KEEP IT SIMPLE

[A_Master]

I agree. But as a wargammer, I would like them to concentrate on AI and game play first, and worry about the Bells and whistles later. No amount of pictures or movies will same the game if it plays crummy.

[C3I2]

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"Also - please - don't use drab unit counters with some obscure symbol on it. Use great graphics - we want SEE those ships - the battlewagons, the carriers - use authentic profiles for them - with sounds - use the graphics power of the computer - this game should be a feast for the eyes as well as for the brain There is no law that says a wargame can't also be a great looking game..."
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As for troop designations I usually prefer standardised icons. Not pictures of men with rifles or whatever, so its something that should be optional. It is as simple as that. Same with sounds of course.


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[sethwrkr]

On simplele:

I had a thought or two on how to handle routine supply.

Have a default setting. Maybe something like it is now. Before you quit the orders phase you should be able to view scheduled supply and raw material/oil harvest. You should be able to see what portion of your merchant fleet is utilized in this and make adjustments.

You should be able to adjust the default plan and see if your new plan is supportable. For example, Tell the computer that I want 5000 more Supply dropped at Rabual than the normal default this turn.

The computer could tell you that that is within your mechant fleets capability or indicate the shortfall in tonnage. Possibly even indicate that this would result in leaving X number of resource units at the sourse. I would immagine this interface to be graphical. Maybe bar graphs and a pie chart etc. You can drag the pie slices making each bigger or smaller. ETC. Drag a few bars around alla Masters of Orion. Just a couple of thoughts.

One of the frustrating things I find in the game is to have a crystal clear #1 sacrifice anything else objective and not be able to get adequate supply for it.

Seth

[Ed Cogburn]

Originally posted by sethwrkr:
On simplele:
I had a thought or two on how to handle routine supply.

That is a great idea, Seth. Anybody remember Master of Orion with its mini barcharts that you could change/tweak with your mouse?

[sethwrkr]

Major Tom,

Why penalize Jap subs that go after merchants. Would they have had a handicap? Beter torpedos and very good subs with professional crews. I think not.

Seth

[Paul Goodman]

Japanese submarines engaged in attacks on merchant shipping should have a huge penalty for the following reasons.

1. Good submarines. I think not. These submarines were large in order to provide the required range for Pacific operations. Because of this, they had a very limited diving depth. In fact, Japanese ASW suffered because they assumed a maximum diving depth of 200 feet based on their own experience. They set their depth charges accordingly until late in the war. Because of their small size, U-boats could dive to deeper than 300 meters. Although also large, U.S. fleet class submarines could dive to around 350 feet; later to 450 feet due to very high quality structural design and construction. Because of the limited diving capability, I class submarines would be fresh meat to U.S. DD and, particularly, hedgehog armed DE's from mid '43 on.

2. Again, due to their large size, I class boats had a monster sonar signature. Whoops! Can't dive deep enough to get below a thermal. One more rising sun on a destroyer bridge.

3. Lack of Radar. Although U-boats did ok without radar, the vastness of the Pacific is very different. It would be difficult to locate targets without air recon (which U-boats had during the period of success). This would force the I boats to operate relatively close to ports, where they would be subject to attack by hundreds of aircraft. By late 1943, Allied aircraft radar was good enough to detect surfaced submarines at long range. They could even detect periscopes in good weather. A large submarine is bound to have a longer diving time than a U-boat. By 1944, transiting the Bay of Biscay was almost as dangerous as attacking a convoy. An I boat would fare far worse.

4. The IJN submarines greatest asset was the Long Lance torpedo. But in convoy warfare, this asset might be a liability. This torpedo was fast, long ranged, reliable, and packed a tremendous punch. Against a 10,000 ton freighter making 10 knots, so what. It was a steam torpedo, leaving a bubble trail right back to the torpedo tube. Huge sonic signature, can't dive deep enough to reach a thermal, and the hedgehog armed DE is following a road map right to your front door. You might consider early retirement.

