India-Pakistan Air Battle, May 7, 2025

[elxaime]

Curious about thoughts on this from experts here, understanding that solid facts are still hard to come by. But the linked article, copied below for ease of reading, posits some lessons learned.

https://www.19fortyfive.com/2025/05/the ... air-force/

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Key Points – On May 7, India’s air force launched Operation Sindoor, targeting militant-linked sites in Pakistan. Despite employing cutting-edge Dassault Rafale fighters and advanced missiles, photographic evidence indicates Pakistan’s Air Force downed multiple Indian jets—including at least one Rafale—without confirmed losses.

-Key to Pakistan’s success were Chinese-supplied J-10CE and JF-17 jets, powerful PL-15 missiles, and Swedish-made Erieye AWACS aircraft. Unlike past simulations like Cope India, this battle showcased real-world networked warfare, emphasizing beyond-visual-range missile effectiveness and AWACS coordination.

-The clash underscores the importance of electronic warfare, intelligence, and long-range missile capabilities, prompting reconsideration of India’s air combat preparedness against an increasingly sophisticated adversary.

Pakistan’s J-10 Fighter vs. India’s Dassault Rafale
On May 7, dozens of Indian Air Force (IAF) warplanes carried out strikes on militant-affiliated targets in Pakistan in retaliation for a murderous terror attack in April that killed 26 tourists in Kashmir. The raid triggered a battle with the Pakistan Air Force (PAF) that according to some reports involved 125 aircraft.

A few days later, photographic evidence increasingly suggests the PAF managed to shoot down a few Indian jets over Indian soil, without having suffered any confirmed losses of its own. (Indian press reports the downing of an F-16 and JF-17s, but photographic evidence is lacking for now.)

This outcome may seem curious, given the IAF’s past successes during air-to-air exercises with the U.S. Air Force in Cope India. To understand why the PAF may have performed relatively well, it is necessary to consider capabilities those exercises didn’t simulate, as well as the IAF’s approach to the raid itself, codenamed Operation Sindoor.

Operation Sindoor
The IAF was undoubtedly ready to revisit the field after tit-for-tat cross-border air raids in 2019 culminated in the downing of a dated Indian MiG-21 fighter by a Pakistani F-16, the capture of its pilot, and the accidental friendly-fire downing of an Indian helicopter.

This time, India’s air force seemingly ensured its most advanced combat aircraft were leading the way, including French-built Rafale jets carrying SCALP-EG subsonic cruise missiles and HAMMER-250 guided glide bombs, and powerful Russian-designed Su-30MKI ‘Flankers’ lugging supersonic BrahMos cruise missiles.

These weapons were launched while still over Indian airspace, and they successfully struck ground targets in Pakistan (with a notable exception detailed below). But in the ensuing air battle, Pakistan’s defenses proved better prepared and better armed.

Discerning real on-the-ground imagery amid a torrent of propaganda, which included intentional disinformation presenting photos of past crashes as current events, proved remarkably difficult. But eventually, wreckage near Bathinda revealed the IAF had lost a Rafale BS-001—the first model of Rafale delivered to India, and the first ever lost in combat. (Both U.S. and French sources reported this loss to media and assert it was dealt by a PAF J-10 jet.) Sadly, the Rafale crash killed one civilian and injured nine more.

Further, apparent photos of a Russian-origin K-36DM ejection seat and a shattered French missile pylon recovered at other locations suggest possible loss of one or two more Indian fighters: most likely a two-seat Su-30MKI jet or a MiG-29, and perhaps (though with less confidence) another Rafale or a Mirage 2000H.

Why Cope India wasn’t a great test of beyond-visual-range air combat
In the 2000s, historically chilly relations between New Delhi and Washington turned decisively for the better, giving way to increased military cooperation. That included the Cope India series of exercises, which, starting in their 2004 iteration, gave American F-15 pilots a chance to test their tactics and technology against Indian counterparts flying a diverse stable of Soviet/Russian and French jets.

The reports that emerged from Cope India proved surprisingly unflattering to the world’s most powerful air force—U.S. pilots lost 90 percent of the engagements in 2004. The following year, F-16s also underwhelmed.

American accounts state the Indians displayed creative tactics and a high degree of coordination, emphasizing that IAF pilots found ways to get their antiquated (but upgraded) MiG-21 jets into knife-fighting range, where their short-range R-73 missiles put them on more even terms with the more modern American fighters.

There’s no doubt U.S. pilots were unprepared for the prowess and creativity of their Indian opponents, and the Air Force used these outcomes to argue it was dangerous to grow complacent about its air warfare dominance.

But certain conditions of the Cope Indias limited realism—namely, the U.S. jets were typically outnumbered 3:1, they were unsupported by AWACS early-warning planes, and they could not use their long-range missiles at ranges exceeding 21-25 miles.

