Dream Features

[Adnan Meshuggi]

Originally posted by mdiehl:
Another point. The super experienced IJN aviators of 1941-1942 fought the highly trained USN aviators of 1941 and 1942 to a nearly dead-even draw in turns of combat a/c lost. By 1943, Kido Butai would have had several additional problems:

1. The overwhelming superiority of US a/c technical capability.

2. American aviators that would have both outnumbered them and, quite likely, had more training.

3. American aviators whom, it is a documented fact, had superior tactical training. In particular the use of a 4-plane 2-element section that was closely coordinated by radio, rather than a 3-element section (Japanese) that tended to come apart in combat.

So any late start to the war probaly sees the USN being superior in training, tactics, a/c technology, and numbers.

---

With what-ifs we have the problem of knowing that the enemy is better.... the US military thought of the japs as a 3rd World country wich could hope to have plane that fly and pilots that could barely land...

So i don´t think that the development of new, much better planes (but please inform me about that developments) had be forced if the americans are not in war with japan and had no combat knowledge about these (in the beginning) total superior pilots in better planes. That the japs had losses of instabile planes is out of question, but for the rest, i think we had that theme long ago and i disagree with you, loke some others. But after some time, i think, the americans will have superior planes and better trained pilots.

On the other hand, late in war (because of the knowledge of jap inferiority) they produced some equal or even superior planes, too (But too late for beeing efficent). So it is a milkmaide calculation.

For me a scenario starting in 1937 sounds intersting, with all these elements of suprise, like a early 39 war decleration by the US or a earlier attack of japs against pearl or or or, with maybe a total withdraw of british ships (because of the european war) or a earlier success in India (??) for the japs. Also this could mean that the germany first strategy would not be chosen, that means no real support for UK, but a huge fleet and material for the pacific theater for the americans...
On the other hand, a NONWAR-China, would sound interesting too. No Fuelstop by USA, and an attack without warnings (a true suprise)

[TIMJOT]

Originally quote by; mdiehl

1. The "disillusionment" of the American public with protracted wars is rather mythical and largely a consequence of the results of Viet Nam. The only salient examples prior to WW2 is the War of the Rebellion. The Federal forces and the northern public endured 1861-mid-1863 a string of rather humiliating and in some cases obviously un-necessary defeats without significant public opposition. Indeed, public sentiment survived pretty much in favor of the war until mid-1864, when the constant-siege and constant-casualty elements of combat began to weight heavily on the northern public's mind in the final Peninsula Campaign. In the South, where things "began well," the serious state of economic deprivation that occurred from early 1863 onward did not have the desired effect of breaking the Confederacy's will to fight. And s string of increasingly frequent battlefied disasters staring in 1863 did not result in the abndonment of the war. Indeed, the Confederate administration fled Richmoind in 1865 with the intention of carrying on the war, even though Lee's army was shattered. It was only the terms of surrender and the agreement among the combatants that led to a decisive and complete end to the war.

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You miss the point. The North and South were fighting for what the overwelming majority of each populations felt was a rightous cause. The North being the "preservation of the Union" and the South "states rights". It has nothing to do with the ferocity or longevity of a war. Like you said Americans have a track record of enduring violent and protracted wars if the cause is considered rightous by the majority.

In Vietnam it wasnt the calsualties it was that people did not understand or believe the reasons they were dying for. You also neglect Korea. It was an unpopular war and there was tremendous pressure to end that war. Eizenhower was elected on a promise to get out of Korea. Somolia and the Philipine insurrection are other examples of unpopular conflicts that puplic pressure force to end prematurely.

[TIMJOT]

Original quote from; mdiel

3. In the 1930's, American public sentiment towards the Chinese was highly favorable, and the Panay Incident darned near started the war very early for Japan. Many American newspapers had an editorial policy that looked away from the Germans but pretty much hammered the Japanese. In short, Japan's reputation in the US public eye was pretty brutal by 1939. A move against "white" people in Singapore, Hong Kong, Australie or the Dutch East Indies would probably have been almost as good at unifying the US populace as the Pearl Harbor attack.