In fact, the I boat was totally unsuitable for commerce warfare. The most it could have been was a nuisance, forcing a convoy system. The Japanese command recognized the strengths and weaknesses of their submarine weapon and used is properly. They did sink several aircraft carriers. And, if they got the Indianapolis coming instead of going?

Paul

[sethwrkr]

Paul,

I do not buy it. If JAP Subs can kill fast escorted fleet carriers then they can kill merchants.

Seth

[Ed Cogburn]

Originally posted by sethwrkr:
Paul,

I do not buy it. If JAP Subs can kill fast escorted fleet carriers then they can kill merchants.

Seth

It isn't about killing Seth, its about surviving *after* you've killed. Yes, they could kill merchants, with that torpedo of theirs they could kill anything, but afterwords they often couldn't survive the DE/DD counterattack, particularly later in the war, and especially against any carrier task force or supply convoy with escort carriers providing ASW, which we got much better at as time went along.

[moore4807]

Originally posted by Ed Cogburn:

It isn't about killing Seth, its about surviving *after* you've killed. Yes, they could kill merchants, with that torpedo of theirs they could kill anything, but afterwords they often couldn't survive the DE/DD counterattack, particularly later in the war, and especially against any carrier task force or supply convoy with escort carriers providing ASW, which we got much better at as time went along.

For gameplay purposes I totally agree with your post-in real life accuracy I'd have to disagree with the escaping part of your post. The Japanese Bushido Code (of honor) demanded they kill thier enemies and dying with "honor" while doing this would allow them to thier version of "heaven" where thier ancestors would greet them. Hence many volunteers for kamikaze missions (as early as Pearl Harbor midget subs)were sincere and had NO hopes of surviving because that would be considered a failure by society and dishonor thier family names! ( I dont understand it either- just have read it over and over.)

[RevRick]

IIRC, the only carrier an I-boat killed was the Wasp, early in the war. Late in the war, the I-boats were nowhere near as effective against the type of escort that developed.



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God Bless;
Rev. Rick, the tincanman

[Paul Goodman]

To: RevRick

Well, I think you also have to include the Yorktown at Midway, finished off by an I boat. The Lipscombe Bay was also torpedoed, heavily damaged, but did not sink, the Gilberts, I think.

However, you only amplify my point. The I class submarines were not particularly formidable weapons. In fact, the Wasp was forced into totally unsuitable duty, as convoy escort from Espiritu Santo to Guadalcanal when she got nailed.

Seth, Ed is exactly right. Of course, anything hit by a Long Lance is in serious trouble. For example, the torpedo spread that got the Wasp, also got the North Carolina (dry dock 4 months) and sunk a destroyer; the Hornet spotted the bubble trail and maneuvered to avoid the torpedoes. The trick is to avoid the counterattack. And that, the I boat could not do after mid 1943.

Paul

[Major Tom]

Here's what some I-Boats managed to do...

I-6 Hit Saratoga January 10, put out of action until just after Midway

I-26 Hit Saratoga August 31, out of action again during crucial fighting (solomans)

I-26 Sank the CLAA Juneau

I-19 Sank the Wasp, and indirectly damaged the North Carolina (putting her out of action for a long time), and sinking the DD O'Brien. These last two were hit by US torpedo's fired to scuttle the Wasp.

I-58 sank the Indianapolis.

I-168 put the final torpedo into the Yorkown

I-175 Sank the CVE Liscome Bay

and so on...

What is as important as sinking a ship is to knock it out of action for crucial months. The Saratoga was sent out of two crucial actions because of sub torpedo hits. However, the IJN CV TF's could/would not exploit this advantage.

Initially, both the USN and IJN had their submarine forces as fleet supporters (ie. scouts and warship killers). The USN picked up on the potential success of commerce raiding through seeing first hand the results of the U-Boat war.

It isn't necessarily a technical penalty for the IJN Subs for attacking Merchant vessels, but, it would be a morale or tactical penalty. Since they were primarily trained that sinking Warships was their main goal, and that this offered the best way to end the war as their concept was more of a war between warriors, instead of a total war.

