Intresting discussion on Chinese DF carrier killers. Thoughts?

[Mickeys91]

Was posted on war college subreddit. Interesting topic. Anyone here have any input? I have tried a few times to fire off these missiles in CMO and don't get much results in hits even if I am tracking.


https://www.reddit.com/r/WarCollege/com ... /?sort=new

[Horns]

Interesting conversation. I haven't tried to use them in CMO, but I did read https://www.amazon.com.au/dp/1915070643 ... ct_details. What the author of the linked book said made sense to me, you don't advertize a missile's (in the case of the DF-26) existence to the world - even writing the name on the side of the TEL in English to make sure your point gets across - and then get secretive about test results if the missile is tactically effective, so long story short I doubt it's fit for purpose, and that's before factoring in US countermeasures and kill chain disruption. However, as DannyBones00 said and others alluded to: "the biggest thing is that it makes the USN respect the threat". If the US are going to use carrier aviation in a conflict against China, the fact that it can equip a nuclear warhead means the US wouldn't just have to bet it will miss, but that it will be so inaccurate that the CSG won't even get caught in a nuclear blast, so it was still worth the PLA's while developing the weapon. Of course, if China fire these and they are seen to be unable to hit the side of a barn all that threat value will be lost, so my guess is we'll never see one used.

[Craigkn]

I am working on a series of scenarios which depict a 2025 conflict between the US and China. The scenarios make extensive use of PLARF missiles. Going off the assumption that they work - which as a war planner, you probably should err on the side of caution - I noticed some interesting behavior's. Putting DF-26's vs a notional US CVBG, with a UK destroyer added - if 1, the ships were given enough notice (SBIRS picks up the launch), AND if the vessels all scattered at flank speed (35 knots), sometimes they would exit the targeting radar radius of the re-entry vehicles, causing a miss. This is due to the PLAN not having a really good way to maintain targeting tracks for mid-course corrections. One huge issue for the Royal Navy was then apparent - the Type 045 maximum speed of 28 knots was not fast enough, and every time the ship was sunk. SM-3's were hard to use, most successful SAM engagements occurred with SM-6, but the hit ratio was very bad. If the ship was defending against a RV targeting it, the hit chance went up, but with the DDG's and CG's not on top of the CVN, defending the carrier was very difficult.

[thewood1]

I have a scenario I modded with the US forcing a passage through Hormuz. Iran has two batteries of ASBMs that unload 16 missiles. I fire 4 SM-6s at each missile. Hit rate for the ASBMs is about 1 in 30 missile fired over multiple plays. One of the keys is I have a commercial fishing trawler shadowing the CVBG. If it strays too close, a DDG takes it out. If it mains the proper standoff, thats usually when I get a hit. If the CVBG is not under constant surveillance, alter speed and course is the best counter. If under surveillance, zig-zagging and changing speed every 1-2 minutes can do it sometimes.

[TempestII]

I posted this on the CMO Discord, but it's probably relevant here too:

I've been playing around with the PRC type scenario where they claimed the DF-26 would annihilate the Ford CSG. Without an Sea Based X-Band Radar near Guam, the US does struggle to firing solution on the missiles and in 10 tests, lost the CVN in 9 and 1 DDG in all 10. 1 CG was lost in the scenario where the Ford survived. With the radar on Guam, the USN can actually use their SM-3s. However, there are a few caveats for the PRC. 1 - There's CAVOK weather. 2 - The PRC's satellites are fully mission capable. 3 - US radars on Japan or on vessels closer to China are destroyed, suppressed, turned-off etc. It's also worth pointing out that the US ships aren't the latest variants, nor have the latest SAMs. I haven't had time to fully test this version - I've only done 2 tests; in one the Ford died, in the other it didn't take any damage.

I've also got it so the PRCs WRA is pretty liberal - Weapons Free against all surface targets, which simplifies it for them. It does help that there's no civilian surface traffic to confuse things. I suppose a major factor is how quickly the China intelligence teams (and in the future, maybe AI too) can review the intelligence being gathered by satellites and other assets (as mentioned in the Reddit thread, closing the kill chain).

