Lawrence of Arabia Gambit for the Rising Sun

[2ndACR]

Sorry Hirohito,

I do not see your plan working. You can take PH, but you will have 2-4 mangled divisions
ie less than 50% strength. KB will be devestated from a/c losses. Your surface combat ships will take a pounding from the mines and coastal guns. The allied player can then re-take PH from you within 2 months.

The allied player really has nothing to fear about you invading the West Coast. As soon as you do, all ground forces arrive 6 months early. The allied player knows this, so he has no fear at all. There are adequate forces assigned to West Coast command to stop you dead in your tracks.

My advice would be to ignore the Alaska and PH adventures and concentrate on India, China, Aus, DEI, PI areas in the 1st 2 years.

My .02 anyway. I look forward to reading an AAR where you try it out. I volunteer to run the Allies. Never played the Allies yet. Barely even looked at them.

[grumbler]

Okay, just finished the three-turn run of the Hirohito bombardment of Pearl plan.

I grounded all US aircraft and assigned KB to attack only naval targets (as this maximizes the suppression of the coastal guns).

I kept all USN ships in port (though the AI created PT boat TFs at PH in spite of all allied HQs being on human).

The japanese used all 6 heavy BBs. DDs were for in seperate ASW groups assigned to escort the BBs.

The relevant combat reports:

Dec 7 & 8 - no bombardment action.

Dec 9 -

Naval Gun Fire at Pearl Harbor (112,68) - Coastal Guns Fire Back!

8 Coastal gun shots fired in defense.
Japanese Ships
CL Yura
BB Fuso

Allied Ships
PT PT-21, and is sunk


Allied ground losses:
126 casualties reported
Guns lost 2

TF 2 encounters mine field at Pearl Harbor (112,68)

Japanese Ships
DD Sanae, Mine hits 1, on fire, heavy damage


Night Time Surface Combat, near Pearl Harbor at 112,68

Japanese Ships
BB Nagato, Shell hits 4
BB Mutsu
BB Fuso, Shell hits 1
BB Yamashiro
BB Ise
BB Hyuga, Shell hits 5
CL Yura
CL Kinu
CL Kitakami
CL Oi
DD Yugumo
DD Mikazuki
DD Sawakaze
DD Yakaze
DD Yukaze
DD Hokaze
DD Tachikaze
DD Wakatake
DD Kuretake
DD Sanae, on fire, heavy damage
DD Sagi

Allied Ships
PT PT-24, Shell hits 2, on fire, heavy damage
PT PT-25
PT PT-26
PT PT-28, Shell hits 39, and is sunk
PT PT-29
PT PT-42


Naval bombardment of Pearl Harbor, at 112,68 - Coastal Guns Fire Back!

118 Coastal gun shots fired in defense.
Japanese Ships
DD Yugumo
DD Sagi, Shell hits 11, on fire, heavy damage
BB Mutsu
DD Tachikaze, Shell hits 5, on fire
DD Hokaze, Shell hits 11, on fire, heavy damage
DD Kuretake
DD Wakatake, Shell hits 8, on fire, heavy damage
DD Yukaze
DD Yakaze
DD Sawakaze, Shell hits 2, on fire
DD Mikazuki
BB Hyuga
BB Ise, Shell hits 2
BB Yamashiro
BB Fuso, Shell hits 5
BB Nagato

Allied Ships
BB Nevada, Shell hits 1, heavy damage
CA New Orleans, Shell hits 1
BB Arizona, Shell hits 1, heavy damage
BB Oklahoma, Shell hits 1
BB California, Shell hits 1, heavy damage
BB Tennessee, Shell hits 2
BB Maryland, Shell hits 2


Allied ground losses:
332 casualties reported
Guns lost 9
Vehicles lost 1

Airbase hits 1
Runway hits 3
Port hits 1

I turned around the retiring BBs for another run, to give the Hirohito plan its best chance of succeeding:

December 10th:

--------------------------------------------------------------------------------
Naval Gun Fire at Pearl Harbor (112,68) - Coastal Guns Fire Back!

