Russia's First Use of Hypersonic Weapon Occurs in Ukraine

[DWReese]

https://www.yahoo.com/finance/news/russ ... 00598.html

[BDukes]

Looking forward to its first use in civ CMO. Just sayin

[Dimitris]

Kinzhal is an ALBM, I'm pretty sure these are already usable in CMO-civ....?

[BDukes]

Kinzhal is an ALBM, I'm pretty sure these are already usable in CMO-civ....?

They are. Thank you!

Mike

[boogabooga]

If Kinzhal counts as a "hypersonic weapon", then shouldn't Iskandar-M as well?

[Darren_H_slith]

If Kinzhal counts as a "hypersonic weapon", then shouldn't Iskandar-M as well?

Exactly. Just more of the usual Russian BS.

[AKar]

If Kinzhal counts as a "hypersonic weapon", then shouldn't Iskandar-M as well?

Exactly. Just more of the usual Russian BS.

Not necessarily. Even if they can reach hypersonic velocities, "traditional" ballistic missiles are not usually classified as hypersonic weapons in this context, the classification being reserved to systems that are able to maneuver in flight in a relatively unconstrained manner, rather similarly to common missiles. While Iskanders appear to have some maneuvering capability around their predominantly ballistic trajectory, it appears that the users themselves do not classify them into the same category with weapon systems nowadays referred into as hypersonic vehicles.

Personally I think one is more likely to slip into BS by over-reading into purported maneuvering capabilities of the Iskender in this context. Of note is that by simple physics, a ballistic missile with even slight maneuvering capabilities is all but an impossible target for an interceptor designed to counter only the ballistic missiles with none.

[thewood1]

"more likely to slip into BS by over-reading into purported maneuvering capabilities"

A piece of brillianace in analysis. Some people read blogs, press releases, and product brochures with only the most limited critical analysis. And that's true on all sides. The main difference is the free-er press in western democracies can tend to get hyper-critical in the opposite extreme. So you end up with some very passionate people thinking every weapon system info released by some very info-controlled society is true and every bad press write up in the less controlled society is true.

A great example is The Aussie Airpower site. Constantly went on about bad weapons development in the US and talked up every missile system out of Russia and China. Weapons development in the US is very messy and inefficient. And we hear all about it to the point movies get made about it. Who has read a NYT article on the graft, corruption, and incompetence in Russian weapons development? I have yet to see one. So some very smart people think that every statement on a weapon system out of Russia and China must be reality because no one is writing about it.

It doesn't help that the US DoD use those PRs to bolster their own agendas and favorite program. Remember the big missile gap in the 50s and 60s? It can lend false creedence to an adversaries actual propaganda. Its a very bizarre circle of logic

[wyskass]

Sometimes the media seems to conflate delivery vehicle with warhead.
You can deliver a nuclear bomb on an old truck or a box of marbles on a hypersonic missile.

[AKar]

"more likely to slip into BS by over-reading into purported maneuvering capabilities"

A piece of brillianace in analysis. [...]

On that point, I'd only claim mere observations more than analysis. Yet, as mentioned, even modest maneuvering capabilities could render defense systems designed against (almost) purely ballistic trajectories all but useless. Add some good propaganda (also known as marketing when the scope is more specified) on to the claims of purported weapon system performance against their feasible actuals, especially when none are available... errr.. We tend to reach conclusions with vast over-performance as to an expected outcome. Yet, as far as I read, none or very few of the Iskendars have confirmed to be successfully intercepted by the Ukrainian air defenses. They remain a difficult target.

A good point was risen by military analyst in the local media recently. It should be almost self-obvious, but apparently not so much for the Russians. If I use some precision weapons, I should have some equivalently precise intel on where to land those and when, to have any good effect. Lots of the intel is, however, done in relatively old-school ways, some classified and covert and whatnot, but more in ways painfully obvious: just see the western OSINT capabilities, and the NATO assets like the Global Hawks, and River Joints, and what not, doing just that. And for Ukrainians, they need not to pinpoint anything to allow for precision weapons (they could do that on the occasion, of course!), but to give, say, battalion-level info to support the maneuvering.

