1.0.84: Granting independence is all backwards

[mrchuck]

Harking back to a topic I've raised before unfortunately...

I'm more than ever convinced that the decolonialisation which starts to happen in the 40s is all wrong. I've had the Irish independence event, for example, and it's +1 prestige to let them go in peace and -1 to hang on to it.

This in my opinion is the opposite of the way it should be. What I propose instead is this:

-1 P at least to grant independence, but with reduction of tension. Both depending on the size and significance of the possession.
+1 P at least to hang on, but tension+ or ++, again depending on the size and significance of the possession, AND
Add an event that the colony may immediately rebel (this might already be there) AND
Add a low-probability event that one or more other Powers may intervene, and you get an unexpected big war, or an even worse backdown with more P--. Study the Suez crisis in '56 for an example. The end result of it was that France and Britain were publicly humiliated, and revealed for all to see as major Powers no longer.

Government type should also be taken into account. Authoritarian government types would be far less likely to let colonies go you would think.

And if colonies rebel, and succeed, this should also be P- and currently isn't.

There is no way you can tell me that Britain's prestige was increased by letting Egypt and India go. Or France's by the loss of Algeria, French Morocco, Tunisia and of course Indochina. No-one thought so at the time; why is the game different?

I believe the above would model the whole thing more realistically, giving the player some incentive to retain possessions. There was little to no argument about the little islands scattered here and there and many of these transitioned quietly. But nearly all the big possessions..not so much. The whole thing should be much more complicated--as it was historically--and make the player juggle the various risks and rewards far more.

The current approach in the game seems to me very simplistic and very much looking at things with 2025 goggles. Of course we now think colonialism was a Bad Thing. But back in the 40s-60s, many Powers fought tooth and nail, and unsuccessfully in the main, to stem the tide of history.

[mrchuck]

Just had more thoughts about this.

Colony value is the obvious thing to take into account when calculating the P and T effects of independence--but so should base size.

Thus, an otherwise insignificant island in the middle of nowhere can have a much larger weight if a lot of resources have been expended making it a big base--and therefore worth hanging on to.

I believe this side of the game could use a fair bit more refinement. The post-colonial era should be difficult to navigate--as it was. Since there's not a land component of the game which models the exhaustion of many of the Powers after the world wars, it has to be done another way.

And base construction in itself should be a tension-modifying event. The interwar naval treaties concerned themselves with bases in Singapore and the Philippines for the express purpose of T-, and much of what followed in 1941-2 was the direct result. Peace treaties should concern themselves with scrapping or reducing bases. You should be able to accelerate base construction, as with ships, and specify larger base increments than is currently possible if you're willing to pay for it in funds, tension, and, I suggest, unrest, especially for democracies.

[WLRoo]

To take your example, by the 1950s Britain had realised that it's Empire was a drain on the economy - it cost far more to build and man the military to support that Empire than received in taxes.

Britain willingly dismantled the Empire - had to due to a lack of specie after WW2 and the easiest way to cut cost was to dismantle the Empire.

Plus by then the UN existed with it's anti-colonisation policy.

[mrchuck]

This is probably the point.

The powers learned by experience the hard way (though the French were a little slower on the uptake, la Gloire and all that). Britain gave up the empire because it couldn't afford the alternative, Churchill having hocked everything to beat Hitler. France only after expensive, brutal and increasingly unpopular actions that lasted until 1962.

Consensus among europeans that decolonlisation was a Good Thing was a pretty late arrival--in game terms, 60s and 70s. And as for the UN...what was the Korean War all about again? Looked at in purely Cold War and sideways at game terms, the US, Britain and France intervened to prevent Southern Korea going to the USSR.

Is there perhaps a need for a set of events that only kick in late in the game, where letting possessions go is the class act and not a failure of will? My argument is that for most of the period covered by the game, the consensus everywhere was the exact opposite, regardless of the economic realities. Since when do realities have anything to do with anything (even today)? The game is about Prestige after all.

[mrchuck]

Let me add that while I am well aware that RTW is not a historical simulation, in its technical aspects a great deal of trouble has been taken to model realistic mechanisms and technology.

Why not apply the same approach to the political and diplomatic aspects?

[MaximKI]

Thanks for the feedback. We'll consider this if we decide to revisit prestige, possessions, events, and diplomacy.

[mrchuck]

Another case in point. In my current game, the Marshall Islands rebelled (1940s) and I simply ignored it. I don't want them; they're no earthly use and just jack up my FS load, while potentially leading to confrontations in the Pacific that do not interest me for any number of reasons.

The base is too small to be credibly defended, and the location makes it not worthwhile to build it up. So, I get out of the Kaiser's mistake for free: letting the rebels succeed costs nothing, and there is no incentive whatever for the player to try to hang on somewhere like this. His Imperial Majesty does not even volunteer an opinion on the subject, unlike practically everything else.

Doesn't seem right to me.