86 Coastal gun shots fired in defense.
Japanese Ships
DD Sagi, and is sunk
DD Hokaze, Bomb hits 1, and is sunk
BB Mutsu, Shell hits 1
BB Ise, Shell hits 6


Allied ground losses:
33 casualties reported
Guns lost 1

--------------------------------------------------------------------------------
Naval Gun Fire at Pearl Harbor (112,68) - Coastal Guns Fire Back!

11 Coastal gun shots fired in defense.
Japanese Ships
DD Yugumo, Shell hits 3

--------------------------------------------------------------------------------
Night Time Surface Combat, near Pearl Harbor at 112,68

Japanese Ships
BB Nagato
BB Mutsu
BB Fuso, Shell hits 1
BB Yamashiro, Torpedo hits 1, on fire
BB Ise
BB Hyuga

Allied Ships
PT PT-20, Shell hits 138, and is sunk
PT PT-23
PT PT-25
PT PT-26
PT PT-27
PT PT-29
PT PT-30
PT PT-42

--------------------------------------------------------------------------------
Night Time Surface Combat, near Pearl Harbor at 112,68

Japanese Ships
BB Nagato
BB Mutsu
BB Fuso
BB Yamashiro, on fire
BB Ise
BB Hyuga

Allied Ships
PT PT-23
PT PT-25
PT PT-26
PT PT-27
PT PT-29, Shell hits 15, and is sunk
PT PT-30
PT PT-42

--------------------------------------------------------------------------------
Naval bombardment of Pearl Harbor, at 112,68 - Coastal Guns Fire Back!

34 Coastal gun shots fired in defense.
Japanese Ships
BB Mutsu
BB Hyuga
BB Ise, Shell hits 9
BB Fuso
BB Nagato, Shell hits 9


Allied ground losses:
55 casualties reported
Guns lost 1

So, the BBs were out of action due to ammo. Yamashiro had 35 SYS, 10 FLT, and 16 FIRE. The rest of the BB force had SYS in the range of 5 and no other damage to speak of.
2 DDs were sunk, 3 would sink en route to japan, and 5 had suffered serious damage (dunno why the DDs got in range of the guns, unless 16" shore batteries reach everyone).

The US lost 5 PTs and received 9 hits on already-damaged warships in port. None of the latter were sunk.

I think it is clear who won this exchange. Adding more japanese ships to the mix just adds to the number of rounds of combat - while they may get some more US ships they also lose more to shore battery fire (no more japanese ships showed up in the three days that I ran this, though I sent every ship north of Formosa into the fray - that included only some Light cruisers that I kept in the ASW groups, as they would be slaughtered by shore fire).

The Japanese bombardment gambit does not trump the USN flak gambit (during this time the Japanese CVs - all "ten" of them - pounded the US fleet and lost 64 DB/TB to flak - and this was with the USAAF grounded throughout and no planes dedicated to anti-airfield attacks). The USN did lose 2 BB, 1 CA, and 3 SS due to the air attacks, but most of those were first-day losses. I think it is hard to pound scrap metal into more scrap metal (and there were 12 USN ships "in the red" besides those sunk) and that the idea of the KB sustaining itself against PH long-term seems unfounded.

In my run, in fact, there was the amusing sidelight of the US PTs actually sortieing against KB and torpedoing two DDs and a CA! That was due to my movement of the KB next to PH to get in maximum airpower against the coastal guns, though, and shouldn't be considered a result of any realistic test.

It is a fun idea to play with. I have a game with everything "frozen" on Dec 7 so that turns pass very quickly for only what is activated, and I enjoy running these little hypotheticals.

Hirohito, anything you wanna change for the next run?

[mogami]

Stonewall never lost a battle adn whipped three Yankee armies, each of which outnumbered his own army, in a series of running battles up and down the length of the Shenandoah Valley before slipping away to help Lee drive McClellan from the gates of Richmond and then on to smash two more union armies at second bull run and chancelorsville.