The test scenario is here it anyone wants to have a play around - this one contains the X-band radar near Guam.

PLARF_Strike_vs_CVN-78_with_US__PRC_Sats_Guam_Radars_AW_-_PT.zip

(81.79 KiB) Downloaded 25 times

https://drive.google.com/file/d/1DpMrvx ... p=drivesdk

[thewood1]

Thats a good little test scenario. I found that detaching a DDG and pushing it out at flank speed as soon as launches are detected, while immediately going to flank and doing a 180 with the CVBG tends to pull in some of the missiles to the DDG. Then the SM-3s can generally handle the rest of the missiles. Its not perfect, but significantly increases the odds of survival. Of course I wouldn't want to be on the DDG. Thats watching it from the US side. Will watch it from the PLARF side to see how it sees that tactic.

[Craigkn]

I posted this on the CMO Discord, but it's probably relevant here too:

I've been playing around with the PRC type scenario where they claimed the DF-26 would annihilate the Ford CSG. Without an Sea Based X-Band Radar near Guam, the US does struggle to firing solution on the missiles and in 10 tests, lost the CVN in 9 and 1 DDG in all 10. 1 CG was lost in the scenario where the Ford survived. With the radar on Guam, the USN can actually use their SM-3s. However, there are a few caveats for the PRC. 1 - There's CAVOK weather. 2 - The PRC's satellites are fully mission capable. 3 - US radars on Japan or on vessels closer to China are destroyed, suppressed, turned-off etc. It's also worth pointing out that the US ships aren't the latest variants, nor have the latest SAMs. I haven't had time to fully test this version - I've only done 2 tests; in one the Ford died, in the other it didn't take any damage.

I've also got it so the PRCs WRA is pretty liberal - Weapons Free against all surface targets, which simplifies it for them. It does help that there's no civilian surface traffic to confuse things. I suppose a major factor is how quickly the China intelligence teams (and in the future, maybe AI too) can review the intelligence being gathered by satellites and other assets (as mentioned in the Reddit thread, closing the kill chain).

The test scenario is here it anyone wants to have a play around - this one contains the X-band radar near Guam.

PLARF_Strike_vs_CVN-78_with_US__PRC_Sats_Guam_Radars_AW_-_PT.zip

https://drive.google.com/file/d/1DpMrvx ... p=drivesdk

What DB version is that? I am getting errors

[TempestII]

I posted this on the CMO Discord, but it's probably relevant here too:

I've been playing around with the PRC type scenario where they claimed the DF-26 would annihilate the Ford CSG. Without an Sea Based X-Band Radar near Guam, the US does struggle to firing solution on the missiles and in 10 tests, lost the CVN in 9 and 1 DDG in all 10. 1 CG was lost in the scenario where the Ford survived. With the radar on Guam, the USN can actually use their SM-3s. However, there are a few caveats for the PRC. 1 - There's CAVOK weather. 2 - The PRC's satellites are fully mission capable. 3 - US radars on Japan or on vessels closer to China are destroyed, suppressed, turned-off etc. It's also worth pointing out that the US ships aren't the latest variants, nor have the latest SAMs. I haven't had time to fully test this version - I've only done 2 tests; in one the Ford died, in the other it didn't take any damage.

I've also got it so the PRCs WRA is pretty liberal - Weapons Free against all surface targets, which simplifies it for them. It does help that there's no civilian surface traffic to confuse things. I suppose a major factor is how quickly the China intelligence teams (and in the future, maybe AI too) can review the intelligence being gathered by satellites and other assets (as mentioned in the Reddit thread, closing the kill chain).

The test scenario is here it anyone wants to have a play around - this one contains the X-band radar near Guam.