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You got to be kidding. Most Americans didnt even know where Singapore was. Never mind willing to die for it. You said yourself, one of the reasons America was reluctant to go to war in WWI was that it was a seen as a war of colonialism. Why then would American mothers be willing to send their boys to die proping up the last vestiges of the European colonial system? Most Americans were at best ambivalent and at worst outright hostile to colonialism. The Dutch in particular were seen as brutal and explotive masters. This is why the US ending its own hypocritical and embarrasing expirement in colonialism (Philipines) was overwelmingly endorced. Your statement that an attack on the Euro-colonies minus any attack on the US would have the same effect as Pearl Harbor is Ludicrous and unsupportable.

Its true that American opinion was overwelmingly favorable to China. Yet even with a vested economic and emotional interest at stake. America was unwilling to go to war for it. Even after it was directly attacked (Panay) and US service men, citezens and missionarys lost there lives.

[TIMJOT]

Original quote by; mdiehl

Also, by the mid 1930s there was radio. If Japan is not at war with the US in 1941, radio broadcasts and also newsreels from overrun nations would have provided a more stark picture of Japanese intentions and occupation policies than any newspaper editorial.

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Oh yeah, just like the newsreels of the brutal rape of Nanking. The terror bombings of Warsaw, Rotterdam, Coventry and London. The overrunning of neutral contries, Demark, Norway, Belguim, Holland, and Luxomburg brought on a declaration of war. Certainly there would be no dought were the US sympathies would lie. But giving military and economic aid through lend lease and other methods is a far cry from committing to a shooting war, without the provocation of actually being attacked. Can you name any major wars the US got involved in without being attacked in some way first.

[TIMJOT]

Originally posted by mdiehl:
Another point. The super experienced IJN aviators of 1941-1942 fought the highly trained USN aviators of 1941 and 1942 to a nearly dead-even draw in turns of combat a/c lost. By 1943, Kido Butai would have had several additional problems:

1. The overwhelming superiority of US a/c technical capability.

2. American aviators that would have both outnumbered them and, quite likely, had more training.

3. American aviators whom, it is a documented fact, had superior tactical training. In particular the use of a 4-plane 2-element section that was closely coordinated by radio, rather than a 3-element section (Japanese) that tended to come apart in combat.

So any late start to the war probaly sees the USN being superior in training, tactics, a/c technology, and numbers.

---

First of all you are useing hindsite and irrevelant historical timelines to make your point.

The US aviators only adopted the 4/2 method after combat expirence showed that the theories and training were proven unsuitable in combat. In fact the inventor (Thatch USN) of the US version of the "Fingers Four" method was repeatdly denied permission to implement it. Even after reports from Europe and early pacific engagements proved the inferiority of the traditional methods.
Thatch was finally given permission to train an "epiremental" section on the Lexington. Its success at the coral sea finally forced the US military to formally adopted it. Without the real world combat experience its more than probable that the USN and USAAF would have continued to train their aviators in obsolete methods.

Second, the Japanese flight training was much more rigorous and selective the US pre-war training. It was the inability to replace its losses that ultimately degraded the combat training of its pilots.

Third, except the incredible fortunate string of envents that precipitated the Midway victory. From the Coral Sea , right trough the Guadacannel battles the Japanese proved much more adept at launching and coordingating its carrier strikes. Even at Midway the US attack was thoroughly confused and uncoordinated.

Finally without the real world combat expirence. It is irrevelant and incorrect to simply project the historical capabilities of the US forces in 43 under the totally different set of circumstances we are discussing.

[mdiehl]

TIMJOT

I'm not sure how to reply to your msgs. You seem to be a little over involved in making your case. I will try to briefly let you know where I'm coming from, and then let you substantiate whatever you like, or not, if you are incliend to be unmoved.

Regarding aircraft technology.

1. US and Europe a/c technology was dedicated to the principle of increasing thrust, by developing very high HP engines. Japan did not take this path until 1942-43, and the engines that they designed (as showed up in the late-war radials) performed poorly in comparison with their European counterparts. There's alot more to this story... the development in the US of 100 octane fuel and its use by GB. The much greater expense associated with the production of high HP engines. The greater demand for really precise mfr tolerance and so forth... areas in which Japan did not excel because it largely could not afford the costs.

