Production: a Complicated Approach
Moderators: Joel Billings, wdolson, Don Bowen, mogami
Production: a Complicated Approach
That other thread is getting too long! Need to start another...
Not sure what could be added to the production system to make the Pacific War a more interesting conflict.
Superbattleships and giant carriers and Japanese four engine bombers would be candy for some. Does either side really need big projects like this, though? The Iowas and Yamatos and B-29s are already pretty big. Not sure the game needs to allow design and production of even more expensive projects than these. Even at the size of the current BBs and CVs, is a change of design really going to matter that much?
What about the low end? Does the game need to give players the ability to build better PT boats, destroyer escorts, destroyers, and fighters? There is already a fair number of light ships and planes. The ships and planes all improve through the course of the war also, so there's a fair amount of variety to play with.
On the other hand, I agree with the author of "Production: a Simple Approach" that some production decisions, including those related to ship and plane classes, would add to the variability of the game and thus to the longevity and magnitude of its popularity. Also, although I never played the SPI War in the Pacific, I did take a look at it when one of my friends was playing it solitaire. The production system did look really interesting. The option for Japan to produce a couple of 10" BC was cool. I think those kinds of options would boost the popularity of the game by at least 15 to 20%, maybe more...
Frankly, I would like to have some choices. I'd like a choice whether to produce more or less DD, CL, CLAA, and CA. I'd like a choice whether to form more LCU and LBA. And I'd like a choice whether to put more or less into strategic weapons like heavy bombers and subs. Of course, if I get more choice, production will be more complicated... :rolleyes:
Not sure what could be added to the production system to make the Pacific War a more interesting conflict.
Superbattleships and giant carriers and Japanese four engine bombers would be candy for some. Does either side really need big projects like this, though? The Iowas and Yamatos and B-29s are already pretty big. Not sure the game needs to allow design and production of even more expensive projects than these. Even at the size of the current BBs and CVs, is a change of design really going to matter that much?
What about the low end? Does the game need to give players the ability to build better PT boats, destroyer escorts, destroyers, and fighters? There is already a fair number of light ships and planes. The ships and planes all improve through the course of the war also, so there's a fair amount of variety to play with.
On the other hand, I agree with the author of "Production: a Simple Approach" that some production decisions, including those related to ship and plane classes, would add to the variability of the game and thus to the longevity and magnitude of its popularity. Also, although I never played the SPI War in the Pacific, I did take a look at it when one of my friends was playing it solitaire. The production system did look really interesting. The option for Japan to produce a couple of 10" BC was cool. I think those kinds of options would boost the popularity of the game by at least 15 to 20%, maybe more...
Frankly, I would like to have some choices. I'd like a choice whether to produce more or less DD, CL, CLAA, and CA. I'd like a choice whether to form more LCU and LBA. And I'd like a choice whether to put more or less into strategic weapons like heavy bombers and subs. Of course, if I get more choice, production will be more complicated... :rolleyes:
-
- Posts: 52
- Joined: Sun Feb 18, 2001 10:00 am
- Location: Scottsdale, Arizona, USA
If you really want to make it complicated, (and I don't), take a look at the table of contents of I. B. Holley's book on production of aircraft for the USAAF in World War II. Which of these topics would be worth including?
Holley, Irving B. Buying Aircraft: Materiel Procurement for the Army Air Forces. U.S. Army in World War II. Center of Military History, U.S. Army. Washington, D.C.: Government Printing Office, 1989.
This volume, one of the “Green Books” series from the Army’s Center of Military History, is written by a distinguished airpower historian. It provides useful information on the U.S. aircraft industry prior and during World War II. However there is a great deal of information on such subjects as government contracting that will be of interest only to the specialist.
One valuable bit of analysis is to break the aircraft industry into four parts: (1) airframe manufacturers, (2) aircraft engine manufacturers, (3) sub-contractors, who represented a wartime expansion capacity, and (4) vendors and suppliers, who supplied everything from rivets to cockpit instruments. Of course some firms, such as Curtiss-Wright, embraced more than one part.
The Table of Contents gives a clearer idea of what the book contains.
I. Introduction
II. The Aircraft Industry on the Eve of World War II
A Survey of the Industry
The Market for Aircraft
The Domestic Civilian Market
The Export Market
The Domestic Military Market
Research and Development
Production
Financing the Aircraft Industry: 1934-38
III. Congress and the Air Arm
Authorized Strength: How Many Aircraft?
The Lassiter Board
The Lampert Committee
The Morrow Board
The Air Corps Act
The 1,800 Program in Operation
Agitation for Reconsideration
The Drum Board
The Baker Board and the Howell Commission
A New Target: 2,320
The 2,320 Act
An Evaluation
Authorizations, Appropriations, and Aircraft
Air Strength in the Booming Twenties
Air Strength in the Depression Years
Relief Funds for the Air Arm
Further Delays in Reaching Full Strength
Congress Tries Some Short Cuts, 1935-38
The Air Arm Imposes Delay
IV. Procurement Legislation, Organizations, and Administration
Organic Legislation for the Procurement of Aircraft
The Statutory Tradition
Procurement Legislation in World War I
Procurement Under the General Statutes 1918-26
Protests from the Aircraft Industry
The Air Corps Act of 1926
The Organization of the Air Arm for Procurement
The Structure of OCAC
The Materiel Division
Problems of Coordination and Command
Some Staff Difficulties
The Administration of Procurement
V. Procurement Under the Air Corps Act
Procurement: 1926-34
An Artful Evasion
Congressional Cloudburst
The Merchants of Death
The Delaney Committee
A Confusion of Issues
The Rogers Committee
Congressional Panaceas
New Procurement Policy
VI. Aircraft Procurement on the Eve of World War II
The New Policy Reconsidered
Premature Boasts
The Transport Case
Drawbacks of the New Policy
The War Department Seeks a Solution
Peacetime Procurement: A Retrospect
VII. Planning for Industrial Mobilization
The Problem
The War Department and Industrial Mobilization
The Air Corps Organization for Mobilization Planning
Air Corps Mobilization Planning
A Healthy Industry: Key to Defense
Conversion Versus Expansion
Air Corps Planning in Perspective
VIII. The Tide Turns
The President Proposes; Congress Disposes
White House Meeting
The President’s Message to Congress
The Air Corps Budget: Fiscal Year 1940
Executive Leadership
The Congress Disposes
From Bill to Statute
The First Expansion Program
The Role of Louis Johnson
The Industry’s Reaction
OCAC Conference, July 1939
The Search for a Yardstick
Data Contracts
The Yardstick Board
Tools For Planning
The Realities of September 1939
IX. Foreign Policy, Politics, and Defense
Politics and Armament
Aircraft Exports and National Defense
Aircraft Exports and Mobilization Planning
X. Requirements
An Essay on Requirements
A Mission Unknown
The Army and the Navy Agree to Disagree
The Political Factor in Requirements
Computing Requirements for Spare Parts
The Attrition Factor In Requirements
Peacetime Thinking and Wartime Requirements
Requirements Computation: A Summary
Origin of the 50,000 Figure
Hemisphere Defense Reconsidered
Aircraft Requirements in the Crisis of May 1940
XI. 50,000 Aircraft
From Slogan to Program
Matching Ends With Means
How Many of What Kind?
