A Japanese invasion of Hawaii

[warspite1]

I have reviewed every post in this thread and most of your replies, more so than anyone else in this thread, have implied that those that disagree with your position are stupid. You don't use that word, you use words like: "Truly Predictable Reponse", "You must be really bad at math", "You are obdurate", etc, etc.

warspite1

For the sake of good order, the comment in bold was said by Curtis Lemay about me.

Fair enough, my apologize for putting that particular phrase in your mouth.

Note: Other people have been PM'ed about their behaviour, as well.

The last thing I want to do is lock an otherwise interesting thread. So lets try to get on, or at least not attack each other.

warspite1

Thank-you Edmon. And my warning is noted and will be acted on.

With regard to the thread topic, I am interested to hear more from Buckrock in regards to what he believes are the problems with the Maui operation.

I would ask that he lets us know his thoughts (albeit this is without the start point details he's requested). Perhaps you could make some assumptions Buckrock and then set out what you believe are the issues with this plan?

Thanks in advance Buckrock.

[Buckrock]

What, you want Xmas to come early?

Have some patience and maybe if you're a very good boy from now on.....

[warspite1]

What, you want Xmas to come early?

Have some patience and maybe if you're a very good boy from now on.....

warspite1

Yes, I do. I have a book on the Soviet navy in WWII from my little warspites and frankly I can't wait to read it so Christmas coming early would be great.....

As for the Maui appraisal, I will sit patiently by the screen awaiting your word

[Aurelian]

Interested in Maui as well.

[RangerJoe]

I have reviewed every post in this thread and most of your replies, more so than anyone else in this thread, have implied that those that disagree with your position are stupid. You don't use that word, you use words like: "Truly Predictable Reponse", "You must be really bad at math", "You are obdurate", etc, etc.

warspite1

For the sake of good order, the comment in bold was said by Curtis Lemay about me.

Other people have been PM'ed about their behaviour, as well.

Well, I am feeling a little left out on this! I guess I could do something about that . . .

But I digress, I should look up some things and post some possibilities . . .

[Buckrock]

With regard to the thread topic, I am interested to hear more from Buckrock in regards to what he believes are the problems with the Maui operation.

I would ask that he lets us know his thoughts (albeit this is without the start point details he's requested). Perhaps you could make some assumptions Buckrock and then set out what you believe are the issues with this plan?

Thanks in advance Buckrock.

I'm not going to make a set of assumptions about how Curtis Lemay's currently vague Maui plan might translate into real life as that would require both work and a suspension of disbelief. If he starts supplying some detail, I'll consider responding to those in kind. Right now all we've got is some loosely-defined DD/APD conversions leaving Japan then magically appearing undetected 100 miles off Maui to drop off several thousand troops who will join with the local chapter of the Super-Secret Ninja Society and overcome all US Army resistance on Maui within hours, securing the island's key military assets for all the other vaguely defined elements of his plan to interact seamlessly with. And the Americans "will take days to fully grasp" what just happened.

Given the lack of details for the plan, I'll currently limit my response to the last part, that the US would take days to recognize what just happened after the Japanese had seized something like a major airfield. In reality, such a delay would be so unlikely that it can be dismissed as just wishful thinking. Anyway....

Immediately off the west coast of Maui was Lahaina Roads, which had been the alternate anchorage to Pearl Harbor for the Pacific Fleet and still formed part of the main training area outside Oahu for the fleet's light forces, that area being the waters bound by Maui, Kahoolawe, Lanai and Molokai. On any given day (or night) ships, subs and aircraft could be found off Maui conducting various types of training such as ASW, navigation, ship-to-shore landing practice, etc. They were there on Dec 6/7th and they could be expected to be there for training at any other time in December prior to hostilities.

The ports and anchorages of Maui were routinely utilized during this training and parties of naval personnel would often be put ashore during the exercises to observe, co-ordinate, etc. Then there were the USN units permanently stationed at Maui to support the ongoing training regime, such as the amphibian utility squadron operating from both Maalaea Bay and nearby Puunene airfield (the one Curtis Lemay wants), the Navy training command and supply elements in Lahaina, as well as several small naval craft that performed general support duties out of Maalaea and Lahaina.