2. Your assumption that the advanced US fighters were designed as a response to combat experiences is in error. Most of the major designs and the requirements issued by the USAAF and USNAF existed prior to the start fo the war for the US. The P38, the P47, the F4U ("Corsair"), even the P80 (Shooting Star) were all in development before the start of the Pacific War. The only USAAF design that was initiated during the war as a response to problems with *enemy* a/c was the P51 (fulfilling the need for an escort with long range and that could "take" the Germans' FW190). The only USN a/c designed as a response to enemy a/c was the F6F ("Hellcat"), a stop-gap response by teh Navy and Grumman to produce a fighter similar to the F4F "Wildcat" that could easily outperform the Japanese A6M series.

Now, the reason why these pre-war designs succeeded so well in particular against the Japanese is a subject for long book. Part of the answer from the Allied side of the equation is the constant drive for higher performance engines, mentioned above.

Another part of the equation is the Germans. I will mention the latter only as an anecdote about the P40 "Warhawk," widely dismissed as an "antiquated plane." The Warhawk was alousy plane to fly against the Germans because the opposition, ME 109E/G series, were faster and slightly more maneuverable, and had a really reliable 20 mm cannon. And against a FW190, teh P40 was just meat. The Warhawk was, however, a fine plane to use against Japan, for the first year anyhow (until the Ki61 came along, which was the P40's equal), because the P40 was 20-40 mph faster than the A6M series, dived better, and rolled faster, and had a tighter turning radius at speeds in excess of roughly 325 mph.

[mdiehl]

TIMJOT

Next comes your commenst about public attitude and perception in the US. This stuff is all hard to measure and definitely not my strong suit. But for what its worth:

US anti-colonialism (which you mentioned) was strong, and one of the principle reasons why Japan and the US were so irritated with each other to begin with. The issue is not whether or not the US would have helped a European colonial power under attack by Japan. Instead the issue is whether the US would have been unmoved if a rapidly rising brutal colonial power would be allowed to continue its growth unchecked, to the point where it would dominate the markets and strategic facilities of southeast Asia.

You underestimate the degree of popular sympathy in the US for China. Beyond that, US public sentiment in favor of Great Britain was extremely strong, and it would not have been in America's strategic interest in any case to let the UK and Commonwealth states be crushed by simultaneous wars with Germany and Japan (who were, as everyone was aware, allies).

US public sentiment about the Japanese did not in particular dismiss Japanese abilities. Sure there was quite a bit of racist propaganda about squinting, talentless primates, but virtually everyone recognized that as propaganda. *No one* was chanting "home in 90 days" as they were during the War of the Rebellion. US WPO envisioned a 2 year fight back across the Pacific, and that was *before* Pearl Harbor.

Finally, there was racism. The only thing likely to piss of an American anticolonialist more than British colonialism was Japanese colonialism. So the US probably would have, for reasons of simply keeping Japan in check, come to the aid of the UK/Australia or Netherlands East Indies in the event of a Japanese move in those areas.

[mdiehl]

re: The P80

Two a/c were operational in Italy by April 1945. One fighter group by the end of the year. My bad on the design specs. They were issued in 1943. The other US jet aicraft in development prior to the P80 apparently never made it past the X-craft stage.

At 967 k/h, its top speed was 604 mph by mid 1946. Faster than the ME 262. By the Korean war it was already obsolete.

[mdiehl]

TIMJOT

One last point. Your assumption that US a/c tactics and section composition evolved primarily in response to the Japanese is incorrect.

The US started to adopt the 4/2 wing/section in late 1940, based on shared strategic analyses of the results of the Battle of Britain. All US pilots used (well, were *trained* to use ... all sections among all combatants had a natural tendency to entropy in combat) this formation prior to the entry of the US into the war.