Productive Capacity Versus Aircraft On Hand
Planner’s Lament
There’s Danger in Numbers: The President’s “Must Program”
Programs in Evolution
The President’s New Targets
“The Numbers Racket”
Observations on the Numbers Game
Return to Reality
Schedules Versus Deliveries
An Unarmed Air Force
XII. Organizing for Production
Posing the Problem
Military Foresight
Theory and Practice
Evolution of an Organization
In Search of Coordination
The NCAC and the Air Corps
The Achievement of Coordination
The JAC in Retrospect
XIII. Legislation for Procurement
Wartime Buying With Peacetime Laws
The Problem: Inadequate Laws
The Solution: New Legislation
Return to the Hill
Procurement Law: An Appraisal
Improvising Legislation in a Crisis
The Turning Point
Emergency Legislation
Patchwork Laws
XIV. The Problem of Industrial Capacity
The Beginning of Facility Expansions
The Foundations of Policy
How Much and When?
Financing Facilities
The First Round of Expansion
Enter Detroit: Air Arm Use of the Automobile Industry
Mr. Knudsen Takes the Initiative
The Bomber Plant Program
The Reuther Plan
Leading or Lagging?
Expansion or Conversion?
Big Business and Small Business
The Facilities Problem After Pearl Harbor
The Facilities Program: An Appraisal
The Record of Achievement
The Cost in Time
Conversion or Construction?
XV. The Negotiation of Contracts
The Transition to Wartime Buying
The Variable Objectives of Military Purchasing
Speeding Procurement by Administrative Means
Manufacturers’ Resistance to Government Contracts
Special Legislation No Panacea
A Land Office Business
The Negotiation of Contracts
The Letter of Intent
The Setting for Negotiation
Negotiating in the Dark
Perfecting the Organization
A Note on Buyers and Sellers
Negotiating at High Noon
The Administration of Contracts
The Contracting Officer
Changing Concepts of the Contracting Officer
Disputes and Appeals
XVI. The Cost-Plus-Fixed-Fee Contract: Negotiation and Administration
Some Revolutionary Implications
The Fixed-Fee Problem
The Determination of Allowable Costs
Auditing and Accounting
The Problem of Property Accountability
The Relation of Primes to Subs
The Conversion of Fixed-Fee Contracts
XVII. Price Adjustment
Escalator Clauses
Excess Profits and Voluntary Refunds
Statutory Renegotiation
The Organization for Renegotiation
The Administration of Renegotiation
Renegotiation and Repricing
Renegotiation in Review
XVIII. Contract Termination
The Background of Termination
The Character of the Termination Problem
The Organization for Termination
Some Illustrative Aspects of Administration
An Afterward
XIX. Organization for Procurement
Coordination, Control, and Command
Expanding the Procurement Organization for War
Problems of Coordination and Control
The Army and the Air Arm
Cross Procurement
Procurement Assignment
Problems of Cross Procurement
Cross Procurement in Action
Centralization and Decentralization
Centralized Procurement
Military Buying Under Fire
Decentralized Procurement
The Difficulties of Decentralization
XX. Production
The Problem Defined
The Dilemma of Mass Production
More Airplanes or Better?
Willow Run: A Tooling Triumph?
Resolving the Dilemma
Modification: A Working Compromise
Coordinating Committees: An Effective Solution
XXI. The Procurement Record
A Statistical Summation
[Includes various statistical charts, including the total and yearly procurement of AAF aircraft by type and model.]
The Measure of Success
Counting the Cost
The Contribution of Industry
XXII. Some Concluding Observations on Military Procurement
What is Air Arm Procurement?
Procurement and Politics
Procurement Leadership in Wartime
Air Power and Organization
Appendices
A. Membership in the Aeronautical Chamber of Commerce; 1938
B. Wartime Producers of Aircraft
[With plant locations and production figures; by aircraft type and model for AAF, aggregate types for Navy/Marines]
C. Major Producers of Aircraft Engines: July 1940 – August 1945
[With plant locations and numbers and types of engines produced]
Holley, Irving B. Buying Aircraft: Materiel Procurement for the Army Air Forces. U.S. Army in World War II. Center of Military History, U.S. Army. Washington, D.C.: Government Printing Office, 1989.
This volume, one of the “Green Books” series from the Army’s Center of Military History, is written by a distinguished airpower historian. It provides useful information on the U.S. aircraft industry prior and during World War II. However there is a great deal of information on such subjects as government contracting that will be of interest only to the specialist.
One valuable bit of analysis is to break the aircraft industry into four parts: (1) airframe manufacturers, (2) aircraft engine manufacturers, (3) sub-contractors, who represented a wartime expansion capacity, and (4) vendors and suppliers, who supplied everything from rivets to cockpit instruments. Of course some firms, such as Curtiss-Wright, embraced more than one part.
The Table of Contents gives a clearer idea of what the book contains.
I. Introduction
II. The Aircraft Industry on the Eve of World War II
A Survey of the Industry
The Market for Aircraft
The Domestic Civilian Market
The Export Market
The Domestic Military Market
Research and Development
Production
Financing the Aircraft Industry: 1934-38
III. Congress and the Air Arm
Authorized Strength: How Many Aircraft?
