Why Japan lost?

[ncc1701e]

Was there any big mistakes on Japanese side?

Midway, the Japanese code was cracked.
Sub warfare, not prepared and no convoy escorts.
Not enough pilots.

Anything else?

[Marco70]

I think so.
The rivalry between army and navy has always hindered a unified approach and strategy. Note that the merchant navy was divided between army, navy and civilian, completely crazy.
Japan has definitely underestimated the impact of a submarine war on its merchant fleet. They could not secure their supply routes at any time.
Regardless of mistakes or not, against the economic power of the USA, Japan never had a chance to win the war. The outcome was clear from the beginning.

[Platoonist]

Not so much a mistake, but a basic intrinsic weakness for Japan was logistics. Like in the German invasion of the Soviet Union, Japanese logistical arrangements seemed to presuppose a quick war. A large reserve of fuel was stockpiled for the fleet, but estimates of how much fuel would actually be used were low by at least a factor of two.

Japanese logistics tended to collapse under pressure, as happened both in New Guinea and at Guadalcanal where Japanese troops eventually found themselves foraging for sweet potatoes and betel nuts. Even the opening Japanese offensive was operated on a logistical shoestring, and 14th Army in the Philippines nearly had its logistics collapse when the campaign went beyond the single month allowed for it in Japanese planning. The Japanese forces suffered severely from malaria when their allocation of quinine ran out, and there were also many cases of beriberi. In part, the weakness of Japanese logistics reflected the much weaker industrial base of Japan relative the United States. The Japanese inferiority in logistics went a long ways towards negating the advantage they had of interior lines of communication.

The shortage of oil was at the foundation of much of Japan's logistical difficulties. When war broke out, the Japanese Navy had managed to stockpile about 6 million tons of oil. This was thought to be sufficient for the first year of war, but consumption greatly exceeded prewar projections. Actual consumption for both the Japanese Army and Navy proved to be at least twice what had been projected. The failed Midway operation burned as much as fuel as the Japanese fleet used in one year in peacetime. By August 1942 the oil shortage had already begun limiting the kinds of operations the Japanese could carry out, and this was aggravated by the lack of forward oil storage facilities. For example, oil storage at Truk amounted to just 77,200 tons, enough to completely refuel the single super-battleship battleship Yamato just twelve times. The Japanese attempted to make up the shortage by anchoring oilers in Truk lagoon, but this further aggravated the tanker shortage. It is likely that fuel shortages were a significant part of the reason Admiral Yamamoto was reluctant to commit Yamato in the Guadalcanal campaign.

Japanese lack of realism in logistical planning peaked in the U-Go offensive in Burma in 1944 where Army personnel were told ahead of time to be prepared to eat grass when the carried provisions ran out. They eventually did that and worse. Cannibalism became rife in some units. According to the testimony of a surviving Pakistani corporal who was captured in Singapore and housed as a prisoner of war in Papua New Guinea, Japanese soldiers on the island killed and ate about one prisoner per day over the course of 100 days.

[Torplexed]

Throughout the war the Japanese had a weakness for expecting unrealistic results from unconventional means of attack, especially any that could be thought of as particularly reliant on individual bravery, aggressiveness and force of will. There was a particular psychology surrounding the Japanese planning process. Failure was dishonorable, thus the possibility of failure was a very serious thing. To consider failure as a possibility was almost like an accusation of failure, or a suspicion that the warrior charged with the execution of a mission did not have the requisite fighting spirit or patriotism to succeed.

To plan for alternative eventualities was almost like an insult to those who were to execute the primary plan. Time and time again during the course of the war this resulted in a lack of flexibility in Japanese planning, and a hesitation to adapt to alternative circumstances.

The love of this particular approach of planning and some luck paid handsome dividends during the opening moves of the Pacific War, but came back to haunt them later. The Japanese were ruthless and bold while their designs went well, but if their plans were derailed or inadequate to the situation they fell into confusion, were slow to re-adjust and invariably stuck too long to their original schemes. They were not prepared to admit that they had made a mistake, and that their plans had misfired and needed recasting.

A good example of this is the during the Battle of Midway. After the carriers Akagi, Kaga and Soryu had been disabled and set aflame, the remaining Japanese carrier Hiryu should have hightailed it out of there. Instead, she became involved in a unequal battle with the three US carriers, eventually resulting in her own loss at the end of the day. All because of an unwillingness to back down, reassess and preserve a combat asset.

[canuckgamer]

I've just finished reading the trilogy on the Pacific theatre by Ian Toll and I recommend it to anyone who has an interest in the war in the Pacific. It also goes in to the politics and economics of both sides. American industrial might dwarfed that of Japan so it was just a matter of time before they were defeated.