[wyskass]

"more likely to slip into BS by over-reading into purported maneuvering capabilities"

A piece of brillianace in analysis. [...]

On that point, I'd only claim mere observations more than analysis. Yet, as mentioned, even modest maneuvering capabilities could render defense systems designed against (almost) purely ballistic trajectories all but useless. Add some good propaganda (also known as marketing when the scope is more specified) on to the claims of purported weapon system performance against their feasible actuals, especially when none are available... errr.. We tend to reach conclusions with vast over-performance as to an expected outcome.

A good point was risen by military analyst in the local media recently. It should be almost self-obvious, but apparently not so much for the Russians. If I use some precision weapons, I should have some equivalently precise intel on where to land those and when, to have any good effect. Lots of the intel is, however, done in relatively old-school ways, some classified and covert and whatnot, but more in ways painfully obvious: just see the western OSINT capabilities, and the NATO assets like the Global Hawks, and River Joints, and what not, doing just that. And for Ukrainians, they need not to pinpoint anything to allow for precision weapons (they could do that on the occasion, of course!), but to give, say, battalion-level info to support the maneuvering.

Good point. Should we assume the intel from the near border flights by those recon and radar NATO aircraft, is being passed to the Ukrainians and being acted upon, or are those observations kept within NATO? I wonder if there are efficient communication channels established for such a thing.
As said that provides huge advantage to Ukraine without NATO having to do anything direct.

[thewood1]

SOmetimes the most effective anti air defense sensor is a guy on a hill with a cell phone. In CMO, everyone wants model the most modern and fanciest IADS. But that guy on the hill can be a very tough nut to crack. Espcially if he's listed as Neutral and ROEs are set as they are.

The point is to your comment on intel...killing the weakest link in the missile's kill chain is the best defense against a super effective dead nuts on hypersonic glide vehicle.

[AKar]

Good point. Should we assume the intel from the near border flights by those recon and radar NATO aircraft, is being passed to the Ukrainians and being acted upon, or are those observations kept within NATO? I wonder if there are efficient communication channels established for such a thing.
As said that provides huge advantage to Ukraine without NATO having to do anything direct.

[Edit: posts reversed with the next one, as I accidentally messed something up with my replies!]

And also, remember that data is not intel. In the CMO-world, for instance, we tend to play with the actuals, that is, with the data. In the messy reality, some very vague and random points of data can be structured into useful intel by skilled network of collectors and analysts, passed on to the forces suffering from the fog of war in usable formats for them to know when to attempt a break with their scarce resources. In a conflict like this, I'd assume that the very majority of the command is done in real-time "blind mode" in what comes to the ground level. Thus, having any good sources of real, timely, and accurate intel on the enemy's situation against yours can be a proper game changer.

[AKar]

Good point. Should we assume the intel from the near border flights by those recon and radar NATO aircraft, is being passed to the Ukrainians and being acted upon, or are those observations kept within NATO? I wonder if there are efficient communication channels established for such a thing.
As said that provides huge advantage to Ukraine without NATO having to do anything direct.

I'd figure that if pretty much the entire EU are rather openly shipping some good parts of their reserve weapon stockpiles into Ukraine for wartime use, notwithstanding long-lasting principles of not allowing for weapons exports into countries involved in an active conflict (for what it has been worth anyways), I'd think that passing a hint or two in forms of good intel would not break NATO's prudence.

[wyskass]

... I'd think that passing a hint or two in forms of good intel would not break NATO's prudence.

True, and what's interesting about that is considering how valuable data and intel (without making a distinction for this point) is these days, and increasingly so, what constitutes direct involvement. As said, he who sees first can fire first, in BVR combat for example, wins. So while no NATO forces are on the ground in boots or pulling the trigger, they can provide a majority of the advantage. This huge NATO Situation Awareness machine, which Ukraine would not otherwise have.