The Lassiter Board
The Lampert Committee
The Morrow Board
The Air Corps Act
The 1,800 Program in Operation
Agitation for Reconsideration
The Drum Board
The Baker Board and the Howell Commission
A New Target: 2,320
The 2,320 Act
An Evaluation
Authorizations, Appropriations, and Aircraft
Air Strength in the Booming Twenties
Air Strength in the Depression Years
Relief Funds for the Air Arm
Further Delays in Reaching Full Strength
Congress Tries Some Short Cuts, 1935-38
The Air Arm Imposes Delay
IV. Procurement Legislation, Organizations, and Administration
Organic Legislation for the Procurement of Aircraft
The Statutory Tradition
Procurement Legislation in World War I
Procurement Under the General Statutes 1918-26
Protests from the Aircraft Industry
The Air Corps Act of 1926
The Organization of the Air Arm for Procurement
The Structure of OCAC
The Materiel Division
Problems of Coordination and Command
Some Staff Difficulties
The Administration of Procurement
V. Procurement Under the Air Corps Act
Procurement: 1926-34
An Artful Evasion
Congressional Cloudburst
The Merchants of Death
The Delaney Committee
A Confusion of Issues
The Rogers Committee
Congressional Panaceas
New Procurement Policy
VI. Aircraft Procurement on the Eve of World War II
The New Policy Reconsidered
Premature Boasts
The Transport Case
Drawbacks of the New Policy
The War Department Seeks a Solution
Peacetime Procurement: A Retrospect
VII. Planning for Industrial Mobilization
The Problem
The War Department and Industrial Mobilization
The Air Corps Organization for Mobilization Planning
Air Corps Mobilization Planning
A Healthy Industry: Key to Defense
Conversion Versus Expansion
Air Corps Planning in Perspective
VIII. The Tide Turns
The President Proposes; Congress Disposes
White House Meeting
The President’s Message to Congress
The Air Corps Budget: Fiscal Year 1940
Executive Leadership
The Congress Disposes
From Bill to Statute
The First Expansion Program
The Role of Louis Johnson
The Industry’s Reaction
OCAC Conference, July 1939
The Search for a Yardstick
Data Contracts
The Yardstick Board
Tools For Planning
The Realities of September 1939
IX. Foreign Policy, Politics, and Defense
Politics and Armament
Aircraft Exports and National Defense
Aircraft Exports and Mobilization Planning
X. Requirements
An Essay on Requirements
A Mission Unknown
The Army and the Navy Agree to Disagree
The Political Factor in Requirements
Computing Requirements for Spare Parts
The Attrition Factor In Requirements
Peacetime Thinking and Wartime Requirements
Requirements Computation: A Summary
Origin of the 50,000 Figure
Hemisphere Defense Reconsidered
Aircraft Requirements in the Crisis of May 1940
XI. 50,000 Aircraft
From Slogan to Program
Matching Ends With Means
How Many of What Kind?
Productive Capacity Versus Aircraft On Hand
Planner’s Lament
There’s Danger in Numbers: The President’s “Must Program”
Programs in Evolution
The President’s New Targets
“The Numbers Racket”
Observations on the Numbers Game
Return to Reality
Schedules Versus Deliveries
An Unarmed Air Force
XII. Organizing for Production
Posing the Problem
Military Foresight
Theory and Practice
Evolution of an Organization
In Search of Coordination
The NCAC and the Air Corps
The Achievement of Coordination
The JAC in Retrospect
XIII. Legislation for Procurement
Wartime Buying With Peacetime Laws
The Problem: Inadequate Laws
The Solution: New Legislation
Return to the Hill
Procurement Law: An Appraisal
Improvising Legislation in a Crisis
The Turning Point
Emergency Legislation
Patchwork Laws
XIV. The Problem of Industrial Capacity
The Beginning of Facility Expansions
The Foundations of Policy
How Much and When?
Financing Facilities
The First Round of Expansion
Enter Detroit: Air Arm Use of the Automobile Industry
Mr. Knudsen Takes the Initiative
The Bomber Plant Program
The Reuther Plan
Leading or Lagging?
Expansion or Conversion?
Big Business and Small Business
The Facilities Problem After Pearl Harbor
The Facilities Program: An Appraisal
The Record of Achievement
The Cost in Time
Conversion or Construction?
XV. The Negotiation of Contracts
The Transition to Wartime Buying
The Variable Objectives of Military Purchasing
Speeding Procurement by Administrative Means
Manufacturers’ Resistance to Government Contracts
Special Legislation No Panacea
A Land Office Business
The Negotiation of Contracts
The Letter of Intent
The Setting for Negotiation
Negotiating in the Dark
Perfecting the Organization
A Note on Buyers and Sellers
Negotiating at High Noon
The Administration of Contracts
The Contracting Officer
Changing Concepts of the Contracting Officer
Disputes and Appeals
XVI. The Cost-Plus-Fixed-Fee Contract: Negotiation and Administration
Some Revolutionary Implications
The Fixed-Fee Problem
The Determination of Allowable Costs
Auditing and Accounting
The Problem of Property Accountability
The Relation of Primes to Subs
The Conversion of Fixed-Fee Contracts
XVII. Price Adjustment
Escalator Clauses
Excess Profits and Voluntary Refunds
Statutory Renegotiation
The Organization for Renegotiation
The Administration of Renegotiation
Renegotiation and Repricing
Renegotiation in Review
XVIII. Contract Termination
The Background of Termination
The Character of the Termination Problem
The Organization for Termination
Some Illustrative Aspects of Administration
An Afterward
XIX. Organization for Procurement
Coordination, Control, and Command
Expanding the Procurement Organization for War
Problems of Coordination and Control
The Army and the Air Arm
Cross Procurement
Procurement Assignment
Problems of Cross Procurement
Cross Procurement in Action
Centralization and Decentralization
Centralized Procurement
Military Buying Under Fire
Decentralized Procurement
The Difficulties of Decentralization
XX. Production
The Problem Defined
The Dilemma of Mass Production
More Airplanes or Better?
Willow Run: A Tooling Triumph?
Resolving the Dilemma
Modification: A Working Compromise
Coordinating Committees: An Effective Solution
XXI. The Procurement Record
A Statistical Summation
[Includes various statistical charts, including the total and yearly procurement of AAF aircraft by type and model.]
The Measure of Success
Counting the Cost
The Contribution of Industry
XXII. Some Concluding Observations on Military Procurement
What is Air Arm Procurement?