You may perhaps be thinking of the widespread use of the Navy/USMC F4F pilots of the two-plane weave in mid 1942. This tactic was already in development in 1941 by USN pilots and employed by two carrier groups prior to teh start of the war, as a result of highly realistic combat training excercises. Its principle advocate, J.Thach, developed it in training excercises as a combat maneuver against a thoeretically faster, more maneuverable opponent. At the time he knew nothing about the Japanese A6M/Zero series. He was, in fact, thinking about the Germans (specifically, the ME109), and his principle opposition in these training excercises were USAAF P40s. This particular maneuver was not, however, routinely used by USN carrier fighter groups until August 1942.

[mdiehl]

"Second, the Japanese flight training was much more rigorous and selective the US pre-war training. It was the inability to replace its losses that ultimately degraded the combat training of its pilots."

The reason why Japan was unable to replace its pilots was, in substantial part, because Japanese flight training was unnecessarily rigorous and selective. Kind of like the experiences of the Mercury 7 astronauts: the docs had no real idea what makes a good pilot, so the emphasis was placed on silly things like gymnastic ability. You want to see what a really "unfit" (by Japanese or western standards) pilot could do? Check out some of the Soviet aces that made their ace after both of their legs had been shot off in prior combat.

As to carrier coordination. There is no basis for your claim. IJN tended to launch large strikes, in the early war. So their offensive punch was very good and well-coordinated. Part of their mystique comes, however, from largely not having any counterstrike to worry about (for example at Pearl, at Darwin, and, so they thought, at Midway). More interesting to me is how quickly Japanese coordination fell apart at Midway when it became apparent that there was a US threat. There was no effective command and control over the Japanese CAP, and the plane handling was magnificently bungled.

Midway might be viewed as a fluke. But then, Coral Sea might have gone the other way but for a fortunate rain front that shielded the Japanese CVs on the second day of the battle. So it's probably not much use to dismiss any of the results as particularly flukey.

[Adnan Meshuggi]

Originally posted by mdiehl:
re: The P80

Two a/c were operational in Italy by April 1945. One fighter group by the end of the year. My bad on the design specs. They were issued in 1943. The other US jet aicraft in development prior to the P80 apparently never made it past the X-craft stage.

At 967 k/h, its top speed was 604 mph by mid 1946. Faster than the ME 262. By the Korean war it was already obsolete.

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Well, if i understand you correct, the p80 was the jet that was under developmet in USA and was used as a trainer back there ??? Well then it was the bad plane i mentioned.... my knowledge about it is, that after beginning of war the US learned by the in that area superior brits about their the jet technology...

Hm in 1946 faster then the me262, cool.. for 1946 the german "should" have jets operational with near mach 1, some looked very similar to the mig15, some like the Korean jet (well my mind, i lost the name, was it the p82???) and they had an advantage of 2+ years. Also, they had limitations about the material they used. (war shortage, a word the us never knew...)

Maybe here a story...
in 1941 the germans had a pisten engine, the Jumo222 nearly ready, but it used "war material" and consumed high octane fuel (bad idea). It was a superior engine with (first stage near 2500 HP, late in the war near 3500+ HP) huge power at a low fuel consumption and moderate wight. A thing that could have solved nearly every Luftwaffenproblem.

Also, the Jumo 004 - Engine (the jetengine of the me262) had around 850 kp, they couldn´t make more, because of the material they used. High temperature with low quality materials didn´t work.

One point in german jet development was the low quality fuel... a jet consumed nearly every fuel (in that time) compared with the normal pisten engine of normal german planes...

So i think, aside of the bad meteor (it was a bad plane and saw no combat in ww2 against german planes) the allies had nothing worthy... but they didn´t need jets. If the germans had shown their jets earlier, maybe the usa had pushed their development and maybe they would produce a better jet earlier, who knows.

But another question. The sherman was ****, the t26 could have produced much faster (well even the t26 was in a balanced fight no match against a panther or tiger, but the germans had quite a lot mark IV and a better tank is a better tank) but the industry/generals/politicans let die the poor soldiers for their arrogance... On the one side (looking as a german) this was good, but on the other side, why the hell did the us gov. do that ????? It sounds like they hadn´t use the p51...

maybe someone can answer me that (because i only wonder but never digged in)

[mdiehl]

"Can you name any major wars the US got involved in without being attacked in some way first."