It also should be pointed out that military aircraft operating in the Lahaina Roads area would be expected to be in radio contact with the relevant USAAC and USN personnel at Puunene airfield while ships would be contacted by the navy utility squadron upon entering that same area. Even if the Japanese could ninja their way across Maui and capture the airfield, the sudden loss of comms from that important facility would quickly be felt, assuming any US aircraft, ships or shore parties hadn't already noticed hundreds of Japanese storming an airfield situated less than two miles from Maalaea beach.

The historical Japanese knew that Lahaina Roads region was an important area of operations for the USN and that there was no way to predict in advance when and how many ships were going to arrive for training. They even sent a submarine during the night of the 6th and a scout plane at dawn on the 7th in an effort to establish if the Pacific Fleet might not have sailed there from Pearl Harbor during the night. It is definitely not an area that the Japanese would have been considering when selecting a target for Operation Ninja Snatch.

Main references.......
Unit diary, Utility Squadron 3, Maui, Dec 1941
CINCPAC, Report of Japanese Raid on Pearl Harbor (includes entries for several USN vessels in Maui area 6-7th Dec).
Joint Committee on the Investigation of the Pearl Harbor Attack (amongst other things, this report has the interview transcripts of Japanese Consulate employees detailing what information they had gathered about Maui pre-war.)

[Platoonist]

Then there were the USN units permanently stationed at Maui to support the ongoing training regime, such as the amphibian utility squadron operating from both Maalaea Bay and nearby Puunene airfield (the one Curtis Lemay wants), the Navy training command and supply elements in Lahaina, as well as several small naval craft that performed general support duties out of Maalaea and Lahaina.

Good point. On the morning of December 7th, 1941 the Tambor-class submarine Gudgeon which had been conducting a simulated war patrol in the area was in Lahaina Roads preparing to conduct recognition exercises with seaplanes. There were also the naval store ships Arctic and Vega, and the minesweeper Seagull, plus two support tankers. On shore was Utility Squadron VJ-3 which was based there to tow targets & operate target drones for the fleet. Plus, of the course, the whole US Army 298th Infantry Battalion. It's hard to believe with this many trained eyes in the area that nobody puts out an alert of a flotilla of Japanese destroyers closing on the island.

[Curtis Lemay]

Right now all we've got is some loosely-defined DD/APD conversions leaving Japan then magically appearing undetected 100 miles off Maui...

I guess the carriers must have used magic, too.

Given the lack of details for the plan, I'll currently limit my response to the last part, that the US would take days to recognize what just happened after the Japanese had seized something like a major airfield. In reality, such a delay would be so unlikely that it can be dismissed as just wishful thinking. Anyway....

It's not wishful thinking. Sure, the folks on Maui will be aware, but can they make the high command aware. The high command will be getting Japanese sightings from all over the place - even the West Coast. By the time someone on Maui is fully aware of the full scope of the Japanese invasion, what comm ability will they have left?

Immediately off the west coast of Maui was Lahaina Roads, which had been the alternate anchorage to Pearl Harbor for the Pacific Fleet and still formed part of the main training area outside Oahu for the fleet's light forces, that area being the waters bound by Maui, Kahoolawe, Lanai and Molokai. On any given day (or night) ships, subs and aircraft could be found off Maui conducting various types of training such as ASW, navigation, ship-to-shore landing practice, etc. They were there on Dec 6/7th and they could be expected to be there for training at any other time in December prior to hostilities.

Maui is 727 square miles and would seem to have a coastline longer than 150 miles. Pathfinders (not ninjas) will guide the invaders to an optimum landing site. If it's too compromised they can issue the abort signal.