Every resource including the most important oil had to be transported from the conquered areas to Japan and by mid 1944 the U.S had cutoff those resources by submarines and air. Although the Yamato and Musashi the pride of Japanese navy were obsolete given the dominance of air power they couldn't even take to sea because of fuel shortage and the enormous amount of fuel that they required. When they and the remaining carriers finally sortied in the Battle of Leyte Gulf it is was basically a naval kamikaze mission.

I will be very interested in seeing how oil and resources are handled in War Plan Pacific. In addition what happens in the spring of 1945? Will there be a nuclear option for the Americans?

[scout1]

Big mistake on the Japanese side ....

Certainly ..... Starting the war which they couldn't win outright within 6 months to a year ...

The IJN pre war study clearly concluded that if they didnt win outright within a year they would get their arss kicked ....

[ncc1701e]

ORIGINAL: scout1

The IJN pre war study clearly concluded that if they didnt win outright within a year they would get their arss kicked ....

Okay but what are winning conditions for Japan? After Pearl Harbor, I am sure the US would have never surrendered even if Hawaii had been invaded. Basically, Japan has no way to win.

Am I wrong?

[Platoonist]

ORIGINAL: ncc1701e

Okay but what are winning conditions for Japan? After Pearl Harbor, I am sure the US would have never surrendered even if Hawaii had been invaded. Basically, Japan has no way to win.

Am I wrong?

As in a lot of Pacific wargames, like War in the Pacific, victory for Japan may just come down to holding out longer than she did historically.

Japanese planners never envisaged a total defeat of the Western Powers. Their intention was to strike a series of demoralizing blows which would secure the resources of south Asia and establish a defensive perimeter around them. Behind that shield, the Imperial Navy would wait to launch javelin thrusts at any counterattacks.

Japan, in short wanted to win the Pacific War as they had previously won wars with Russia in 1905 and China in 1895. Limiting the conflict by escalating its material and moral costs beyond what the opposing powers, America in particular was willing to pay. The Japan reasoned that Americans were businessmen, not samurai. Eventually they would calculate costs and benefits and come to terms with the realities created by Japanese arms and begin negotiating for a peace.

That was plan A. There was no plan B. Japan until the end of the war kept trying to raise the cost in blood beyond what America was willing to pay. They certainly came close with Iwo Jima and Okinawa. But those drawn-out battles just made the decision to drop the A-bombs all the easier.

[ncc1701e]

Good points, thanks

[Anonymous]

[Deleted by Admins]

[nikdav]

Two big start mistakes !
- Attacking Pearl Harbor:
(they would have sunk all American battleships in the open sea within a couple of months)!
- Let the British fleet escape:
(Chasing the British as far as the Atlantic as far as Great Britain,
the end of the British Fleet, with big impact on the whole war)!

[michaelCLARADY]

ORIGINAL: ncc1701e

ORIGINAL: scout1

The IJN pre war study clearly concluded that if they didnt win outright within a year they would get their arss kicked ....

Okay but what are winning conditions for Japan? After Pearl Harbor, I am sure the US would have never surrendered even if Hawaii had been invaded. Basically, Japan has no way to win.

Am I wrong?

Japan was baited into a war they knew was objectively hopeless. FDR wanted a war to end the 12 year depression in the USA. The USA trade embargo gave Japan a choice of their economy grinding to a halt in a year or gambling that Japan's warriors Bushido Code was a match for a 10X larger economy.

Japan's better move would have been to strike North against the USSR in cooperation with Germany.

[wesy]

I think this provides a good perspective "Why Japan Really Lost the War"

Just one example:

US Merchant ship production (39-45) = 33,993,230
Japanese Merchant ship production (39-45) = 4,152,361

[Elessar2]

ORIGINAL: nikdav

Two big start mistakes !
- Attacking Pearl Harbor:
(they would have sunk all American battleships in the open sea within a couple of months)!
- Let the British fleet escape:
(Chasing the British as far as the Atlantic as far as Great Britain,
the end of the British Fleet, with big impact on the whole war)!

There was a path to victory, but one which would have required a lot more foresight than the majority of the admirals had, as well as a lack of same on the part of the Americans. Forget the two Yamatos and build 4 more Shokaku's, with expanded pilot training programs to keep said sword sharp.

Pearl Harbor was a mistake in more ways than one, but most crucially by showing the US the IJN's hand, as in how effective massed carrier power could be. Without that clear & obvious object lesson, the US would likely have blundered fairly early into the kind of devastating loss that the IJN was shooting for. Having 2-4 more fleet carriers would have made said victory that much more decisive. The Japanese needed to keep their sword hidden until the right moment came to unleash it.

