CV strike composition

[jwilkerson]

[/quote]

Sorry, but even treatment for carrier ops is nonsense in 1942 and 1943.

[/quote]

I'm back with some data - still advocating for even treatment for carrier ops in 1942 and 1943.

Below are the numbers of planes launched by each side in the 1942 carrier battles, note that neither side launched more than 116 planes in a wave in 1942.


Coral Sea
IJN - 69
USN - 75

Midway
IJN - 24 and 16
USN - 116 and 35 and 40

Eastern Solomons
IJN - 37 and 36
USN - 38

Santa Cruz
IJN - 62, 24, 20, 29
USN - 29, 19, 25

Both sides had coordinating difficulties ... at Midway a major chunk of the 116 plane strike turned torwards Miday and missed the battle. At Eastern Solomons the second Japanese strike missed the Americans due to a plotting officers error.

In terms of results - the IJN lost 4 CV and 2 CVL in the above actions, the USN lost 3 CV ( and another to a sub ). So it is difficult to agree with a rule that gives the Japanese an a-historical advantage in carrier operations.

[Mike Scholl]

INTERESTING. So in reality neither side should be getting more than
100 A/C in 1942 in actual battles? That would certainly be better than
the one-sided rule in place now. And the allowance would be doubled
for striking land targets like PH, Darwin, and the like? Makes sense,
as a lot more preparation would be possible when you knew in advance
that you would be striking X target from Y distance and direction---and
the rascal wasn't going to move on you in the mean time.....

[Halsey]

Good information.

So it looks to me that the CV restrictions should apply to both sides. Instead of sticking it to only the Allies. This could be useful in stopping the Death Star strategy for both sides also. It would make a two CV TF a reality instead of the exception.

[Mike Scholl]

Terrific! Someone finally presents some solid support for applying this restrictive rule
equalhandedly..., and the forum virtually ignores it. Come on, all you supporters of
the "hamstring the Allies" movement. Let's hear some well thought out response,,,,

[Halsey]

[:D][:D][:D] Nice post Mike!

[spence]

Even the IJN raids against land bases never put 200+ planes in the air in a single wave:

Pearl Harbor: 1st wave - 183 a/c; take off at 0610
2nd wave - 168 a/c: take off at 0715

Kido Butai maintained a CAP of just 9 fighters during the raids

Darwin Raid (2/19/42) - 188 carrier a/c plus 54 LBA

Ceylon Raids - hard to find specifics - apparently the first raid was approx 120 a/c

Even at Pearl Harbor where the Japanese were going all out in what Yamamoto considered a real crap shoot with nothing held back the Japanese were forced by a/c handling realities to launch in two seperate waves an hour apart.

On a related topic: the Americans have Fighter Direction Centers which don't always perform as theoretically possible; the Japanese have no Fighter Direction Centers at all; and, in that not every Zero has a radio, control their CAP with hand signals between the pilots. Yet; a la Death Star tactic, Kido Butai puts up a CAP of 100+ fighters which unfaillingly intercepts each and every one of the US CVs raids.

GEEZ, EVEN NOW OUR POOR PILOTS ARE FORCED TO USE OUTMODED PROCEDURES LIKE AWACS. HOW COME THE USN NEVER MANAGED TO DEVELOP HAND SIGNALS[&:]

[Ron Saueracker]

ORIGINAL: Mike Scholl

Terrific! Someone finally presents some solid support for applying this restrictive rule
equalhandedly..., and the forum virtually ignores it. Come on, all you supporters of
the "hamstring the Allies" movement. Let's hear some well thought out response,,,,

Another example of the lingering fact that game design is based more on earlier gaming assumptions than fact. This assumption that Japan was better at CV opshas been around since AH games.

[Halsey]

So this is pretty interesting.

I would suggest the limit of 200 with CAP aircraft included in deciding the strike package. It should be applicable to both sides. Then increasing to 300+ for the Allies in 1944.

Any developers willing to look at this?
<duck and cover>[:D]

[jwilkerson]

The following KB raids against stationary land bases contained 160-188 planes per wave.