The ports and anchorages of Maui were routinely utilized during this training and parties of naval personnel would often be put ashore during the exercises to observe, co-ordinate, etc. Then there were the USN units permanently stationed at Maui to support the ongoing training regime, such as the amphibian utility squadron operating from both Maalaea Bay and nearby Puunene airfield (the one Curtis Lemay wants), the Navy training command and supply elements in Lahaina, as well as several small naval craft that performed general support duties out of Maalaea and Lahaina.

We already have a reduced battalion of infantry that will have to be overcome. A few naval personnel added to that wouldn't change the outcome. Several small naval craft could be anything.

It also should be pointed out that military aircraft operating in the Lahaina Roads area would be expected to be in radio contact with the relevant USAAC and USN personnel at Puunene airfield while ships would be contacted by the navy utility squadron upon entering that same area. Even if the Japanese could ninja their way across Maui and capture the airfield, the sudden loss of comms from that important facility would quickly be felt, assuming any US aircraft, ships or shore parties hadn't already noticed hundreds of Japanese storming an airfield situated less than two miles from Maalaea beach.

Really? Silence will be immediately interpreted as something other than technical difficulties?

The historical Japanese knew that Lahaina Roads region was an important area of operations for the USN and that there was no way to predict in advance when and how many ships were going to arrive for training. They even sent a submarine during the night of the 6th and a scout plane at dawn on the 7th in an effort to establish if the Pacific Fleet might not have sailed there from Pearl Harbor during the night. It is definitely not an area that the Japanese would have been considering when selecting a target for Operation Ninja Snatch.

Now they have spies on the island for that purpose.

[Curtis Lemay]

Good point. On the morning of December 7th, 1941 the Tambor-class submarine Gudgeon which had been conducting a simulated war patrol in the area was in Lahaina Roads preparing to conduct recognition exercises with seaplanes. There were also the naval store ships Arctic and Vega, and the minesweeper Seagull, plus two support tankers. On shore was Utility Squadron VJ-3 which was based there to tow targets & operate target drones for the fleet.

All day-time operations. The Japs arrive, unload troops, and depart at night, on a Sunday, in peacetime.

Plus, of the course, the whole US Army 298th Infantry Battalion. It's hard to believe with this many trained eyes in the area that nobody puts out an alert of a flotilla of Japanese destroyers closing on the island.

60% strength on the weekend. No alert.

[RangerJoe]

Good point. On the morning of December 7th, 1941 the Tambor-class submarine Gudgeon which had been conducting a simulated war patrol in the area was in Lahaina Roads preparing to conduct recognition exercises with seaplanes. There were also the naval store ships Arctic and Vega, and the minesweeper Seagull, plus two support tankers. On shore was Utility Squadron VJ-3 which was based there to tow targets & operate target drones for the fleet.

All day-time operations. The Japs arrive, unload troops, and depart at night, on a Sunday, in peacetime.

Plus, of the course, the whole US Army 298th Infantry Battalion. It's hard to believe with this many trained eyes in the area that nobody puts out an alert of a flotilla of Japanese destroyers closing on the island.

60% strength on the weekend. No alert.

Back then, military personnel would probably need a pass to get of base. But if they were off the base, seeing a bunch of Japanese destroyers off the beach landing troops at the beach would have at least some to question the military exercise that they were not informed about. They would report up the chain of command, the local commanders would issue an alert, the arms rooms would be open, the weapons handed out, the ammo handed out, then the live fire target practice would start. The Naval personnel would contact their counterparts on Oahu and the Army would contact their counterparts on Oahu, then the entire surprise is off. All leaves would be canceled, aircraft would be armed, the pilots would be sucking on oxygen to clear their heads, CAP would be flown, the bombers would be armed, the radar target would be investigated and then attacked. All AA weaponry would be unlocked, manned, and issued ammo.

Oh, I am sure that the civilian authorities would be notified about any wargames going on at a public beach. Hearing about an invasion, the local police would be called up, issued weapons, and the higher civilian authorities would be notified. Then the higher civilian authorities would contact the military commands, especially when the invading troops start firing real bullets . . .

So how is that surprise aerial attack going to work out now? Except that it won't be a surprise and the Japanese airstrike would face an alerted enemy.