If one provides a gun, address, photo, name, when they will be coming home, and where they are now, to a guy for an assassination, would that still be considered no direct involvement, by a court of law? Would a defense of, "hey, I didn't pull the trigger" stand up or would this actually be 95% of the involvement.

Just made me wonder, since we are hearing about not crossing the line to direct confrontation, which could maybe even be moot. Or maybe it really does come down to boots on the ground ultimately, as has also been said.

[thewood1]

"If one provides a gun, address, photo, name, when they will be coming home, and where they are now, to a guy for an assassination, would that still be considered no direct involvement, by a court of law? Would a defense of, "hey, I didn't pull the trigger" stand up or would this actually be 95% of the involvement."

In the US, its called conspiracy to commit murder in most states. In some, its equivalent to actually pulling the trigger. But in all, you can still go to jail.

[wyskass]

In the US, its called conspiracy to commit murder in most states. In some, its equivalent to actually pulling the trigger. But in all, you can still go to jail.

Exactly. Which makes me wonder about NATO assistance to Ukraine in that context.

[thewood1]

On the other hand, shooting someone attacking someone else, or rendering them physical assistance is covered under good samaritan and self-defense laws in most states.

[AKar]

... I'd think that passing a hint or two in forms of good intel would not break NATO's prudence.

True, and what's interesting about that is considering how valuable data and intel (without making a distinction for this point) is these days, and increasingly so, what constitutes direct involvement. As said, he who sees first can fire first, in BVR combat for example, wins. So while no NATO forces are on the ground in boots or pulling the trigger, they can provide a majority of the advantage. This huge NATO Situation Awareness machine, which Ukraine would not otherwise have.

If one provides a gun, address, photo, name, when they will be coming home, and where they are now, to a guy for an assassination, would that still be considered no direct involvement, by a court of law? Would a defense of, "hey, I didn't pull the trigger" stand up or would this actually be 95% of the involvement.

Just made me wonder, since we are hearing about not crossing the line to direct confrontation, which could maybe even be moot. Or maybe it really does come down to boots on the ground ultimately, as has also been said.

Of course, I am obviously just guessing here, so take my words for what they are worth. Yet, I find it highly unlikely that Ukrainian defenses are being provided with significant, or indeed any, real time command & control feeds by NATO, like proper AWACS or JSTARS services. This would indeed be rather direct involvement, and we'd have to assume that Russian SIGINT is capable of gathering evidence over presence of such.

However, I do find it very likely that they are being provided with intelligence analysis services, both working on open sources and quite likely getting some 'donations' from NATO intelligence platforms. Think it like getting some solid briefs and maps and such every so often via diplomatic channels or whatever, addressed to "whoever this might concern", and for "whatever purposes the recipient may find the information useful". As a side note, I don't think that if any of such is actually included, it would be provided by NATO as an organisation, but instead by intelligence services of individual member nations. Thus, it would not need to be a collaborative NATO effort which in turn could be considered a joint movement against Russia.

Further, it should be noted that when nations are in conflict, references into laws that concern civil and criminal proceedings within a country are rather hard to apply. Given the circumstances, it is rather irrelevant to discuss legalities, as technically Russia is not even supposed to be in a war with Ukraine, but conducting a "special operation" on grounds of another sovereign nation.

On the latter point, when looking more into near-future, it is important to realize how decisively the politics in the Europe changed almost over just one night. Just as an example, I see it highly likely that Finland will apply for NATO membership in an expedited manner, and somewhat likely drawing Sweden along, just showing how decades of work on good Russian relationships was basically impaired worthless in course of few days.

[wyskass]

Sure, good points.
Though, you can track some flights of US monitoring aircraft, and supporting tankers on Flighttracker and such doing loops right near border over Poland. So NATO is definitely observing activities and knows well what's going on. Am curious what sorts of new classified aircraft are possibly overflying.
So whether they share directly or not, they have the necessary info. I guess you also don't need much high tech, when Russian's are communicating over clear frequencies.