All interesting, but not addressing my original point.
As for your MOS, you are far from the only veteran on this site and I have been both an airman and (later) a lieutenant. I understand how much clout lieutenants don't have. There should have been a filter center and a more senior officer on duty.
As I said before, the Ward was there to detect submarines. It found and sunk one, confirmed by the Antares. That is in fact an "existential threat", which was why the ship's captain had the authority to fire on the sub.
The local warnings received were too late to prevent the disaster. Even if the warning system had worked perfectly, even if there had been duty officers with sufficient smarts and authority to issue a Fleet and Air Defense Warning, the crippling of the Battle Fleet would still have occurred. Being at Condition 1 would have made salvage of some ships easier, but the damaged would still have been extensive.
Although the country was technical "at peace", it was fighting an undeclared naval war in the Atlantic against the Germans; had lost the gunboat Panay to Japanese in China and had embargoed both oil and scrap metal to the Japanese. The 1932 (XIII) and the 1940 (XXI) Fleet Problems were both designed around defending against a surprise aircraft carrier attack by an "unspecified" Asian Power. This could only be referring to the Japanese since the only carriers in the Pacific were either American or Japanese. The hypothetical Asian Power had damaged the fleet in Pearl Harbor both times. Hence FDR's decision to move the fleet forward to deter Japan, which instead was the final provocation.
If you read about what Adm Kimmel and Gen Short were doing in the year prior to the attack, they were active commanders. The fleet was honed to a fine edge, in fact some complained they were training too much. That's why the Second Wave took the bulk of the casualties from naval AA fire. The ships' crews were well-trained. Short, who was commissioned from the ranks, had greatly increased the defenses on the Island. Unfortunately he was kept out of the Army-Navy-State Intel loop. So in the end the ambiguous message traffic caused him to pull lots of aircraft out of their revetments to be parked on the ramp where they could be guarded against sabotage.
My original idea for the scenario was that faulty intelligence analysis and fusion as well as poorly worded warn warning messages denied the commanders on scene the information they needed to prepare for the right kind of attack. The Japanese reputation at the time was one of treachery, based on historical facts as well as racism on both sides. This led the locals to emphasize anti-sabotage measures that crippled air defense because no one in Washington really believed the Japanese would attack so far to the East. Otherwise they would have not pushed the Fleet from San Diego to Pearl.
Not sure about Kimmel himself receiving the contact report 30 minutes prior, I doubt the 30 minutes would have helped anyway. Even if Kimmel and Short had received both the radar warning and started an Alert, it would have not stopped the massive attack approaching the island.
I want to explore what would happen if the war warnings had been unambiguous. That's why I'm writing this scenario.
In any case I have enjoyed discussing and debating this, you have brought up some facts and opinions which will help inform my scenario.
From the manual, this is what having it turn on does, so I guess these things do not happen if you turn it off.
I am not sure you can turn it on if you start before December 7th, 1941, a test would be necessary to find out.
A quick test says you can.
2.4.6 DECEMBER 7TH SURPRISE
If the player selects a scenario that begins on December 7th, 1941, this option may be selected.
When chosen, during the Morning Phase only on December 7, 1941, the following occurs to
represent Allied surprise:
»» Allied air units flying patrols (CAP, search, etc.) have
a 50% chance of not flying any aircraft
»» If an air group passes this test and elects to fly, the
number of aircraft that will fly is reduced by 75%
»» The Allies will launch no airstrikes
»» Japanese Naval TFs may have enhanced first turn movement, depending
upon TF settings in the scenario (see Editor Manual for details)
»» Aircraft making a port attack during any December 7 phase will attack
ships 100 percent of the time if there are at least 10 ships in the port
»» Aircraft hit on any Allied airfields suffer increased damage
»» Aircraft hit on any Allied ships suffer increased
damage due to lack of Damage Control
»» Vary Setup option has been disabled for Admiral’s Edition.
Something else you will need to do something about. Many units, air, ship and land, have arrival dates of 12/06/41 so they show up on day one
of a full campaign scenario. These will not be available until then.
There will be no air units, the only ships will be the minisubs.
Thanks for your replies. I'm not going to comment on the "tactical" last-minute warnings by Ward and Opana Radar Station etc. I'm interested in the alleged failures of Admiral Stark, RAdm Turner and the Washington intelligence community. You say that no clear warnings have been sent from Washington and Kimmel and Short have been left with incomplete information. What information has been held back? There have been the war warning messages of November 27/28, therefore Kimmel and Short have been warned rather clearly that war with Japan was a distinct possibility. What "more detailed warnings" Washington should have sent? As you say, the "...messages indicated possible Japanese operations in the Far East, not a carrier attack on Pearl itself." Maybe because the Washington folks had no hard information about a pending carrier attack on Pearl? Yes, they could have mentioned the possibility of a carrier attack on Pearl, but that possibility was already known in Navy circles - and considered to be very unlikely due to distance and difficulties involved. And if the Washington people had hard intel about a pending carrier attack on Pearl but held it back, then what information has been held back and why?
Well, good luck with your scenario. It's an interesting counterfactual, and certainly won't be the only "alternate history" one out there. I did get a really good chuckle from learning that you were once a lieutenant. Given the context of our exchange and me being a former enlisted radar guy, well, that was priceless! [:D]
I was told that US Army military scouts would state that the easiest way to get lost would be to give a 2nd LT the map . . .
I would suppose that the timing of the radar information would have allowed the Army Air Corps plus any Naval fighter pilots including US Naval infantry fighter pilots to get to fighters that were combat loaded and get up in the air for CAP. Some did call a secondary airfield to get fighters ready, drove there, took off, and shot down Japanese aircraft.
Seek peace but keep your gun handy.
I'm not a complete idiot, some parts are missing!
“Illegitemus non carborundum est (“Don’t let the bastards grind you down”).” ; Julia Child
Well, good luck with your scenario. It's an interesting counterfactual, and certainly won't be the only "alternate history" one out there. I did get a really good chuckle from learning that you were once a lieutenant. Given the context of our exchange and me being a former enlisted radar guy, well, that was priceless! [:D]
My experience is that the Louies that make good officers are the ones who know they don't know nuthin' and listen to toe Corporals...lol.
Signed,
Cpl Whatley, USMC
There are only two kinds of people that understand Marines: Marines and the enemy. Everyone else has a second-hand opinion.
; Julia Child
