This is a good thread.
Hey, Mogami. South Dakota may have been loosely run, but she also performed loosely in combat. In comparison with Washington, who's Captain believed deeply in radar fire control and actually trained his crew in this, this low level of discipline doesn't look too good. Washington, using night radar fire control, blasted Kirishima out of line and in a sinking condition while South Dakota diddled around trying to get the generators going. After finally getting the main battery going, SD fired, missed, and was raked by cruiser fire for her trouble. Maybe a shave and a hair cut is not a bad idea. Maybe maintaining equipment is not a bad idea, either.
I think the idea of big gun war may be fun, but is not realistic. Long before Pearl Harbor, both Lexington and Saratoga were converted into CV's from battlecruisers. Before their prewar modernization, they even carried part of the battlecruiser main battery.
I also believe that CV41, 42, and 43 (Midway class) were built on battlecruiser hulls (Alaska class hulls?) I think the first of these was launched in 46. Certainly, planning for these had to have begun no later than 1944, even with the hulls fairly far along. These ships, with their heavy hull armor (45,000 tons compared to 32,000 for Essex class) and armored flight decks would have been able to withstand the kamikaze attacks much more readily than the wood flight decks of the Essex class. My point here is that we might as well design Essex class CV's with armored flight decks if we are going to play this production game.
Paul
"Historical" Production vs. Historical Choices
Moderators: Joel Billings, wdolson, Don Bowen, mogami
Mogami; to clarify:
A ship is commissioned after builders and acceptance trials - which "shakes down" the ship to find out what has to be fixed. For example, the Washington had a real problem with the screws and a vibration which limited the ship to speeds which were only marginally in excess of the old BB's - until the found the right screw combination. When that part is finished, then the ship "works up" to get the crew to function as a team. Getting everyone to find their stations according to the "Watch, Quarter & Station Bill", learning their tasks during endlessly repetitive drills from everything from GQ to Unrep, Man overboard, casualty & collision drills, etc, takes a long time. This is usually the four month or so period you will find in the ship's histories between commissioning and deployment and reporting for duty in the assigned theater.
Regarding the South Dakota - I believe the Captain you're talking about was Gatch. And he was a wild man. During the Second Naval Battle of Guadalcanal, (15 Nov 42) The engineer had wired the breakers open in the ship, and the first time the guns fired it tripped power virtually throughout the ship - which caused them to drop the load to everything including the fire control central - which meant they were a blind charging elephant. She also made a course correction to clear a sinking and burning destroyer which silhouetted her for two CA's and the Kirishima - which pounded her with about 42 major caliber rounds (had one 14 in round unexploded lodged against the after barbette). Washington had cleared the destroyer to port, I belive, and was not silhouetted, and China Lee was onboard. I think she had closed to 8000 yards before she opened fire on Kirishima (which is kinda like shooting across the room at the wall with a 30.06 rifle). Washington even checked fire for a bit when the command staff was not entirely sure where South Dakota was, or she might have sunk Kirishima outright and one or both of the CA's.
Regarding CV 41 class. I do not think they used Alaska hulls. The Alaska's were 808' OA length, and the Midways were 968' OA, and had a lot more horsepower to boot. They were layed down in late '43 to early '44 so planning was probably started in 42 and material acquisition in early 43. One report actually said that in practice they were not materially better than the Essex's because it took longer to get the airgroup launched and formed up, and they were not markedly superior to the Essex class in flight deck handling of a/c. I don't know, I wouldn't mind having a birdfarm which could handle almost 140 aircraft around handy.
Just some random thoughts.
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God Bless;
Rev. Rick, the tincanman
A ship is commissioned after builders and acceptance trials - which "shakes down" the ship to find out what has to be fixed. For example, the Washington had a real problem with the screws and a vibration which limited the ship to speeds which were only marginally in excess of the old BB's - until the found the right screw combination. When that part is finished, then the ship "works up" to get the crew to function as a team. Getting everyone to find their stations according to the "Watch, Quarter & Station Bill", learning their tasks during endlessly repetitive drills from everything from GQ to Unrep, Man overboard, casualty & collision drills, etc, takes a long time. This is usually the four month or so period you will find in the ship's histories between commissioning and deployment and reporting for duty in the assigned theater.
Regarding the South Dakota - I believe the Captain you're talking about was Gatch. And he was a wild man. During the Second Naval Battle of Guadalcanal, (15 Nov 42) The engineer had wired the breakers open in the ship, and the first time the guns fired it tripped power virtually throughout the ship - which caused them to drop the load to everything including the fire control central - which meant they were a blind charging elephant. She also made a course correction to clear a sinking and burning destroyer which silhouetted her for two CA's and the Kirishima - which pounded her with about 42 major caliber rounds (had one 14 in round unexploded lodged against the after barbette). Washington had cleared the destroyer to port, I belive, and was not silhouetted, and China Lee was onboard. I think she had closed to 8000 yards before she opened fire on Kirishima (which is kinda like shooting across the room at the wall with a 30.06 rifle). Washington even checked fire for a bit when the command staff was not entirely sure where South Dakota was, or she might have sunk Kirishima outright and one or both of the CA's.