The War of the American Revolution.

Then there are the manufactured or allegedly manufactured wars, where a rather insignificant pretext in reality or in fact was used to whip up support.

The Mexican War (in which a small Mexican incursion in disputed territory along an ill-defined border led to the successful invasion of Mexico).

The Spanish American War. The Maine explosion was trumped up by the press to be perceived as an attack. The war was *highly* popular among the public. This is a particularly suitable point of comparison because the vilification of Spain and the fabricated tales of sorded conduct by Spanish soldiers in Cuba, and the perception that the US would free "oppressed" folks from a brutal Colonial tyrant were all used to good effect to whip up public sentiment. Very similar circumstances to WW2 vis a vis Japan. The US could have used or manufactured any pretext to get a hot war with Japan, any time the Roosevelt admin felt inclinded to do so.

The Viet Nam war.

The "Gulf War."

And as to minor wars:

The post 1865 US Army Plains Indian campaigns.
The Pershing campaigns in Mexico in 1916.
The US/UK invasion of the USSR in, uh, 1920 IIRC.
The Guatemalan War of 1950.
The Grenada invasion of, uh, 1984 was it not?

[mdiehl]

"But another question. The sherman was ****, the t26 could have produced much faster (well even the t26 was in a balanced fight no match against a panther or tiger, but the germans had quite a lot mark IV and a better tank is a better tank) but the industry/generals/politicans let die the poor soldiers for their arrogance... On the one side (looking as a german) this was good, but on the other side, why the hell did the us gov. do that ????? It sounds like they hadn´t use the p51..."

Armor is not my strong suit, but I understand that the problem was a doctrinal one. The US Army though tank busting was the job of "tank destroyers" (hence the M10 and later the M36b) whereas "tanks" (the M4 "sherman") were for breaking through static positions and for infantry support. It seems like a dumb thing in retrospect.

The Sherman had some things going for it, namely:

It was as good as the German Mark III-IV series and it had better armor protection. The sloped glacis of the American M4 gave the German PzIV tankers some problems. The Sherman was also easy to service, and more mechanically reliable. Finally, German Mark Vs and VIs were, thankfully, not plentiful.

[ February 27, 2002: Message edited by: mdiehl ]</p>

[TIMJOT]

Mdiehl

Well I will try to reply to the relevant points.

First I never said US advance aircraft design and production was based on combat experience. I think you might be confusing me with Adanan. I said fighter tactics were developed through combat expirence. I may be confusing the particulars a bit. But you are right that Thatch and another pilot whose name escapes me, were allowed to train two units on an expiremental basis. It was only after proving themselves in combat that it was adopted as you said in Aug 42. Judging by the stonewalling Thatch recieved from the higher ups it is doubtful these tactics would have been adopted without the combat expirence.

Your P-40 statement is incorrect. The P-40 did not hold its own in the early pacific stages. It suffered badly in the PI, DIE, and NG precisely due to poor and incorrect tactics. US pilots initially tried to turn and dogfight with the much nimbler zeros and suffered the consequences. Only the AVG, where Chenault had trained his pilots in the dive and climb tactics. Which maximized the P-40s strengths in dive speed and firepower did the P-40 make a good account of itself early in the war.

Thankyou for reinforceing my point on the correlation of combat expirence and tactics

[TIMJOT]

Originally posted by mdiehl:
TIMJOT

Next comes your commenst about public attitude and perception in the US. This stuff is all hard to measure and definitely not my strong suit. But for what its worth:

US anti-colonialism (which you mentioned) was strong, and one of the principle reasons why Japan and the US were so irritated with each other to begin with. The issue is not whether or not the US would have helped a European colonial power under attack by Japan. Instead the issue is whether the US would have been unmoved if a rapidly rising brutal colonial power would be allowed to continue its growth unchecked, to the point where it would dominate the markets and strategic facilities of southeast Asia.