Hi, Just for the record "Stonewall" did lose a battle. Following a dismal winter campaign that produced no good result he attacked a Union force at Kernstown thinking it a rear guard and was soundly whipped. (Mar 1862) In May he began his brilliant Campaign in the Valley. During the 7 days he was late and AP Hill suffered as a result.
For much of the war Sields Divison was known as the divison that whipped Stonewall.
However his defeat did produce important strategic results. (although he had nothing to do with it) The reinforcements (McDowell) McClellan was waiting on were diverted and formed the core of Popes ill fated Army of Virginia. Against this force Stonewall had much success.

[pasternakski]

ORIGINAL: Hirohito
illusions of grandeur

Hirohito

Hee hee. Kids.

[mogami]

Hi, So explain to me again because I am not seeing the logic how attacking Allied strongpoints and tying down the major portion of Japanese material to static defense is conducting the war the way Larry or Tom or Sunny would have done it? Looks more like Haig or Gamlein or Nappy when he grew tired of out smarting people and began to just throw mass around.

[WiTP_Dude]

I was thinking about this last night in my sleep and had another question: what is going to stop the Commonwealth from invading Southeast Asia? They can just swoop in and take all those nice airfields since the Japanese are elsewhere.

[Central Blue]

Hirohito...

good to see that you're sticking around.

Now I'm looking forward to some AAR's from a PBEM game. And I would certainly like to take a crack at you after the new patch comes out.

[WiTP_Dude]

Take out Midway, Johson Island, Palmyra Island, Christmas Island, Canton Island, Nassau Island and Cook Island and any ancillary islands in between on turn 1, or turn 2 if you are using the silly no Japanese attacks outside of PH on turn 1, it won't matter, none of these places can hold on turn 2 either.

This is easier said than done given the distances involved. What units are you using to get there in the first couple of days?

[2ndACR]

I would be willing to bet he is using the 4 units stationed on Kwajalain for the turn 1 and 2 invasions of those islands.

Any units deployed from Japan, usually do not make it past the Guam line by the end of turn 1.

[mogami]

Hi, Yes if you load units on 4.5k AP (the 14kt ones) they can reach on turn 1. But they are not ready and if the Allied player has a CA waiting goodbye AP. (not to mention the USN CV can reach them on turn 1 or 2) The Allied player can kill these units quite easy.
A base is not a problem unless it has aviation support and enough fighters to stop a 3 CV airstrike. These actions are not Lawerance of Arabia style actions. They are boy in the Cookie Jar actions. Then when the lad tries to pull a handfull of cookies out he discovers he either has to let some of them go or his hand stays stuck and he gets caught.

Why would the Japanese player wish to do all the Allid players brain work for him? If Japan grabs empty bases it only shows the Allied player where to CONCENTRATE. The Japanese player who wishes to be Lawerance should allow the ALlied player the chance to make rapid deployments in forward areas in many areas (disipate) And then at the right moment sweep down and gobble up what he can before retreating out of sight again to emerge somewhere else at a later date.
So what that Japan has a free move? If he moves the Kwajalean forces to advanced bases he loses them (or the Allies by pass what is not on the direct route and swoops in and takes Kwajalean. Japan does not have the airforce to cover all those bases do the SRA contain the CBI and CONCENTRATE against any Allied offensive operation.
Why go where you can't stay and then try to stay? Kill the baseforce if the impulse cannot be denied but then get back on the AP and return out of range.

[2ndACR]

In my game with Ron, I have secured the Gilberts (including Baker island). It is Late Jan 42 in our game, and I have yet to make very many moves in the South Pacific area yet. But now more forces are becoming available either by reinforcments or secured objectives, that I might decide to slowly move forward. But not until Tarawa is size 4 airfield. I have the air force ready to deploy, the supplies available, shipping ready.

Never thought of using the 4500 size ones for invasions. I almost always use the 1500 size AP's if there is any chance the invasion may be opposed.

It is one thing to do some overextending in the DEI where you have a few things that can put a crimp in your plans, but going where the Allied player is strongest to early is asking for it IMO.

Now if only I could get about 6 more Zero groups earlier I would be set. I am cranking out 204 of them per month. my only bottleneck is engines at the moment, only 35 left in the pool, but 180 still to repair.