Regarding CV 41 class. I do not think they used Alaska hulls. The Alaska's were 808' OA length, and the Midways were 968' OA, and had a lot more horsepower to boot. They were layed down in late '43 to early '44 so planning was probably started in 42 and material acquisition in early 43. One report actually said that in practice they were not materially better than the Essex's because it took longer to get the airgroup launched and formed up, and they were not markedly superior to the Essex class in flight deck handling of a/c. I don't know, I wouldn't mind having a birdfarm which could handle almost 140 aircraft around handy.
Just some random thoughts.
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God Bless;
Rev. Rick, the tincanman
"Action springs not from thought, but from a readiness for responsibility.” ― Dietrich Bonhoeffer
What I think probably will happen, is, that you will be given a certain number of hull types and aircraft frames on certain dates. There were many projects that were rejected for no real reason (the Ki-60 project was given precidence over that of the Ki-61, but, didn't lead up to the designers specifications and shelved for the 61, even though its original armament was much higher than that of the 61 and was only a few miles per hour slower. If the Ki-60 project kept going, then the IJAAF would have a plane capable of easily besting the P-40's, P-39's and giving the P-38's a hard run in mid-early 1942, vs the Ki-61's arrival in 1943.
What I would like to see is the commanders on the field (not you, your commanders) put back their experience on what they encounter into the design requests. So, if they (you) use carriers, or they see the enemy using carriers then there will be more designs of carriers than battleships. Or, if one weapon is not behaving particularly well (like the 1.1" AA guns) then a replacement is developed (40mm AA guns).
You submit a request for a ship/aircraft design, like lets say a CLAA, and you are given a number of possible designs and you choose the best. They can be completely random, or from a series of hardcoded ones (but not every design will appear in every game). So, you couldn't say EXACTLY how many 5/38 guns this CLAA will have.
Possibly if an aircraft design does not reach your specifications, you can order the team to work on it for another few months, and possibly by the end of that time the design could be improved, possibly not. This is what really happend (using the example of the Ki-60, time was spend on a plane that was no good, whereas if time was spent on the Ki-61 instead it could have got out much earlier).
If we allow players to design their own ships and planes then we will end up with only a few 'gamey' designs ever used. Giving a player a 'shell' design, and allowing them to create a plane/ship from scratch up to their own specifications will ignore the very real problems encountered in developing a ship/plane design. Specifications aren't always met, if design is to be incorporated, there must be some sort of randomness to it.
What I would like to see is the commanders on the field (not you, your commanders) put back their experience on what they encounter into the design requests. So, if they (you) use carriers, or they see the enemy using carriers then there will be more designs of carriers than battleships. Or, if one weapon is not behaving particularly well (like the 1.1" AA guns) then a replacement is developed (40mm AA guns).
You submit a request for a ship/aircraft design, like lets say a CLAA, and you are given a number of possible designs and you choose the best. They can be completely random, or from a series of hardcoded ones (but not every design will appear in every game). So, you couldn't say EXACTLY how many 5/38 guns this CLAA will have.
Possibly if an aircraft design does not reach your specifications, you can order the team to work on it for another few months, and possibly by the end of that time the design could be improved, possibly not. This is what really happend (using the example of the Ki-60, time was spend on a plane that was no good, whereas if time was spent on the Ki-61 instead it could have got out much earlier).
If we allow players to design their own ships and planes then we will end up with only a few 'gamey' designs ever used. Giving a player a 'shell' design, and allowing them to create a plane/ship from scratch up to their own specifications will ignore the very real problems encountered in developing a ship/plane design. Specifications aren't always met, if design is to be incorporated, there must be some sort of randomness to it.
>>I think the idea of big gun war may be fun, but is not realistic. Long before Pearl Harbor, both Lexington and Saratoga were converted into CV's from battlecruisers. Before their prewar modernization, they even carried part of the battlecruiser main battery.<<
This was soley due to the Washington Treaty. Washington required the entire class of 6 CCs to be cancelled (along with 1 of the Colorado and all 6 of the South Dakota), but allowed for two of those hulls to be converted to carriers. Lexington and Saratoga were converted to recoup some of the money already spent.
Actually, if you look at the ships cancelled as a result of Washington, a whole lot of them were battlecruisers (14 of the 31 captial ships were cancelled as a result of Washington were battlecruisers). Since all these were planned after Jutland, it sort of gives lie to the oft repeated concept that battlecruisers were obsolete.
>>I also believe that CV41, 42, and 43 (Midway class) were built on battlecruiser hulls (Alaska class hulls?) I think the first of these was launched in 46.<<
Nope, entirely seperate design. However, they did use the same machinery as the aborted Montana class batleships.
>>Certainly, planning for these had to have begun no later than 1944, even with the hulls fairly far along. These ships, with their heavy hull armor (45,000 tons compared to 32,000 for Essex class) and armored flight decks would have been able to withstand the kamikaze attacks much more readily than the wood flight decks of the Essex class. My point here is that we might as well design Essex class CV's with armored flight decks if we are going to play this production game.<<
In a very real sense the Midays *were* just armoured deck Essexes. All the increase in size and capacity was as a result in the increase in armour. The extra armour required more power, which required more bunkerage, which required a bigger hull to maintain stability; which then required more armour etc. The extra capacity was entirely a byproduct (and regarded as a bad thing, since it was felt the airgroup was too large to be managed effectively).