You underestimate the degree of popular sympathy in the US for China. Beyond that, US public sentiment in favor of Great Britain was extremely strong, and it would not have been in America's strategic interest in any case to let the UK and Commonwealth states be crushed by simultaneous wars with Germany and Japan (who were, as everyone was aware, allies).

US public sentiment about the Japanese did not in particular dismiss Japanese abilities. Sure there was quite a bit of racist propaganda about squinting, talentless primates, but virtually everyone recognized that as propaganda. *No one* was chanting "home in 90 days" as they were during the War of the Rebellion. US WPO envisioned a 2 year fight back across the Pacific, and that was *before* Pearl Harbor.

Finally, there was racism. The only thing likely to piss of an American anticolonialist more than British colonialism was Japanese colonialism. So the US probably would have, for reasons of simply keeping Japan in check, come to the aid of the UK/Australia or Netherlands East Indies in the event of a Japanese move in those areas.

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Mdiehl, actually its not too hard to measure. I can site gallup polls taken in 40/41 that demonstrated that the majority of Americans supporting doing everything "SHORT" of war to assist the chinese and check Japanese expansion. Polls also indicated there was a rather large vocal minority that advocating disengaging from china altogther rather than risk war.

I submit that the vast majority did believe the propaganda. Thats why there was so much shock and disbelief in the aftermath of PH.

While the USN did plan 1 to 2 year advance through the pacific. The majority in the US military never imagined in their wildest dreams that Japan was capable of launching the complicated and simutanuous multiple attacks it pulled off in 41/42.

Finally I did not say the US would just sit by. Certainly it would have greatly increased Lend/lease to include ANZAC and DIE. It probably would have even taken up escorting convoys to Austrailia, as they did in the Atlantic in 1941.

[mdiehl]

"Your P-40 statement is incorrect. The P-40 did not hold its own in the early pacific stages. It suffered badly in the PI, DIE, and NG precisely due to poor and incorrect tactics. US pilots initially tried to turn and dogfight with the much nimbler zeros and suffered the consequences. Only the AVG, where Chenault had trained his pilots in the dive and climb tactics. Which maximized the P-40s strengths in dive speed and firepower did the P-40 make a good account of itself early in the war."

I may have mistaken your post for another. All in good intent. <img src="wink.gif" border="0">

Regarding the PI, NEI and NG. The P40 series performed pretty credibly in New Guinea in many engagements (see "Fire in the Sky" ... by, uh, Eric Bergerud IIRC). The P40 had a couple of other strengths including that it was faster (max speed, level flight) and had a higher roll rate. The problem with the early engagements in NG (through April) was Port Moresby itself. The A/F there were in a very primitive state. Moreover, in the radar shadow of the major mtn range that separated it from the Japanese airbases, the lead time for getting aloft and in a position to use those a/c strengths against the Zekes was pretty short. The result was that the Japanese could attack in circumstances that gave the P40 drivers the choice between duking it out at slow speed in a turning duel (the Zeke's forte) or running away. They *ought* to have run away... at least initially, long enough to gain an altitude and speed advantage. So in a sense I'm not disputing you about learning from combat experience, but there were circumstances that (as in any air to air combat situtation) mitigated against success in early 1942 in New Guinea. Supply was another problem at the time.

The PI is a different circumstance, I hope you might agree, because the logistical rope was completely broken, the USAAFFE were completely outnumbered, and many of their a/c were destroyed in the initial Japanese raids. Not because of poor combat tactics, but because on 8 December many of them were caught on the ground refueling after a protracted CAP patrol initiated by a false warning of an incoming raid. When you're outnumbered 5:1 or more, you're going to eventually get bounced or just ground down. You can call that bad strategy or poor communication or whatever, but it was much less an issue of pilot training than an issue of upper level management.

Very few P40s saw combat in the NEI. IIRC, Langley was sunk ferrying crated P40s because the local colonial AF had so few first line a/c. Fokkers, F2s, and early US twin engined export bombers. I don't recall the models. If you search the web there are a couple of sites that give OOBs for the Netherland East Indies a/f in Dec 1941. Pretty shocking. IIRC there were a few brief engagements in the island barrier. In some of those circumstances the P40s dealt out considerably more punishment than they received and in others they were on the losing side.