The latter two conditions were imposed because neither side wanted to expose the full capabilities of their radars and missiles to the others’ sensors. But it means the exercises didn’t simulate how air forces armed with long-range missiles and AWACS aircraft would really fight.

What actually happened in the huge Indo-Pakistan air battle of May 7, 2025?

Despite the prevailing fog of war, there are now ample clues suggesting the PAF’s performance on May 7 arises from effective use of long-range missiles and AWACS aircraft to form a spotter-shooter-missile kill chain that could threaten Indian fighters even dozens of miles deep into Indian-controlled airspace.

Notably, in 2021 Pakistan imported its first advanced Chinese fighters: single-engine Shenyang J-10CEs with stealthy, jam-resistant active electronically scanned array (AESA) radars and compatibility with China’s world-class air-to-air missiles. It also upgraded its burgeoning fleet of JF-17 Thunder jets to the Block III model compatible with long range missiles. (The Thunders are a joint China-Pakistan design mating a modern engine and F-16-style avionics to an evolved MiG-21/F-7 airframe.)

Finally, China apparently rushed delivery to Pakistan of the export model of its best air-to-air missile—the PL-15E, which has a dual-pulse motor, satellite navigation and an AESA radar seeker. Though the export PL-15E has only around half the maximum range of domestic PL-15s (90 miles, rather than 180), it still exceeds the range of most missiles used by Indian fighters, save the Meteors carried by India’s Rafales.

The PAF benefited from another special weapon: Swedish airliners—specifically, Saab 2000s fitted with Erieye radars to serve as AWACS aircraft able to detect and track hostile aircraft out to 280 miles, including low-flying aircraft masking themselves against terrain. These also help coordinate the response by friendly fighters and can even allow these jets to operate more stealthily with their own radars off.

Moreover, as China uses the Erieye too, its PL-15 missiles were designed to network with the radar via two-way datalink. That means a Saab 2000 AWACS orbiting safely backfield can transmit guidance instructions to PL-15 missiles fired by Pakistan’s J-10 and JF-17 fighters, even if those jets keep their radars off. This method also can deny targeted aircraft warning of the missile’s approach until the final terminal phase, when the missile’s active seeker turns on to complete the intercept.

While the IAF has the needed ingredients to form long-distance kill-chains as well, using Rafales, Meteor missiles, and Embraer AWACs jets, there is not yet confirmed proof of any successes.

Still, air warfare over Ukraine has shown that even outdated fighters, if sufficiently forewarned, can evade long-range missiles. And given the many aircraft involved, it’s possible Pakistani and Indian fighters launched dozens of air-to-air missiles, with only a tiny number reaching their mark.

There remains much we don’t know about the May 7 battle, and additional losses suffered by either side may eventually be revealed. But we do know wreckage from two PL-15 missiles was discovered 60 miles into Indian territory; that one Indian Rafale crashed in India; and that debris found elsewhere offers compelling but not conclusive evidence of a lost Russian-designed fighter, and possibly of a third jet.

In addition, parts from two jettisoned BrahMos missiles found east of India’s Sirsa airbase suggest some Indian Su-30MKIs may have been assailed by long-range missiles shortly after taking off, compelling evasive maneuvers eastward and ditching of the heavy BrahMos.

The impact of Pakistan’s and India’s ground-based air defenses (including Chinese HQ-9s and Russian S-400s, respectively) on May 7 remains murky. One analyst argues the IAF didn’t muster adequate electronic-warfare assets for the operation, which could have degraded the effective range of Pakistani missiles—and that Indian communications lacked encryption and proved vulnerable to Pakistani jamming.

Possible errors aside, it’s also worth considering how political dynamics constrained planning for India’s air raid. In a wartime combat operation, smart air forces suppress enemy ground-based air defenses and sweep away enemy fighters in advance of, or at least concurrently to raids by strike aircraft targeting primary objectives.

But as these nuclear-armed states were not in a state of open war, New Delhi’s plan to control escalation was to target only non-military militant targets, even if retaliation from Pakistan’s military would surely follow. This meant conceding the first shot to Pakistan’s air force.

Whether or not India achieved desired effects from its strikes, the mediatic buzz resulting from the aircraft loss has arguably undermined the operation’s political goals.

Following the raids, Pakistan and India have spent days exchanging large-scale artillery bombardments and drone attacks, including 120 Israeli Harops-2 kamikaze drones targeting Pakistani air defenses, and more than 300 much smaller Turkish Songars launched by Pakistan on the border.

So far, neither side seems keen to attempt more large-scale raids by manned jets. Drone expenditures have much less political salience than losing expensive fighters invested with national glory, and with people inside them. However, that could change should the conflict escalate or drone attacks create exploitable air defense gaps.

