Neil Hilton wrote: ↑Tue Nov 15, 2022 1:10 pm
RangerJoe wrote: ↑Sun Nov 06, 2022 1:36 am
Neil Hilton wrote: ↑Sat Nov 05, 2022 10:11 am
Wrong. The Royal Navy did not need the USN to 'teach them' anything. They were experts at damage control and repair.
After the battle of Coral Sea a USN officer had a 'lightbulb' moment. To flood a carriers aviation fuel pipe network with CO2 rather than just drain it (leaving it filled with avgas fumes).
In reality it was the IJN training system that was at fault, it was a system that actually punished personal initiative. Only their specialist damage control crews were trained and motivated to conduct repairs. The ordinary seamen were not. So 'the allied damage control bonus' should be more accurately called the 'japanese damage control penalty'.
Check this out
https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=iC6LN3U5ELk
Sir, you are incorrect.
https://militaryhistorynow.com/2021/05/ ... -u-s-navy/
Some interesting info there
As far as i can see it outlines how a non-US carrier is outfitted to operate with the USN. It would be a standard procedure to make the ships as operationally compatible as possible. Also it included some upgrades (AAA upgrade etc). That was also normal as British shipyards were hard pressed throughout the war and many RN ships had refits and repairs done in US shipyards.
None of it shows that the USN 'taught' the RN anything they didnt already know.
Aside from operational details:
"Joining the U.S. Navy
On the way to Noumea, New Caledonia, the Royal Navy discovered how the U.S. Navy conducted underway replenishment. Due to Pacific Ocean distances, the U.S. Navy was adept at keeping ships at sea for 80 to 90 days between port visits, something the crew of Victorious/Robin had never experienced.
British sailors on Victorious saw for the first time how U.S. Navy oilers and supply ships refuelled a carrier or battleship on one side and one or more ships on the other. Sometimes, U.S. carriers and battleships refuelled destroyers. Later in the war, the Royal Navy adapted many of U.S. Navy’s underway replenishment techniques."
Plus:
"Lessons
The real value of the Victorious/Robin loan came from the lessons learned from cross-decking aircraft and conducting real combat operations and the improvements in damage control/firefighting techniques. The exchange of squadrons was continued throughout the Cold War."
Finally:
"Damage control improvements made to Victorious
The damage caused by the two fires that occurred en route to Hawaii also rekindled a U.S. Navy/Royal Navy discussion over carrier design philosophies.
The U.S. Navy’s position was that the additional hull armour used on British vessels restricted the space on the hangar deck, reduced the maintenance spaces needed to repair aircraft and hindered a crews’ ability to fight fires. The lack of ventilation prevented the starting of airplanes on the hangar deck and raising them to the flight deck by elevator for immediate take off. It also limited the ability to vent the hangar deck to rid it of dangerous fumes or to suffocate a fire. The Royal Navy believed that the armoured flight deck and sides improved the survivability of the ship.
As the war progressed, experience showed that the armoured deck had value but not the way the RN ships were designed. When the Royal Navy ships were hit by kamikazes off Okinawa, the value of their armoured decks was proven, but so were the improvements in their fire-fighting systems installed by the U.S. Navy.
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Another lesson learned from the Victorious/Ranger trade was that U.S. inspectors were able to point out how the Royal Navy could improve its carrier’s fire-fighting systems. They were, where possible, carried out in yard periods in Norfolk and Pearl Harbor.
On board Victorious, the most visible change were the dollies with large CO2 extinguishers positioned on the hangar and flight decks along with more smaller bottles mounted on the bulkheads. These were added because had they been on board when Victorious/Robin was transiting from the Panama Canal to Hawaii, the damage caused by the two fires could have been minimized.
Other changes including modifying the capacity of the ship’s firefighting system with bigger pumps and its ability to vent and pressurize the aircraft fuelling system with CO2 when the ship was not flying or went to action stations."
https://militaryhistorynow.com/2021/05/ ... -u-s-navy/
; Julia Child