Yes, there were some people on the American side like Nimitz may have been aware of the danger even without the PH attack. But if Halsey was the admiral on point, the IJN could have easily used his overaggressiveness against him.

If instead the US had resisted said temptation & held most of their fleet back until the Essexes + prewar CVs outnumbered the IJN's (and the F6F became the dominant USN fighter), the result would have been the same in the end, tho likely stretching into 1946.

[Platoonist]

ORIGINAL: wesy

I think this provides a good perspective "Why Japan Really Lost the War"

Just one example:

US Merchant ship production (39-45) = 33,993,230
Japanese Merchant ship production (39-45) = 4,152,361

That's a good read. I think Japan did recognize the industrial superiority of the United States. The problem was that the full enormity of that disparity couldn't have been fully anticipated in 1941 due to the effects of the Depression. Also, the Germans never proved to be the full military distraction that Japan hoped they would be.

A fundamental strategic problem is that Japanese did not have any access to any American center of gravity or vital areas. There was no Moscow, Ukraine or Donbass to aim at like in Barbarossa. When Yamamoto stated that he would "dictate his terms in Washington" perhaps, subconsciously, he had that very limitation in mind, because he certainly knew he could not dictate them from anywhere in the Pacific. He knew neither the Japanese Imperial Army or Navy could not get him to Washington. Washington would have to extend an invitation and there was the dilemma.

One of the more ironic consequences of Japan's early period of military successes was that although she conquered many areas containing badly needed strategic resources after December 1941, she didn't capture a single production center worthy of the name, because there really weren't any. In Europe, the Germans benefited greatly from capturing or annexing such industrial complexes as the Skoda armament works in Czechoslovakia, the central industrial region of Poland, the factories around Paris and in the Rhone valley, the shipyards of Brest, St Nazaire, Amsterdam and Gdynia. However, there were no comparable facilities in Southern Asia. Apart from Japan and the United States, there wasn't a single shipyard in the Pacific capable of launching any warship larger than a destroyer. Nothing that could assist Japan in competing with the naval juggernaut then building in American shipyards.

[BeirutDude]

wo big start mistakes !
- Attacking Pearl Harbor:
(they would have sunk all American battleships in the open sea within a couple of months)!

At bare minimum not destroying the fuel depot and dry docks as their primary targets at Pearl. Even if they, "sunk all American battleships in the open sea within a couple of months" it wouldn't have made a difference but destroying Pearl Harbor's infrastructure delays the American response by months to a year.

[BeirutDude]

Wouldn't have changed the finial outcome but breaking up Kidō Butai before Coral Sea was a HUGE mistake! Even with Hiryu damaged the remaining Kido Butai, with five fleet carriers and Ryūjō, easily destroys the Yorktown, with lower losses to pilots. Then with Hiryu rejoining for Kidō Butai Midway, the Enterprise and Hornet are outgunned three to one! I doubt the USN launches Operation Watchtower in August and goes into a defensive position with Wasp and Saratoga (when both could avoid I-Boat torpedoes). This gives the IJN some breathing room until several Essexes and CVLs/CVEs are commissioned. I doubt the US could have taken on Kidō Butai again until mid 1943.

Also ditch, Chūichi Nagumo, but not sure who they would have replaced him with? Maybe Ozawa?

[warspite1]

ORIGINAL: nikdav

Two big start mistakes !
- Attacking Pearl Harbor:
(they would have sunk all American battleships in the open sea within a couple of months)!
- Let the British fleet escape:
(Chasing the British as far as the Atlantic as far as Great Britain,
the end of the British Fleet, with big impact on the whole war)!

warspite1

How would the Japanese chase the British as far as the Atlantic, let alone Great Britain? Where do the Japanese re-fuel, re-arm, repair her ships and aircraft?

[ncc1701e]

ORIGINAL: warspite1

ORIGINAL: nikdav

Two big start mistakes !
- Attacking Pearl Harbor:
(they would have sunk all American battleships in the open sea within a couple of months)!
- Let the British fleet escape:
(Chasing the British as far as the Atlantic as far as Great Britain,
the end of the British Fleet, with big impact on the whole war)!

warspite1

How would the Japanese chase the British as far as the Atlantic, let alone Great Britain? Where do the Japanese re-fuel, re-arm, repair her ships and aircraft?

Didn't you know that the Japanese had a hidden base near Ushuaia?

[Platoonist]

ORIGINAL: warspite1

How would the Japanese chase the British as far as the Atlantic, let alone Great Britain? Where do the Japanese re-fuel, re-arm, repair her ships and aircraft?

Logistics are for soft, cowering Westerners who fight wars like effeminate accountants!! You obviously lack seishin! [:D]

I guess the concept of a "raid" is a difficult one for some. You go in, make your hits and you get out.