PLARF_Strike_vs_CVN-78_with_US__PRC_Sats_Guam_Radars_AW_-_PT.zip

https://drive.google.com/file/d/1DpMrvx ... p=drivesdk

What DB version is that? I am getting errors

DB501 (CMO Beta 1328.6).

[thewood1]

I didn't realize the Ford's radars were blaring out loud. If I shut all jamming and radars off, the DF-26s have a very hard time finding the carrier. It looks like initial detection is ELINT from a satellite and then home on jam for the missile. Out of seven run throughs, six total misses on the carrier. If I go to flank and change heading on missile detection. The missiles all miss. I would hope that the USN could handle those tactics and countermeasures.

edit: If I shut down all SM-3s and run silent, the PLARF has a very difficult time maintaining a lock on the carrier and the group. In three runs, the Ford got damaged twice and I lost 1-2 escorts. I think this shows, at least in the CMO version of life, that having the ASBM missiles are a fleet in being only if you don't have the infrastructure to maintain a targetable lock on the carrier.

[Transient]

I suspect that ABM engagements in CMO are missing something, even when the assets are in place.

For one, the SM-3s are launched even when there is no possibility of getting anywhere near the Ballistic Missile to be engaged.

In actuality the AEGIS system would have processed the ability of the SM-3 (whichever model is available) to at least be able to get into a viable intercept position before it even allows for a launch. CMO already does that for SAM launches against Air Breathing targets, but against BM targets it seems most of the SM-3s fired just cannot even get into the vicinity of the BM target in the first place. Which is puzzling considering a BM target follows a rather predictable path, at least during the ballistic phase of its flight which is the most of its flight path.

Of course, that results in a situation where the CMO simulation would need a way to show the defended zones vis-a-vis the expected enemy BM launch zones, which is going to be a big headache.

Another issue is the rather poor detection performance of the ABM sensors against BMs.

For example, TPY-2s and SPY-1/6s barely detect the BMs, often far too late for any engagement to be carried out organically. Even with early detection by other platforms, they also cannot intercept most of the time. The SBIRS sensors also cannot seem to get a reliable track most of the time.

Notice that if you try to emulate the Aegis ABM tests carried out, say FTM-31 E1a as described in https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=fzI1AgUd3Hs&t=4s, it would be impossible to carry out the intercept in CMO.

Anyway, I did a test scenario, if u are wondering why there are so many DDGs... It was because I was exasperated and I just placed DDGs all along the path of the BM.

There are 3 BM engagements, testing various geometries and against different systems.

1 against a THAAD system, 2 against AEGIS SAGs.

The number of SM-3s/THAAD required to take down a BM is off the charts.

Also notice that by the time SM-6s are launched (if they are launched), the BM is already about to impact.

AEGIS BMD - Test2.zip

(297.69 KiB) Downloaded 11 times

[thewood1]

I think you are seeing some real-life issues in there. I have posted DoD assessments of various ABM systems over the years and its a little disheartening. Its only recent developments with SM-3s that its anywhere near consistent. And those tests are set up so that the SM-3 has a perfect shot and the tracking radar is perfectly positioned. The DoD has finally gotten the SM-3s where they need to be, but, to me, the real serious issue is still radars and location of those radars.

SM-6s have a pretty good shot at RV and even HGV if detecting systems are properly positioned. But RV speed and height are very specific when using SM-6s. They function relatively well with MRBMs. Both Aegis and E-2Ds can help on MRBM. But IRBMs are a struggle for navy-bound assets, other than the SM-3.

In my experience in reading DoD reports, congressional oversight reports, and even vendor reports is that the kill chain against IRBM is very unstable. Everything has to be perfectly in place. For MRBMs, its a little more forgiving and tool of choice is the SM-6. Of course this stuff changes very rapidly. The old adage about it being better to not be seen over focusing on not getting hit applies in CMO and real-life.

I will point out that something changed in CMO about a year or so ago. SM-3s were almost impossible to position before that. Then suddenly ABM engagements seemed to become much more forgiving.