Procurement and Politics
Procurement Leadership in Wartime
Air Power and Organization
Appendices
A. Membership in the Aeronautical Chamber of Commerce; 1938
B. Wartime Producers of Aircraft
[With plant locations and production figures; by aircraft type and model for AAF, aggregate types for Navy/Marines]
C. Major Producers of Aircraft Engines: July 1940 – August 1945
[With plant locations and numbers and types of engines produced]
Heeeelllppp!!!!!
That really would be a game all by itself! Imagine players representing the different factions, the President, each of the services, and each of the major manufacturers, all trying to win something, and the AXIS hardly figuring into it but representing an obstacle for the different players as a sort of random event generator:
"Japanese aircraft prove completely superior to P-39 Airacobra!"
What I would really like to see is just some slide bars or something to set production priorities to heavy bomber, medium bomber, light bomber, fighter-bomber, fighter, naval bomber, naval fighter, DD, CL, CLAA, CA, BB, CVL, CV, and land combat units. That way priorities could be adjusted according to the strategy you wish to pursue. The selected priorities would get faster developement and more resources. :rolleyes:
That really would be a game all by itself! Imagine players representing the different factions, the President, each of the services, and each of the major manufacturers, all trying to win something, and the AXIS hardly figuring into it but representing an obstacle for the different players as a sort of random event generator:
"Japanese aircraft prove completely superior to P-39 Airacobra!"
What I would really like to see is just some slide bars or something to set production priorities to heavy bomber, medium bomber, light bomber, fighter-bomber, fighter, naval bomber, naval fighter, DD, CL, CLAA, CA, BB, CVL, CV, and land combat units. That way priorities could be adjusted according to the strategy you wish to pursue. The selected priorities would get faster developement and more resources. :rolleyes:
- madflava13
- Posts: 1501
- Joined: Wed Feb 07, 2001 10:00 am
- Location: Alexandria, VA
I really like the slider bar idea. I think that might be the most workable solution to this problem. It definitely seems do-able. I imagine that if you put the slide bar all the way to "heavy bombers", then you may be pumping out B-17s or -24s, but there's only a trickle of B-25s, or Dauntlesses reaching the aircraft pool. The player still has to make strategic decisions about what airframes are most needed- especially factoring in wartime attrition, but the model is simple enough that you don't need to be an aconomics major to figure it out. I also imagine that individual factories could still be given build orders ("Build P-40", etc.) but the factories set to build whatever the slider is set on will have production bonuses whereas the other factories have negative production bonuses. I like it. Great suggestion!
"The Paraguayan Air Force's request for spraying subsidies was not as Paraguayan as it were..."
Bravo!!!!!
May I have the honor of seconding madflava's and warpups suggestions? Its stated much better than anything I've come up with so far. I like the slider bar (or even percentages)as a possible solution and assigning values to airframes, hulls etc. COULD even make for a good game as G. Wilmoth suggests.
May I have the honor of seconding madflava's and warpups suggestions? Its stated much better than anything I've come up with so far. I like the slider bar (or even percentages)as a possible solution and assigning values to airframes, hulls etc. COULD even make for a good game as G. Wilmoth suggests.
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- Posts: 80
- Joined: Sun Jun 11, 2000 8:00 am
- Location: Waterford WI, USA
Great ideas! I am a poor one to speak, as I am an economics major(once, a long time ago). By being able to vary the basic assumptions, i.e., how many of what when, we can make the game last much longer. The games that have lasted, like the SP series, have features that accomplish this like scenario editors, instant battles etc.
By enforcing historical orders of battle, with a little variation, we can only vary our play. By allowing significantly different OOBs, we vary the underlying assumptions of our strategies. Having the players start long enough before the War to enable different starting forces would be another feature that would add longevity. I think a choice of interface, like sliders or a complicated text based would be something to look at. They could both have the same production effect, just allowing more or less tweaking. R & D and the uncertainty of results would also be nice. Kind of like the untried unit kind of thing, but in equipment. The combat effect of logistics is also a factor, as the effect of arty is measured in tons of ammo, not tubes to shoot it. Too much already.
By enforcing historical orders of battle, with a little variation, we can only vary our play. By allowing significantly different OOBs, we vary the underlying assumptions of our strategies. Having the players start long enough before the War to enable different starting forces would be another feature that would add longevity. I think a choice of interface, like sliders or a complicated text based would be something to look at. They could both have the same production effect, just allowing more or less tweaking. R & D and the uncertainty of results would also be nice. Kind of like the untried unit kind of thing, but in equipment. The combat effect of logistics is also a factor, as the effect of arty is measured in tons of ammo, not tubes to shoot it. Too much already.
When in doubt, go on line.
The slidebar is simple but effective solution to use. Anyone played the "Settlers" games? I know in the Settlers II the production system and distribution of resources are set with slide bars. There is even a system to set the priority of what resource or material gets transported around first. Those who have played the game will know what I'm talking about.
In War in the Pacific you could use the slide bard to prioritize what natural resources get loaded and delivered first and wether the resource should go to producing ships,tanks or planes..So if you've got plenty of tanks, why not devote more steel to build to ships
In War in the Pacific you could use the slide bard to prioritize what natural resources get loaded and delivered first and wether the resource should go to producing ships,tanks or planes..So if you've got plenty of tanks, why not devote more steel to build to ships
-
- Posts: 45
- Joined: Thu Jul 05, 2001 8:00 am
- Location: Toledo,oh
The slider bar idea is a good one. What we really need to determine is steel, iron ore, coal, oil, and other resource production of the beligerents. A good resource for this is The History Book Clubs' Encyclopedia of Facts & Figures. I will put some of these stats in this forum soon.
We should be able to determine what to convert to different classes. The Junyo and Hiyo were converted from liners. The Shoho and Zuiho were converted from fast oilers. The Chitose and Chiyoda were seaplane carriers. The Independence class was converted from Cleveland class CLs. The list goes on and on. The Mogami class was originally a CL. All of these options were available and should be available in some aspect for the game.
More production should take place elsewhere as well. Taipei, Formosa produced aircraft and parts during the war.
Also, besides war material production, a slider should be used for technology such as radar, jet engines, and nuclear power.
Another aspect that could be considered is controlling production from pre-1941. If I was the Japanese I would not have dumped so many resources into 4 Yamato class BBs (4 laid down, 2 finished as BB, 1 as CV, 1 cancelled). Both the Japs and Americans had very interesting ships commissioned in the 30's: Tone class CA (1939), Shokaku class CV (1941), Zuiho class CVL (1940), Katori class CL (1940--only made 18 knots??), Yorktown class (1939-1941). I would like to determine things like this from a prewar stand point.