Also Kamakazes played no role in their design. The Midways were designed in 41-42, well before the Kamakazes. It was the success of the British armoured deck carriers in the Med that lead to the adoption of the armoured flight deck for the Midways. Though, without the British "armoured box" concept (which was simply armouring the carriers main battery ie the entire hanger), they would have still been quite vunerable to Kamakazes
This was soley due to the Washington Treaty. Washington required the entire class of 6 CCs to be cancelled (along with 1 of the Colorado and all 6 of the South Dakota), but allowed for two of those hulls to be converted to carriers. Lexington and Saratoga were converted to recoup some of the money already spent.
Actually, if you look at the ships cancelled as a result of Washington, a whole lot of them were battlecruisers (14 of the 31 captial ships were cancelled as a result of Washington were battlecruisers). Since all these were planned after Jutland, it sort of gives lie to the oft repeated concept that battlecruisers were obsolete.
>>I also believe that CV41, 42, and 43 (Midway class) were built on battlecruiser hulls (Alaska class hulls?) I think the first of these was launched in 46.<<
Nope, entirely seperate design. However, they did use the same machinery as the aborted Montana class batleships.
>>Certainly, planning for these had to have begun no later than 1944, even with the hulls fairly far along. These ships, with their heavy hull armor (45,000 tons compared to 32,000 for Essex class) and armored flight decks would have been able to withstand the kamikaze attacks much more readily than the wood flight decks of the Essex class. My point here is that we might as well design Essex class CV's with armored flight decks if we are going to play this production game.<<
In a very real sense the Midays *were* just armoured deck Essexes. All the increase in size and capacity was as a result in the increase in armour. The extra armour required more power, which required more bunkerage, which required a bigger hull to maintain stability; which then required more armour etc. The extra capacity was entirely a byproduct (and regarded as a bad thing, since it was felt the airgroup was too large to be managed effectively).
Also Kamakazes played no role in their design. The Midways were designed in 41-42, well before the Kamakazes. It was the success of the British armoured deck carriers in the Med that lead to the adoption of the armoured flight deck for the Midways. Though, without the British "armoured box" concept (which was simply armouring the carriers main battery ie the entire hanger), they would have still been quite vunerable to Kamakazes
Miday was commissioned on 10th September 1945, FDR on 27th October 1945 and Coral Sea on 1st October 1947. But all the ships operated with only token airgroups for some time.Originally posted by Nimits:
I was under impression that the first Midway was in service bylate 1945 (just a few months after WW2 ended).
USS Midway was commissioned 10 Sep 45.
As far as turning this game into SimPacWar, allowing wholescale redesigns and reordering of the OOB, that is best left to a Game Editor. Lets get the historical game out first.
Battleships are wonderful ships, but after six months to a year it would be apparent that CV's were the new queens of the seas (as long as we are talking about historical progression of aircraft and CV design and the war starts in late 41.) So you guys can build your Montana's and Super Yamatos, give me a few more CV's anytime. And this is coming from a Surface sailor (20 years) who never sailed a CV - combat results just don't lie and neither do the poor souls on the POW and Arizona.
As far as turning this game into SimPacWar, allowing wholescale redesigns and reordering of the OOB, that is best left to a Game Editor. Lets get the historical game out first.
Battleships are wonderful ships, but after six months to a year it would be apparent that CV's were the new queens of the seas (as long as we are talking about historical progression of aircraft and CV design and the war starts in late 41.) So you guys can build your Montana's and Super Yamatos, give me a few more CV's anytime. And this is coming from a Surface sailor (20 years) who never sailed a CV - combat results just don't lie and neither do the poor souls on the POW and Arizona.
"I propose to fight it out on this line if it takes all summer."-Note sent with Congressman Washburne from Spotsylvania, May 11, 1864, to General Halleck. - General Ulysses S. Grant
Obviously WitP is going to come with historical scenarios and campaigns when it's released.
But that doesn't preclude having an alternate history option for a campaign based on the Washington
Treaty having never been signed. This would be huge fun for those of us who are surface combat
fans and would provide a good plausible alternative to the common types of Pacific theater
campaigns we are already familiar with. It would add some extra spice to an already great
wargame.
But that doesn't preclude having an alternate history option for a campaign based on the Washington
Treaty having never been signed. This would be huge fun for those of us who are surface combat
fans and would provide a good plausible alternative to the common types of Pacific theater
campaigns we are already familiar with. It would add some extra spice to an already great
wargame.
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Teppo Saarinen
- Posts: 21
- Joined: Thu Aug 31, 2000 8:00 am
- Location: Glasgow, Scotland, UK
(I don't normally follow this thread and was just flicking through to get an idea on the game...)Originally posted by RevRick:
Regarding the South Dakota - I believe the Captain you're talking about was Gatch. And he was a wild man. During the Second Naval Battle of Guadalcanal, (15 Nov 42) The engineer had wired the breakers open in the ship, and the first time the guns fired it tripped power virtually throughout the ship - which caused them to drop the load to everything including the fire control central - which meant they were a blind charging elephant. She also made a course
But this point was very, very interesting. The last I heard of South Dakota was that the main power cables were hit by an extremely unprobable shell, and that it took some time to get the reserve net going.
