Biggest German East front mistake

[Error in 0]

Hello
The germans came close to achieve their goals on the Eastern front (at least to isolate Leningrad, capturing Morskow and Stalingrad), but ultimately failed. Was the biggest mistake made prior to Barbarossa (ie no plan for wintercampaign, too few units, underestimating the massive number of sov soldiers etc), or was it during the campaign it all went wrong (the fixation upon Stalingrad, general abortion of well laid plans in favour of hitlers 'notions' etc).

How much would the oilfields in the Kaukasus really have meant for die Wehrmacht? Could the division of armeegruppe sud into a Stalingrad and a Kaukasus front be justified, or was it Hitler who trumphed this one through based on 'instincts' and overestimation of his soldiers?

And most entertaining: in hindsight, was a successful Barbarossa even possible? Would the germans have managed to hold a frontline along Don and Volga, and then strategic bomb the surrender out of the russians? I think it would have taken alot of men and guns to do so, at least, and maybe the effect would not have been soo differently from a 2-front war? Just speculations of couse, but it would be fun if anyone has made some analysis of this.


regards

[Hexed Gamer]

They screwed up Russia when they failed to see that Malta was worth losing all the parachutists just to take it, and that the war in the desert wasn't just a side show.

As any gamer already knows, if they had taken the desert seriously, they would have closed the canal, rolled up the middle east hit the oil from behind as well as through the actual Barbarossa, and the world would never have experienced much in the way of Russian post war history.

But then, how many politicians are any good as decent wargamers

[String]

Attacking in the first place, with such poor logistical capacity

[IronDuke_slith]

ORIGINAL: String

Attacking in the first place, with such poor logistical capacity

Absolutely. The errors in chronological order (IMHO)

Starting the whole thing with too few men, and a logistical infrastructure not equipped to support the ones they were deploying.

Changing the strategic objectives mid-campaign.

Ignoring (if the rumours are true) Stalin's overtures for a peace along the Dnieper when it became clear that the Russians were replacing losses as fast as the Germans could inflict them.

Launching Blau with far too few troops, and then giving ever deeper objectives to too few men.

Launching the patiently rebuilt Panzerwaffe into the face of the most heavily defended piece of real estate in military history at Kursk.

After that, it didn't really matter what they did, their strategic choices had run out.

There are a host of other smaller mistakes, but I'd rate these the key ones.

Regards,
IronDuke

[EricGuitarJames]

ORIGINAL: IronDuke

ORIGINAL: String

Attacking in the first place, with such poor logistical capacity

Absolutely. The errors in chronological order (IMHO)

Starting the whole thing with too few men, and a logistical infrastructure not equipped to support the ones they were deploying.

Changing the strategic objectives mid-campaign.

Regards,
IronDuke

Failure to press on to Moscow was close to catastrophic. Whilst it would not of itself defeated the USSR it was a central communications/logistics hub and its capture would have made it that much more difficult for the Soviets to co-ordinate the defence of their territory. Perversely, Hitler recognised Germany's lack of strategic resources and adjusted the campaign objectives accordingly but failed to recognise that the USSR was not beaten - basically wrongly applying the principles of 'Grand Strategy' at an operational level.

The other fundamental error made was in the way Russian civilians, particularly those in the Ukraine were treated. With a bit of thought and a bit of foresight the Germans would have had at worst a subservient if resentful population to control in their rear areas. As it was they fanned the flames of resistence tying up resources which could otherwise have proved very useful (if not decisive) at the front.

[SeaMonkey]

Concluding hostilities with UK first.

[Error in 0]

ORIGINAL: EricGuitarJames
The other fundamental error made was in the way Russian civilians, particularly those in the Ukraine were treated. With a bit of thought and a bit of foresight the Germans would have had at worst a subservient if resentful population to control in their rear areas. As it was they fanned the flames of resistence tying up resources which could otherwise have proved very useful (if not decisive) at the front.

Also, they did not realize the full potential of drafting soldiers from occupied areas. There were plenty of men who would fight the russians on the german side.

[barbarrossa]

Agree with all stated so far.

But Kursk would have to be the back-breaker for the Wermacht for me.

As Guderian asked, "Why attack in 1943 at all?"

[riverbravo]

Not going for moscow was the killer.

[Jane Doe]

I'll say that Kursk was the biggest mistake

and i'll add that going to moscow is still a really big what-if. it's not sure whether the germans would hav esucceeded.

[Charles2222]

I don't know why I never thought of this earlier, but I'm pretty sure I've never seen anyone reach this conclusion here, though it's just too easy, that is, if you think Hitler lost the war because he went against the scared cow that you can't win a war on 2 fronts, remember he did one worse and fought on 3 fronts at the same time. But, still, remember that the principle can't apply to only losers, afterall, if you believe that you can't win a war when fighting on two or more fronts, recall how the British and USA did just fine thank you.