[mogami]

Hi Please define "secured" To me a base is secured when

1. It has LCU in place larger then available enemy LCU
2. It has fighters in amounts larger then current enemy CV TF can bring
3. It has supporting surface combat ships in numbers higher then enemy can bring
4. It has bombers enough to serioulsy damage enemy TF in range and they are escorted.
5. It has supply enough to last 3 months while engaging in active combat.
6. It has fuel on hand to refuel supporting TF.

Unless a base is "secure" the forces deployed on it are "Targets" not defensive assets.

[Cav Trooper]

Sorry for a long post, but I've read every post here and have the following $0.02 worth of observations to add, in a very summerized version.

I personally don't see how his strategy would work across a geographical area the size of the Pacific. Not to mention how this strategy would hold out in the long run. The Lawrence Plan is based on a historical operation that in no way reflects the conditions that existed in the Pacific.

The Ottomans had established garrisons at key strategic positions to influence a realtively small area of operations. At the time, the normal military thinking was to use force on force to decide the outcome of any particular campaign. Manuever Warfare was not normal nor even considered a rational mode of thinking. Lawrence on the other hand found the fatal flaw in the Ottomans' troop dispositions and concept of operations. He saw that the Lines of communication and logistics were not only undefended and vulnerable, he also saw that if you were to cut or even threaten them, the Ottomans had to respond in some fashion to protect them. METT-T principles dictated that the Ottomans' only answer was to empty the garrisions to only those necessary to support the garrisions and deploy the rest to protect the long exposed LOC and Logistics. Lawrence also relied upon a secure line of Communication and Logistics for his own forces. Gaining tactical and operational surprise allowed him to conduct his raids, thereby creating the necessary conditions which ultimately allowed the end state to become what it was.

Now, if the same theory is applied to the Japanese strategy, and I will trust Mogami's expertise on logistics of the matter, I do not see how it would even surive the first 9 months of the war. Case in point, the success and operations are carried out as outlined. All intial Objectives are accomplished without any serious setbacks, or losses. As the Allied Player, I recognize that his forces are spread out and his interior lines of communication / logistics are spread very thin. I take a number of moderate to hi risk raids across his whole front lines. Goal is to damage not only installations, but also to damage (not necessarily sink) his merchant ships. Damaged ships need repair ergo another supply consumption increase. Conduct these raids where I can gain local superiority for a moment, then withdraw. Continue to do so, until I've gained sufficent reserves and Task Force strength to allow one or two extended raids on key points of his line, and then wait for him to collapse under the failure of his logistical nightmare. Just a very brief outline of an applicable strategy against his intial plan.

The idea of Attack where it can not be defended, and defend that which can not be attacked, is a very broad and open debatable subject and statement. In addition, the Stonewall Jackson quote can be summerized very well in the following statement: Deception is key to any operation against a known enemy. Show him what he wants to see and he will see it for what it is, exactly what he wants and expects to see, there by confirming his every expectation(s). Even though you are showing him what he wants to see, you do not have to deliver what he expects to see or even use that deception at all; rather you plan your operation based upon what you see and what he does not.

Summary, his strategy might work in a limited geographical area such as the Malaya / Burma area, DEI or even the PI's, I do not see it working across the board. All he has done, is to weaken himself across the whole Theater, allow the Allies to not only choose the type, location of thier response, it also allows them to determine when and how. All this strategy does in my opinion is to deliver the initative over to Allies, and leaves the IJN player wide open to a crushing defeat by a overwhelming response of the Allies at the time and place of their choosing.

Hiro, not a bad concept of opening moves in my honest opinion, however I fail to see a follow on strategy or defensive concept left open to you. And the assumption that the Allies will respond in the same manner as history is a response that I fail to see materialize. Again, not a bad theoretical discussion, and very thought provoking excercise. Salute....