We should be able to determine what tanks are in what units. An AFV could mean anything. The Jap tanks were pathetic for the most part but it would be neat to pick em just like in War in Russia.
I think there should also be regular artillery and coastal artillery/ fortications. Guns like this were used in Singapore and Fort Drum. The Singapore guns were removed and taken to Tarawa.
We should be able to produce mines, torpedoes, ammunition, etc... Upgrades in technology should be available.
These are just ideas that I am rattling off the top of my head. What does everyone else think??
We should be able to determine what to convert to different classes. The Junyo and Hiyo were converted from liners. The Shoho and Zuiho were converted from fast oilers. The Chitose and Chiyoda were seaplane carriers. The Independence class was converted from Cleveland class CLs. The list goes on and on. The Mogami class was originally a CL. All of these options were available and should be available in some aspect for the game.
More production should take place elsewhere as well. Taipei, Formosa produced aircraft and parts during the war.
Also, besides war material production, a slider should be used for technology such as radar, jet engines, and nuclear power.
Another aspect that could be considered is controlling production from pre-1941. If I was the Japanese I would not have dumped so many resources into 4 Yamato class BBs (4 laid down, 2 finished as BB, 1 as CV, 1 cancelled). Both the Japs and Americans had very interesting ships commissioned in the 30's: Tone class CA (1939), Shokaku class CV (1941), Zuiho class CVL (1940), Katori class CL (1940--only made 18 knots??), Yorktown class (1939-1941). I would like to determine things like this from a prewar stand point.
We should be able to determine what tanks are in what units. An AFV could mean anything. The Jap tanks were pathetic for the most part but it would be neat to pick em just like in War in Russia.
I think there should also be regular artillery and coastal artillery/ fortications. Guns like this were used in Singapore and Fort Drum. The Singapore guns were removed and taken to Tarawa.
We should be able to produce mines, torpedoes, ammunition, etc... Upgrades in technology should be available.
These are just ideas that I am rattling off the top of my head. What does everyone else think??
Dan,
Look up production- a simple approach- first it contains several references to your suggestions... There have been many posts on this over the past year. However it also pretty much eliminates these options as too cumbersome for this game to operate at all, (its almost a game of supply/demand in itself!).
I too would love a pre-war political and supply type beginning to a grand strategic wargame...maybe when online gaming becomes more popular... (online servers vs CD-ROMS
)
Look up production- a simple approach- first it contains several references to your suggestions... There have been many posts on this over the past year. However it also pretty much eliminates these options as too cumbersome for this game to operate at all, (its almost a game of supply/demand in itself!).
I too would love a pre-war political and supply type beginning to a grand strategic wargame...maybe when online gaming becomes more popular... (online servers vs CD-ROMS

I do not mean to pick on you, but this is exactly what I do NOT want. I think PACWAR is where we need to look for the right way to handle production, not in the actual way that this new game should work as PACWAR is oversimplified, but in the level of importance it plays in the game. It is important, as it should be, but it is NOT the focus, or even in the top three in importance IMO. Sure you want to make sure you stop building P39's, but I play PACWAR to sink enemy ships and take their bases. I want to play as Nimitz, Yamamoto, or Montbatten, not the Quartermaster General.Originally posted by Greg Wilmoth:
If you really want to make it complicated, (and I don't).....
Ringbolt
LtCom: "Sgt. Lee, is that a Navy
Cross I see you wearing?"
Sgt. Lee: "No Sir, it's three."
Cross I see you wearing?"
Sgt. Lee: "No Sir, it's three."
I do not mean to pick on you, but this is exactly what I do NOT want. I think PACWAR is where we need to look for the right way to handle production, not in the actual way that this new game should work as PACWAR is oversimplified, but in the level of importance it plays in the game. It is important, as it should be, but it is NOT the focus, or even in the top three in importance IMO. Sure you want to make sure you stop building P39's, but I play PACWAR to sink enemy ships and take their bases. I want to play as Nimitz, Yamamoto, or Montbatten, not the Quartermaster General.Originally posted by Greg Wilmoth:
If you really want to make it complicated, (and I don't).....
Ringbolt
LtCom: "Sgt. Lee, is that a Navy
Cross I see you wearing?"
Sgt. Lee: "No Sir, it's three."
Cross I see you wearing?"
Sgt. Lee: "No Sir, it's three."
The sliders sound good, but you've got to be careful how much you can control. If you start directing raw materials towards a particular industry, there has to be a way of knowing how much material and resources are required to support it. If you are allowed to build more carriers, exactly how much steel does that require? And how do you manage naval aircraft production to ensure you have enough planes to outfit the ships? If there is too much input by the human, you run the risk of trying to build lots of carriers and tying up you entire industry doing so only to find that nothing is being produced because you only made 25% of the widgets that you need to make as much as you'd planned.
I could see where you could use sliders to direct general production, e.g., aircraft vs. ships or heavy planes vs. light. After that, the computer is going to have to give you some assistance. I think the best way to do it is to rank priorities in production so that the computer fills all the material needs for your number one priority first, then the second, and so on until it runs out of material. The items at the bottom of the list may never get made because higher priority items have drained off the required material/production capacity. The computer would have to graphically show you the results so that you KNOW that something won't be made. You would get some kind of a chart that shows that the steel dried up after being committed to your first five priorities. If there isn't enough steel to make the tanks that you've got low on the production list, then you may just have to readjust the slider and make fewer battleships thus freeing up some steel resources.
And what would the raw materials be that would be used as input? Steel, of course. But what else? Aluminum? Rubber? Basically everything was steel, so I just don't see many options here - at least for the Allies. The Japanese would have to worry about oil and rubber. But, then, oil is probably more of an operational problem than a production problem and can be kept out of the production mix.
An easy method of handling it while still leaving production entirely in the player's control would be to just have generic raw material points that you can spread around as you see fit. Same thing with manufacturing capacity. You've got 500 resource points to divide among tanks, infantry, different classes of ships, and aircraft. You've got 200 manufacturing points to divide among shipyards, a/c plants and tank factories. Aircraft may require fewer resource points but more manufacturing points. Capital ships may require more resource points but fewer manufacturing points (or maybe not). But that would be an easy way to do it. And if you have enough resource points to make a lot of something but not enough manufacturing points - sorry! You'll just have to strike something off the Christmas list and readjust your production until you're using both at maximum capacity.