[blu3s]

I am working on a scenario-test to dig into this a bit more. As a curiosity I leave you this graphic. It is the number of losses per iteration. In this scenario the RED side loses contact with the CSG once the missiles are launched. As you can see, when there is jamming presence around the CSG from the same ships as well as from electronic warfare planes and helicopters, the chances of being hit increase.

Captura.JPG (39.72 KiB) Viewed 1190 times

[thewood1]

Just curios what the separation is between ships. I found leaving off ECM for all ships causes the DF-26 to lose track of all ships.

[blu3s]

The distances between the DDG's and CVN are 10nmi, and the CVN and CG 40 nmi

EWIN.jpg (361.85 KiB) Viewed 1176 times

[thewood1]

My view is the CG, with radar on, along with the aircraft, are too close to the CVBG, especially the helos. If any of them have radar or ECM running, its a magnet for the DF-26. That would bring the DF-26s into range of its own active radar. I would push all those ECM assets out to 100-150 miles. I would put the E-2 off-axis at least 100 miles. Then keep the CVBG radar/ECM silent.

If I were an admiral setting up this mission for US, I would swap out some of the Tomahawks for SM-3s in each ship. I would even consider pulling the CG and one DDG and moving most of my Tomahawks to those ships to load up my ships with SM-3s and SM-6s. I would also change my WRA to 3 per DF-26.

[Transient]

I think you are seeing some real-life issues in there. I have posted DoD assessments of various ABM systems over the years and its a little disheartening. Its only recent developments with SM-3s that its anywhere near consistent. And those tests are set up so that the SM-3 has a perfect shot and the tracking radar is perfectly positioned. The DoD has finally gotten the SM-3s where they need to be, but, to me, the real serious issue is still radars and location of those radars.

SM-6s have a pretty good shot at RV and even HGV if detecting systems are properly positioned. But RV speed and height are very specific when using SM-6s. They function relatively well with MRBMs. Both Aegis and E-2Ds can help on MRBM. But IRBMs are a struggle for navy-bound assets, other than the SM-3.

In my experience in reading DoD reports, congressional oversight reports, and even vendor reports is that the kill chain against IRBM is very unstable. Everything has to be perfectly in place. For MRBMs, its a little more forgiving and tool of choice is the SM-6. Of course this stuff changes very rapidly. The old adage about it being better to not be seen over focusing on not getting hit applies in CMO and real-life.

I will point out that something changed in CMO about a year or so ago. SM-3s were almost impossible to position before that. Then suddenly ABM engagements seemed to become much more forgiving.

One possibility I can think of is that when in the SPY-1 radars operate in BMD only mode, the radar would spend most of its power/time budget scanning the horizon in 'fence mode' (and most likely only a certain sector of the airspace), giving the radar increased range and sensitivity. CMO as a simulation would understandably be hard pressed to model this specific radar mode for multi-mode radars like SPY-1/6. I also suspect actual radar performance exceeds publicly stated capabilities by quite a bit but that's just me....

The above however, won't explain why THAAD's TPY-2 radars give so poor detection ranges against their intended targets.
After all it is a dedicated ABM radar. I used DF-16s in my scenario which should be quite squarely within the THAAD's target set, especially when the BM target was the THAAD system itself, consider that that should be quite the optimal intercept trajectory for the THAAD or any other ABM system.

The poor intercept rate of THAADs and Patriots in CMO contrast with actual intercepts carried out in the past decade, where THAAD and even PAC-2 GEMS have conducted quite a few operational intercepts against SRBMs and MRBMs.

Also, let's not forget DOT&E. DOT&E has never been one to mince their words when it comes to operational evaluation of weapons systems. Were the tests so restrictive in terms of operational parameters as to be unrealistic, I doubt DOT&E would have kept quiet about it. Indeed they have commented on the need for even more realistic targets (https://www.defensedaily.com/dote-says- ... e-defense/) but overall the AEGIS ABM system's capabilities have been validated to their general satisfaction.