I think that a better plan would be needed.

[Buckrock]

Right now all we've got is some loosely-defined DD/APD conversions leaving Japan then magically appearing undetected 100 miles off Maui...

I guess the carriers must have used magic, too.

You're still spitballing. Get back to me when you've got some real details about KB and the APDs, times, positions, etc. We have to start somewhere before we can deal with the rest of your "plan".

[Curtis Lemay]

Back then, military personnel would probably need a pass to get of base. But if they were off the base, seeing a bunch of Japanese destroyers off the beach landing troops at the beach would have at least some to question the military exercise that they were not informed about. They would report up the chain of command, the local commanders would issue an alert, the arms rooms would be open, the weapons handed out, the ammo handed out, then the live fire target practice would start. The Naval personnel would contact their counterparts on Oahu and the Army would contact their counterparts on Oahu, then the entire surprise is off. All leaves would be canceled, aircraft would be armed, the pilots would be sucking on oxygen to clear their heads, CAP would be flown, the bombers would be armed, the radar target would be investigated and then attacked. All AA weaponry would be unlocked, manned, and issued ammo.

Oh, I am sure that the civilian authorities would be notified about any wargames going on at a public beach. Hearing about an invasion, the local police would be called up, issued weapons, and the higher civilian authorities would be notified. Then the higher civilian authorities would contact the military commands, especially when the invading troops start firing real bullets . . .

So how is that surprise aerial attack going to work out now? Except that it won't be a surprise and the Japanese airstrike would face an alerted enemy.

I think that a better plan would be needed.

Just a reminder:

They ignored radar detection of the incoming planes.
They ignored a sub caught sneaking into the harbor.
They bungled detection of the Japanese ultimatum.
The AAA had no ammo.
They were STUNNED that Pearl had been attacked.

The US was oblivious. The APDs are arriving at night on a weekend. The risk is very low. The reward is huge.

[RangerJoe]

Back then, military personnel would probably need a pass to get of base. But if they were off the base, seeing a bunch of Japanese destroyers off the beach landing troops at the beach would have at least some to question the military exercise that they were not informed about. They would report up the chain of command, the local commanders would issue an alert, the arms rooms would be open, the weapons handed out, the ammo handed out, then the live fire target practice would start. The Naval personnel would contact their counterparts on Oahu and the Army would contact their counterparts on Oahu, then the entire surprise is off. All leaves would be canceled, aircraft would be armed, the pilots would be sucking on oxygen to clear their heads, CAP would be flown, the bombers would be armed, the radar target would be investigated and then attacked. All AA weaponry would be unlocked, manned, and issued ammo.

Oh, I am sure that the civilian authorities would be notified about any wargames going on at a public beach. Hearing about an invasion, the local police would be called up, issued weapons, and the higher civilian authorities would be notified. Then the higher civilian authorities would contact the military commands, especially when the invading troops start firing real bullets . . .

So how is that surprise aerial attack going to work out now? Except that it won't be a surprise and the Japanese airstrike would face an alerted enemy.

I think that a better plan would be needed.

Just a reminder:

They ignored radar detection of the incoming planes.
Not true, a butterbar in training did not verify what the contact was nor did he ask his training officer for advise.
They ignored a sub caught sneaking into the harbor.
The USS Ward sank the sub, how is that ignoring it? The Captain of the Ward was new, he only took command on the Friday before so verification was requested.
They bungled detection of the Japanese ultimatum.
There was no bungling, it was not a declaration of war. It was essentially stating that further talks would not be productive at this time. President Rooseveldt had just asked for an in person meeting which could actually have prevented this war.
The AAA had no ammo.
That how were the Japanese planes shot down? Especially by a cook with no training?
They were STUNNED that Pearl had been attacked.
So? If you were there, wouldn't you be stunned? All of the other Japanese movements were detected, the Japanese aircraft carriers were thought to be in their home waters. Even with modern technology, ships and aircraft may not be found when in or over the ocean.