A long post, but necessary. Controlling production is a lot of fun, but only so long as you know what the problems and bottlenecks will be in advance.
I could see where you could use sliders to direct general production, e.g., aircraft vs. ships or heavy planes vs. light. After that, the computer is going to have to give you some assistance. I think the best way to do it is to rank priorities in production so that the computer fills all the material needs for your number one priority first, then the second, and so on until it runs out of material. The items at the bottom of the list may never get made because higher priority items have drained off the required material/production capacity. The computer would have to graphically show you the results so that you KNOW that something won't be made. You would get some kind of a chart that shows that the steel dried up after being committed to your first five priorities. If there isn't enough steel to make the tanks that you've got low on the production list, then you may just have to readjust the slider and make fewer battleships thus freeing up some steel resources.
And what would the raw materials be that would be used as input? Steel, of course. But what else? Aluminum? Rubber? Basically everything was steel, so I just don't see many options here - at least for the Allies. The Japanese would have to worry about oil and rubber. But, then, oil is probably more of an operational problem than a production problem and can be kept out of the production mix.
An easy method of handling it while still leaving production entirely in the player's control would be to just have generic raw material points that you can spread around as you see fit. Same thing with manufacturing capacity. You've got 500 resource points to divide among tanks, infantry, different classes of ships, and aircraft. You've got 200 manufacturing points to divide among shipyards, a/c plants and tank factories. Aircraft may require fewer resource points but more manufacturing points. Capital ships may require more resource points but fewer manufacturing points (or maybe not). But that would be an easy way to do it. And if you have enough resource points to make a lot of something but not enough manufacturing points - sorry! You'll just have to strike something off the Christmas list and readjust your production until you're using both at maximum capacity.
A long post, but necessary. Controlling production is a lot of fun, but only so long as you know what the problems and bottlenecks will be in advance.

Byron,
Of no real importance whatsoever- I read a book on Mr Wrigley (yes, the chewing gum!) It noted that Wrigley had to convince the War Production Board of his products necessity because the US was so short of rubber that they started to import guava sap from abundant trees in S. America to make artificial rubber.
Mr Wrigley conviced them so well that he got valuable cargo space on the ships transporting guava products to include chicle for his gum. He even got the right to pack C-Rations (or K-rations as they called them then) and put a stick of gum in each one. Thats production in my book!
Jim
Of no real importance whatsoever- I read a book on Mr Wrigley (yes, the chewing gum!) It noted that Wrigley had to convince the War Production Board of his products necessity because the US was so short of rubber that they started to import guava sap from abundant trees in S. America to make artificial rubber.
Mr Wrigley conviced them so well that he got valuable cargo space on the ships transporting guava products to include chicle for his gum. He even got the right to pack C-Rations (or K-rations as they called them then) and put a stick of gum in each one. Thats production in my book!
Jim
Huh? I don't understand your point. More likely, you weren't able to discern mine from my ramblings.
The most important point is that, regardless of how detailed the production is in the game, the game needs to provide the human with a clear picture of what the results of the human's decisions are going to be. I refer you to Talonsoft's Twelve O'Clock High: Bombing the Reich game (also by Gary). The German has the ability to change production of various kinds of aircraft. He also has to be sure to convert factories to make the proper engines and parts for that aircraft. Sometimes the aircraft aren't produced in the quantities expected or they don't produce at all, and the game provides no explanation. It could be that there is an engine shortfall because other plane models have priority, or rail damage or a shortage of electricity is preventing a necessary resource from reaching the factory, or some other reason. The point is that the human player doesn't know why the desired aircraft is not being produced and, hence, does not know how to rectify the situation. It just doesn't happen, and you are left wondering if there is a bug in the program.
I can see where WiP:SAJ could have the same frustrating problems. You set sliders to build lots of battleships and four-engined bombers, but you only get a trickle. The game needs to let you know why. If resources are an issue, it needs to let you know how many are on hand and how much each item being produced requires. If the Japanese are sinking all the guava, chicle, and rubber ships, then you need to have an indication so that you can say, "Hmmm. Guess I need to provide more escorts" or at least know that you can't count on having chewing gum and had better plan on something else. The point is: the game needs to tell me that if I set my production a certain way, I will get X number of ships. If there is some other factor that could increase/decrease that figure, I need to know that factor's status as well. Don't leave me wondering why I'm not getting the expected results, or these forums (fora?) will be burning up with people asking what the heck is going on. It is a plea to design the production system - whatever it ends up being - right the first time.
The other point that emerged only as I wrote is that a priority-based system would be ideal. I can envision an interactive chart with the various items being produced listed down the side, and then columns for desired quantity produced per month (ships would be handled differently), a column for the required amount of each necessary resource input (rubber, steel, etc.) to make the desired number, a similar column showing the amount of resources actually on hand that will be devoted to making the item, and a column showing actual output. Thus, you might desire 100 tanks per month, it requires 10 points of steel, but there is only 8 points of steel available in the third column, which results in the actual output column showing only 80 tanks being produced. You would then rank each item to be produced by numeric priority. The computer would provide the necessary resources to build the highest priority units until the resources run out.
You could then design your production by either:
1. Building as much of the high priority stuff as you want/can and just not build lower priority stuff because there are insufficient resources (and you would know this because the quantity produced column would be zero as would the quantity on hand of whatever resource is lacking), or
2. Set up your production carefully so that you're making some of everything by scaling back the desired production quantity of the high priority stuff to provide sufficient resources to trickle down to lower priority. If you fell asleep at the switch and didn't check the chart for a month, and if there was a decrease in resource quantities, the priority of resources would still go to the high priority stuff, and the low priority stuff would stop being produced until you reset the desired production figures again.
You might also be able to push a button to instruct the computer to decrease all production by the same percentage if there is a shortfall in resources. For example, once you've set up your production, if there is a 5% decrease in rubber for some reason, all items requiring rubber would decrease production by 5% (assuming you were using all the rubber available) instead of having the lowest priority production item taking the full brunt of the rubber decrease.
Finally, if there are production delays due to converting to a new design, the computer would give you a note off to the side. You would then know that there will be a one month delay if you retool the P-40 factory to make P-38's. In some instances, the computer may not give you any advanced warning of a delay, and these would represent unanticipated delays, e.g., problems in converting cruisers to carriers. Though not anticipated, and though the computer may not tell you how long the delay will last, you will still know that the item will not be produced due to a delay.