The idea I'm getting from your description is that someone had manually jacked the off-load gennies circuit breakers open (open breaker=will not conduct) and when the main guns fired the on-load gennies could not cope with the sudden surge in load and tripped, causing a major power failure incl all essential services? Sounds like an extremely strange thing to do (jacking breakers open) in a combat situation.
I'd be extremely grateful if you could elaborate on this a little, if you're still following the thread.
Cheers, Teppo
"I think, so I think I am." (Err... probably...)
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Blackhorse
- Posts: 1415
- Joined: Sun Aug 20, 2000 8:00 am
- Location: Eastern US
When talking about production options we should keep the game's time scale in mind. If 1 turn = 1 day how realistic is it for the player to be scheduling capital ship construction that can not arrive for another 1,000+ turns? How many scenarios will have 1,000 turns? How many players have the time to play them?
WitP-AE -- US LCU & AI Stuff
Oddball: Why don't you knock it off with them negative waves? Why don't you dig how beautiful it is out here? Why don't you say something righteous and hopeful for a change?
Moriarty: Crap!
Oddball: Why don't you knock it off with them negative waves? Why don't you dig how beautiful it is out here? Why don't you say something righteous and hopeful for a change?
Moriarty: Crap!
Teppo;
I believe that I spoke in reverse, which is not abnormal for me. The book is about the USS Washington, and the report that crew had about the battle damage to the South Dakota at the Naval Battle of Guadalcanal on 15 Nov 42. The engineer had wired the breakers so that they would not trip and drop power of line..which had the effect of wiring the entire ship in series, I believe is the term. The information stated that when the main guns fired, that dropped the whole load from engineering and all they had were the boilers, engines, and emergency steering control. Again, I have not seen any official documentation on the battle from any source, but that is what came to me from a historical book about the other BB involved in the action. If you have any more information, let me know were it is. I read the Morison series many years ago, but I don't remember much about his report of the action except the damage included the unexploded 14"
round lodged against the #3 barbette.
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God Bless;
Rev. Rick, the tincanman
I believe that I spoke in reverse, which is not abnormal for me. The book is about the USS Washington, and the report that crew had about the battle damage to the South Dakota at the Naval Battle of Guadalcanal on 15 Nov 42. The engineer had wired the breakers so that they would not trip and drop power of line..which had the effect of wiring the entire ship in series, I believe is the term. The information stated that when the main guns fired, that dropped the whole load from engineering and all they had were the boilers, engines, and emergency steering control. Again, I have not seen any official documentation on the battle from any source, but that is what came to me from a historical book about the other BB involved in the action. If you have any more information, let me know were it is. I read the Morison series many years ago, but I don't remember much about his report of the action except the damage included the unexploded 14"
round lodged against the #3 barbette.
------------------
God Bless;
Rev. Rick, the tincanman
"Action springs not from thought, but from a readiness for responsibility.” ― Dietrich Bonhoeffer
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Greg Wilmoth
- Posts: 52
- Joined: Sun Feb 18, 2001 10:00 am
- Location: Scottsdale, Arizona, USA
Some of the earlier posts in this thread talked about ship design problems. Strategy & Tactics magazine just came out with an article I wrote on a class exercise on designing an aircraft carrier (S&T #204). It would take too long to go into detail here, but basically the class sat as the US Navy's General Board in 1931 trying to decide the characteristics of the Navy's remaining aircraft carriers under the Washington Naval Treaties. The exercise included edited versions of the actual exhibits the Board examined as testimony and evidence. The class was called Understanding Military Technology. It was part of the Strategic Studies program at the School of Advanced International Studies at The Johns Hopkins University, and anyone can get the exercise for a couple of bucks. Details can be found at http://www.sais-jhu.edu/depts/strategic/index.html Oh, and while there was no right answer for the exercise, the majority of the class unwittingly arrived at the historical outcome: two 20,000 ton carriers and one 15,000 ton carrier (i.e. the Enterprise and Yorktown, and the smaller Wasp).
[QUOTE]Originally posted by Sapphire:
Consider the following:
In mid '42 the Japanese decided to emphasize carrier production over battleships. As a result the Musashi became their last battleship, and the Shinano became a carrier. That's historical fact.
REPLY-- Why not give the Japs the ability to build a fighter, in some quantities, that, unlike the zero, stressed pilot protection equipment (self sealing tanks, armored cockpit, etc) Zeroes are fine for long distance work against an unprepared foe, but if you're going against US fighters, you want to keep those pilots alive. Especially the Japanese pilots, they were just about the best in the world, certainly the best carrier pilots.
Consider the following:
In mid '42 the Japanese decided to emphasize carrier production over battleships. As a result the Musashi became their last battleship, and the Shinano became a carrier. That's historical fact.