The US was oblivious. The APDs are arriving at night on a weekend. The risk is very low. The reward is huge.
The US was not oblivious to the possibility of war coming and the US was preparing. The risk is very high and the reward is questionable. For the number of aircraft that you have been mentioning, the carrier air groups of the USS Enterprise and the USS Lexington could have handled them. This would be while those two aircraft carriers would be steaming for the US West Coast where all available combat aircraft would be sent. Troops as well but they would probably come later. There would be no US troops or aircraft sent to Europe for awhile, unlike in real life where a US Division arrived in the United Kingdom in January 1942 . . .

But you still did not suggest a better plan than attacking an island by invading a public beach on a weekend, moving overland, then attacking one or more military posts as a surprise attack - with alert military forces at that location.

Beware of the Red Bull!

https://www.nationalww2museum.org/war/a ... ngdom-1942

[warspite1]

With regard to the thread topic, I am interested to hear more from Buckrock in regards to what he believes are the problems with the Maui operation.

I would ask that he lets us know his thoughts (albeit this is without the start point details he's requested). Perhaps you could make some assumptions Buckrock and then set out what you believe are the issues with this plan?

Thanks in advance Buckrock.

I'm not going to make a set of assumptions about how Curtis Lemay's currently vague Maui plan might translate into real life as that would require both work and a suspension of disbelief. If he starts supplying some detail, I'll consider responding to those in kind. Right now all we've got is some loosely-defined DD/APD conversions leaving Japan then magically appearing undetected 100 miles off Maui to drop off several thousand troops who will join with the local chapter of the Super-Secret Ninja Society and overcome all US Army resistance on Maui within hours, securing the island's key military assets for all the other vaguely defined elements of his plan to interact seamlessly with. And the Americans "will take days to fully grasp" what just happened.

Given the lack of details for the plan, I'll currently limit my response to the last part, that the US would take days to recognize what just happened after the Japanese had seized something like a major airfield. In reality, such a delay would be so unlikely that it can be dismissed as just wishful thinking. Anyway....

Immediately off the west coast of Maui was Lahaina Roads, which had been the alternate anchorage to Pearl Harbor for the Pacific Fleet and still formed part of the main training area outside Oahu for the fleet's light forces, that area being the waters bound by Maui, Kahoolawe, Lanai and Molokai. On any given day (or night) ships, subs and aircraft could be found off Maui conducting various types of training such as ASW, navigation, ship-to-shore landing practice, etc. They were there on Dec 6/7th and they could be expected to be there for training at any other time in December prior to hostilities.

The ports and anchorages of Maui were routinely utilized during this training and parties of naval personnel would often be put ashore during the exercises to observe, co-ordinate, etc. Then there were the USN units permanently stationed at Maui to support the ongoing training regime, such as the amphibian utility squadron operating from both Maalaea Bay and nearby Puunene airfield (the one Curtis Lemay wants), the Navy training command and supply elements in Lahaina, as well as several small naval craft that performed general support duties out of Maalaea and Lahaina.

It also should be pointed out that military aircraft operating in the Lahaina Roads area would be expected to be in radio contact with the relevant USAAC and USN personnel at Puunene airfield while ships would be contacted by the navy utility squadron upon entering that same area. Even if the Japanese could ninja their way across Maui and capture the airfield, the sudden loss of comms from that important facility would quickly be felt, assuming any US aircraft, ships or shore parties hadn't already noticed hundreds of Japanese storming an airfield situated less than two miles from Maalaea beach.

The historical Japanese knew that Lahaina Roads region was an important area of operations for the USN and that there was no way to predict in advance when and how many ships were going to arrive for training. They even sent a submarine during the night of the 6th and a scout plane at dawn on the 7th in an effort to establish if the Pacific Fleet might not have sailed there from Pearl Harbor during the night. It is definitely not an area that the Japanese would have been considering when selecting a target for Operation Ninja Snatch.