Also, the Mini-Subs weren't were not originally intended as suicide craft. MANY weapons, not just Japanese, were considered to be 'suicide' weapons. Driving Sherman tanks against King Tigers was seen as 'suicidal', but, the midset of the pilots was not to die, optimally, they would survive so they could kill more enemies at some later point.

[sethwrkr]

Thanks Major T.


I think it is clear that I boats were effective shipping killers.

If they had been turned on less defended, slower merchants they would have had a greater impact than they did historically.

Seth

[Ed Cogburn]

Originally posted by Major Tom:
Here's what some I-Boats managed to do...

No one is questioning what I-boats with Long Toms or suicide torpedos are capable of. What we're arguing is that I-boats were not good at surviving after the kill for whatever reason. The obvious exceptions for lone warships like the Indianapolis, or crippled carriers left to sink, are granted. But for protected ship groups, i.e. convoys, protected by DD/DE ships and/or aircraft providing ASW from escort carriers, the I-boats had a hard time suviving the first salvo. Look at what GG does in PacWar. While US subs get better torpedoes, and become harder to kill, I-boats become *easier* to kill later in the war, to represent increasing ASW skill by the US. Japan lost about 130 of its submarines to only 50 by the US despite the fact that the US sub fleet was *much* larger, and the USN figure is for both the Atlantic and Pacific.

We're also saying it is not some trivial action to get the IJN subs to start sinking merchants. They had serious problems with this because of their Bushido Code and their doctrine covering the use of subs.

I would love to see this as a scenario option in WitP to represent the possibility, however remote, that the Japanese could overcome their problems and use their subs as merchant raiders, but otherwise there should be some kind of restriction on Japanese subs, if WitP aims to be an accurate simulation of the war (assuming this scenario option is not selected). Furthermore, there is obviously going to be a response to this use of IJN subs as merchant raiders by the US. So this scenario option should have a counterpart, where the US responds by escalating the production of DE types and escort carriers and long range ASW planes. There should be some penalty to this as well, perhaps the US must delay some other construction to allow this escalated production of ASW craft to happen.

This is an example of the kind of scenario options that WitP should have, BTW. Any option like this would have a counter-response by the enemy, or some other penalty for its use. In this case, if the IJN chooses to allow subs to attack merchant shipping, they will not have those subs available for other military operations, *and* the US is then given a counter-option it can choose to use. Again, the US choosing this option then has a penalty elsewhere. This makes the game much more interesting without being unrealistic, since giving the IJN this option and not giving the USN the opportunity to respond in an obvious way would be unrealistic.


[This message has been edited by Ed Cogburn (edited January 01, 2001).]

[sethwrkr]

ED,

If you put to many restrictions on Japanese freedom of action you may find it hard to find somone who is willing to play the Japanese. After all we know how the war turned out. When I play the Japanese I am hoping for a different outcome.


Seth

[Major Tom]

USN Convoys were usually heavily protected by DD's, and especially later on by innumerable DE's.

One thing that a bunch of books noted was that the IJN Submariners tended to be less aggressive than any other branch of the Japanese military. If it weren't for their supurb torpedo's, I would have severely doubted that they would have been successful at all. Their determination to confirm a kill, or to get close enough to guarantee a kill was lacking (as shown by the high number of damaged USN vessels, but, relatively few sunk).

As was already mentioned, most of the warships attacked in the Pacific War were done so WITHOUT the loss of the IJN sub. This is primarily due to the fact that they kept well out of range, fired a big spread of torpedo's of high quality and tended to get fewer hits. Attacking a Convoy in this manner will result in relatively few ships sunk (as the escorts primary job is to look out for submarines, instead of fleet destroyers acting primarily as surface escorts).

IJN Subs weren't designed to be convoy stalkers. They were, on average, larger and clumsier than USN Submarines. Their doctrine ever since their creation was to act as fleet support units, attacking Military targets, as, this was what was seen as the way to win the war.

However, since WitP is supposed to allow the greatest freedom of choice for both players on how to wage a war, I would state that total restriction of their ability to perform commerce raiding should not be inacted. Yet, I still believe that they would perform much worse than their USN counterparts, primarily through the lack of aggression of their captains and crew, along with representing the relative inflexability of the Japanese High Command to accept that this was a total war with tactics reflecting this.