REPLY-- Why not give the Japs the ability to build a fighter, in some quantities, that, unlike the zero, stressed pilot protection equipment (self sealing tanks, armored cockpit, etc) Zeroes are fine for long distance work against an unprepared foe, but if you're going against US fighters, you want to keep those pilots alive. Especially the Japanese pilots, they were just about the best in the world, certainly the best carrier pilots.
Unfortunately, this idea enters the realm of hindsight. The charactor of the Japanese was such that losses were not considered as sigificant as mission accomplishment and maintenance of honor.
To a Japanese pilot, changing from a premier offensive aircraft like the Zero to a more defensively-oriented aircraft (like the Irving) was seen as a slur on their honor and skill.
Defensive capabilities were deemed unnecessary if the pilot was good enough to avoid getting shot at. Giving him a plane that was designed to take fire was telling him that he wasn't good enough to avoid taking fire.
Had the elite pilots lived long enough to be offered such planes, I think they would have refused the opportunity vigorously.
To a Japanese pilot, changing from a premier offensive aircraft like the Zero to a more defensively-oriented aircraft (like the Irving) was seen as a slur on their honor and skill.
Defensive capabilities were deemed unnecessary if the pilot was good enough to avoid getting shot at. Giving him a plane that was designed to take fire was telling him that he wasn't good enough to avoid taking fire.
Had the elite pilots lived long enough to be offered such planes, I think they would have refused the opportunity vigorously.
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Greg Wilmoth
- Posts: 52
- Joined: Sun Feb 18, 2001 10:00 am
- Location: Scottsdale, Arizona, USA
Could one of you economics majors explain how you would like to see the economy model changed? I'm not familiar with the game "Capitalism."Originally posted by Paul Dyer:
Two thoughts on this topic.
1/. ....
2/. ....
P.S. Sapphire - I'm also an economics graduate (no economist jokes please - we've heard them all). I think Pacwar succeeds because it operates on many levels. A good war game and also a good resource management game. Agree few games ever model economies properly - Capitalism is one that comes to mind. We don't want to go overboard, but I note that games in areas like managing football teams often benefit by having to also manage the finances and face resource constraints. A bit of this could enhance Pacwar, especially if you could always turn it off.
Thanks.
[QUOTE]Originally posted by grumbler:
Unfortunately, this idea enters the realm of hindsight. The charactor of the Japanese was such that losses were not considered as sigificant as mission accomplishment and maintenance of honor.
Yes, it is in the realm of hindsight, and that's the problem with all these discussions of allowing US and Japan more choices, especially those that propose to start the game before 1941. But, if you're going to let players tinker with history, you can't readily restrict them in areas that would be under the control of the military's top brass. If I'm a Jap Admiral and I say that some Jap pilots will fly a more defensive plane, that is end of discussion. Besides, what military gives their pilots a 'choice'of what plane they will be flying?
Unfortunately, this idea enters the realm of hindsight. The charactor of the Japanese was such that losses were not considered as sigificant as mission accomplishment and maintenance of honor.
Yes, it is in the realm of hindsight, and that's the problem with all these discussions of allowing US and Japan more choices, especially those that propose to start the game before 1941. But, if you're going to let players tinker with history, you can't readily restrict them in areas that would be under the control of the military's top brass. If I'm a Jap Admiral and I say that some Jap pilots will fly a more defensive plane, that is end of discussion. Besides, what military gives their pilots a 'choice'of what plane they will be flying?
One problem with for example allowing the Japanese to build a/c with different characteristics (better pilot protection and so forth) is that their design was integrated with their production abilitities and with their tactical doctrine.
The Zeke was in some ways perfect for Japan's economy and doctrine because:
1. It used a relatively inexpensive 900-ish Hp radial that ran well on low-octane fuel.
2. Because it only developed 900-ish it could not be all that robust, so it was light and maneuverable and as a by product had long range.
3. Because the plane was highly maneuverable (but not very fast) it was ideal for an a-a combat doctrine that emphasized skill at aerobatic maneuvers...
4. ... said skill (ability at aerobatics emphasizing maneuverability) being chiefly important in analyses of WWI a-a combat... (and, unfortunately for the Japanese, pretty inferior against an adequately trained Allied pilot, even one with little combat experience, as long as the Allied pilot flew a faster, rugged plane packed with cannon and remembered his lessons from combat training.)
5. ... and also being perfectly suited to the notion of a Japanese pilot being an individual Samurai and his plane his "sword."
After all, it is not as though the Japanese did not care about losses (at least I do not think they were unconcerned). Certainly a different philosophy of resignation (or even glorification) to combat losses, but minimizing losses was definiteley desirable. Instead, the Zeke was the plane that was a concurrent product of the limitations on Japanese industry in combination with their (outdated by 1941) doctrine for a-a combat.
Now, try making something like the Ki-44 and you end up with the historical product. A better plane, IMO, than the Zeke, when it worked at all, that was far less reliable, far more costly to mfr, and much more difficult to service, and that still did not compete well with many late-war Allied a/c (because it was still considerably slower than some of the late war Allied a/c).