I like this idea because it provides me with maximum control of production, I can see graphically exactly at what rate things are being produced, exactly why things are NOT being produced and what I need to change, and I believe this is an exceptionally easy thing to program. You are simply putting in visual form the exact same math computations that the computer is going to have to do anyway.
The most important point is that, regardless of how detailed the production is in the game, the game needs to provide the human with a clear picture of what the results of the human's decisions are going to be. I refer you to Talonsoft's Twelve O'Clock High: Bombing the Reich game (also by Gary). The German has the ability to change production of various kinds of aircraft. He also has to be sure to convert factories to make the proper engines and parts for that aircraft. Sometimes the aircraft aren't produced in the quantities expected or they don't produce at all, and the game provides no explanation. It could be that there is an engine shortfall because other plane models have priority, or rail damage or a shortage of electricity is preventing a necessary resource from reaching the factory, or some other reason. The point is that the human player doesn't know why the desired aircraft is not being produced and, hence, does not know how to rectify the situation. It just doesn't happen, and you are left wondering if there is a bug in the program.
I can see where WiP:SAJ could have the same frustrating problems. You set sliders to build lots of battleships and four-engined bombers, but you only get a trickle. The game needs to let you know why. If resources are an issue, it needs to let you know how many are on hand and how much each item being produced requires. If the Japanese are sinking all the guava, chicle, and rubber ships, then you need to have an indication so that you can say, "Hmmm. Guess I need to provide more escorts" or at least know that you can't count on having chewing gum and had better plan on something else. The point is: the game needs to tell me that if I set my production a certain way, I will get X number of ships. If there is some other factor that could increase/decrease that figure, I need to know that factor's status as well. Don't leave me wondering why I'm not getting the expected results, or these forums (fora?) will be burning up with people asking what the heck is going on. It is a plea to design the production system - whatever it ends up being - right the first time.
The other point that emerged only as I wrote is that a priority-based system would be ideal. I can envision an interactive chart with the various items being produced listed down the side, and then columns for desired quantity produced per month (ships would be handled differently), a column for the required amount of each necessary resource input (rubber, steel, etc.) to make the desired number, a similar column showing the amount of resources actually on hand that will be devoted to making the item, and a column showing actual output. Thus, you might desire 100 tanks per month, it requires 10 points of steel, but there is only 8 points of steel available in the third column, which results in the actual output column showing only 80 tanks being produced. You would then rank each item to be produced by numeric priority. The computer would provide the necessary resources to build the highest priority units until the resources run out.
You could then design your production by either:
1. Building as much of the high priority stuff as you want/can and just not build lower priority stuff because there are insufficient resources (and you would know this because the quantity produced column would be zero as would the quantity on hand of whatever resource is lacking), or
2. Set up your production carefully so that you're making some of everything by scaling back the desired production quantity of the high priority stuff to provide sufficient resources to trickle down to lower priority. If you fell asleep at the switch and didn't check the chart for a month, and if there was a decrease in resource quantities, the priority of resources would still go to the high priority stuff, and the low priority stuff would stop being produced until you reset the desired production figures again.
You might also be able to push a button to instruct the computer to decrease all production by the same percentage if there is a shortfall in resources. For example, once you've set up your production, if there is a 5% decrease in rubber for some reason, all items requiring rubber would decrease production by 5% (assuming you were using all the rubber available) instead of having the lowest priority production item taking the full brunt of the rubber decrease.
Finally, if there are production delays due to converting to a new design, the computer would give you a note off to the side. You would then know that there will be a one month delay if you retool the P-40 factory to make P-38's. In some instances, the computer may not give you any advanced warning of a delay, and these would represent unanticipated delays, e.g., problems in converting cruisers to carriers. Though not anticipated, and though the computer may not tell you how long the delay will last, you will still know that the item will not be produced due to a delay.
I like this idea because it provides me with maximum control of production, I can see graphically exactly at what rate things are being produced, exactly why things are NOT being produced and what I need to change, and I believe this is an exceptionally easy thing to program. You are simply putting in visual form the exact same math computations that the computer is going to have to do anyway.

- madflava13
- Posts: 1501
- Joined: Wed Feb 07, 2001 10:00 am
- Location: Alexandria, VA
I think we're all getting off track here with the idea of resource allocation and production complexity. If you want to assign resources to factories or worry about getting enough steel, play a game like Command and Conquer or Pharaoh - there's plenty of resource management in those games. I want to worry about which ships are in which task force, who's commanding, and what they're doing. Personally, I think Pacwar's model was not oversimplified - it was right on. I don't care about How many tons of steel it takes to make a Brooklyn Class CL. Thats an entirely seperate game. Just give me the damn CL so I can fight with it. I would be happy if WITP has arrival dates like Pacwar, and very limited ability to change production (ie Pacwar's factory menu). Also, a simple slider would be nice to designate focus on say heavy bombers vs. tacbombers, fighters vs. bombers, etc... Escorts v. capital chips, you get the idea...I don't mean to offend anyone who wants to micromanage the factories, but thats not what this game should be about, IMHO, and putting that into it will only hurt the actual game itself. My opinions - let me know what you think.
"The Paraguayan Air Force's request for spraying subsidies was not as Paraguayan as it were..."
I think yours is a legitimate approach for two reasons:
1. It's historical; and
2. Many people just want to shoot the bullets and not worry where they come from. It is, after, a wargame and not a production game.
However, as has stated on this and other threads, historical production limits replayability (not that anyone can play a game of this magnitude too many times) because:
1. You are given the same tools to fight the war, which limits your ability to try different strategies; and
2. You (unrealistically) know what and when the opposing side gets what kind of material.
In addition, some of us (like myself) are interested in the logistics involved. We would like to be able to mold the war in the way we wish it molded. There happened to be a two-pronged strategy in the Pacific because we had two strong-willed commanders, MacArthur and Halsey, neither of which were willing to be outshone by the other. Well, now I'm in charge, I don't have to keep some other ego inflated, and I'd like to set the grand strategy myself and tailor my forces accordingly. I can do that better if I can tell the War Department what I need built to prosecute that strategy.
Bottom line: I want some control over production - more than just deciding when a factory converts from F4F's to Corsairs. It doesn't really matter how detailed the process is so long as I have control over what rolls off the end of the production line. I agree that there should be some limits on extreme production decisions, and whether that is hard-coded or factored in as penalties in a "free market" production system doesn't matter.