[blu3s]

My view is the CG, with radar on, along with the aircraft, are too close to the CVBG, especially the helos. If any of them have radar or ECM running, its a magnet for the DF-26. That would bring the DF-26s into range of its own active radar. I would push all those ECM assets out to 100-150 miles. I would put the E-2 off-axis at least 100 miles. Then keep the CVBG radar/ECM silent.

If I were an admiral setting up this mission for US, I would swap out some of the Tomahawks for SM-3s in each ship. I would even consider pulling the CG and one DDG and moving most of my Tomahawks to those ships to load up my ships with SM-3s and SM-6s. I would also change my WRA to 3 per DF-26.

With radars off it's a bloodbath (at least with this config). SM-3s in this configuration work "relatively" well against df-26s.

I'm sure there are other better configurations, I used this one because it's the configuration from the "paper" mentioned in the FT article

[thewood1]

If you leave CV radars on, the carrier gets hit most of the time. If any ship has radar jamming on and is near the CV, the carrier is at serious risk. I'm using the scenario included in thread. Its all about detection. If the scenario gives the PLARF a spy to get targeting data to the missiles, the CV is most likely dead.

[thewood1]

One possibility I can think of is that when in the SPY-1 radars operate in BMD only mode, the radar would spend most of its power/time budget scanning the horizon in 'fence mode' (and most likely only a certain sector of the airspace), giving the radar increased range and sensitivity. CMO as a simulation would understandably be hard pressed to model this specific radar mode for multi-mode radars like SPY-1/6. I also suspect actual radar performance exceeds publicly stated capabilities by quite a bit but that's just me....

The above however, won't explain why THAAD's TPY-2 radars give so poor detection ranges against their intended targets.
After all it is a dedicated ABM radar. I used DF-16s in my scenario which should be quite squarely within the THAAD's target set, especially when the BM target was the THAAD system itself, consider that that should be quite the optimal intercept trajectory for the THAAD or any other ABM system.

The poor intercept rate of THAADs and Patriots in CMO contrast with actual intercepts carried out in the past decade, where THAAD and even PAC-2 GEMS have conducted quite a few operational intercepts against SRBMs and MRBMs.

Also, let's not forget DOT&E. DOT&E has never been one to mince their words when it comes to operational evaluation of weapons systems. Were the tests so restrictive in terms of operational parameters as to be unrealistic, I doubt DOT&E would have kept quiet about it. Indeed they have commented on the need for even more realistic targets (https://www.defensedaily.com/dote-says- ... e-defense/) but overall the AEGIS ABM system's capabilities have been validated to their general satisfaction.

Just on the DOT&E angle. They are only a factor when large scale production contracts are in the offing. My understanding they are only advisory in almost all of the ABM testing, except SM-6.

edit: A fairly comprehensive report. Shows why CMO's approach and results are as good as anyone else's guess. Its also more recent than what I had been using. So DOT&E might be involved now.

https://www.gao.gov/assets/gao-23-106011.pdf

[thewood1]

Well, looking at this chart, having enough SM-3s is surely going to be a problem. This is from the GAO report so its pretty credible.

Screenshot 2023-07-12 132510.jpg (369.94 KiB) Viewed 1150 times

btw, note the testing failures slowing production.

edit: A slightly older but useful report that validates the above chart. https://sgp.fas.org/crs/weapons/RL33745.pdf

Note this quote from USN Adm John Richardson:

“Right now, as we speak, I have six multi-mission, very sophisticated, dynamic cruisers
and destroyers―six of them are on ballistic missile defense duty at sea,” Richardson said
during his address at the U.S. Naval War College’s Current Strategy Forum. “And if you
know a little bit about this business you know that geometry is a tyrant.

“You have to be in a tiny little box to have a chance at intercepting that incoming missile.
So, we have six ships that could go anywhere in the world, at flank speed, in a tiny little
box, defending land.”