A whole lot seems to have depended on initial conditions in combat, and the pilots ability to recognize that the initial conditions were bad, and his willingness or ability to exit stage left under such circumstances. I think this is the area where Allied pilot wisdom and experience improved the most throughout the war. The ever increasing supply of better a/c, better radar, and better logistics increasingly put them in circumstances where they could control the initial conditions. Or they could run away and "reset" the conditions to be more favorable.

Bear in mind that the USAAF was already heavily invested in the analysis of the results of A/A combat in the ETO by the end of 1940. The quality of US pilot training was very very good in 1941 and 1942. As the veterans were rotated into training duties (the forerunner to the USN Top Gun
school was started in 1942), US pilots increasingly came to have the training that made them perform like veterans. Good training can and does compensate for lack of *hot* combat experience.

And there in a nutshell is the problem, incidently, with the old Grigsby Pacific War. A pilot with 1000 hours of experience is not 500 hours "better" than a pilot with 500 hours experience. If the guy with 500 hours experience or even no combat experience is well-enough trained to fly his a/c to its strengths, and if his plane is a better plane than the one flown by the fellow with 1000 hours experience, the rookie is going to tend (statistically) to win.

As to "Everything short of war" uh, yeah, I agree. But increased lend-lease, increased fortification and buildup in the PI, increased A/F development would, I suspect, have led to a very rapid conflict. I suppose in a perfect world the Japanese might have prevented all units from ever attacking any American units, even though the US would have probably violated every "rule of war" regarding the conduct of neutrals (as we did in the Atlantic), but I don't believe it. Can you imagine how ticked the Japanese would have been if the US had declared a "mid-Pacific line" or an "Australian line" along which British or Australian merchantment would be guarded by the Pacific Fleet, as we did in the Atlantic? Can you imagine their reactino to a 20 mile neutrality zone aroyund the PI? Or "Dutch Lend Lease" with the US occupying the southern Indonisian barrier islands like Timor, Celebes or even Balikpapan?

[ February 27, 2002: Message edited by: mdiehl ]</p>

[TIMJOT]

Originally posted by; Mdiehl

As to carrier coordination. There is no basis for your claim. IJN tended to launch large strikes, in the early war. So their offensive punch was very good and well-coordinated. Part of their mystique comes, however, from largely not having any counterstrike to worry about (for example at Pearl, at Darwin, and, so they thought, at Midway). More interesting to me is how quickly Japanese coordination fell apart at Midway when it became apparent that there was a US threat. There was no effective command and control over the Japanese CAP, and the plane handling was magnificently bungled.

---

The Japanese carrier strikes launched at the Coral sea, Midway and the Carrier battles around Guadacanel. Were excecuted with the TBs, DBs and Ftrs attacking in coordination. While more often than the not the USN strikes frequently were dispersed and uncoordinated. It worked in there favor at Midway, but that was luck not by design. It wasnt until later in war the US through expireince and trial and error became proficient in coordinating there strikes.

[Rumpelmauser]

I would be happy about an option to get an option to use the shipbuild points and build ships of your choice.Maybe every month or every three months you are able to expend them to order ships.Shipbuilding could be delayed,or in the opposite faster.Ressource shortage and modern building technics can influence the effort.Japan ordered an carrier fleet almost so large as the US Carrier fleet.Katsuragi,Amagi and Unryu were only the first.Fifteen or so more Carriers of this class were ordered but their build were delayed as Us subs already take their toll on the Japanese shipping and ressources were needed anywere.I think in a Pacific War game on grand scale ressources are really critical,as they can be converted to produce war material or are able stimulate the industry.Surly would be every programmer get mad to simulate the reserves and productions of cooper,tin,steel,oil etc,but I would like to have more control about it <img src="smile.gif" border="0"> .