[Brigz]

IronDuke:

The other fundamental error made was in the way Russian civilians, particularly those in the Ukraine were treated. With a bit of thought and a bit of foresight the Germans would have had at worst a subservient if resentful population to control in their rear areas. As it was they fanned the flames of resistence tying up resources which could otherwise have proved very useful (if not decisive) at the front.

I agree totally with this. And I would even go out on a very long limb and say that the German army lost the war way back in 1933 when they swore their souls to Hitler and the National Socialist party. They were afraid of the "Red Scare" then, little realizing how the "Red Scare" would really hit them in the winter of 1941. From the beginning of WWII, Hitler's initial "brilliant victory's" were possible because of thier blantent audacity and sheer luck and also because of the temerity and unpreparedness of the Allies. Soon after the invasion of Russia it became clear that Hitler was a complete imbecile when it came to military affairs, totally locked into his Teutonic dreams. If the German High Command could have done what they wanted they wouldn't have invaded Russia in the first place.

My six bits.

[PeckingFury]

ORIGINAL: SeaMonkey

Concluding hostilities with UK first.

I feel the same way. In some form of twisted logic im glad Russia was attacked, could not imagine the full German force thrown at the brits and her allies at the start. Germans made a grave mistake attacking Russia, one that I am glad it was made in gigantic proportions.

[Error in 0]

ORIGINAL: PeckingFury

ORIGINAL: SeaMonkey

Concluding hostilities with UK first.

I feel the same way. In some form of twisted logic im glad Russia was attacked, could not imagine the full German force thrown at the brits and her allies at the start. Germans made a grave mistake attacking Russia, one that I am glad it was made in gigantic proportions.

I think Hitler believed that taking Russia would force England to reconsider, and maybe offer, a truce. At this point, England was alone, and US just a possible ally in the future. So if you believe you could take russia quickly, then it was not insane to do so. However, he schould have prepared it better, but was blinded by the stunning victories in Europa.

[PeckingFury]

Agree, better preperation and more control of the battle on the feild and not with hitler. Basically it all comes down to the 2 front war, the germans with common sense during this time saw the writting on the wall.

[Belisarius]

Well, if by "mistake" we mean something where the outcome could be controlled by the Wehrmacht, Kursk must be the biggest one. Since they had the alternative not to do it, or attack in some other place....

[Error in 0]

Kursk, what a battle! The sovjets had everything on their side. They waited for the germans in heavily well prepared positions. They knew the German plan in great detail. They had time to prepare everything for this battle. Still the outcome was a draw. Is Kursk one of the best german military achievements? (Altough, after Kursk the East front was definetily lost).

[Riun T]

I think we all could consider Hitlers not making better negotiations with his supposed allies the japanese to get after their side of Russia, and just keep the original caucuss oil feilds in mind would have had them last a little longer but I've seen and read too much that explained too well that Hitler himself wasn't very worldly traveled and the first rule to any project,Military or otherwise, is for the designer of the task, has to know the land, and Russia was just too big for the bulshevik corprals brain!!..

[EricGuitarJames]

ORIGINAL: Riun T

I think we all could consider Hitlers not making better negotiations with his supposed allies the japanese to get after their side of Russia, and just keep the original caucuss oil feilds in mind would have had them last a little longer but I've seen and read too much that explained too well that Hitler himself wasn't very worldly traveled and the first rule to any project,Military or otherwise, is for the designer of the task, has to know the land, and Russia was just too big for the bulshevik corprals brain!!..

It can indeed be argued that the vast expanses of Russia were something Hitler didn't fully grasp. The successes in Poland and in Western Europe had also bred a certain overconfidence. More than anything though it was the backward nature of the Soviet infrastructure that caused the Germans huge problems in supplying their troops. In the Winter of 41/42 it wasn't that the Germans lacked cold weather clothing but they simply hadn't been able to move it up to the front line. Unmetalled roads, low quality railway rolling stock (and rails that were the 'wrong' guage) and the complacency bred by the stunning early successes all contributed to this.

[Subchaser]

ORIGINAL: JallaTryne

Kursk, what a battle! The sovjets had everything on their side. They waited for the germans in heavily well prepared positions. They knew the German plan in great detail. They had time to prepare everything for this battle. Still the outcome was a draw. Is Kursk one of the best german military achievements? (Altough, after Kursk the East front was definetily lost).

Draw??? German goal was to take Kursk, surround Soviet forces there and destroy them, strategic goal was to take strategic initiative back from Soviets and change balance on East front in Wehrmacht favor … nothing from this was achieved. Soviet goal was to force Germans to throw all their reserves into doomed from the start battle, maul them with numerically superior forces and start drive to the West with Berlin as final destination… everything was achieved. Where is a draw here?