The problem was: To make a heavier plane work you need more Hp. That requires finer machine tolerances for parts and greater combustion pressure (cause the goal is more Hp per unit of engine weight)... something for which the Japanese did not have the machine shops, machine tools, or volume of trained engineers, or the means to produce the same. Then, higher HP also means you need a more refined, higher octane aviation fuel that is more expensive to produce and which Japanese industry was not tooled up to produce in decent quantities (contra the European powers and the US, thanks to Doolittle).
To fix the problem with producing the better airplane you reduce available manpower for combat and support units (cause they are all in 2-year technical schools), you ratchet down production to minimal levels at the precise moment that you need to field the maximum number of operational a/c and their replacements, etc.
In game terms I suppose one could argue that the Japanese player should have the choice. But then, there should be very little with which to fight in 1941 and 1942... few replacement a/c, few pilots, few technicians, and not enough gasoline to go around, even before you start worying about losses caused by enemy pilots, submarines and so forth.
[This message has been edited by mdiehl (edited February 27, 2001).]
The Zeke was in some ways perfect for Japan's economy and doctrine because:
1. It used a relatively inexpensive 900-ish Hp radial that ran well on low-octane fuel.
2. Because it only developed 900-ish it could not be all that robust, so it was light and maneuverable and as a by product had long range.
3. Because the plane was highly maneuverable (but not very fast) it was ideal for an a-a combat doctrine that emphasized skill at aerobatic maneuvers...
4. ... said skill (ability at aerobatics emphasizing maneuverability) being chiefly important in analyses of WWI a-a combat... (and, unfortunately for the Japanese, pretty inferior against an adequately trained Allied pilot, even one with little combat experience, as long as the Allied pilot flew a faster, rugged plane packed with cannon and remembered his lessons from combat training.)
5. ... and also being perfectly suited to the notion of a Japanese pilot being an individual Samurai and his plane his "sword."
After all, it is not as though the Japanese did not care about losses (at least I do not think they were unconcerned). Certainly a different philosophy of resignation (or even glorification) to combat losses, but minimizing losses was definiteley desirable. Instead, the Zeke was the plane that was a concurrent product of the limitations on Japanese industry in combination with their (outdated by 1941) doctrine for a-a combat.
Now, try making something like the Ki-44 and you end up with the historical product. A better plane, IMO, than the Zeke, when it worked at all, that was far less reliable, far more costly to mfr, and much more difficult to service, and that still did not compete well with many late-war Allied a/c (because it was still considerably slower than some of the late war Allied a/c).
The problem was: To make a heavier plane work you need more Hp. That requires finer machine tolerances for parts and greater combustion pressure (cause the goal is more Hp per unit of engine weight)... something for which the Japanese did not have the machine shops, machine tools, or volume of trained engineers, or the means to produce the same. Then, higher HP also means you need a more refined, higher octane aviation fuel that is more expensive to produce and which Japanese industry was not tooled up to produce in decent quantities (contra the European powers and the US, thanks to Doolittle).
To fix the problem with producing the better airplane you reduce available manpower for combat and support units (cause they are all in 2-year technical schools), you ratchet down production to minimal levels at the precise moment that you need to field the maximum number of operational a/c and their replacements, etc.
In game terms I suppose one could argue that the Japanese player should have the choice. But then, there should be very little with which to fight in 1941 and 1942... few replacement a/c, few pilots, few technicians, and not enough gasoline to go around, even before you start worying about losses caused by enemy pilots, submarines and so forth.
[This message has been edited by mdiehl (edited February 27, 2001).]
Show me a fellow who rejects statistical analysis a priori and I'll show you a fellow who has no knowledge of statistics.
Didn't we have this conversation already?
Didn't we have this conversation already?
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Greg Wilmoth
- Posts: 52
- Joined: Sun Feb 18, 2001 10:00 am
- Location: Scottsdale, Arizona, USA
[QUOTE]Originally posted by mdiehl:
"4. ... said skill (ability at aerobatics emphasizing maneuverability) being chiefly important in analyses of WWI a-a combat... (and, unfortunately for the Japanese, pretty inferior against an adequately trained Allied pilot, even one with little combat experience, as long as the Allied pilot flew a faster, rugged plane packed with cannon and remembered his lessons from combat training.)"
Which was to use their aircraft's superior diving speed for slash and run attacks--a tactic that was learned the hard way through early losses.
[QUOTE]Originally posted by mdiehl:
"The problem was: To make a heavier plane work you need more Hp. That requires finer machine tolerances for parts and greater combustion pressure (cause the goal is more Hp per unit of engine weight)... something for which the Japanese did not have the machine shops, machine tools, or volume of trained engineers, or the means to produce the same. Then, higher HP also means you need a more refined, higher octane aviation fuel that is more expensive to produce and which Japanese industry was not tooled up to produce in decent quantities (contra the European powers and the US, thanks to Doolittle)."
Eric Bergerund in his book Fire In The Sky about the air war in the South Pacific notes the first Zero prototype was delivered to an airfield for its first test flight by ox-cart. He claims Japanese industry couldn't consistently achieve the machine tolerances necessary to manufacture key subassemblies for "second generation" WWII fighters.