Pearl Harbor waves 1 and 2
Darwin 1 wave
Tjilapjit 1 wave
Colombo 1 wave
Trincomalee 1 wave

Thus if possible a fix should include allowing both sides to have larger strike packages against stationary land bases. But the fix Halsey proposes is a good start.

The one 1944 "Carrier Battle" had the IJN with 4 waves and the USN with 1 wave as follows.

Philippine Sea
IJN 69, 110, 47, 82
USN 216

[spence]

A few more historical records with regards to carrier strikes: in these cases late war USN strikes.

TF38 flew 259 sorties in several waves against Kurita's TF in the Sibuyan Sea (Leyte Gulf -10/44)
Later it flew 527 sorties in several waves against the decoy carrier force off Cape Engano

TF 58 flew 380 sorties in 2 waves against the Yamato TF in April 45.

TF 58 flew 1200 sorties over the course of 2 days against Truk in Feb 44.

TF38 flew approx 2000 sorties on 7/28/45 when attacking Japanese Naval Base at Kure - haven't found any mention of waves or simultaneous sorties or how split between attacking a/c and CAP. It appears that this was the day with the most intense USN carrier operations during the war.

Admittedly it was not an exhaustive organized search but the single largest strike packaged launched during the war was the 215 plane strike launched against the IJN carrier TFs on 20 June 44 during the Battle of the Philippine Sea.

I would submit that the carrier ops penalty rule should be applied to make strikes in excess of 200 a/c most unlikely throughout the war. Strikes by more than 100 a/c against ships (but not land bases) should also be unlikely.

Unless the USN is allowed to spend supply or something to develop early war HAND SIGNALS (see previous post) instead of Fighter Direction Centers then perhaps some limitations on CAP coordination should be imposed.[;)]

[Halsey]

Good data gathering![8D]

Keep up the good work spence.[;)]

[Philwd]

I think you guys are missing the most important element here. Its not the total number of planes but rather the number of planes each CV can launch in a certain time interval. PH strike was limited by how many planes Nagumo could get into the air at one time. Coral Sea, Eastern Solomons and Santa Cruz had far fewer CVs avail to launch so the strike packages were much smaller. The land strikes really give us the raw data we need to determine how many planes could be put into the air. For the IJN it seems to be ~ 30-35 per CV or slightly under 50% of the plane complement. I would stick with a hard number rather than a % as plane losses accumulate the % will become too low.

And I totally agree that CAP for both sides is very overpowered for 1942. There is little data for '43 as the IJN hid all year but we all know how good the USN is in '44. So put '43 somewhere in the middle for CAP effectiveness. And cut '42 by a significant %.

Also one more option might be good here. A button that is either an alpha strike with the kitchen sink thrown in or a 50% strike with a reserve held back just in case. There is no easy way to do this now unless you have many CV together and just set some to port attack and rest to naval etc.

Ducking for cover now.[:D]

Quark

[jwilkerson]

I agree the problem is more complex but at the same time looking at the hard numbers can't be a bad thing.

When the IJN raided Ceylon we perhaps have the best model for what they would do when they were in control of the course of events. Launch about 180 planes at the imobile land target and 80-90 at the mobile sea target. Allowing KB to launch 180 planes and a just spotted fast moving carrier force assumes they were in "ambush mode" ... I'd go with 180-190 tops for land targets and about 100 tops for sea targets until 44.

[Halsey]

So Nik, there is no foundation to these statistics? Just curious.

[jwilkerson]

No comprende ?

[Halsey]

That one was for Nikademus.[:D] oops!

I was wondering what the historical precedent was. Not sure if he was refering to Zero's, which I think the bonus is alright also. Or, the coordination rules, regarding the limit on planes in a strike. Which I think could use a little more balance, and less bias towards the Allies.

[LargeSlowTarget]

ORIGINAL: Mike Scholl

Terrific! Someone finally presents some solid support for applying this restrictive rule
equalhandedly..., and the forum virtually ignores it. Come on, all you supporters of
the "hamstring the Allies" movement. Let's hear some well thought out response,,,,

Probably not well thought-out, but...