Main references.......
Unit diary, Utility Squadron 3, Maui, Dec 1941
CINCPAC, Report of Japanese Raid on Pearl Harbor (includes entries for several USN vessels in Maui area 6-7th Dec).
Joint Committee on the Investigation of the Pearl Harbor Attack (amongst other things, this report has the interview transcripts of Japanese Consulate employees detailing what information they had gathered about Maui pre-war.)

warspite1

Thank-you for this Buckrock. It is nice to have some detail at last. The Lahaina Roads, and the position of this anchorage, would clearly stop the Japanese from even considering any such operation ahead of the successful conquest of the NEI and capture of the oil.

Imho the limitations of the plan (previously set out) no longer even need considering because Japan simply couldn’t consider this (and even that assumed plan was only ‘possible’ if the Japanese were given foresight they never had, and a relaxed attitude to the rather important matter of oil that no leaders of an industrialised country could surely have.

[Torplexed]

Imho the limitations of the plan (previously set out) no longer even need considering because Japan simply couldn’t consider this (and even that assumed plan was only ‘possible’ if the Japanese were given foresight they never had, and a relaxed attitude to the rather important matter of oil that no leaders of an industrialised country could surely have.

We also keep making the generous assumption that you could get the Imperial Japanese Army to commit to this plan. We ignore the fact that there was no unified leadership of Japan preceding the war. There were just the leaders of the Army and Navy. There was no one who had the authority to impose a unified direction, so all was accomplished through excruciating compromise.

At the start of the Pacific War, the IJA (as well as the IJN) considered the area east of the Philippines to be the IJN’s sole sphere of responsibility. The IJA therefore made only a minor commitment to operations in Guam and the Southern Pacific Ocean (the 144th Regiment, South Seas Detachment) and likely would have granted nothing to an operation as far afield as Hawaii. It also insisted that those army troops committed to the southward advance would be returned to China and Manchuria as soon as possible. Difficult to do when you have an open-ended commitment to Hawaii 4,000 miles away.

Even after December 1941, the IJA’s strategic priority continued to be the prosecution of its war on the mainland and possibly the Soviet Union and it held the IJN's feet to the fire on this interservice agreement of the need to eventually return troops back to China when it proposed invading Australia and Ceylon.

[Aurelian]

On the ships, the AA munitions were locked up. Didn't take sailors all that long to smash the locks off. I believe the ready ammo for the Army was the same way.

So, it's not like the AA had no ammo.

[Buckrock]

Thank-you for this Buckrock. It is nice to have some detail at last. The Lahaina Roads, and the position of this anchorage, would clearly stop the Japanese from even considering any such operation ahead of the successful conquest of the NEI and capture of the oil.

Puunene was probably the one Hawaiian airfield outside of Oahu the Japanese couldn't attempt to occupy without rapidly tripping a clear alarm back at Kimmel's HQ. And last time I checked, Curtis Lemay was going to attempt this in broad daylight.

The whole area was a giant radio net, connected back to PH (and the area was communicating with PH during the raid, it's in the CINCPAC logs). The airfield control station had radios. The aircraft being readied around the airfield had radios. The aircraft flying over the nearby waters had radios, as did the ships and the Maalaea shore base and likely any parties dropped off elsewhere to monitor the training exercises. If such a key comms center for the training goes offline, it wont take long before someone drives the less than two miles back from Maalaea to the airfield or one of the utility aircraft comes back to land or flies overhead to blinker the airfield.

And this was supposed to go unrecognized for days.

And we don't know exactly where the Japanese landing attempt is and how far away that was from their objectives. And we don't know exactly how they would then make it to all their objectives without an alarm being raised somewhere. And we don't know exactly how they recruited their super ninja force on the island despite the ongoing interest of the FBI, military intelligence and the suspicions of the Maui police and locals. And we don't know the where and when of the APDs at the point they receive their go orders and we don't know where they return to when the mission is inevitably aborted. And we don't know how in the name of the emperor this plan could have made it past its first table viewing by the General Staff, even with the help of a ship value chart from a Gary Grigsby game.

Call me paranoid but I suspect Curtis Lemay might just be keeping everything vague on purpose. It supplies the wriggle room to keep the plan alive despite its numerous likely failure points and it supplies imaginary slack that can be used to always have forces be wherever and whenever they need to be.