It seems to me that technological uncertainty is a critical missing element. When these planes were designed and first tested (on both sides), nobody really knew how they would perform. Like someone has suggested in another thread about leaders, maybe players shouldn't know exactly how well various aircraft are rated until they are first available for production. Then they can decide what to produce. I suppose it depends on whether the purpose of the game is to set the player in the position of the historical decision makers, or to set him up as a time traveller to the past with perfect knowledge of what happened historically. Either way is an interesting game in its own right, but they are different viewpoints.
[This message has been edited by Greg Wilmoth (edited February 27, 2001).]
"4. ... said skill (ability at aerobatics emphasizing maneuverability) being chiefly important in analyses of WWI a-a combat... (and, unfortunately for the Japanese, pretty inferior against an adequately trained Allied pilot, even one with little combat experience, as long as the Allied pilot flew a faster, rugged plane packed with cannon and remembered his lessons from combat training.)"
Which was to use their aircraft's superior diving speed for slash and run attacks--a tactic that was learned the hard way through early losses.
[QUOTE]Originally posted by mdiehl:
"The problem was: To make a heavier plane work you need more Hp. That requires finer machine tolerances for parts and greater combustion pressure (cause the goal is more Hp per unit of engine weight)... something for which the Japanese did not have the machine shops, machine tools, or volume of trained engineers, or the means to produce the same. Then, higher HP also means you need a more refined, higher octane aviation fuel that is more expensive to produce and which Japanese industry was not tooled up to produce in decent quantities (contra the European powers and the US, thanks to Doolittle)."
Eric Bergerund in his book Fire In The Sky about the air war in the South Pacific notes the first Zero prototype was delivered to an airfield for its first test flight by ox-cart. He claims Japanese industry couldn't consistently achieve the machine tolerances necessary to manufacture key subassemblies for "second generation" WWII fighters.
It seems to me that technological uncertainty is a critical missing element. When these planes were designed and first tested (on both sides), nobody really knew how they would perform. Like someone has suggested in another thread about leaders, maybe players shouldn't know exactly how well various aircraft are rated until they are first available for production. Then they can decide what to produce. I suppose it depends on whether the purpose of the game is to set the player in the position of the historical decision makers, or to set him up as a time traveller to the past with perfect knowledge of what happened historically. Either way is an interesting game in its own right, but they are different viewpoints.
[This message has been edited by Greg Wilmoth (edited February 27, 2001).]
mdiehl,
Great post. You got at the heart of what I was trying (and failing) to say. All of these factors are interrelated to a degree that is simply not possible to understand, perhaps, until you have "seen the procurement elephant".
Greg, what you suggest is interesting, but doen't go far enough. In fact, no one can tell how good an aircraft (or any other) design REALLY is until it is in production and has seen combat. Them, it is too late to make the production decision - it has already been made, and all you can do is make the best of what you already have.
That is why, in the end, using either (1) historical or (2) ahistorical but random production decisions really creates the interesting decisions in the game. If both sides get to concentrate on uberweapons using hindsight, then most of the interest goes away, at least for me. It is far more interesting to try to explot the limited strengths of what you get handed, IMO, than to try to figure out what the optimal, if unrealistic, production strategy ought to be.
Probably no Admirals since Fischer ever saw the products of their design inputs, because the time lag from requirement to commisioning was longer than the time any WWII Admiral had in office. As players, if we accepted this truth, the game is much more challenging and interesting.
Great post. You got at the heart of what I was trying (and failing) to say. All of these factors are interrelated to a degree that is simply not possible to understand, perhaps, until you have "seen the procurement elephant".
Greg, what you suggest is interesting, but doen't go far enough. In fact, no one can tell how good an aircraft (or any other) design REALLY is until it is in production and has seen combat. Them, it is too late to make the production decision - it has already been made, and all you can do is make the best of what you already have.
That is why, in the end, using either (1) historical or (2) ahistorical but random production decisions really creates the interesting decisions in the game. If both sides get to concentrate on uberweapons using hindsight, then most of the interest goes away, at least for me. It is far more interesting to try to explot the limited strengths of what you get handed, IMO, than to try to figure out what the optimal, if unrealistic, production strategy ought to be.
Probably no Admirals since Fischer ever saw the products of their design inputs, because the time lag from requirement to commisioning was longer than the time any WWII Admiral had in office. As players, if we accepted this truth, the game is much more challenging and interesting.
Well, I would differ with you both on some of the finer points of detail. IMO most of the powers (possibly even Japan) knew exactly what they were getting after the first or second design go-round, with respect to durability, speed, diving/climbing characteristics, roll rate, and all that. The real question is whether or not they a) could produce a/c with different characteristics, and, b) wanted to.
Consider the P38... everyone knew from the YP38 platforms that they had a pretty good a/c. It was *very* (very very!!) fast for its, uh, design window (1940-ish for the YP variants). Likewise, the Japanese knew that the A6M had control problems at higher speeds (problem of having a thin-skinned a/c and huge control surfaces) but made no efforts to alter it until the A6M5.
I for one do *not* view the US/European focus on speed and hitting power as a design strategy that evolved by accident or through, say, some kind of selective pressure induced by combat losses (though I'm not sure that you implied that, grumbler, I may just be reading your post wrong). All the Euro/US and even the Soviet designers were going that way. Japan took a turn down a different path in the 1930s and it was just the wrong path.
