ORIGINAL: Torplexed
The latter two were the result of poor pre-war Japanese commitment to intel and their inability to commit resources to (indicative of their contempt for) strategic intelligence.
And their total inability to change plans on the fly, or "improvise" off of a superior's original gameplan (like the Germans tended to do). Parshall & Tully said it best in Shattered Sword:
At an operational level, plan inertia manifested itself in a stubborn unwillingness to adapt immediately before & during battle. Karl von Clausewitz' famous maxim that "No battle plan survives first contact with the enemy," probably never met with a less enthusiastic audience than the Imperial Japanese Navy.
[and, quoting a British general]
The fundamental fault of their generalship was a lack of moral, as distinct from physical, courage. They were not prepared to admit they made a mistake, that their plans had misfired and needed recasting. Rather than confess that, they passed onto their subordinates, unchanged, the order that they themselves had received, well knowing that with the resources available the tasks demanded were impossible. Time & again, this blind passing of responsibility ran down a chain of disaster. They scored highly by determination; they paid heavily for lack of flexibility.