Overall, the May 7 battle reaffirms the dominance of network-centric beyond-visual-range combat in 21st-century air warfare, and the importance of accurately assessing an adversary’s capabilities and tactics—preferably before the shooting starts. It also highlights how exercises like Cope India don’t usually simulate every aspect of real conflicts.

[HalfLifeExpert]

Commissar Binkov put up a video today about this battle.

https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=aHY8t_SABC8

[Tcao]

Regarding the joint exercises between the Indian Air Force and the U.S. Air Force mentioned in 1945 article

I happened to be reading another article.
https://www.quora.com/How-was-Rafale-sh ... ype=answer

https://www.guancha.cn/yangji/2025_05_11_775373_1.shtml


Putting aside the subjective exaggerations and propagandistic tones in the piece, it does mention that the Pakistan Air Force (PAF) learned far more practical combat experience from joint exercises with the PLAAF than from those with the USAF.

In past joint exercises between the PAF and the USAF, the U.S. side imposed strict secrecy and “downgraded” key electronic systems—especially radar and electronic warfare equipment—in order to prevent sensitive electromagnetic parameters from being exposed to non-allied or potentially proliferating parties. As a result, Pakistani pilots:

Could not face the real performance of American radar, electronic warfare systems, or true BVR (Beyond Visual Range) combat capabilities;

Had a “lower-dimensional” or simplified training experience;

And were unable to fully grasp the true challenges of modern BVR warfare.

In short, the U.S. military conservatively limited the performance exposure of key systems, preventing the Pakistan Air Force from truly learning the essence of modern BVR combat. They were only able to engage in a form of simulated opposition with limited transparency.

In contrast, the cooperation with the Chinese Air Force was much more open.
The article emphasizes that during the “Shaheen” (雄鹰) series of joint exercises with the PLAAF, the Chinese side:

Did not downgrade or restrict key tactical training;

Allowed full-scale exercises involving data link operations, radar countermeasures, and tactical design;

And provided a comprehensive training environment that closely resembled real combat conditions.

This enabled the Pakistan Air Force to, for the first time, truly understand the complexity of BVR combat, leading to significant reforms in its training system.

In summary:
the article clearly states that due to the strict confidentiality measures imposed by the U.S., the PAF was unable to learn real BVR combat during exercises with the USAF. In contrast, training with the PLAAF helped fill this gap substantially.

[thewood1]

The main reason for the US hesitancy in training with the PAF is the change in the US's standing with the Pakistan. In the US's eyes, Pakistan is becoming significantly less important as a close ally than India. Especially as the PAF gets closer and closer to China. Every thing the US has sent to Pakistan is now open to China. The real triangle of danger for the US is now China-Pakistan-Iran.

Meanwhile, India could realistically see itself at war with both China and Pakistan simultaneously. India has realized that Russia won't be coming to its aid any time soon. I think that not enough people are talking about that shift and how monumental it is in relation to defense strategies in the region and beyond.

[HalfLifeExpert]

If I'm not mistaken, the US originally became buddies with Pakistan due to India refusing to play ball in the early stages of Cold War One, and taking the "non-aligned" path rather than joining the Blue Force (NATO & other Western Allies). The US cozied up even more after India started to become closer friends with the USSR (while itself remaining non-communist/socialist).

I believe things started going sour, of course, during the earlier phases of the War on Terror, and no doubt went worse following the confirmed location of Bin Laden in Pakistan, and the subsequent assassination raid in 2011.

Now, the Pakistanis seem to be in closer partnership with the PRC, and so naturally, India is a more appealing partner for the US than was the case in Cold War One.

As we see in Command: Kashmir Fire, I think in Cold War Two, we will see the situation reversed regarding South Asia: India being aligned with Blue Force, and Pakistan being aligned with the Red/Orange Force.

[BDukes]

Good video on the history of all this and why the alliances landed like they did.

https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=LbkO84MsmyM&t=90s

Thanks!

Mike

[Tcao]

Finally got a chance to watch Binkov's video.

At first, we thought that Pakistan was hiding its fighter jets at low altitude, staying behind its own SAM umbrella, and waiting for the moment when Indian aircraft had completed their mission and were preparing to land at their airbases—then they would accelerate, climb, and launch missiles near the border to attack the Indian planes as they prepared to land.

However, according to the PAF's press conference, they launched their attack after the Indian aircraft had dropped their bombs and turned around, seemingly concentrating their attack on the Indian formations in the northernmost that are using AASM Hammer bombs to attack Kashmir region targets.

In any case, Pakistan achieved surprise in this engagement and gained a numerical advantage in the tactical area (assuming Pakistan’s claims about the number of aircraft involved on both sides are accurate)—42 aircraft versus 12 to 18 relatively isolated IAF aircraft on the far right wing.