We started talking about numbers of CVs per TF, now we talk strike sizes, okay. I've argued that the Japanese have been using six carriers concentrated in one TF from Day 1 of the war, and tended to keep KB together for the most part (Hiryu/Soryu detached for Midway, Shok/Zuik for Coral Sea, one CV (Kaga or Akagi?) absent in the Indian Ocean due to upkeep). I also claim that the JN was able to launch coordinated strikes from those carriers, the number of a/c per strike being limited only by the inherent restrictions of carrier ops, i.e. the ability of the carriers to launch only a certain number of a/c at once. I agree that the PH strike was a maximum effort and that the JN apparently could launch slightly less than 50% of its CAG in one wave. This is already modelled by the number of carrier ops points. Furtermore I've argued that Japanese strike waves tended to have better coordination and cohesion and usually arrived (or failed to find the target) in distinct and compact waves. I have also agreed that JN CAP did not benefit from fighter direction centers and therefore should suffer a CAP penalty (or the USN a CAP benefit, or both)

On the other side, I went on to argue that the USN did not operate multi-CV-TFs early in the war due to inferior doctrine regarding carrier warfare and shortage of CVs (and pressing strategic demands which precluded concentration of CVs, I might add - theoretically they could have concentrated six fleet CVs in one TF as well). Even if several CVs were available, they were operated in seperate TFs (although Task Group would be the proper term, but that wasn't used until later in the war). The same inherent restrictions to carrier ops also applied to the USN, whose 'full deckloads' also comprised only part of the total number of a/c aboard (can someone come up with the precise number of a/c per full deckload?). From what I have read I have gained the impression that USN carrier air strikes tended to be launched and/or to arrive at the target area piecemeal and rather uncoordinated but for chance (Midway), with strike groups from different carriers not joining up, taking different paths to the target area, parts of strike groups becoming separated, lost or joining up with 'wrong' elements of other strike groups. Simply adding up the numbers of a/c launched per carrier battle doesn't say anything at all in this regard. I have also stated that the USN enjoyed a certain CAP advantage due to fighter directors, which performed less-than-optimal early in the war but became better with time.

Translated into WitP:
1a. CAP penalty for JN and/or CAP benefit for USN growing with time
1b. related to this, penalty for JN strike escorts (hand signals, few radios), none for USN
2. limit of numbers of a/c that can be launched per given time per carrier
3. limit on number of CVs that USN can operate in one TF early in the war
4. JN strikes tending to be bigger, but prone to miss the target entirely, USN strikes tending to split up in uncoordinated smaller strikes (some of which failing to find target)

Question is how #3 can be achieved - by house rules in PBEM, Malthusian 'moral restraint' if playing against AI or by denying the player the ahistorical benefits of concentrating his CVs with an early war strike penalty (or a what-if-scenario with no penalty if we assume that the USN did have an early war doctrine for concentrated CV-TFs and the means, training and experience for such operations).

[jwilkerson]

Someone who knows more about modeling carrier tactics in WWII than any of us ever will ... came to the conclusion that carrier ops in 1942 were about a 1-1 draw. The data we've presented support that. Hence some of us have difficulty supporting a rule which attempts to produce non-equal results.

This person is CPT Wayne P. Hughes Jr. ( USN Ret.) The book is "FLEET TACTICS" [ Naval Institute Press]. In this book CPT Hughes describes a model of carrier battles for WWII which predicts the results. CPT Hughes was professor of Operations Research at Monterey, CA and held the Chair of Tactical Analysis at that postgraduate school.