[mdiehl]

"The Japanese carrier strikes launched at the Coral sea, Midway and the Carrier battles around Guadacanel. Were excecuted with the TBs, DBs and Ftrs attacking in coordination. While more often than the not the USN strikes frequently were dispersed and uncoordinated. It worked in there favor at Midway, but that was luck not by design. It wasnt until later in war the US through expireince and trial and error became proficient in coordinating there strikes."

Again, a matter of doctrine. The US strikes at Midway and Coral sea were strung out because the US was committed in general to the notion that he that strikes first strikes hardest. Can we say that this was much better or worse than the Japanese doctrine? Consider that Lexington may have been a damage control casualty. Otherwise it may have survived the fight. Or that either of the Japanese fleet carriers damaged at Coral Sea might have taken a bomb hit that sank them rather than damaged them. That's the problem with one-offs. Change the formula just a little and the whole anecdote changes.

As to Midway. The disarray of the US strikes was a deliberate choice. The goal was explicitly to catch the Japanese planes refueling and the strikes were timed, brillinatly, to accomplish exactly that effect. The decision to form up or send the bombers ahead was weighed, and the bombers were sent first. The price was that the TBDs got chewed. Was it an inferior doctrine? Who can say but to judge by the results. At the end of the engagement the IJN lost 4 CVs, a CB (or whatever you want to call Mikuma... certainly a "very heavy" CA), and a support vessel that was improbably torpedoed by, of all things, a PBY. The USN as all know lost Yorktown.

[ February 27, 2002: Message edited by: mdiehl ]</p>

[TIMJOT]

Originally posted by mdiehl:
"Can you name any major wars the US got involved in without being attacked in some way first."

The War of the American Revolution.

Then there are the manufactured or allegedly manufactured wars, where a rather insignificant pretext in reality or in fact was used to whip up support.

The Mexican War (in which a small Mexican incursion in disputed territory along an ill-defined border led to the successful invasion of Mexico).

The Spanish American War. The Maine explosion was trumped up by the press to be perceived as an attack. The war was *highly* popular among the public. This is a particularly suitable point of comparison because the vilification of Spain and the fabricated tales of sorded conduct by Spanish soldiers in Cuba, and the perception that the US would free "oppressed" folks from a brutal Colonial tyrant were all used to good effect to whip up public sentiment. Very similar circumstances to WW2 vis a vis Japan. The US could have used or manufactured any pretext to get a hot war with Japan, any time the Roosevelt admin felt inclinded to do so.

The Viet Nam war.

The "Gulf War."

And as to minor wars:

The post 1865 US Army Plains Indian campaigns.
The Pershing campaigns in Mexico in 1916.
The US/UK invasion of the USSR in, uh, 1920 IIRC.
The Guatemalan War of 1950.
The Grenada invasion of, uh, 1984 was it not?

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First I said "MAJOR" war, but anyway lets take a look at your examples.

1.War of Independence;

British fired the first shot attacking the militia at Lexington and Concorde. Then followed up with the Attack on Bunker Hill

2.Mexican War;

Well you got me here. There was a small manufactored "incident" on the Rio Grande. And there was the "popular" and precieved rightous cause of "manifest Destiny". Besides 19th century perception of war was significantly different than 20th centuries.

3.Spanish American War;

Majority of Americans believed we were attacked "The sinking of the Maine"

4.Vietnam

"Gulf of Tonkin" May or may not have been manufactured, however majority of Amercans still believed there leaders at that time

5.Gulf War

No attack, but we did have agreements agreements with both Kuwait and Saudi Arabia.

6.Minor wars?

Again I said "MAJOR" and none of the following were declared wars but anyway
a.Indian wars; Domestic and not applicable
b.Perhings Campaign; Poncho Villa's attacks on
on US border towns.
c.USSR intevention; Not a war and majority of
Americans unaware it at the time.
d.Guatamala; Banna Wars dont count, again
undeclared and public unaware.


Mdiehl, any war with Japan was not going to be a minor incident. It would be a major and total war that would need the wholehearted support of the people to be successful. I think your examples strenghen my arguements not weaken them.

Of course there is some evidence that FDR would have tried to manufature an incident. Sending the USN Yacht into harmsway is suspicious to say the least