I don't need to have resource allocation be a part of the game, though my personality would enjoy it. I can see where others, such as yourself, would consider it a distraction. As stated earlier (probably on another thread) the answer may be just to have the option to play purely historical with no production inputs and an option to play with a more flexible (and better
) production system. Player's choice. My guess is that the design team will not make it as detailed as some have suggested due to time and money constraints.
1. It's historical; and
2. Many people just want to shoot the bullets and not worry where they come from. It is, after, a wargame and not a production game.
However, as has stated on this and other threads, historical production limits replayability (not that anyone can play a game of this magnitude too many times) because:
1. You are given the same tools to fight the war, which limits your ability to try different strategies; and
2. You (unrealistically) know what and when the opposing side gets what kind of material.
In addition, some of us (like myself) are interested in the logistics involved. We would like to be able to mold the war in the way we wish it molded. There happened to be a two-pronged strategy in the Pacific because we had two strong-willed commanders, MacArthur and Halsey, neither of which were willing to be outshone by the other. Well, now I'm in charge, I don't have to keep some other ego inflated, and I'd like to set the grand strategy myself and tailor my forces accordingly. I can do that better if I can tell the War Department what I need built to prosecute that strategy.
Bottom line: I want some control over production - more than just deciding when a factory converts from F4F's to Corsairs. It doesn't really matter how detailed the process is so long as I have control over what rolls off the end of the production line. I agree that there should be some limits on extreme production decisions, and whether that is hard-coded or factored in as penalties in a "free market" production system doesn't matter.
I don't need to have resource allocation be a part of the game, though my personality would enjoy it. I can see where others, such as yourself, would consider it a distraction. As stated earlier (probably on another thread) the answer may be just to have the option to play purely historical with no production inputs and an option to play with a more flexible (and better


I could not have said it better myself. War is about blowing stuff up and killing your enemy. I also think Pacwar was right on with its level of detail given to production, just enough for it to be watched but NOT a primary concern. Any time spent on overcomplicating production is time that could be used to develope deeper and more acurate combat, which is what this game should be about IMO, not counting beans.Originally posted by madflava13:
I don't mean to offend anyone who wants to micromanage the factories, but thats not what this game should be about, IMHO, and putting that into it will only hurt the actual game itself. My opinions - let me know what you think.
Ringbolt
LtCom: "Sgt. Lee, is that a Navy
Cross I see you wearing?"
Sgt. Lee: "No Sir, it's three."
Cross I see you wearing?"
Sgt. Lee: "No Sir, it's three."
I disagree with both the above.
A computer enables you to handle easily
alot of chrome that you cannot with a board game for example.
A computer could easily handle the supply
distribution in a game like CNA whereas
manual handling is a time intensive pain staking chore.
Pacwar is an example of that oversimplification. It would be sad if
WITP ends up being no more than an
enhanced Pacwar.
Of course I think that is unlikely since
you can compare USAAF to TOH and see
that Gary tends to expand the simulation
to the limits of the hardware, and I say
that is good.
(Of course I still wonder if bombing Steel
affects repair rate.)
I observe that there are apparently two
factions trying to promote a polarized
view. I doubt that we will see a unified
consensus.
A computer enables you to handle easily
alot of chrome that you cannot with a board game for example.
A computer could easily handle the supply
distribution in a game like CNA whereas
manual handling is a time intensive pain staking chore.
Pacwar is an example of that oversimplification. It would be sad if
WITP ends up being no more than an
enhanced Pacwar.
Of course I think that is unlikely since
you can compare USAAF to TOH and see
that Gary tends to expand the simulation
to the limits of the hardware, and I say
that is good.
(Of course I still wonder if bombing Steel
affects repair rate.)
I observe that there are apparently two
factions trying to promote a polarized
view. I doubt that we will see a unified
consensus.
“It is clear that the individual who persecutes a man, his brother, because he is not of the same opinion, is a monster.”
Voltaire
'For those with faith, no proof is needed. For those without faith, no proof is enough'
French Priest
"Statistic
Voltaire
'For those with faith, no proof is needed. For those without faith, no proof is enough'
French Priest
"Statistic
Byron,
I was replying to your third paragraph about steel being the only real "need" for the allies... Then your right- I went into a ramble myself! (I thought that Mr Wrigley's solution was a novel way to get around restrictions!)
Now as for the posts about production- this is exactly what this forum is for...simple or complicated, I happen to like playing supply/demand type games as a part of the strategy genre. I do like Pacwar- just that as posted above I CANT change history with pre-programmed limits on a game... As Chiteng posted -its pretty much AI driven choices anyhow- make it an option for players and those that want to- make it manual choices, those that dont -keep on steaming!
I agree that there are basically two trains of thought going here- I dont mind opposing points of view- I see what Ringbolt's saying, Madflava just wants to do battle- OK by me... I seem to agree more with Byrons point of view, believing that the advancements in CPU's allow us more choices than ever before as Chiteng said. (as I've said before- look at Pong 20 yrs ago, did we stop pushing the envelope then? Nope, why stop now?...)
So maybe someone is reading this and will design a supply/demand WWII game that sends us strategy types away happy??? (well I CAN dream, cant I?)
Oh well
just a thought...
I was replying to your third paragraph about steel being the only real "need" for the allies... Then your right- I went into a ramble myself! (I thought that Mr Wrigley's solution was a novel way to get around restrictions!)
Now as for the posts about production- this is exactly what this forum is for...simple or complicated, I happen to like playing supply/demand type games as a part of the strategy genre. I do like Pacwar- just that as posted above I CANT change history with pre-programmed limits on a game... As Chiteng posted -its pretty much AI driven choices anyhow- make it an option for players and those that want to- make it manual choices, those that dont -keep on steaming!
I agree that there are basically two trains of thought going here- I dont mind opposing points of view- I see what Ringbolt's saying, Madflava just wants to do battle- OK by me... I seem to agree more with Byrons point of view, believing that the advancements in CPU's allow us more choices than ever before as Chiteng said. (as I've said before- look at Pong 20 yrs ago, did we stop pushing the envelope then? Nope, why stop now?...)
So maybe someone is reading this and will design a supply/demand WWII game that sends us strategy types away happy??? (well I CAN dream, cant I?)
Oh well
just a thought...