[mogami]

Hi, I just think it close to oxymoronic to use L of A as an example to a strategy that outlines seizing bases and using them to "harass" an enemy who is under no compulsion to provide targets. This strategy requires committing assets to stationary positions. There is no surprise. The enemy knows where these Japanese forces are located. He is not compelled to go near them before he is of a mind to destroy them and then the strategy is providing victory for the enemy. How is this doing anything advocated by the examples of L of A, Stonewall or Sun Tzu? It seems to be exactly counter to what he quotes being the Philosophy of the strategy.
To reflect the quoted Philosophy the Japanese forces should remain at large and appear without warning at points where they proceed to inflict more damage then they sustain before retiring out of sight to appear elsewhere at a later time. This strategy as outlined leaves nothing to question for Allies. They know exactly all the where's and what's. If they then appear to engage these forces it will be when they choose and in force enough to inflict more damage then they sustain. The outer Japanese bases are exactly the type of targets L of A exploited to advantage. Get the Japanese to tie down more force to defend then they are worth.

Jumping on empty bases is not a strategy. It is an exploit. I don't mean an exploit of game or program but of the existing situation in the Pacific in 1941. Exploiting is good however I don't see where the plan turns this early exploit into a later advantage.
Instead it converts the element of time (tempo) that Japan has into a static condition.
Japan has tempo at start of war but it will not last. Using the available forces in static defense ends the use of these forces in mobile operations. It also spreads them out.
It seems a quick way to convert Japan's starting advantage into a later Allied advantage. There is no compulsion placed on the Allied player to react before he is ready. I might be misunderstanding or missing something but I don't see this as anything remarkable towards solving the long term problems Japan will encounter in the Pacific.

[Bandkanon]

Hirohito: I got a question:

If you are amassing every major ship north of Taiwan and committing them to operations how do you expect to keep your ships running after 6 months? KB's attack on PH sucked half a year's of IJ's fuel reserves. With more ships committed how can you hope of maintaining any kind of naval operations after half year?

Oh, and another question: The fundamental goal of your plan is to have gauntlets in rings where the US has to attack past. To form these rings required you to hold 26 bases you said and make them impregnable to attack by consolidating IJ forces. However, wouldn't it be very possible that the US has to only focus on one base in every ring and break through to reach the next line and leave every base in the previous ring to whither and die on the vine or ignored since the ring is already broken by the loss of just one base thus causing a gap to be opened?

But I digress. The most important question is where are you going to get the fuel to sustain such a high level of naval operations without crippling your forces in the process?

[Bandkanon]

Perhaps this is Hirohito's real strategy:


Here is a quote from The 36 Strategems:

A Strategem for Confrontation: Create Something Out of Nothing

Design a counterfeit front to put the enemy off-guard. When the trick works, the front is changed into something real so that the enemy will be thrown into a a state of double confusion. In short, deceptive appearances often conceal some forthcoming dangers.

Or a Strategem for Confusion: Feigning Foolishness

At times, it is better to pretend to be foolish and do nothing than to brag about yourself and act recklessly. Be composed and plot secretly, like thunder clouds hiding themselves during winter only to bolt out when the time is right.

[Central Blue]

the only question worth asking...

where is the PBEM AAR?

[dtravel]

ORIGINAL: Central Blue

the only question worth asking...

where is the PBEM AAR?

Here you go, just click on the URL: tm.asp?m=716742

[Central Blue]

dtravel...

thanks for the link! Too much time on the game (and baseball on the internet) for detailed surfing!

I was sort of wondering when Hirohito would take someone on, but this will do.

[WiTP_Dude]

Hirohito, I believe this plan has some merit but here are some tactical tips for when you get started:

1. Do not approach American LBAs with your carriers. They will sink your carriers quickly. Instead you can send in your transports without air cover. They will mostly all sink but not until they have delivered their units. Once established, a land base becomes a permanent, unsinkable aircraft carrier.

2. Send your carriers to run patrols and sink enemy carriers. You won't be able to keep PH out of action for too long by using your carrier based bombers. Just hit it at the beginning and then move those carriers out. Attempt to find and destroy the two carriers located in the central Pacific.

3. Don't bombard Pearl or Midway, at least until right before the invasions begin. These bombardments aren't worth the losses. Little damage is done to the facilities or aircraft on the islands. Aircraft are much better at softening up the defenses and don't sink as fast.

4. Don't create additional AVs. The new ones only have a capacity of one. Also do increase production of the Emilies. Use these to look wide and far.