase the attrition. So, it doesn’t matter that IJ has less BB or CA overall to have multiple heavy supports and swap them to replenish ammo, or provided dedicated SAG - they shouldn’t be attacking, at least not somewhere needing any such heavy support to be successful. It’s a waste of ressources.

And finally, places with so many CD guns as True should simply not be invaded, but bypassed, unless your opponent has been sloppy enough to rely only on the big guns and didn’t bring additional infantry and artillery. If he did, then bomb the thing out to hell, and then invade, but usually those places can be safely just bypassed after being bombed heavily (and regularly).

Back on your battle report, it boils down to « what did he expect ? » as there lies a TF with anemic AAA (Kent-class CA like the Cornwall have weak AA until ‘44, and only one DD appeared ?), provided no air-cover to by a nearby CV TF (according to you) ? If your opponent is half-proficient, I can only infer from the hex coordinate (13 hexes out of the Andamans) that he didn’t expect to stumble on your CVs so far out (I even wonder myself what your CVs were doing there, apart of accumulating wear and tear and risking ops losses, unless you were underway for some raiding around the IO), but even without factoring KB in the equation, there’s a risk of being attacked by G3M/G4M, with the same result. So, LRCAP was needed anyway.
And then, what’s an amphib TF doing there ? Invading the Andamans with a slow TF and inadequate air cover ? Even if he brought the US CV (but then, why didn’t he bring better US CA/CL to provide more AAA for the amphib TF ?), he’s still be facing an invasion, early war, against a target which can be supported on the IJ side by multiple airfields and large LBA, including out of the top of my head at least four AF4 (Rangoon, Tavoy, Victoria Point, Moulmein), not counting any he could have built up like Sabang, all of which are within range of A6M cover.
If it wasn’t an amphibious assault on the Andamans, I’d say « what were they doing there ? » instead, because they’re again within range of LBA on Sumatra or the Andamans, or in Burma. So, a convoy to Calcutta/Chittagong area should not venture so far in the south, while a convoy to Australia should not venture so far east.
OTOH, if your opponent is a little more than half-competent, it might have been a decoy, and now you’ve revealed the localisation of at least two fleet CVs, half-way around to globe of the probable main attack...[;)]

[Ian R]

ORIGINAL: Ambassador
it might have been a decoy, and now you’ve revealed the localisation of at least two fleet CVs, half-way around to globe of the probable main attack...[;)]

The thought did occur. That BB withdraws in about 12 months anyway, and he only used xA* ships. The loss of squads is probably more of a mid term problem.

Having said that, Alamander's opponent should be doing it 11-43, not 11-42, IMHO

[Ambassador]

ORIGINAL: Ian R

ORIGINAL: Ambassador
it might have been a decoy, and now you’ve revealed the localisation of at least two fleet CVs, half-way around to globe of the probable main attack...[;)]

The thought did occur. That BB withdraws in about 12 months anyway, and he only used xA* ships. The loss of squads is probably more of a mid term problem.

Having said that, Alamander's opponent should be doing it 11-43, not 11-42, IMHO

I checked the withdrawal date of Royal Sovereign, otherwise I’d have been more certain it was a decoy. A year early is a bit much, though, albeit it might be the point, to serve as a less obvious throwaway decoy.
As for squads, we don’t know what those are. It might have been a bunch of cheap Chinese infantry (or not really useful CW).

But I agree with you on the timetable, if this isn’t a diversion. Such an assault should only be done in ‘43. To do a coup in the Andamans that early, you need fast ships like APD, and/or to be sure the IJ CV assets (and most LBA) are busy elsewhere, far out.
Or, if it’s a full-blown assault, it would warrant far more escorts and supports than one BB and one CA anyway, especially if, as Alemander suspects, the US CVs have come to the IO.

[Alamander]

Oh... it was no decoy. It was moving south from Ceylon to link up with what appeared to be 2 other divisions, at least 2 heavy SAG/bombardments groups, including serious BBs, such as Colorado, what I suspect was a group of AOs, and at least 1, probably more CV TFs. It was pretty well orchestrated, and they would have linked up the next day. The day before, he was under LBA cover from Ceylon, so it was one day out of air-cover in the western Bay of Bengal, where, I am sure, he did not expect to encounter a CVTF.

What was my air combat TF doing out there? Well... as I say, I suspected from a couple of sources that something big was in the works. I knew, with some degree of accuracy (exactly, as it turns out), where the 2 groups would finish their moves. I actually had something else in mind for that group, but as several sources began to indicate that big moves were happening, they moved to intercept.

The allied amphibious operation was timed to coincide with a major offensive in Burma, which has now begun. The game is a bit unusual in that I took the northern island of New Zealand, along with Suva, New Caledonia, and so forth so as to cut off Australia from access via the Pacific. Mike responded by sending a lot of troops via the Magellan route west and into India. There is a large U.S. expeditionary force and most of the USAAF is in India right now: for a total, when combined with the British units, of about 300 bombers and 500 fighters.

I suspect that plan involved massive attacks on my airfields to limit my ability to respond with LBA to the invasion. The massive airfield attacks have begun, it would seem, regardless, and it is a decisive moment in the game. We both have a lot committed to the western theater, and the next couple of days will decide, in my opinion, how the war will go.

It was no feint. It is the center of all activity in the game right now.

[Alamander]

ORIGINAL: BBfanboy

As I understand it, the game does not allow land-based artillery to fire against bombarding ships unless it is a Coast Defence/Naval Fort unit or has DP guns. Standard artillery will not return suppressing fire, but will fire at landing troops.

That is my understanding as well. Standard artillery units will not fire on bombardment TFs. They do seem to fire on amphibious TFs, however, which is the entire point that I am making about BBs in amphibious groups and using some 10 cm and 15 cm guns to try to take advantage of this type of TF construction.

[Ian R]

ORIGINAL: Alamander

Oh... it was no decoy... Snipped but I read it.

Sounds like your clever ploy bagged a follow up TF with a base force on board.

You might want to lower the volume on the self congratulation here. I am starting to like Mike's work.

[Alamander]

ORIGINAL: Ian R

ORIGINAL: Alamander


Sounds like your clever ploy bagged a follow up TF with a base force on board.

You might want to lower the volume on the self congratulation here. I am starting to like Mike's work.

I am not congratulating myself. The point that I was making was to suggest that while BBs may have a role in some amphibious groups (as BBFanboy notes), they can do more harm than good.

The conversation was sidetracked a bit. Several folk suggested that my opponent was being careless, and my intent was to defend him by stating that he was not being careless and that he had planned it out pretty well from the looks of it on my end. Of course, you are free to read whatever you want into intent and make whatever sorts of judgements you deem fit.