[Ed Cogburn]

Originally posted by Major Tom:
As was already mentioned, most of the warships attacked in the Pacific War were done so WITHOUT the loss of the IJN sub. This is primarily due to the fact that they kept well out of range, fired a big spread of torpedo's of high quality and tended to get fewer hits.

I don't know how we can square this with the statistic of 130 IJN subs lost to 50 for the USN. *Somebody* was killing IJN subs in a rather proficient manner.

For all the rest I do agree with you. You concisely mentioned all the reasons why the IJN sub fleet was never used against the Allied merchant fleet. WitP should reflect this reality in some fashion, and that may mean restrictions of some type on IJN subs. A pre-war option representing the IJN overcoming these problems and using their subs against merchants is ok as long as its balanced.


[This message has been edited by Ed Cogburn (edited January 01, 2001).]

[Ed Cogburn]

Originally posted by sethwrkr:
If you put to many restrictions on Japanese freedom of action ....

If the restriction is *historical* then I'd argue we shouldn't make a game that bypasses those historical problems. An option available to represent an ahistorical result is ok, as long as the counter-response by the other side is supported as well. An IJN sub fleet going after Allied merchants would certainly have triggered counter-actions by the Allies.

[Paul Goodman]

I think that we would all agree that, if Japan was to win, it had to do so in 1942. After that, the most it can hope for is to inflict enough casualties to achieve some form of face-saving peace.

The actual historical events give many interesting opportunities. "Miracle at Midway" was exactly that. Under computer game conditions, where ultimately, cold hard numbers take over, Midway will be a significant Japanese victory. The "what then" offers the Japanese player immense strategic opportunities even in a realistic model. Also, the Guadalcanal operation was really a shoestring operation that probably should (and if they knew about the Long Lance, would not have)not have been undertaken. A little cooperation between IJA and IJN, with a full scale attack by the combined fleet, it seems to me, would have resulted in a major Japanese victory and destruction of the 1st Marine Division. How would that go with the American public.

So, in an accurate model, I think the Japanese have some excellent opportunities, just as they had in reality. Creating an unrealistic model to facilitate playability is unnecessary and unwanted.

Paul

[mdiehl]

A technical correction to the post on IJN submarines. They did not carry Long Lance torpedoes. The submarine torpedoes were reliable, had somewhat greater range than early US submarine torpedoes, comparable speed, and a comparable warhead (with a reliable contact detonator).

As to the rest. They had some tactical successes against US warships. Listing the US CVs and CAs &c sunk by Japanese submarines is not a meaningful way to assess their relative contribution to the war effort though, either by comparison with other IJN services or US submarines.

American submarines sank more warships (and hundreds more merchant ships) than their Japanese counterparts... partly because of numbers but also for reasons that Paul Goodman listed above. US submarines were superior to most (only the German Type XXI was faster underwater or could dive deeper than the US Gato class), and once the torpedo bugs were solved they were devastatingly superior. Beyond these things, US submarine doctrine was superior to IJN doctrine, and US command and control of submarines in the field was far superior. The latter is important and reflects the ability to find and interdict convoys and warships... both because of technical abilities such as radar and because of superior US radio direction finding and intelligence apparatus.

So Japanese submarines should be substantially penalized when attempting to contact any American ship (or, alternatively, US submarine groups of equal size should make contact far more often), and Japanese submarines should be less effective against merchant ships (which their captains and crew disdained).

I suppose that in theory IJN submarines should be allowed to attack US merchant convoys. Just make the IJN submarines highly vulnerable (as they were), limit the size of the groups in which they operate so that they are unable to form large wolf packs (to reflect the fact that the Japanese never adopted that dotrine), and make them very easy to detect. If the IJN player wishes to embrace 1:2 or 1:1 sub losses v. merchant kills, let him. The US player should welcome such an exchange.


[This message has been edited by mdiehl (edited January 02, 2001).]

[This message has been edited by mdiehl (edited January 02, 2001).]