A key variable is whether to concentrate or disperse. LST contends that to disperse is "inferior doctrine". It is true that after the battle of Midway, Adm. King "ordered" that US carriers operate in single carrier task forces, with a ( Rear ) Admiral commanding each. However, after Midway and before mid-1943 the opportunity for the USN to have more than 2 carriers in a single task force could be numbered in a few weeks. Thus this point was moot until sufficient carriers arrived to force a resolution of doctrine. Ted Sherman had consistently argued for multi-carrier task forces before the war ( has had RAdm Yamaguchi on the Japanese side - his ideas were implemented after Midway - producing 2 and later 3 muti-carrier task forces in the IJN ... i.e. increasing dispersion vis-a-vis the pre-Midway tactics). When the war began there was no clear doctrine on the US side. Depending on your definition the US used 2 CV task forces in both of the battles before Adm.King released his order. Note that his order ( for single carrier TF ) was due to a desire to avoid suffering a reverse Midway. Also depending on your definition the IJN used 2 single carrier TFs at Coral Sea ... the distance between the carriers was 8 miles. And, actually, the IJN had more than one carrier task force in every carrier battle except Midway.

As CPT Hughes makes clear, in Naval tactics, dispersal reduces offensive firepower while concentration increases it. However, also in general, dispersal increases defense by increasing survivabilty by forcing the opponent to disperse his fire across more widely dispersed targets. This fundamental trade off must be evaluated by the Fleet Commander and the correct decision made for each circumstance.

Thus if you can survive an opponents strike - you should clearly concentrate - if you cannot - you should probably disperse. The IJN did not disperse at Midway and did not survive the enemy first strike and thus could not effectively hit back.

This question of fleet tactics is fundamental. I would submit that it should be a decision of the players as to whether to concentrate or disperse. The game should model the laws of physics not force fundamental doctrine upon the players. The so called "co-ordination" rule ... is merely a restriction on the US ... which as LST indicates is attempting to model US doctrine. Probably the Adm. King order. But by using this rule we also allow the Japanese to disperse their carriers and still operate with out any doctrinal disadvantage.

Testing has indicated that using anything more than single carrier task forces for the US will results in sub-optimal strike totals. However, if facing the "Death Star" ... the US is actually best off ( given the existence of "THE RULE" ) to use single carrier TF ... most times ( 3 out of 4 ) the Japanese only get one massive strike ... killing one CV ... the others survive and ( assuming they are in the same hex or different hexes at the same range ) still get a chance to coordinate their strikes without suffering the penalty of "THE RULE". I've actually had one test where the USN got all planes coordinated into one 200+ strike when operating with 4 single carrier TF.

So I submit that "THE RULE" has the effect in 1942 ... of encouraging the US to use the unrealistic tactic of single carrier TF when facing the Death Star. It is far more likely IRL that strike concentration would be optimized by having the ships in one TF ... but "THE RULE" prevents this ... and avoidance of the rule ... by using single carrier TF gets better concentration AND better defensive dispersal ... so "THE RULE" produces an invalid state of affairs.

For my money ... the simplest fix is to eliminate "the rule" all together ... the game already models strike coordination whether in the same TF or not. Placing additional restrictions is not having either historical results or even the desired effect.

And a final note. The historical strike totals in the 1942 carrier battles make it clear that 2 carrier task forces never launched more than 100 planes in a strike. The existing rule ( based on testing ) gives the Japanese a greater than 50/50 chance of launching well more than 50% and often 100% of the total planes on board, while ensuring that the USN rarely exceed the 50% ( one carriers worth ). The historical launch numbers for Coral Sea, Eastern Solomons and Santa Cruz just don't bare giving either side an advantage. The rule does give one side an advantage.

Occam's Razor says eliminate the rule or at least make it an option.

[LargeSlowTarget]

Don't know this book, yet... Were carrier ops a draw because both sides had more or less the same capabilities, or were they a draw because the advantages/deficits each side had canceled each other out?

[USSMaine]

ORIGINAL: Ron Saueracker

Another example of the lingering fact that game design is based more on earlier gaming assumptions than fact. This assumption that Japan was better at CV opshas been around since AH games.

Not that I disagree with your premise .... but ....

In all fairness Ron - I had a bunch of AH games - and they only had a couple dealing with carrier combat and I don't recall any rules like this - some were too simple (Midway) and others were more tactical (Flattop) perhaps SPI is more to blame