Which naturally brings me back to my ongoing quest to nail down the starting times and positions of the KB and the APDs when they get their "2CVs" go order. Then we'll finally have a fixed point to work from.

[Platoonist]

Call me paranoid but I suspect Curtis Lemay might just be keeping everything vague on purpose. It supplies the wriggle room to keep the plan alive despite its numerous likely failure points and it supplies imaginary slack that can be used to always have forces be wherever and whenever they need to be.

I guess we could refer to it as Operation Spitball. Throw wet, loosely-wadded stuff at the wall. Hope it sticks.

[warspite1]

Goodnesss, this thread is actually getting me interested in the boring Pacific theatre Buckrock


So moving away from the Hawaiian leg of the 'plan' for a second, I am keen to understand more about the impact that taking the IJNAF aircraft away from Luzon would have on operations in the Philippines - and of course the subsequent move in the NEI.

Of course the chances of the Maui invasion force not being detected is pretty much zero but, lets go with the scenario that either a) they are not detected, or b) they are detected sufficiently late in the day that MacArthur, Brereton and Sutherland in the PI take no action other than what they did in real life.

What would the likely effect be? With a) less aircraft, and b) less long range aircraft, what level of loss would the USAAF and USN likely suffered in those initial days? Perhaps moreover, would sufficent aircraft be available to interupt the Japanese landings in the southern PI? Obviously it's impossible to say with certainty, but presumably those in the know can hazard an educated guess? My (admittedly limited) understanding is that it was the IJNAF aircraft (as opposed to the shorter range IJAAF) that really hurt the US airforce, but that may be incorrect.

This aspect is of course vital to the 'plan' because of the need to secure the NEI.

[warspite1]

Secondly, but just as important, how is the unknown date for the Pearl Harbor attack (and thus the war starting between the Japanese and the Western Allies) going to be co-ordinated to ensure that all forces are advised and so don't act precipitously?

As part of the Malaya operation, the Japanese sent out a submarine screen and laid minefields to keep the RN away from the invasion convoys. As part of this plan the convoys left on 4 December to be in place for the attack on the 7th. But of course the attack has to be postponed because the required number of carriers are not at Pearl. So the invasion forces are all recalled, but how do all the subs of the submarine screen get told about the delay? What if the minefield is detected? Would the British not wonder why mines have been laid off southern Malaya?

When does the invasion fleet for Midway need to sail (by the way we still need to know what this fleet is made up of and also exactly what defences the US have on Midway). This is pretty important for obvious reasons, but doubly so when the invasion force appear to be relying upon carrier aircraft from the KB. But while approaching Midway the invasion fleet won't have air cover initially.

Has any check been made on whether the Japanese actually have enough destroyers for all these simultaneous additional operations. Yes, we've been told that the destroyers that would have taken part in the Luzon landings are now free, but we also know that more than 10% of the Japanese destroyer strength has been converted to allow the Maui attack to take place.

How many destroyers (and other ships) will be needed for:

- The Midway invasion?
- The escort of the tankers and ships that will be providing follow up supplies, fuel and ordnance to Midway and Maui?
- Just how many tankers have the Japanese had to add to those that were actually used for the Pearl attack to keep all these extra ships at sea (and remember, this for what is an indeterminate length of time)? Japanese weren't exacly flush with tankers - but more tankers means more destroyer escorts.
- I understand that the follow up supply vessels for Maui are no longer to be destroyers, but will be merchant ships. Presumably they are not going to sail to Maui with just a destroyer (more destroyers!! but how many?) escort. But they can't use cruisers from the KB as they were needed at Wake (although the Japanese won't have known that at the time). So does that mean the merchant ships have nothing larger than a destroyer force to escort them or does the attack on Wake get delayed even further?
- And remember, all the while these ships are not in Maui, the aircraft (assuming the airfield was in Japanese hands and they landed safely) are simply empty, impotent and pretty much defenceless chunks of metal.....