One reason for the Euro/US/USSR focus on speed and hitting power may have been the perceived threat from strategic bombers and high-speed medium bombers. And though it was known by all that the US was making efforts there, no one (outside of the USAAF) expected the development of a really long range bomber. So maybe Japan simply saw no threat in the vast reaches of the Pacific and from the ultra-underdeveloped nations in close proximity to the home islands. And of course, the analyses of the Spanish Civil War already pointed to the importance of speed in "pursuit" a/c.
Greg, it is just *not* true that US pilots learned hit and run tactics as a result of attrition in 1942. Jimmy Thach was devising tactics for using the F4F against more maneuverable forces in 1940 and put his tactics to the test in Army-Navy trials (P40s vs F4Fs) in mid 1941. Zoom and boom was the tactical doctrine for the USN/USMC thereafter. The USAAF and Commonwealth forces were all thoroughly retrained beginning in late 1940 based on UK analyses of tactics and results from 1940 (resulting in the abandonment of linear formations and big sections in favor of 4-plane sections divisible as two mutually supporting units of 2 a/c.)
It shows too. I posted a brief analysis of Frank's loss list on the "a/c attributes" section in the GGPW discussion (blown away by the recent web-reset). F4Fs in 1942 typically shot down as many or more A6Ms in combat than they lost at Guadalcanal. (Claims that the Zekes were lost in surface attack, or that the numbers are affected by a/c losses due to CV loss are incorrect since both were excluded from that analysis).
More than that, there are plenty of sources describing huge IJN losses at Coral Sea as a result of a/a combat.
What I'd like to see is a good assessment of USAAF a/c vs IJN/IJA a/c for the period from January through April 1941 [* oops, 1942*] that excludes US a/c destroyed on the ground. I think that what you will find is that US a/c were only badly trounced when they had little warning of an incoming raid (& were at a tactical disadvantage at the onset of combat). The only consistent losers in the non-Chinese Allied a/c pool will be Hurricanes, F2s and P39s.
(A shame that last one. With a decent supercharger the P39 would have wiped the slate against any Japanese a/c built through 1943).
[This message has been edited by mdiehl (edited March 01, 2001).]
Consider the P38... everyone knew from the YP38 platforms that they had a pretty good a/c. It was *very* (very very!!) fast for its, uh, design window (1940-ish for the YP variants). Likewise, the Japanese knew that the A6M had control problems at higher speeds (problem of having a thin-skinned a/c and huge control surfaces) but made no efforts to alter it until the A6M5.
I for one do *not* view the US/European focus on speed and hitting power as a design strategy that evolved by accident or through, say, some kind of selective pressure induced by combat losses (though I'm not sure that you implied that, grumbler, I may just be reading your post wrong). All the Euro/US and even the Soviet designers were going that way. Japan took a turn down a different path in the 1930s and it was just the wrong path.
One reason for the Euro/US/USSR focus on speed and hitting power may have been the perceived threat from strategic bombers and high-speed medium bombers. And though it was known by all that the US was making efforts there, no one (outside of the USAAF) expected the development of a really long range bomber. So maybe Japan simply saw no threat in the vast reaches of the Pacific and from the ultra-underdeveloped nations in close proximity to the home islands. And of course, the analyses of the Spanish Civil War already pointed to the importance of speed in "pursuit" a/c.
Greg, it is just *not* true that US pilots learned hit and run tactics as a result of attrition in 1942. Jimmy Thach was devising tactics for using the F4F against more maneuverable forces in 1940 and put his tactics to the test in Army-Navy trials (P40s vs F4Fs) in mid 1941. Zoom and boom was the tactical doctrine for the USN/USMC thereafter. The USAAF and Commonwealth forces were all thoroughly retrained beginning in late 1940 based on UK analyses of tactics and results from 1940 (resulting in the abandonment of linear formations and big sections in favor of 4-plane sections divisible as two mutually supporting units of 2 a/c.)
It shows too. I posted a brief analysis of Frank's loss list on the "a/c attributes" section in the GGPW discussion (blown away by the recent web-reset). F4Fs in 1942 typically shot down as many or more A6Ms in combat than they lost at Guadalcanal. (Claims that the Zekes were lost in surface attack, or that the numbers are affected by a/c losses due to CV loss are incorrect since both were excluded from that analysis).
More than that, there are plenty of sources describing huge IJN losses at Coral Sea as a result of a/a combat.
What I'd like to see is a good assessment of USAAF a/c vs IJN/IJA a/c for the period from January through April 1941 [* oops, 1942*] that excludes US a/c destroyed on the ground. I think that what you will find is that US a/c were only badly trounced when they had little warning of an incoming raid (& were at a tactical disadvantage at the onset of combat). The only consistent losers in the non-Chinese Allied a/c pool will be Hurricanes, F2s and P39s.
(A shame that last one. With a decent supercharger the P39 would have wiped the slate against any Japanese a/c built through 1943).
[This message has been edited by mdiehl (edited March 01, 2001).]
Show me a fellow who rejects statistical analysis a priori and I'll show you a fellow who has no knowledge of statistics.
Didn't we have this conversation already?
Didn't we have this conversation already?